the critique of pure reason-第120部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



dream；　and　that　if　we　could　intuite　ourselves　and　other　things　as　they

really　are；　we　should　see　ourselves　in　a　world　of　spiritual　natures；

our　connection　with　which　did　not　begin　at　our　birth　and　will　not

cease　with　the　destruction　of　the　body。　And　so　on。

　　We　cannot　be　said　to　know　what　has　been　above　asserted；　nor　do　we

seriously　maintain　the　truth　of　these　assertions；　and　the　notions

therein　indicated　are　not　even　ideas　of　reason；　they　are　purely

fictitious　conceptions。　But　this　hypothetical　procedure　is　in

perfect　conformity　with　the　laws　of　reason。　Our　opponent　mistakes

the　absence　of　empirical　conditions　for　a　proof　of　the　complete

impossibility　of　all　that　we　have　asserted；　and　we　have　to　show　him

that　be　has　not　exhausted　the　whole　sphere　of　possibility　and　that

he　can　as　little　compass　that　sphere　by　the　laws　of　experience　and

nature；　as　we　can　lay　a　secure　foundation　for　the　operations　of　reason

beyond　the　region　of　experience。　Such　hypothetical　defences　against

the　pretensions　of　an　opponent　must　not　be　regarded　as　declarations　of

opinion。　The　philosopher　abandons　them；　so　soon　as　the　opposite

party　renounces　its　dogmatical　conceit。　To　maintain　a　simply

negative　position　in　relation　to　propositions　which　rest　on　an

insecure　foundation；　well　befits　the　moderation　of　a　true　philosopher；

but　to　uphold　the　objections　urged　against　an　opponent　as　proofs　of

the　opposite　statement　is　a　proceeding　just　as　unwarrantable　and

arrogant　as　it　is　to　attack　the　position　of　a　philosopher　who　advances

affirmative　propositions　regarding　such　a　subject。

　　It　is　evident；　therefore；　that　hypotheses；　in　the　speculative

sphere；　are　valid；　not　as　independent　propositions；　but　only

relatively　to　opposite　transcendent　assumptions。　For；　to　make　the

principles　of　possible　experience　conditions　of　the　possibility　of

things　in　general　is　just　as　transcendent　a　procedure　as　to　maintain

the　objective　reality　of　ideas　which　can　be　applied　to　no　objects

except　such　as　lie　without　the　limits　of　possible　experience。　The

judgements　enounced　by　pure　reason　must　be　necessary；　or　they　must　not

be　enounced　at　all。　Reason　cannot　trouble　herself　with　opinions。　But

the　hypotheses　we　have　been　discussing　are　merely　problematical

judgements；　which　can　neither　be　confuted　nor　proved；　while；

therefore；　they　are　not　personal　opinions；　they　are　indispensable　as

answers　to　objections　which　are　liable　to　be　raised。　But　we　must

take　care　to　confine　them　to　this　function；　and　guard　against　any

assumption　on　their　part　of　absolute　validity；　a　proceeding　which

would　involve　reason　in　inextricable　difficulties　and　contradictions。



　　　　　SECTION　IV。　The　Discipline　of　Pure　Reason　in　Relation

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　to　Proofs。



　　It　is　a　peculiarity；　which　distinguishes　the　proofs　of

transcendental　synthetical　propositions　from　those　of　all　other　a

priori　synthetical　cognitions；　that　reason；　in　the　case　of　the　former；

does　not　apply　its　conceptions　directly　to　an　object；　but　is　first

obliged　to　prove；　a　priori；　the　objective　validity　of　these

conceptions　and　the　possibility　of　their　syntheses。　This　is　not　merely

a　prudential　rule；　it　is　essential　to　the　very　possibility　of　the

proof　of　a　transcendental　proposition。　If　I　am　required　to　pass；　a

priori；　beyond　the　conception　of　an　object；　I　find　that　it　is

utterly　impossible　without　the　guidance　of　something　which　is　not

contained　in　the　conception。　In　mathematics；　it　is　a　priori

intuition　that　guides　my　synthesis；　and；　in　this　case；　all　our

conclusions　may　be　drawn　immediately　from　pure　intuition。　In

transcendental　cognition；　so　long　as　we　are　dealing　only　with

conceptions　of　the　understanding；　we　are　guided　by　possible

experience。　That　is　to　say；　a　proof　in　the　sphere　of　transcendental

cognition　does　not　show　that　the　given　conception　（that　of　an　event；

for　example）　leads　directly　to　another　conception　（that　of　a　cause）…

for　this　would　be　a　saltus　which　nothing　can　justify；　but　it　shows

that　experience　itself；　and　consequently　the　object　of　experience；

is　impossible　without　the　connection　indicated　by　these　conceptions。

It　follows　that　such　a　proof　must　demonstrate　the　possibility　of

arriving；　synthetically　and　a　priori；　at　a　certain　knowledge　of

things；　which　was　not　contained　in　our　conceptions　of　these　things。

Unless　we　pay　particular　attention　to　this　requirement；　our　proofs；

instead　of　pursuing　the　straight　path　indicated　by　reason；　follow

the　tortuous　road　of　mere　subjective　association。　The　illusory

conviction；　which　rests　upon　subjective　causes　of　association；　and

which　is　considered　as　resulting　from　the　perception　of　a　real　and

objective　natural　affinity；　is　always　open　to　doubt　and　suspicion。　For

this　reason；　all　the　attempts　which　have　been　made　to　prove　the

principle　of　sufficient　reason；　have；　according　to　the　universal

admission　of　philosophers；　been　quite　unsuccessful；　and；　before　the

