history of the impeachment of andrew johnson-及48何蛍
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�察�the expulsion was on the report of a committee declaring him guilty of a high misdemeanor。 At least one Senator has been expelled on simple formal motion。 Others have been expelled without any formal allegations or formal proofs。 * * * The Constitution provides that ;Each House shall determine its rules of proceeding。; The Senate on the expulsion of its own members has already done。 this practically and set an example of simplicity。 But it has the same power over its rules of proceeding; on the expulsion of the President�察�and there can be no reason for simplicity in the one case not equally applicable in the other。 Technicality is as little consonant with the one as with the other。 Each has for its object the PUBLIC SAFETY。 For this a Senator is expelled�察�for this�察�also�察�the President is expelled。 Salus Populi Suprema Lex。 The proceedings in each case must be in subordination to this rule。;
Thus�察�Mr。 Sumner would have removed the President by an ordinary concurrent resolution of Congress。
The purpose of all this was apparentthat the President was in effect�察�to be tried and judged before a Court of Public Opinion�察�and not before the Senate sitting as a High Court of Impeachment�察�but BY the Senate sitting in its legislative capacityto create the impression in the minds of Senators that in this high judicial procedure they were still acting as a legislative bodysimply as Senators�察�and not in a judicial capacity�察�as judges and jurors�察�and therefore not bound specifically by their oaths as such�察�to convict only for crime denounced by the law�察�or for manifest high political misdemeanors�察�but could take cognizance of and convict on alleged partisan offenses and allegations based on differences of opinion and partisan prejudices and partisan predilectionsthat it was not essential that the judgment of Senators should be confined to the specific allegations of the indictment�察�but that the whole range of alleged political and partisan misdemeanors and delinquencies could be taken into account in seeking a pretext for Mr。 Johnson's conviction。
The superiority of the Legislative branch was thus openly。 advocated and insisted�察�and uncontroverted by any Republican supporting the impeachment。 Mr。 Johnson�察�according to these oft repeated declarations�察�was to be tried and convicted�察�not necessarily for any specific violation of law�察�or of the Constitution�察�but by prevailing public opinionpublic clamor´in a word�察�on administrative differences subsisting between the President and the leaders of the dominant party in and out of Congress�察�and that public opinion�察�as concurrent developments fully establish�察�was industriously manufactured throughout the North�察�on the demand of leaders of the impeachment movement in the House�察�through the instrumentality of a partisan press and partisan public meetings�察�and in turn reflected back upon the Senate�察�in the form of resolutions denunciatory of the President and demanding his impeachment and removal。
That was in fact�察�and in a large sense�察�the incentive to the impeachment movement�察�and it wasnot confined to a faction�察�but characterized the dominant portion of the political party then in the ascendancy in and out of Congress。
In this state of facts lay largely the vice of the impeachment movement�察�and it illustrated to a startling degree the danger in the departure from established forms of judicial procedure in such cases。
It became apparent�察�long before the close�察�that it was but little if anything more than a partisan prosecutionand that fact became more generally and firmly fixed�察�from day to day�察�as the trial approached conclusion。
In that state of facts�察�again�察�and in that sense�察�the impeachment of the President�察�was an assault upon the principle of coordination that underlies our political system and thus a menace to our established political forms�察�as�察�if successful�察�it would�察�logically�察�have been the practical destruction of the Executive Departmentand�察�in view of previous legislation out of which the impeachment movement had to a degree arisen�察�and of declarations in the House and Senate quoted in this connection�察�the final and logical result of conviction would have been the absorption of the Executive functions of the Government by the Legislative Department�察�and the consequent declension of that Department to a mere bureau for the registration of the decrees of the Legislature。
Conscious of the natural tendency to infringement by a given Department of the Government upon the functions of its coordinates�察�the framers of the Constitution wisely defined the respective spheres of the several departments�察�and those definitions constitute unmistakable admonition to each as to trespass by either upon the political territory of its coordinates。
As John C。 Calhoun wrote�察�in the early days of the Republic��
;The Constitution has not only made a general delegation of the legislative power to one branch of the Government�察�of the executive to another�察�and of the judicial to the third�察�but it has specifically defined the general powers and duties of each of those departments。 This is essential to peace and safety in any Government�察�and especially in one clothed only with specific power for national purposes and erected in the midst of numerous State Governments retaining exclusive control of their local concerns。* * * Were there no power to interpret�察�pronounce and execute the law�察�the Government would perish through its own imbecility�察�as was the case with the Articles of Confederation�察�or other powers must be assumed by the legislative body�察�to the destruction of liberty。; Again�察�as was eloquently and forcefully said by Daniel Webster in the U。 S。 Senate in 1834��
;The first object of a free people is the preservation of their liberty�察�and liberty is only to be preserved by maintaining constitutional restraints and just division of political power。 Nothing is more deceptive or more dangerous than the pretense of a desire to simplify government。 The simplest governments are despotisms�察�the next simplest�察�limited monarchies�察�but all republics�察�all governments of law�察�must impose numerous limitations and qualifications of authority and give many positive and many qualified rights。 In other words�察�they must be subject to rule and regulation。 This is the very essence of free political institutions。 The spirit of liberty is�察�indeed�察�a bold and fearless spirit�察�but it is also a sharp´sighted spirit�此�it is a cautious�察�sagacious�察�discriminating�察�far´seeing intelligence�察�it is jealous of encroachment�察�jealous of power�察�jealous of man。 It demands checks�察�it seeks for guards�察�it insists on securities�察�it entrenches itself behind strong defenses�察�and fortifies itself with all possible care against the assaults of ambition and passion。 It does not trust the amiable weaknesses of human nature�察�and�察�therefore�察�it will not permit power to overstep its prescribed limits�察�though benevolence�察�good intent�察�and patriotic purpose come along with it。 Neither does it satisfy itself with flashy and temporary resistance to illegal authority。 Far otherwise。 It seeks for duration and permanence�察�it looks before and after�察�and�察�building on the experience of ages which are past�察�it labors diligently for the benefit of ages to come。 This is the nature of constitutional liberty�察�and this is our liberty�察�if we will rightly understand and preserve it。 Every free government is necessarily complicated�察�because all such governments establish restraints�察�as well on the power of government itself as on that of individuals。 If we will abolish the distinction of branches�察�and have but one branch�察�if we will abolish jury trials�察�and leave all to the judge�察�if we will then ordain that the legislator shall himself be that judge�察�and if we will place the executive power in the same hands�察�we may readily simplify government。 We may easily bring it to the simplest of all possible forms�察�a pure despotism。 But a separation of departments�察�so far as practicable�察�and the preservation of clear lines of division between them�察�is the fundamental idea in the creation of all our constitutions�察�and�察�doubtless�察�the continuance of regulated liberty depends on maintaining these boundaries。;
Each department is supreme within its own constitutionally prescribed limits�察�and the Supreme Court is made the umpire for the definition of the limits and the protection of the rights of all。 Neither Congress�察�nor the Executive�察�are authorized to determine the constitutionality and therefore the validity of their acts�察�or the limits of their jurisdiction under the Constitution�察�but the Supreme Court is so authorized�察�and it is the umpire before which all differences in that regard must be determined。 It is the tribunal of last resort�察�save the people themselves�察�before whom both Senate and House�察�and the Executive�察�must bow�察�and its decision is final in the interpretation of the Constitution。
A due regard�察�therefore�察�for the interpretation of law and the division of powers thus established�察�constitutes the great safeguard upon which the harmonious and successful operation of our political system depends。 On its religious observance rests�察�primarily�察�the preservation of our free institutions and the perpetuation of our peculiar system of popular government。 That quality of co´ordinationof the equality of the several Departments as adjusted by the Organic Actconstitutes the balance wheel of our political system。
The logical effect of the doctrines promulgated by the House of Representatives in that regard�察�and re´echoed on the floor of the Senate�察�in the press and on the stump throughout the North�察�were therefore not only revolutionary�察�but destructive。 To have removed the President upon accusations in reality based upon partisan and personalnot amounting even to substantial political differenceswould have been the establishment of a precedent of the most dangerous character。
In a large sense�察�the American system of politics and of government was on trial�察�quite as much as was Andrew Johnson。 The extreme element of American politics was in absolute control in the House of Representatives�察�and practically so�察�in the Senate。 The impeachment and removal of the President on unsubstantiated�察�or even remotely doubtful charges�察�simply�此�because of a disagreeme