euthydemus-第6部分

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He　assented。

And　should　we　be　happy　by　reason　of　the　presence　of　good　things；　if　they　profited　us　not；　or　if　they　profited　us？

If　they　profited　us；　he　said。

And　would　they　profit　us；　if　we　only　had　them　and　did　not　use　them？　　For　example；　if　we　had　a　great　deal　of　food　and　did　not　eat；　or　a　great　deal　of　drink　and　did　not　drink；　should　we　be　profited？

Certainly　not；　he　said。

Or　would　an　artisan；　who　had　all　the　implements　necessary　for　his　work；　and　did　not　use　them；　be　any　the　better　for　the　possession　of　them？　　For　example；　would　a　carpenter　be　any　the　better　for　having　all　his　tools　and　plenty　of　wood；　if　he　never　worked？

Certainly　not；　he　said。

And　if　a　person　had　wealth　and　all　the　goods　of　which　we　were　just　now　speaking；　and　did　not　use　them；　would　he　be　happy　because　he　possessed　them？

No　indeed；　Socrates。

Then；　I　said；　a　man　who　would　be　happy　must　not　only　have　the　good　things；　but　he　must　also　use　them；　there　is　no　advantage　in　merely　having　them？

True。

Well；　Cleinias；　but　if　you　have　the　use　as　well　as　the　possession　of　good　things；　is　that　sufficient　to　confer　happiness？

Yes；　in　my　opinion。

And　may　a　person　use　them　either　rightly　or　wrongly？

He　must　use　them　rightly。

That　is　quite　true；　I　said。　　And　the　wrong　use　of　a　thing　is　far　worse　than　the　non…use；　for　the　one　is　an　evil；　and　the　other　is　neither　a　good　nor　an　evil。　　You　admit　that？

He　assented。

Now　in　the　working　and　use　of　wood；　is　not　that　which　gives　the　right　use　simply　the　knowledge　of　the　carpenter？

Nothing　else；　he　said。

And　surely；　in　the　manufacture　of　vessels；　knowledge　is　that　which　gives　the　right　way　of　making　them？

He　agreed。

And　in　the　use　of　the　goods　of　which　we　spoke　at　firstwealth　and　health　and　beauty；　is　not　knowledge　that　which　directs　us　to　the　right　use　of　them；　and　regulates　our　practice　about　them？

He　assented。

Then　in　every　possession　and　every　use　of　a　thing；　knowledge　is　that　which　gives　a　man　not　only　good…fortune　but　success？

He　again　assented。

And　tell　me；　I　said；　O　tell　me；　what　do　possessions　profit　a　man；　if　he　have　neither　good　sense　nor　wisdom？　　Would　a　man　be　better　off；　having　and　doing　many　things　without　wisdom；　or　a　few　things　with　wisdom？　　Look　at　the　matter　thus：　　If　he　did　fewer　things　would　he　not　make　fewer　mistakes？　if　he　made　fewer　mistakes　would　he　not　have　fewer　misfortunes？　and　if　he　had　fewer　misfortunes　would　he　not　be　less　miserable？

Certainly；　he　said。

And　who　would　do　leasta　poor　man　or　a　rich　man？

A　poor　man。

A　weak　man　or　a　strong　man？

A　weak　man。

A　noble　man　or　a　mean　man？

A　mean　man。

And　a　coward　would　do　less　than　a　courageous　and　temperate　man？

Yes。

And　an　indolent　man　less　than　an　active　man？

He　assented。

And　a　slow　man　less　than　a　quick；　and　one　who　had　dull　perceptions　of　seeing　and　hearing　less　than　one　who　had　keen　ones？

All　this　was　mutually　allowed　by　us。

Then；　I　said；　Cleinias；　the　sum　of　the　matter　appears　to　be　that　the　goods　of　which　we　spoke　before　are　not　to　be　regarded　as　goods　in　themselves；　but　the　degree　of　good　and　evil　in　them　depends　on　whether　they　are　or　are　not　under　the　guidance　of　knowledge：　　under　the　guidance　of　ignorance；　they　are　greater　evils　than　their　opposites；　inasmuch　as　they　are　more　able　to　minister　to　the　evil　principle　which　rules　them；　and　when　under　the　guidance　of　wisdom　and　prudence；　they　are　greater　goods：　　but　in　themselves　they　are　nothing？

