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building　it。　The　building…rent；　or　the　ordinary　profit　of

building；　is；　therefore；　everywhere　regulated　by　the　ordinary

interest　of　money。　Where　the　market　rate　of　interest　is　four　per

cent　the　rent　of　a　house　which；　over　and　above　paying　the

ground…rent；　affords　six　or　six　and　a　half　per　cent　upon　the

whole　expense　of　building；　may　perhaps　afford　a　sufficient　profit

to　the　builder。　Where　the　market　rate　of　interest　is　five　per

cent；　it　may　perhaps　require　seven　or　seven　and　a　half　per　cent。

If；　in　proportion　to　the　interest　of　money；　the　trade　of　the

builder　affords　at　any　time　a　much　greater　profit　than　this；　it

will　soon　draw　so　much　capital　from　other　trades　as　will　reduce

the　profit　to　its　proper　level。　If　it　affords　at　any　time　much

less　than　this；　other　trades　will　soon　draw　so　much　capital　from

it　as　will　again　raise　that　profit。

　　　　　Whatever　part　of　the　whole　rent　of　a　house　is　over　and　above

what　is　sufficient　for　affording　this　reasonable　profit　naturally

goes　to　the　ground…rent；　and　where　the　owner　of　the　ground　and

the　owner　of　the　building　are　two　different　persons；　is；　in　most

cases；　completely　paid　to　the　former。　This　surplus　rent　is　the

price　which　the　inhabitant　of　the　house　pays　for　some　real　or

supposed　advantage　of　the　situation。　In　country　houses　at　a

distance　from　any　great　town；　where　there　is　plenty　of　ground　to

choose　upon；　the　ground…rent　is　scarce　anything；　or　no　more　than

what　the　ground　which　the　house　stands　upon　would　pay　if　employed

in　agriculture。　In　country　villas　in　the　neighborhood　of　some

great　town；　it　is　sometimes　a　good　deal　higher；　and　the　peculiar

conveniency　or　beauty　of　situation　is　there　frequently　very　well

paid　for。　Ground…rents　are　generally　highest　in　the　capital；　and

in　those　particular　parts　of　it　where　there　happens　to　be　the

greatest　demand　for　houses；　whatever　be　the　reason　of　that

demand；　whether　for　trade　and　business；　for　pleasure　and　society；

or　for　mere　vanity　and　fashion。

　　　　　A　tax　upon　house…rent；　payable　by　the　tenant　and

proportioned　to　the　whole　rent　of　each　house；　could　not；　for　any

considerable　time　at　least；　affect　the　building…rent。　If　the

builder　did　not　get　his　reasonable　profit；　he　would　be　obliged　to

quit　the　trade；　which；　by　raising　the　demand　for　building；　would

in　a　short　time　bring　back　his　profit　to　its　proper　level　with

that　of　other　trades。　Neither　would　such　a　tax　fall　altogether

upon　the　ground…rent；　but　it　would　divide　itself　in　such　a　manner

as　to　fall　partly　upon　the　inhabitant　of　the　house；　and　partly

upon　the　owner　of　the　ground。

　　　　　Let　us　suppose；　for　example；　that　a　particular　person　judges

that　he　can　afford　for　house…rent　an　expense　of　sixty　pounds　a

year；　and　let　us　suppose；　too；　that　a　tax　of　four　shillings　in

the　pound；　or　of　one…fifth；　payable　by　the　inhabitant；　is　laid

upon　house…rent。　A　house　of　sixty　pounds　rent　will　in　this　case

cost　him　seventy…two　pounds　a　year；　which　is　twelve　pounds　more

than　he　thinks　he　can　afford。　He　will；　therefore；　content　himself

with　a　worse　house；　or　a　house　of　fifty　pounds　rent；　which；　with

the　additional　ten　pounds　that　he　must　pay　for　the　tax；　will　make

up　the　sum　of　sixty　pounds　a　year；　the　expense　which　he　judges　he

can　afford；　and　in　order　to　pay　the　tax　he　will　give　up　a　part　of

