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his　orders　in　war；　and　submit　to　his　jurisdiction　in　peace。　He　is

necessarily　both　their　general　and　their　judge；　and　his

chieftainship　is　the　necessary　effect　of　the　superiority　of　his

fortune。　In　an　opulent　and　civilised　society；　a　man　may　possess　a

much　greater　fortune　and　yet　not　be　able　to　command　a　dozen

people。　Though　the　produce　of　his　estate　may　be　sufficient　to

maintain；　and　may　perhaps　actually　maintain；　more　than　a　thousand

people；　yet　as　those　people　pay　for　everything　which　they　get

from　him；　as　he　gives　scarce　anything　to　anybody　but　in　exchange

for　an　equivalent；　there　is　scarce　anybody　who　considers　himself

as　entirely　dependent　upon　him；　and　his　authority　extends　only

over　a　few　menial　servants。　The　authority　of　fortune；　however；　is

very　great　even　in　an　opulent　and　civilised　society。　That　it　is

much　greater　than　that　either　of　age　or　of　personal　qualities　has

been　the　constant　complaint　of　every　period　of　society　which

admitted　of　any　considerable　inequality　of　fortune。　The　first

period　of　society；　that　of　hunters；　admits　of　no　such　inequality。

Universal　poverty　establishes　their　universal　equality；　and　the

superiority　either　of　age　or　of　personal　qualities　are　the　feeble

but　the　sole　foundations　of　authority　and　subordination。　There　is

therefore　little　or　no　authority　or　subordination　in　this　period

of　society。　The　second　period　of　society；　that　of　shepherds；

admits　of　very　great　inequalities　of　fortune；　and　there　is　no

period　in　which　the　superiority　of　fortune　gives　so　great

authority　to　those　who　possess　it。　There　is　no　period　accordingly

in　which　authority　and　subordination　are　more　perfectly

established。　The　authority　of　an　Arabian　sherif　is　very　great；

that　of　a　Tartar　khan　altogether　despotical。

　　　　　The　fourth　of　those　causes　or　circumstances　is　the

superiority　of　birth。　Superiority　of　birth　supposes　an　ancient

superiority　of　fortune　in　the　family　of　the　person　who　claims　it。

All　families　are　equally　ancient；　and　the　ancestors　of　the

prince；　though　they　may　be　better　known；　cannot　well　be　more

numerous　than　those　of　the　beggar。　Antiquity　of　family　means

everywhere　the　antiquity　either　of　wealth；　or　of　that　greatness

which　is　commonly　either　founded　upon　wealth；　or　accompanied　with

it。　Upstart　greatness　is　everywhere　less　respected　than　ancient

greatness。　The　hatred　of　usurpers；　the　love　of　the　family　of　an

ancient　monarch；　are；　in　a　great　measure；　founded　upon　the

contempt　which　men　naturally　have　for　the　former；　and　upon　their

veneration　for　the　latter。　As　a　military　officer　submits　without

reluctance　to　the　authority　of　a　superior　by　whom　he　has　always

been　commanded；　but　cannot　bear　that　his　inferior　should　be　set

over　his　head；　so　men　easily　submit　to　a　family　to　whom　they　and

their　ancestors　have　always　submitted；　but　are　fired　with

indignation　when　another　family；　in　whom　they　had　never

acknowledged　any　such　superiority；　assumes　a　dominion　over　them。

　　　　　The　distinction　of　birth；　being　subsequent　to　the　inequality

of　fortune；　can　have　no　place　in　nations　of　hunters；　among　whom

all　men；　being　equal　in　fortune；　must　likewise　be　very　nearly

equal　in　birth。　The　son　of　a　wise　and　brave　man　may；　indeed；　even

among　them；　be　somewhat　more　respected　than　a　man　of　equal　merit

who　has　the　misfortune　to　be　the　son　of　a　fool　or　a　coward。　The

difference；　however；　will　not　be　very　great；　and　there　never　was；

I　believe；　a　great　family　in　the　world　whose　illustration　was

entirely　derived　from　the　inheritance　of　wisdom　and　virtue。

　　　　　The　distinction　of　birth　not　only　may；　but　always　does　take

place　among　nations　of　shepherds。　Such　nations　are　always

strangers　to　every　sort　of　luxury；　and　great　wealth　can　scarce

ever　be　dissipated　among　them　by　improvident　profusion。　There　are

no　nations　accordingly　who　abound　more　in　families　revered　and

honoured　on　account　of　their　descent　from　a　long　race　of　great

and　illustrious　ancestors；　because　there　are　no　nations　among

whom　wealth　is　likely　to　continue　longer　in　the　same　families。

　　　　　Birth　and　fortune　are　evidently　the　two　circumstances　which

principally　set　one　man　above　another。　They　are　the　two　great

sources　of　personal　distinction；　and　are　therefore　the　principal

causes　which　naturally　establish　authority　and　subordination

among　men。　Among　nations　of　shepherds　both　those　causes　operate

with　their　full　force。　The　great　shepherd　or　herdsman；　respected

on　account　of　his　great　wealth；　and　of　the　great　number　of　those

who　depend　upon　him　for　subsistence；　and　revered　on　account　of

the　nobleness　of　his　birth；　and　of　the　immemorial　antiquity　of

his　illustrious　family；　has　a　natural　authority　over　all　the

inferior　shepherds　or　herdsmen　of　his　horde　or　clan。　He　can

command　the　united　force　of　a　greater　number　of　people　than　any

of　them。　His　military　power　is　greater　than　that　of　any　of　them。

In　time　of　war　they　are　all　of　them　naturally　disposed　to　muster