That；　he　replied；　is　obvious。

What　then　is　the　result　of　what　has　been　said？　　Is　not　this　the　result　that　other　things　are　indifferent；　and　that　wisdom　is　the　only　good；　and　ignorance　the　only　evil？

He　assented。

Let　us　consider　a　further　point；　I　said：　　Seeing　that　all　men　desire　happiness；　and　happiness；　as　has　been　shown；　is　gained　by　a　use；　and　a　right　use；　of　the　things　of　life；　and　the　right　use　of　them；　and　good…　fortune　in　the　use　of　them；　is　given　by　knowledge；the　inference　is　that　everybody　ought　by　all　means　to　try　and　make　himself　as　wise　as　he　can？

Yes；　he　said。

And　when　a　man　thinks　that　he　ought　to　obtain　this　treasure；　far　more　than　money；　from　a　father　or　a　guardian　or　a　friend　or　a　suitor；　whether　citizen　or　strangerthe　eager　desire　and　prayer　to　them　that　they　would　impart　wisdom　to　you；　is　not　at　all　dishonourable；　Cleinias；　nor　is　any　one　to　be　blamed　for　doing　any　honourable　service　or　ministration　to　any　man；　whether　a　lover　or　not；　if　his　aim　is　to　get　wisdom。　　Do　you　agree？　I　said。

Yes；　he　said；　I　quite　agree；　and　think　that　you　are　right。

Yes；　I　said；　Cleinias；　if　only　wisdom　can　be　taught；　and　does　not　come　to　man　spontaneously；　for　this　is　a　point　which　has　still　to　be　considered；　and　is　not　yet　agreed　upon　by　you　and　me

But　I　think；　Socrates；　that　wisdom　can　be　taught；　he　said。

Best　of　men；　I　said；　I　am　delighted　to　hear　you　say　so；　and　I　am　also　grateful　to　you　for　having　saved　me　from　a　long　and　tiresome　investigation　as　to　whether　wisdom　can　be　taught　or　not。　　But　now；　as　you　think　that　wisdom　can　be　taught；　and　that　wisdom　only　can　make　a　man　happy　and　fortunate；　will　you　not　acknowledge　that　all　of　us　ought　to　love　wisdom；　and　you　individually　will　try　to　love　her？

Certainly；　Socrates；　he　said；　I　will　do　my　best。

I　was　pleased　at　hearing　this；　and　I　turned　to　Dionysodorus　and　Euthydemus　and　said：　　That　is　an　example；　clumsy　and　tedious　I　admit；　of　the　sort　of　exhortations　which　I　would　have　you　give；　and　I　hope　that　one　of　you　will　set　forth　what　I　have　been　saying　in　a　more　artistic　style：　　or　at　least　take　up　the　enquiry　where　I　left　off；　and　proceed　to　show　the　youth　whether　he　should　have　all　knowledge；　or　whether　there　is　one　sort　of　knowledge　only　which　will　make　him　good　and　happy；　and　what　that　is。　　For；　as　I　was　saying　at　first；　the　improvement　of　this　young　man　in　virtue　and　wisdom　is　a　matter　which　we　have　very　much　at　heart。

Thus　I　spoke；　Crito；　and　was　all　attention　to　what　was　coming。　　I　wanted　to　see　how　they　would　approach　the　question；　and　where　they　would　start　in　their　exhortation　to　the　young　man　that　he　should　practise　wisdom　and　virtue。　　Dionysodorus；　who　was　the　elder；　spoke　first。　　Everybody's　eyes　were　directed　towards　him；　perceiving　that　something　wonderful　might　shortly　be　expected。　　And　certainly　they　were　not　far　wrong；　for　the　man；　Crito；　began　a　remarkable　discourse　well　worth　hearing；　and　wonderfully　persuasive　regarded　as　an　exhortation　to　virtue。

Tell　me；　he　said；　Socrates　and　the　rest　of　you　who　say　that　you　want　this　young　man　to　become　wise；　are　you　in　jest　or　in　real　earnest？

I　was　led　by　this　to　imagine　that　they　fancied　us　to　have　been　jesting　when　we　asked　them　to　converse　with　the　youth；　and　that　this　made　them　jest　and　play；　and　being　under　this　impression；　I　was　the　more　decided　in　saying　that　we　were　in　profound　earnest。　　Dionysodorus　said：