the　additional　conveniency　which　he　might　have　had　from　a　house

of　ten　pounds　a　year　more　rent。　He　will　give　up；　I　say；　a　part　of

this　additional　conveniency；　for　he　will　seldom　be　obliged　to

give　up　the　whole；　but　will；　in　consequence　of　the　tax；　get　a

better　house　for　fifty　pounds　a　year　than　he　could　have　got　if

there　had　been　no　tax。　For　as　a　tax　of　this　kind　by　taking　away

this　particular　competitor；　must　diminish　the　competition　for

houses　of　sixty　pounds　rent；　so　it　must　likewise　diminish　it　for

those　of　fifty　pounds　rent；　and　in　the　same　manner　for　those　of

all　other　rents；　except　the　lowest　rent；　for　which　it　would　for

some　time　increase　the　competition。　But　the　rents　of　every　class

of　houses　for　which　the　competition　was　diminished　would

necessarily　be　more　or　less　reduced。　As　no　part　of　this

reduction；　however；　could；　for　any　considerable　time　at　least；

affect　the　building…rent；　the　whole　of　it　must　in　the　long…run

necessarily　fall　upon　the　ground…rent。　The　final　payment　of　this

tax；　therefore；　would　fall　partly　upon　the　inhabitant　of　the

house；　who；　in　order　to　pay　his　share；　would　be　obliged　to　give

up　a　part　of　his　conveniency；　and　partly　upon　the　owner　of　the

ground；　who；　in　order　to　pay　his　share；　would　be　obliged　to　give

up　a　part　of　his　revenue。　In　what　proportion　this　final　payment

would　be　divided　between　them　it　is　not　perhaps　very　easy　to

ascertain。　The　division　would　probably　be　very　different　in

different　circumstances；　and　a　tax　of　this　kind　might；　according

to　those　different　circumstances；　affect　very　unequally　both　the

inhabitant　of　the　house　and　the　owner　of　the　ground。

　　　　　The　inequality　with　which　a　tax　of　this　kind　might　fall　upon

the　owners　of　different　ground…rents　would　arise　altogether　from

the　accidental　inequality　of　this　division。　But　the　inequality

with　which　it　might　fall　upon　the　inhabitants　of　different　houses

would　arise　not　only　from　this；　but　from　another　cause。　The

proportion　of　the　expense　of　house…rent　to　the　whole　expense　of

living　is　different　in　the　different　degrees　of　fortune。　It　is

perhaps　highest　in　the　highest　degree；　and　it　diminishes

gradually　through　the　inferior　degrees；　so　as　in　general　to　be

lowest　in　the　lowest　degree。　The　necessaries　of　life　occasion　the

great　expense　of　the　poor。　They　find　it　difficult　to　get　food；

and　the　greater　part　of　their　little　revenue　is　spent　in　getting

it。　The　luxuries　and　vanities　of　life　occasion　the　principal

expense　of　the　rich；　and　a　magnificent　house　embellishes　and　sets

off　to　the　best　advantage　all　the　other　luxuries　and　vanities

which　they　possess。　A　tax　upon　house…rents；　therefore；　would　in

general　fall　heaviest　upon　the　rich；　and　in　this　sort　of

inequality　there　would　not；　perhaps；　be　anything　very

unreasonable。　It　is　not　very　unreasonable　that　the　rich　should

contribute　to　the　public　expense；　not　only　in　proportion　to　their

revenue；　but　something　more　than　in　that　proportion。

　　　　　The　rent　of　houses；　though　it　in　some　respects　resembles　the

rent　of　land；　is　in　one　respect　essentially　different　from　it。

The　rent　of　land　is　paid　for　the　use　of　a　productive　subject。　The

land　which　pays　it　produces　it。　The　rent　of　houses　is　paid　for

the　use　of　an　unproductive　subject。　Neither　the　house　nor　the

