an enquiry concerning human understanding-第15部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


ideas　is　not　a　whit　more　comprehensible：　So　that；　upon　the
whole；　there　appears　not；　throughout　all　nature；　any　one
instance　of　connexion　which　is　conceivable　by　us。　All　events
seem　entirely　loose　and　separate。　One　event　follows　another；
but　we　never　can　observe　any　tie　between　them。　They　seem
；　but　never　。　And　as　we　can　have　no
idea　of　any　thing　which　never　appeared　to　our　outward　sense
or　inward　sentiment；　the　necessary　conclusion　seems　to　be
that　we　have　no　idea　of　connexion　or　power　at　all；　and　that
these　words　are　absolutely；　without　any　meaning；　when
employed　either　in　philosophical　reasonings　or　common　life。

　　　　　But　there　still　remains　one　method　of　avoiding　this
conclusion；　and　one　source　which　we　have　not　yet　examined。
When　any　natural　object　or　event　is　presented；　it　is
impossible　for　us；　by　any　sagacity　or　penetration；　to
discover；　or　even　conjecture；　without　experience；　what　event
will　result　from　it；　or　to　carry　our　foresight　beyond　that
object　which　is　immediately　present　to　the　memory　and
senses。　Even　after　one　instance　or　experiment　where　we　have
observed　a　particular　event　to　follow　upon　another；　we　are
not　entitled　to　form　a　general　rule；　or　foretell　what　will
happen　in　like　cases；　it　being　justly　esteemed　an
unpardonable　temerity　to　judge　of　the　whole　course　of　nature
from　one　single　experiment；　however　accurate　or　certain。　But
when　one　particular　species　of　event　has　always；　in　all
instances；　been　conjoined　with　another；　we　make　no　longer
any　scruple　of　foretelling　one　upon　the　appearance　of　the
other；　and　of　employing　that　reasoning；　which　can　alone
assure　us　of　any　matter　of　fact　or　existence。　We　then　call
the　one　object；　；　the　other；　。　We　suppose
that　there　is　some　connexion　between　them；　some　power　in　the
one；　by　which　it　infallibly　produces　the　other；　and　operates
with　the　greatest　certainty　and　strongest　necessity。

　　　　　It　appears；　then；　that　this　idea　of　a　necessary
connexion　among　events　arises　from　a　number　of　similar
instances　which　occur　of　the　constant　conjunction　of　these
events；　nor　can　that　idea　ever　be　suggested　by　any　one　of
these　instances；　surveyed　in　all　possible　lights　and
positions。　But　there　is　nothing　in　a　number　of　instances；
different　from　every　single　instance；　which　is　supposed　to
be　exactly　similar；　except　only；　that　after　a　repetition　of
similar　instances；　the　mind　is　carried　by　habit；　upon　the
appearance　of　one　event；　to　expect　its　usual　attendant；　and
to　believe　that　it　will　exist。　This　connexion；　therefore；
which　we　　in　the　mind；　this　customary　transition　of
the　imagination　from　one　object　to　its　usual　attendant；　is
the　sentiment　or　impression　from　which　we　form　the　idea　of
power　or　necessary　connexion。　Nothing　farther　is　in　the
case。　Contemplate　the　subject　on　all　sides；　you　will　never
find　any　other　origin　of　that　idea。　This　is　the　sole
difference　between　one　instance；　from　which　we　can　never
receive　the　idea　of　connexion；　and　a　number　of　similar
instances；　by　which　it　is　suggested。　The　first　time　a　man
saw　the　communication　of　motion　by　impulse；　as　by　the　shock
of　two　billiard…balls；　he　could　not　pronounce　that　the　one
event　was　：　But　only　that　it　was　　with
the　other。　After　he　has　observed　several　instances　of　this
nature；　he　then　pronounces　them　to　be　。　What
alteration　has　happened　to　give　rise　to　this　new　idea　of
？　Nothing　but　that　he　now　　these　events　to
be　　in　his　imagination；　and　can　readily　foretell
the　existence　of　one　from　the　appearance　of　the　other。　When
we　say；　therefore；　that　one　object　is　connected　with
another；　we　mean　only　that　they　have　acquired　a　connexion　in
our　thought；　and　give　rise　to　this　inference；　by　which　they
become　proofs　of　each　other's　existence：　A　conclusion　which
is　somewhat　extraordinary；　but　which　seems　founded　on
sufficient　evidence。　Nor　will　its　evidence　be　weakened　by
any　general　diffidence　of　the　understanding；　or　sceptical
suspicion　concerning　every　conclusion　which　is　new　and
extraordinary。　No　conclusions　can　be　more　agreeable　to
scepticism　than　such　as　make　discoveries　concerning　the
weakness　and　narrow　limits　of　human　reason　and　capacity。

