the critique of pure reason-第31部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



powers　which　we　include　generally　under　the　generic　denomination　of

understanding。

　　As　this　merely　formal　logic　makes　abstraction　of　all　content　of

cognition；　whether　pure　or　empirical；　and　occupies　itself　with　the

mere　form　of　thought　（discursive　cognition）；　it　must　contain　in　its

analytic　a　canon　for　reason。　For　the　form　of　reason　has　its　law；

which；　without　taking　into　consideration　the　particular　nature　of

the　cognition　about　which　it　is　employed；　can　be　discovered　a

priori；　by　the　simple　analysis　of　the　action　of　reason　into　its

momenta。

　　Transcendental　logic；　limited　as　it　is　to　a　determinate　content；

that　of　pure　a　priori　cognitions；　to　wit；　cannot　imitate　general　logic

in　this　division。　For　it　is　evident　that　the　transcendental　employment

of　reason　is　not　objectively　valid；　and　therefore　does　not　belong　to

the　logic　of　truth　（that　is；　to　analytic）；　but　as　a　logic　of　illusion；

occupies　a　particular　department　in　the　scholastic　system　under　the

name　of　transcendental　dialectic。

　　Understanding　and　judgement　accordingly　possess　in　transcendental

logic　a　canon　of　objectively　valid；　and　therefore　true　exercise；　and

are　comprehended　in　the　analytical　department　of　that　logic。　But

reason；　in　her　endeavours　to　arrive　by　a　priori　means　at　some　true

statement　concerning　objects　and　to　extend　cognition　beyond　the　bounds

of　possible　experience；　is　altogether　dialectic；　and　her　illusory

assertions　cannot　be　constructed　into　a　canon　such　as　an　analytic

ought　to　contain。

　　Accordingly；　the　analytic　of　principles　will　be　merely　a　canon　for

the　faculty　of　judgement；　for　the　instruction　of　this　faculty　in　its

application　to　phenomena　of　the　pure　conceptions　of　the　understanding；

which　contain　the　necessary　condition　for　the　establishment　of　a

priori　laws。　On　this　account；　although　the　subject　of　the　following

chapters　is　the　especial　principles　of　understanding；　I　shall　make　use

of　the　term　Doctrine　of　the　faculty　of　judgement；　in　order　to　define

more　particularly　my　present　purpose。



　　INTRODUCTION。　Of　the　Transcendental　Faculty　of　judgement　in　General。



　　If　understanding　in　general　be　defined　as　the　faculty　of　laws　or

rules；　the　faculty　of　judgement　may　be　termed　the　faculty　of

subsumption　under　these　rules；　that　is；　of　distinguishing　whether　this

or　that　does　or　does　not　stand　under　a　given　rule　（casus　datae　legis）。

General　logic　contains　no　directions　or　precepts　for　the　faculty　of

judgement；　nor　can　it　contain　any　such。　For　as　it　makes　abstraction　of

all　content　of　cognition；　no　duty　is　left　for　it；　except　that　of

exposing　analytically　the　mere　form　of　cognition　in　conceptions；

judgements；　and　conclusions；　and　of　thereby　establishing　formal

rules　for　all　exercise　of　the　understanding。　Now　if　this　logic

wished　to　give　some　general　direction　how　we　should　subsume　under

these　rules；　that　is；　how　we　should　distinguish　whether　this　or　that

did　or　did　not　stand　under　them；　this　again　could　not　be　done

otherwise　than　by　means　of　a　rule。　But　this　rule；　precisely　because　it

is　a　rule；　requires　for　itself　direction　from　the　faculty　of

judgement。　Thus；　it　is　evident　that　the　understanding　is　capable　of

being　instructed　by　rules；　but　that　the　judgement　is　a　peculiar

talent；　which　does　not；　and　cannot　require　tuition；　but　only　exercise。

This　faculty　is　therefore　the　specific　quality　of　the　so…called　mother

wit；　the　want　of　which　no　scholastic　discipline　can　compensate。

　　For　although　education　may　furnish；　and；　as　it　were；　engraft　upon

a　limited　understanding　rules　borrowed　from　other　minds；　yet　the　power

of　employing　these　rules　correctly　must　belong　to　the　pupil　himself；

and　no　rule　which　we　can　prescribe　to　him　with　this　purpose　is；　in　the

absence　or　deficiency　of　this　gift　of　nature；　secure　from　misuse。*　A

physician　therefore；　a　judge　or　a　statesman；　may　have　in　his　head　many

admirable　pathological；　juridical；　or　political　rules；　in　a　degree

that　may　enable　him　to　be　a　profound　teacher　in　his　particular

science；　and　yet　in　the　application　of　these　rules　he　may　very

possibly　blunder…　either　because　he　is　wanting　in　natural　judgement

（though　not　in　understanding）　and；　whilst　he　can　comprehend　the

general　in　abstracto；　cannot　distinguish　whether　a　particular　case

in　concreto　ought　to　rank　under　the　former；　or　because　his　faculty

of　judgement　bas　not　been　sufficiently　exercised　by　examples　and

real　practice。　Indeed；　the　grand　and　only　use　of　examples；　is　to

sharpen　the　judgement。　For　as　regards　the　correctness　and　precision　of

the　insight　of　the　understanding；　examples　are　commonly　injurious

rather　than　otherwise；　because；　as　casus　in　terminis　they　seldom

adequately　fulfil　the　conditions　of　the　rule。　Besides；　they　often

weaken　the　power　of　our　understanding　to　apprehend　rules　or　laws　in

their　universality；　independently　of　particular　circumstances　of

experience；　and　hence；　accustom　us　to　employ　them　more　as　formulae