appearance　of　transcendental　criticism；　it　was　considered　better；　as

this　principle　could　not　be　abandoned；　to　appeal　boldly　to　the

common　sense　of　mankind　（a　proceeding　which　always　proves　that　the

problem；　which　reason　ought　to　solve；　is　one　in　which　philosophers

find　great　difficulties）；　rather　than　attempt　to　discover　new

dogmatical　proofs。

　　But；　if　the　proposition　to　be　proved　is　a　proposition　of　pure

reason；　and　if　I　aim　at　passing　beyond　my　empirical　conceptions　by　the

aid　of　mere　ideas；　it　is　necessary　that　the　proof　should　first　show

that　such　a　step　in　synthesis　is　possible　（which　it　is　not）；　before　it

proceeds　to　prove　the　truth　of　the　proposition　itself。　The　so…called

proof　of　the　simple　nature　of　the　soul　from　the　unity　of　apperception；

is　a　very　plausible　one。　But　it　contains　no　answer　to　the　objection；

that；　as　the　notion　of　absolute　simplicity　is　not　a　conception　which

is　directly　applicable　to　a　perception；　but　is　an　idea　which　must　be

inferred…　if　at　all…　from　observation；　it　is　by　no　means　evident　how

the　mere　fact　of　consciousness；　which　is　contained　in　all　thought；

although　in　so　far　a　simple　representation；　can　conduct　me　to　the

consciousness　and　cognition　of　a　thing　which　is　purely　a　thinking

substance。　When　I　represent　to　my　mind　the　power　of　my　body　as　in

motion；　my　body　in　this　thought　is　so　far　absolute　unity；　and　my

representation　of　it　is　a　simple　one；　and　hence　I　can　indicate　this

representation　by　the　motion　of　a　point；　because　I　have　made

abstraction　of　the　size　or　volume　of　the　body。　But　I　cannot　hence

infer　that；　given　merely　the　moving　power　of　a　body；　the　body　may　be

cogitated　as　simple　substance；　merely　because　the　representation　in　my

mind　takes　no　account　of　its　content　in　space；　and　is　consequently

simple。　The　simple；　in　abstraction；　is　very　different　from　the

objectively　simple；　and　hence　the　Ego；　which　is　simple　in　the　first

sense；　may；　in　the　second　sense；　as　indicating　the　soul　itself；　be　a

very　complex　conception；　with　a　very　various　content。　Thus　it　is

evident　that　in　all　such　arguments　there　lurks　a　paralogism。　We

guess　（for　without　some　such　surmise　our　suspicion　would　not　be

excited　in　reference　to　a　proof　of　this　character）　at　the　presence

of　the　paralogism；　by　keeping　ever　before　us　a　criterion　of　the

possibility　of　those　synthetical　propositions　which　aim　at　proving

more　than　experience　can　teach　us。　This　criterion　is　obtained　from　the

observation　that　such　proofs　do　not　lead　us　directly　from　the

subject　of　the　proposition　to　be　proved　to　the　required　predicate；　but

find　it　necessary　to　presuppose　the　possibility　of　extending　our

cognition　a　priori　by　means　of　ideas。　We　must；　accordingly；　always　use

the　greatest　caution；　we　require；　before　attempting　any　proof；　to

consider　how　it　is　possible　to　extend　the　sphere　of　cognition　by　the

operations　of　pure　reason；　and　from　what　source　we　are　to　derive

knowledge；　which　is　not　obtained　from　the　analysis　of　conceptions；　nor

relates；　by　anticipation；　to　possible　experience。　We　shall　thus

spare　ourselves　much　severe　and　fruitless　labour；　by　not　expecting

from　reason　what　is　beyond　its　power；　or　rather　by　subjecting　it　to

discipline；　and　teaching　it　to　moderate　its　vehement　desires　for　the

extension　of　the　sphere　of　cognition。

　　The　first　rule　for　our　guidance　is；　therefore；　not　to　attempt　a

transcendental　proof；　before　we　have　considered　from　what　source　we

are　to　derive　the　principles　upon　which　the　proof　is　to　be　based；

and　what　right　we　have　to　expect　that　our　conclusions　from　these

principles　will　be　veracious。　If　they　are　principles　of　the

understanding；　it　is　vain　to　expect　that　we　should　attain　by　their

means　to　ideas　of　pure　reason；　for　these　principles　are　valid　only

in　regard　to　objects　of　possible　experience。　If　they　are　principles　of

pure　reason；　our　labour　is　alike　in　vain。　For　the　principles　of

reason；　if　employed　as　objective；　are　without　exception　dialectical

and　possess　no　validity　or　truth；　except　as　regulative　principles　of

the　systematic　employment　of　reason　in　experience。　But　when　such

delusive　proof　are　presented　to　us；　it　is　our　duty　to　meet　them　with

the　non　liquet　of　a　matured　judgement；　and；　although　we　are　unable

to　expose　the　particular　sophism　upon　which　the　proof　is　based；　we

have　a　right　to　demand　a　deduction　of　the　principles　employed　in　it；

and；　if　these　principles　have　their　origin　in　pure　reason　alone；

such　a　deduction　is　absolutely　impossible。　And　thus　it　is

unnecessary　that　we　should　trouble　ourselves　with　the　exposure　and

confutation　of　every　sophistical　illusion；　we　may；　at　once；　bring

all　dialectic；　which　is　inexhaustible　in　the　production　of

fallacies；　before　the　bar　of　critical　reason；　which　tests　the

principles　upon　which　all　dialectical　procedure　is　based。　The　second

peculiarity　of　transcendental　proof　is　that　a　transcendental

proposition　cannot　rest　upon　more　than　a　single　proof。　If　I　am　drawing

conclusions；　not　from　conceptions；　but　from　intuition　corresponding