ground　which　it　stands　upon　produce　anything。　The　person　who　pays

the　rent；　therefore；　must　draw　it　from　some　other　source　of

revenue　distinct　from　the　independent　of　this　subject。　A　tax　upon

the　rent　of　houses；　so　far　as　it　falls　upon　the　inhabitants；　must

be　drawn　from　the　same　source　as　the　rent　itself；　and　must　be

paid　from　their　revenue；　whether　derived　from　the　wages　of

labour；　the　profits　of　stock；　or　the　rent　of　land。　So　far　as　it

falls　upon　the　inhabitants；　it　is　one　of　those　taxes　which　fall；

not　upon　one　only；　but　indifferently　upon　all　the　three　different

sources　of　revenue；　and　is　in　every　respect　of　the　same　nature　as

a　tax　upon　any　other　sort　of　consumable　commodities。　In　general

there　is　not；　perhaps；　any　one　article　of　expense　or　consumption

by　which　the　liberality　or　narrowness　of　a　man's　whole　expense

can　be　better　judged　of　than　by　his　house…rent。　A　proportional

tax　upon　this　particular　article　of　expense　might；　perhaps；

produce　a　more　considerable　revenue　than　any　which　has　hitherto

been　drawn　from　it　in　any　part　of　Europe。　If　the　tax　indeed　was

very　high；　the　greater　part　of　people　would　endeavour　to　evade

it；　as　much　as　they　could；　by　contenting　themselves　with　smaller

houses；　and　by　turning　the　greater　part　of　their　expense　into

some　other　channel。

　　　　　The　rent　of　houses　might　easily　be　ascertained　with

sufficient　accuracy　by　a　policy　of　the　same　kind　with　that　which

would　be　necessary　for　ascertaining　the　ordinary　rent　of　land。

Houses　not　inhabited　ought　to　pay　no　tax。　A　tax　upon　them　would

fall　altogether　upon　the　proprietor；　who　would　thus　be　taxed　for

a　subject　which　afforded　him　neither　conveniency　nor　revenue。

Houses　inhabited　by　the　proprietor　ought　to　be　rated；　not

according　to　the　expense　which　they　might　have　cost　in　building；

but　according　to　the　rent　which　an　equitable　arbitration　might

judge　them　likely　to　bring　if　leased　to　a　tenant。　If　rated

according　to　the　expense　which　they　may　have　cost　in　building；　a

tax　of　three　or　four　shillings　in　the　pound；　joined　with　other

taxes；　would　ruin　almost　all　the　rich　and　great　families　of　this；

and；　I　believe；　of　every　other　civilised　country。　Whoever　will

examine；　with　attention；　the　different　town　and　country　houses　of

some　of　the　richest　and　greatest　families　in　this　country　will

find　that；　at　the　rate　of　only　six　and　a　half　or　seven　per　cent

upon　the　original　expense　of　building；　their　house…rent　is　nearly

equal　to　the　whole　net　rent　of　their　estates。　It　is　the

accumulated　expense　of　several　successive　generations；　laid　out

upon　objects　of　great　beauty　and　magnificance；　indeed；　but；　in

proportion　to　what　they　cost；　of　very　small　exchangeable　value。

　　　　　Ground…rents　are　a　still　more　proper　subject　of　taxation

than　the　rent　of　houses。　A　tax　upon　ground…rents　would　not　raise

the　rents　of　houses。　It　would　fall　altogether　upon　the　owner　of

the　ground…rent；　who　acts　always　as　a　monopolist；　and　exacts　the

greatest　rent　which　can　be　got　for　the　use　of　his　ground。　More　or

less　can　be　got　for　it　according　as　the　competitors　happen　to　be

richer　or　poorer；　or　can　afford　to　gratify　their　fancy　for　a

particular　spot　of　ground　at　a　greater　or　smaller　expense。　In

every　country　the　greatest　number　of　rich　competitors　is　in　the

capital；　and　it　is　there　accordingly　that　the　highest

ground…rents　are　always　to　be　f