themselves　under　his　banner；　rather　than　under　that　of　any　other

person；　and　his　birth　and　fortune　thus　naturally　procure　to　him

some　sort　of　executive　power。　By　commanding；　too；　the　united

force　of　a　greater　number　of　people　than　any　of　them；　he　is　best

able　to　compel　any　one　of　them　who　may　have　injured　another　to

compensate　the　wrong。　He　is　the　person；　therefore；　to　whom　all

those　who　are　too　weak　to　defend　themselves　naturally　look　up　for

protection。　It　is　to　him　that　they　naturally　complain　of　the

injuries　which　they　imagine　have　been　done　to　them；　and　his

interposition　in　such　cases　is　more　easily　submitted　to；　even　by

the　person　complained　of；　than　that　of　any　other　person　would　be。

His　birth　and　fortune　thus　naturally　procure　him　some　sort　of

judicial　authority。

　　　　　It　is　in　the　age　of　shepherds；　in　the　second　period　of

society；　that　the　inequality　of　fortune　first　begins　to　take

place；　and　introduces　among　men　a　degree　of　authority　and

subordination　which　could　not　possibly　exist　before。　It　thereby

introduces　some　degree　of　that　civil　government　which　is

indispensably　necessary　for　its　own　preservation：　and　it　seems　to

do　this　naturally；　and　even　independent　of　the　consideration　of

that　necessity。　The　consideration　of　that　necessity　comes　no

doubt　afterwards　to　contribute　very　much　to　maintain　and　secure

that　authority　and　subordination。　The　rich；　in　particular；　are

necessarily　interested　to　support　that　order　of　things　which　can

alone　secure　them　in　the　possession　of　their　own　advantages。　Men

of　inferior　wealth　combine　to　defend　those　of　superior　wealth　in

the　possession　of　their　property；　in　order　that　men　of　superior

wealth　may　combine　to　defend　them　in　the　possession　of　theirs。

All　the　inferior　shepherds　and　herdsmen　feel　that　the　security　of

their　own　herds　and　flocks　depends　upon　the　security　of　those　of

the　great　shepherd　or　herdsman；　that　the　maintenance　of　their

lesser　authority　depends　upon　that　of　his　greater　authority；　and

that　upon　their　subordination　to　him　depends　his　power　of　keeping

their　inferiors　in　subordination　to　them。　They　constitute　a　sort

of　little　nobility；　who　feel　themselves　interested　to　defend　the

property　and　to　support　the　authority　of　their　own　little

sovereign　in　order　that　he　may　be　able　to　defend　their　property

and　to　support　their　authority。　Civil　government；　so　far　as　it　is

instituted　for　the　security　of　property；　is　in　reality　instituted

for　the　defence　of　the　rich　against　the　poor；　or　of　those　who

have　some　property　against　those　who　have　none　at　all。

　　　　　The　judicial　authority　of　such　a　sovereign；　however；　far

from　being　a　cause　of　expense；　was　for　a　long　time　a　source　of

revenue　to　him。　The　persons　who　applied　to　him　for　justice　were

always　willing　to　pay　for　it；　and　a　present　never　failed　to

accompany　a　petition。　After　the　authority　of　the　sovereign；　too；

was　thoroughly　established；　the　person　found　guilty；　over　and

above　the　satisfaction　which　he　was　obliged　to　make　to　the　party；

was　likewise　forced　to　pay　an　amercement　to　the　sovereign。　He　had

given　trouble；　he　had　disturbed；　he　had　broke　the　peace　of　his

lord　the　king；　and　for　those　offences　an　amercement　was　thought

due。　In　the　Tartar　governments　of　Asia；　in　the　governments　of

Europe　which　were　founded　by　the　German　and　Scythian　nations　who

overturned　the　Roman　empire；　the　administration　of　justice　was　a

considerable　source　of　revenue；　both　to　the　sovereign　and　to　all

the　lesser　chiefs　or　lords　who　exercised　under　him　any　particular

jurisdiction；　either　over　some　particular　tribe　or　clan；　or　over

some　particular　territory　or　district。　Originally　both　the

sovereign　and　the　inferior　chiefs　used　to　exercise　this

jurisdiction　in　their　own　persons。　Afterwards　they　universally

found　it　convenient　to　delegate　it　to　some　substitute；　bailiff；

or　judge。　This　substitute；　however；　was　still　obliged　to　account

to　his　principal　or　constituent　for　the　profits　of　the

jurisdiction。　Whoever　reads　the　instructions　which　were　given　to

the　judges　of　the　circuit　in　the　time　of　Henry　II　will　see

clearly　that　those　judges　were　a　sort　of　itinerant　factors；　sent

round　the　country　for　the　purpose　of　levying　certain　branches　of

the　king's　revenue。　In　those　days　the　administration　of　justice

not　only　afforded　a　certain　revenue　to　the　sovereign；　but　to

procure　this　revenue　seems　to　have　been　one　of　the　principal

advantages　which　he　proposed　to　obtain　by　the　administration　of

justice。

　　　　　This　scheme　of　making　the　administration　of　justice

subservient　to　the　purposes　of　revenue　could　scarce　fail　to　be

productive　of　several　very　gross　abuses。　The　person　who　applied

for　justice　with　a　large　present　in　his　hand　was　likely　to　get

something　more　than　justice；　while　he　who　applied　for　it　with　a

small　one　was　likely　to　get　something　less。　Justice；　too；　might

frequently　be　delayed　in　order　that　this　present　might　be

repeated。　The　amercement；　besides；　of　the　person　complained　of；

might　frequently　sug