the critique of pure reason-第123部分

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for　pure　reason。　A　will　is　purely　animal　（arbitrium　brutum）　when　it　is

determined　by　sensuous　impulses　or　instincts　only；　that　is；　when　it　is

determined　in　a　pathological　manner。　A　will；　which　can　be　determined

independently　of　sensuous　impulses；　consequently　by　motives

presented　by　reason　alone；　is　called　a　free　will　（arbitrium

liberum）；　and　everything　which　is　connected　with　this　free　will；

either　as　principle　or　consequence；　is　termed　practical。　The　existence

of　practical　freedom　can　be　proved　from　experience　alone。　For　the

human　will　is　not　determined　by　that　alone　which　immediately　affects

the　senses；　on　the　contrary；　we　have　the　power；　by　calling　up　the

notion　of　what　is　useful　or　hurtful　in　a　more　distant　relation；　of

overcoming　the　immediate　impressions　on　our　sensuous　faculty　of

desire。　But　these　considerations　of　what　is　desirable　in　relation　to

our　whole　state；　that　is；　is　in　the　end　good　and　useful；　are　based

entirely　upon　reason。　This　faculty；　accordingly；　enounces　laws；

which　are　imperative　or　objective　laws　of　freedom　and　which　tell　us

what　ought　to　take　place；　thus　distinguishing　themselves　from　the　laws

of　nature；　which　relate　to　that　which　does　take　place。　The　laws　of

freedom　or　of　free　will　are　hence　termed　practical　laws。

　　Whether　reason　is　not　itself；　in　the　actual　delivery　of　these

laws；　determined　in　its　turn　by　other　influences；　and　whether　the

action　which；　in　relation　to　sensuous　impulses；　we　call　free；　may　not；

in　relation　to　higher　and　more　remote　operative　causes；　really　form

a　part　of　nature…　these　are　questions　which　do　not　here　concern　us。

They　are　purely　speculative　questions；　and　all　we　have　to　do；　in　the

practical　sphere；　is　to　inquire　into　the　rule　of　conduct　which

reason　has　to　present。　Experience　demonstrates　to　us　the　existence

of　practical　freedom　as　one　of　the　causes　which　exist　in　nature；

that　is；　it　shows　the　causal　power　of　reason　in　the　determination　of

the　will。　The　idea　of　transcendental　freedom；　on　the　contrary；

requires　that　reason…　in　relation　to　its　causal　power　of　commencing

a　series　of　phenomena…　should　be　independent　of　all　sensuous

determining　causes；　and　thus　it　seems　to　be　in　opposition　to　the　law

of　nature　and　to　all　possible　experience。　It　therefore　remains　a

problem　for　the　human　mind。　But　this　problem　does　not　concern　reason

in　its　practical　use；　and　we　have；　therefore；　in　a　canon　of　pure

reason；　to　do　with　only　two　questions；　which　relate　to　the　practical

interest　of　pure　reason：　Is　there　a　God？　and；　Is　there　a　future

life？　The　question　of　transcendental　freedom　is　purely　speculative；

and　we　may　therefore　set　it　entirely　aside　when　we　come　to　treat　of

practical　reason。　Besides；　we　have　already　discussed　this　subject　in

the　antinomy　of　pure　reason。



　　　SECTION　II。　Of　the　Ideal　of　the　Summum　Bonum　as　a　Determining

　　　　　　　　　　　Ground　of　the　Ultimate　End　of　Pure　Reason。



　　Reason　conducted　us；　in　its　speculative　use；　through　the　field　of

experience　and；　as　it　can　never　find　complete　satisfaction　in　that

sphere；　from　thence　to　speculative　ideas…　which；　however；　in　the　end

brought　us　back　again　to　experience；　and　thus　fulfilled　the　purpose　of

reason；　in　a　manner　which；　though　useful；　was　not　at　all　in　accordance

with　our　expectations。　It　now　remains　for　us　to　consider　whether