than　as　principles。　Examples　are　thus　the　go…cart　of　the　judgement；

which　he　who　is　naturally　deficient　in　that　faculty　cannot　afford　to

dispense　with。



　　*Deficiency　in　judgement　is　properly　that　which　is　called　stupidity；

and　for　such　a　failing　we　know　no　remedy。　A　dull　or　narrow…minded

person；　to　whom　nothing　is　wanting　but　a　proper　degree　of

understanding；　may　be　improved　by　tuition；　even　so　far　as　to　deserve

the　epithet　of　learned。　But　as　such　persons　frequently　labour　under

a　deficiency　in　the　faculty　of　judgement；　it　is　not　uncommon　to　find

men　extremely　learned　who　in　the　application　of　their　science　betray　a

lamentable　degree　this　irremediable　want。



　　But　although　general　logic　cannot　give　directions　to　the　faculty

of　judgement；　the　case　is　very　different　as　regards　transcendental

logic；　insomuch　that　it　appears　to　be　the　especial　duty　of　the

latter　to　secure　and　direct；　by　means　of　determinate　rules；　the

faculty　of　judgement　in　the　employment　of　the　pure　understanding。　For；

as　a　doctrine；　that　is；　as　an　endeavour　to　enlarge　the　sphere　of　the

understanding　in　regard　to　pure　a　priori　cognitions；　philosophy　is

worse　than　useless；　since　from　all　the　attempts　hitherto　made；

little　or　no　ground　has　been　gained。　But；　as　a　critique；　in　order　to

guard　against　the　mistakes　of　the　faculty　of　judgement　（lapsus

judicii）　in　the　employment　of　the　few　pure　conceptions　of　the

understanding　which　we　possess；　although　its　use　is　in　this　case

purely　negative；　philosophy　is　called　upon　to　apply　all　its

acuteness　and　penetration。

　　But　transcendental　philosophy　has　this　peculiarity；　that　besides

indicating　the　rule；　or　rather　the　general　condition　for　rules；

which　is　given　in　the　pure　conception　of　the　understanding；　it　can；　at

the　same　time；　indicate　a　priori　the　case　to　which　the　rule　must　be

applied。　The　cause　of　the　superiority　which；　in　this　respect；

transcendental　philosophy　possesses　above　all　other　sciences　except

mathematics；　lies　in　this：　it　treats　of　conceptions　which　must

relate　a　priori　to　their　objects；　whose　objective　validity

consequently　cannot　be　demonstrated　a　posteriori；　and　is；　at　the

same　time；　under　the　obligation　of　presenting　in　general　but

sufficient　tests；　the　conditions　under　which　objects　can　be　given　in

harmony　with　those　conceptions；　otherwise　they　would　be　mere　logical

forms；　without　content；　and　not　pure　conceptions　of　the　understanding。

　　Our　transcendental　doctrine　of　the　faculty　of　judgement　will　contain

two　chapters。　The　first　will　treat　of　the　sensuous　condition　under

which　alone　pure　conceptions　of　the　understanding　can　be　employed…

that　is；　of　the　schematism　of　the　pure　understanding。　The　second

will　treat　of　those　synthetical　judgements　which　are　derived　a

priori　from　pure　conceptions　of　the　understanding　under　those

conditions；　and　which　lie　a　priori　at　the　foundation　of　all　other

cognitions；　that　is　to　say；　it　will　treat　of　the　principles　of　the

pure　understanding。

　　　　　　　TRANSCENDENTAL　DOCTRINE　OF　THE　FACULTY　OF　JUDGEMENT

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　OR；　ANALYTIC　OF　PRINCIPLES。



　　　　CHAPTER　I。　Of　the　Schematism　at　of　the　Pure　Conceptions

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　Understanding。



　　In　all　subsumptions　of　an　object　under　a　conception；　the

representation　of　the　object　must　be　homogeneous　with　the

conception；　in　other　words；　the　conception　must　contain　that　which

is　represented　in　the　object　to　be　subsumed　under　it。　For　this　is

the　meaning　of　the　expression：　〃An　object　is　contained　under　a

conception。〃　Thus　the　empirical　conception　of　a　plate　is　homogeneous

with　the　pure　geometrical　conception　of　a　circle；　inasmuch　as　the

roundness　which　is　cogitated　in　the　former　is　intuited　in　the　latter。

　　But　pure　conceptions　of　the　understanding；　when　compared　with

empirical　intuitions；　or　even　with　sensuous　intuitions　in　general；　are

quite　heterogeneous；　and　never　can　be　discovered　in　any　intuition。　How

then　is　the　subsumption　of　the　latter　under　the　former；　and

consequently　the　application　of　the　categories　to　phenomena；

possible？…　For　it　is　impossible　to　say；　for　example：　〃Causality　can　be

intuited　through　the　senses　and　is　contained　in　the　phenomenon。〃…　This

natural　and　important　question　forms　the　real　cause　of　the　necessity

of　a　transcendental　doctrine　of　the　faculty　of　judgement；　with　the

purpose；　to　wit；　of　showing　how　pure　conceptions　of　the

understanding　can　be　applied　to　phenomena。　In　all　other　sciences；

where　the　conceptions　by　which　the　object　is　thought　in　the　general

are　not　so　different　and　heterogeneous　from　those　which　represent

the　object　in　concreto…　as　it　is　given；　it　is　quite　unnecessary　to

institute　any　special　inquiries　concerning　the　application　of　the

former　to　the　latter。

　　Now　it　is　quite　clear　that　there　must　be　some　third　thing；　which

on　the　one　side　is　homogeneous　with　the　category；　and　with　the

phenomenon　on　the　other；　and　so　makes　the　application　of　the　former　to

the　latter　possible。　This　mediating　representation　must　be　pure

（wi