　　　　　And　what　stronger　instance　can　be　produced　of　the
surprising　ignorance　and　weakness　of　the　understanding　than
the　present。　For　surely；　if　there　be　any　relation　among
objects　which　it　imports　to　us　to　know　perfectly；　it　is　that
of　cause　and　effect。　On　this　are　founded　all　our　reasonings
concerning　matter　of　fact　or　existence。　By　means　of　it　alone
we　attain　any　assurance　concerning　objects　which　are　removed
from　the　present　testimony　of　our　memory　and　senses。　The
only　immediate　utility　of　all　sciences；　is　to　teach　us；　how
to　control　and　regulate　future　events　by　their　causes。　Our
thoughts　and　enquiries　are；　therefore；　every　moment；
employed　about　this　relation：　Yet　so　imperfect　are　the　ideas
which　we　form　concerning　it；　that　it　is　impossible　to　give
any　just　definition　of　cause；　except　what　is　drawn　from
something　extraneous　and　foreign　to　it。　Similar　objects　are
always　conjoined　with　similar。　Of　this　we　have　experience。
Suitably　to　this　experience；　therefore；　we　may　define　a
cause　to　be　。　Or　in　other　words　。
The　appearance　of　a　cause　always　conveys　the　mind；　by　a
customary　transition；　to　the　idea　of　the　effect。　Of　this
also　we　have　experience。　We　may；　therefore；　suitably　to　this
experience；　form　another　definition　of　cause；　and　call　it；
。　But　though　both　these
definitions　be　drawn　from　circumstances　foreign　to　the
cause；　we　cannot　remedy　this　inconvenience；　or　attain　any
more　perfect　definition；　which　may　point　out　that
circumstances　in　the　cause；　which　gives　it　a　connexion　with
its　effect。　We　have　no　idea　of　this　connexion；　nor　even　any
distant　notion　what　it　is　we　desire　to　know；　when　we
endeavour　at　a　conception　of　it。　We　say；　for　instance；　that
the　vibration　of　this　string　is　the　cause　of　this　particular
sound。　But　what　do　we　mean　by　that　affirmation？　We　either
mean　。　We　may
consider　the　relation　of　cause　and　effect　in　either　of　these
two　lights；　but　beyond　these；　we　have　no　idea　of　it。＇21＇

　　　　　To　recapitulate；　therefore；　the　reasonings　of　this
section：　Every　idea　is　copied　from　some　preceding　impression
or　sentiment；　and　where　we　cannot　find　any　impression；　we
may　be　certain　that　there　is　no　idea。　In　all　single
instances　of　the　operation　of　bodies　or　minds；　there　is
nothing　that　produces　any　impression；　nor　consequently　can
suggest　any　idea　of　power　or　necessary　connexion。　But　when
many　uniform　instances　appear；　and　the　same　object　is　always
followed　by　the　same　event；　we　then　begin　to　entertain　the
notion　of　cause　and　connexion。　We　then　　a　new
sentiment　or　impression；　to　wit；　a　customary　connexion　in
the　thought　or　imagination　between　one　object　and　its　usual
attendant；　and　this　sentiment　is　the　original　of　that　idea
which　we　seek　for。　For　as　this　idea　arises　from　a　number　of
similar　instances；　and　not　from　any　single　instance；　it　must
arise　from　that　circumstance；　in　which　the　number　of
instances　differ　from　every　individual　instance。　But　this
customary　connexion　or　transition　of　the　imagination　is　the
only　circumstance　in　which　they　differ。　In　every　other
particular　they　are　alike。　The　first　instance　which　we　saw
of　motion　communicated　by　the　shock　of　two　billiard　balls
（to　return　to　this　obvious　illustration）　is　exactly　similar
to　any　instance　that　may；　at　present；　occur　to　us；　except
only；　that　we　could　not；　at　first；　　one　event　from
the　other；　which　we　are　enabled　to　do　at　present；　after　so
long　a　course　of　uniform　experience。　I　know　not　whether　the
reader　will　readily　apprehend　this　reasoning。　I　am　afraid
that；　should　I　multiply　words　about　it；　or　throw　it　into　a
greater　variety　of　lights；　it　would　only　become　more　obscure
and　intricate。　In　all　abstract　reasonings　there　is　one　point
of　view　which；　if　we　can　happily　hit；　we　shall　go　farther
towards　illustrating　the　subject　than　by　all　the　eloquence
and　copious　expression　in　the　world。　This　point　of　view　we
should　endeavour　to　reach；　and　reserve　the　flowers　of
rhetoric　for　subjects　which　are　more　adapted　to　them。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　VIII。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　Liberty　and　Necessity。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　I。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　I/T　might　reasonably　be　expected　in　questions　which
have　been　canvassed　and　disputed　with　great　eagerness；　since
the　first　origin　of　science；　and　philosophy；　that　the
meaning　of　all　the　terms；　at　least；　should　have　been　agreed
upon　among　the　disputants；　and　our　enquiries；　in　the　course
of　two　thousand　years；　been　able　to　pass　from　words　to　the
true　and　real　subject　of　the　controversy。　For　how　easy　may
it　seem　to　give　exact　definitions　of　the　terms　employed　in
reasoning；　and　make　these　definitions；　not　the　mere　sound　of
words；　the　object　of　future　scrutiny　and　examination？　But　if
we　consider　the　matter　more　narrowly；　we　shall　be　apt　to
draw　a　quite　opposite　conclusion。　From　this　circumstance
alone；　that　a　controversy　has　been　long　kept　on　foot；　and
remains　still　undecided；　we　may　presume　that　there　is　some
ambiguity　in　the　expression；　and　that　the　disputants　affix
different　ideas　to　the　terms　employed　in　the　controversy。
For　as　the　faculties　of　the　mind　are　supposed　to　be
naturally　alike　in　every　individual；　otherwise　nothing　could
be　more　fruitless　than　to　reason　or　dispute　together；　it
were　impossible；　if