pure　reason　can　be　employed　in　a　practical　sphere；　and　whether　it　will

here　conduct　us　to　those　ideas　which　attain　the　highest　ends　of　pure

reason；　as　we　have　just　stated　them。　We　shall　thus　ascertain

whether；　from　the　point　of　view　of　its　practical　interest；　reason

may　not　be　able　to　supply　us　with　that　which；　on　the　speculative　side；

it　wholly　denies　us。

　　The　whole　interest　of　reason；　speculative　as　well　as　practical；　is

centred　in　the　three　following　questions：



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1。　WHAT　CAN　I　KNOW？

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2。　WHAT　OUGHT　I　TO　DO？

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3。　WHAT　MAY　I　HOPE？



　　The　first　question　is　purely　speculative。　We　have；　as　I　flatter

myself；　exhausted　all　the　replies　of　which　it　is　susceptible；　and　have

at　last　found　the　reply　with　which　reason　must　content　itself；　and

with　which　it　ought　to　be　content；　so　long　as　it　pays　no　regard　to　the

practical。　But　from　the　two　great　ends　to　the　attainment　of　which

all　these　efforts　of　pure　reason　were　in　fact　directed；　we　remain　just

as　far　removed　as　if　we　had　consulted　our　ease　and　declined　the　task

at　the　outset。　So　far；　then；　as　knowledge　is　concerned；　thus　much；

at　least；　is　established；　that；　in　regard　to　those　two　problems；　it

lies　beyond　our　reach。

　　The　second　question　is　purely　practical。　As　such　it　may　indeed

fall　within　the　province　of　pure　reason；　but　still　it　is　not

transcendental；　but　moral；　and　consequently　cannot　in　itself　form

the　subject　of　our　criticism。

　　The　third　question：　If　I　act　as　I　ought　to　do；　what　may　I　then

hope？…　is　at　once　practical　and　theoretical。　The　practical　forms　a

clue　to　the　answer　of　the　theoretical；　and…　in　its　highest　form…

speculative　question。　For　all　hoping　has　happiness　for　its　object

and　stands　in　precisely　the　same　relation　to　the　practical　and　the　law

of　morality　as　knowing　to　the　theoretical　cognition　of　things　and

the　law　of　nature。　The　former　arrives　finally　at　the　conclusion　that

something　is　（which　determines　the　ultimate　end）；　because　something

ought　to　take　place；　the　latter；　that　something　is　（which　operates

as　the　highest　cause）；　because　something　does　take　place。

　　Happiness　is　the　satisfaction　of　all　our　desires；　extensive；　in

regard　to　their　multiplicity；　intensive；　in　regard　to　their　degree；

and　protensive；　in　regard　to　their　duration。　The　practical　law　based

on　the　motive　of　happiness　I　term　a　pragmatical　law　（or　prudential

rule）；　but　that　law；　assuming　such　to　exist；　which　has　no　other　motive

than　the　worthiness　of　being　happy；　I　term　a　moral　or　ethical　law。　The

first　tells　us　what　we　have　to　do；　if　we　wish　to　become　possessed　of

happiness；　the　second　dictates　how　we　ought　to　act；　in　order　to

deserve　happiness。　The　first　is　based　upon　empirical　principles；　for

it　is　only　by　experience　that　I　can　learn　either　what　inclinations

exist　which　desire　satisfaction；　or　what　are　the　natural　means　of

satisfying　them。　The　second　takes　no　account　of　our　desires　or　the

means　of　satisfying　them；　and　regards　only　the　freedom　of　a　rational

being；　and　the　necessary　conditions　under　which　alone　this　freedom　can

harmonize　with　the　distribution　of　happiness　according　to

principles。　This　second　law　may　therefore　rest　upon　mere　ideas　of　pure

reason；　and　may　be　cognized　a　priori。