Reflect；　Socrates；　you　may　have　to　deny　your　words。

I　have　reflected；　I　said；　and　I　shall　never　deny　my　words。

Well；　said　he；　and　so　you　say　that　you　wish　Cleinias　to　become　wise？

Undoubtedly。

And　he　is　not　wise　as　yet？

At　least　his　modesty　will　not　allow　him　to　say　that　he　is。

You　wish　him；　he　said；　to　become　wise　and　not；　to　be　ignorant？

That　we　do。

You　wish　him　to　be　what　he　is　not；　and　no　longer　to　be　what　he　is？

I　was　thrown　into　consternation　at　this。

Taking　advantage　of　my　consternation　he　added：　　You　wish　him　no　longer　to　be　what　he　is；　which　can　only　mean　that　you　wish　him　to　perish。　　Pretty　lovers　and　friends　they　must　be　who　want　their　favourite　not　to　be；　or　to　perish！

When　Ctesippus　heard　this　he　got　very　angry　（as　a　lover　well　might）　and　said：　　Stranger　of　Thuriiif　politeness　would　allow　me　I　should　say；　A　plague　upon　you！　　What　can　make　you　tell　such　a　lie　about　me　and　the　others；　which　I　hardly　like　to　repeat；　as　that　I　wish　Cleinias　to　perish？

Euthydemus　replied：　　And　do　you　think；　Ctesippus；　that　it　is　possible　to　tell　a　lie？

Yes；　said　Ctesippus；　I　should　be　mad　to　say　anything　else。

And　in　telling　a　lie；　do　you　tell　the　thing　of　which　you　speak　or　not？

You　tell　the　thing　of　which　you　speak。

And　he　who　tells；　tells　that　thing　which　he　tells；　and　no　other？

Yes；　said　Ctesippus。

And　that　is　a　distinct　thing　apart　from　other　things？

Certainly。

And　he　who　says　that　thing　says　that　which　is？

Yes。

And　he　who　says　that　which　is；　says　the　truth。　　And　therefore　Dionysodorus；　if　he　says　that　which　is；　says　the　truth　of　you　and　no　lie。

Yes；　Euthydemus；　said　Ctesippus；　but　in　saying　this；　he　says　what　is　not。

Euthydemus　answered：　　And　that　which　is　not　is　not？

True。

And　that　which　is　not　is　nowhere？

Nowhere。

And　can　any　one　do　anything　about　that　which　has　no　existence；　or　do　to　Cleinias　that　which　is　not　and　is　nowhere？

I　think　not；　said　Ctesippus。

Well；　but　do　rhetoricians；　when　they　speak　in　the　assembly；　do　nothing？

Nay；　he　said；　they　do　something。

And　doing　is　making？

Yes。

And　speaking　is　doing　and　making？

He　agreed。

Then　no　one　says　that　which　is　not；　for　in　saying　what　is　not　he　would　be　doing　something；　and　you　have　already　acknowledged　that　no　one　can　do　what　is　not。　　And　therefore；　upon　your　own　showing；　no　one　says　what　is　false；　but　if　Dionysodorus　says　anything；　he　says　what　is　true　and　what　is。

Yes；　Euthydemus；　said　Ctesippus；　but　he　speaks　of　things　in　a　certain　way　and　manner；　and　not　as　they　really　are。

Why；　Ctesippus；　said　Dionysodorus；　do　you　mean　to　say　that　any　one　speaks　of　things　as　they　are？

Yes；　he　saidall　gentlemen　and　truth…speaking　persons。

And　are　not　good　things　good；　and　evil　things　evil？

He　assented。

And　you　say　that　gentlemen　speak　of　things　as　they　are？

Yes。

Then　the　good　speak　evil　of　evil　things；　if　they　speak　of　them　as　they　are？

Yes；　indeed；　he　said；　and　they　speak　evil　of　evil　men。　　And　if　I　may　give　you　a　piece　of　advice；　you　had　better　take　care　that　they　do　not　speak　evil　of　you；　since　I　can　tell　you　that　the　good　speak　evil　of　the　evil。

And　do　they　speak　great　things　of　the　great；　rejoined　Euthydemus；　and　warm　things　of　the　warm？

To　be　sure　they　do；　said　Ctesippus；　and　they　speak　coldly　of　the　insipid　and　cold　dialectician。

You　are　abusive；　Ctesippus；　said　Dionys