　　I　assume　that　there　are　pure　moral　laws　which　determine；　entirely

a　priori　（without　regard　to　empirical　motives；　that　is；　to　happiness）；

the　conduct　of　a　rational　being；　or　in　other　words；　to　use　which　it

makes　of　its　freedom；　and　that　these　laws　are　absolutely　imperative

（not　merely　hypothetically；　on　the　supposition　of　other　empirical

ends）；　and　therefore　in　all　respects　necessary。　I　am　warranted　in

assuming　this；　not　only　by　the　arguments　of　the　most　enlightened

moralists；　but　by　the　moral　judgement　of　every　man　who　will　make　the

attempt　to　form　a　distinct　conception　of　such　a　law。

　　Pure　reason；　then；　contains；　not　indeed　in　its　speculative；　but　in

its　practical；　or；　more　strictly；　its　moral　use；　principles　of　the

possibility　of　experience；　of　such　actions；　namely；　as；　in

accordance　with　ethical　precepts；　might　be　met　with　in　the　history

of　man。　For　since　reason　commands　that　such　actions　should　take　place；

it　must　be　possible　for　them　to　take　place；　and　hence　a　particular

kind　of　systematic　unity…　the　moral…　must　be　possible。　We　have

found；　it　is　true；　that　the　systematic　unity　of　nature　could　not　be

established　according　to　speculative　principles　of　reason；　because；

while　reason　possesses　a　causal　power　in　relation　to　freedom；　it　has

none　in　relation　to　the　whole　sphere　of　nature；　and；　while　moral

principles　of　reason　can　produce　free　actions；　they　cannot　produce

natural　laws。　It　is；　then；　in　its　practical；　but　especially　in　its

moral　use；　that　the　principles　of　pure　reason　possess　objective

reality。

　　I　call　the　world　a　moral　world；　in　so　far　as　it　may　be　in　accordance

with　all　the　ethical　laws…　which；　by　virtue　of　the　freedom　of

reasonable　beings；　it　can　be；　and　according　to　the　necessary　laws　of

morality　it　ought　to　be。　But　this　world　must　be　conceived　only　as　an

intelligible　world；　inasmuch　as　abstraction　is　therein　made　of　all

conditions　（ends）；　and　even　of　all　impediments　to　morality　（the

weakness　or　pravity　of　human　nature）。　So　far；　then；　it　is　a　mere　idea…

though　still　a　practical　idea…　which　may　have；　and　ought　to　have；　an

influence　on　the　world　of　sense；　so　as　to　bring　it　as　far　as

possible　into　conformity　with　itself。　The　idea　of　a　moral　world　has；

therefore；　objective　reality；　not　as　referring　to　an　object　of

intelligible　intuition…　for　of　such　an　object　we　can　form　no

conception　whatever…　but　to　the　world　of　sense…　conceived；　however；　as

an　object　of　pure　reason　in　its　practical　use…　and　to　a　corpus

mysticum　of　rational　beings　in　it；　in　so　far　as　the　liberum

arbitrium　of　the　individual　is　placed；　under　and　by　virtue　of　moral

laws；　in　complete　systematic　unity　both　with　itself　and　with　the

freedom　of　all　others。

　　That　is　the　answer　to　the　first　of　the　two　questions　of　pure

reason　which　relate　to　its　practical　interest：　Do　that　which　will

render　thee　worthy　of　happiness。　The　second　question　is　this：　If　I

conduct　myself　so　as　not　to　be　unworthy　of　happiness；　may　I　hope

thereby　to　obtain　happiness？　In　order　to　arrive　at　the　solution　of

this　question；　we　must　inquire　whether　the　principles　of　pure

reason；　which　prescribe　a　priori　the　law；　necessarily　also　connect

this　hope　with　it。

　　I　say；　then；　that　just　as　the　moral　principles　are　necessary

according　to　reason　in　its　practical　use；　so　it　is　equally　necessary

according　to　reason　in　its　theoretical　use　to　assume　that　eve