the critique of pure reason-第71部分

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that　is；　it　is　infinite　in　regard　to　extension。*



　　*Space　is　merely　the　form　of　external　intuition　（formal

intuition）；　and　not　a　real　object　which　can　be　externally　perceived。

Space；　prior　to　all　things　which　determine　it　（fill　or　limit　it）；

or；　rather；　which　present　an　empirical　intuition　conformable　to　it；

is；　under　the　title　of　absolute　space；　nothing　but　the　mere

possibility　of　external　phenomena；　in　so　far　as　they　either　exist　in

themselves；　or　can　annex　themselves　to　given　intuitions。　Empirical

intuition　is　therefore　not　a　composition　of　phenomena　and　space　（of

perception　and　empty　intuition）。　The　one　is　not　the　correlate　of　the

other　in　a　synthesis；　but　they　are　vitally　connected　in　the　same

empirical　intuition；　as　matter　and　form。　If　we　wish　to　set　one　of

these　two　apart　from　the　other…　space　from　phenomena…　there　arise

all　sorts　of　empty　determinations　of　external　intuition；　which　are

very　far　from　being　possible　perceptions。　For　example；　motion　or

rest　of　the　world　in　an　infinite　empty　space；　or　a　determination　of

the　mutual　relation　of　both；　cannot　possibly　be　perceived；　and　is

therefore　merely　the　predicate　of　a　notional　entity。





　　　　　　　　　　　　OBSERVATIONS　ON　THE　FIRST　ANTINOMY。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　THE　THESIS。



　　In　bringing　forward　these　conflicting　arguments；　I　have　not　been

on　the　search　for　sophisms；　for　the　purpose　of　availing　myself　of

special　pleading；　which　takes　advantage　of　the　carelessness　of　the

opposite　party；　appeals　to　a　misunderstood　statute；　and　erects　its

unrighteous　claims　upon　an　unfair　interpretation。　Both　proofs

originate　fairly　from　the　nature　of　the　case；　and　the　advantage

presented　by　the　mistakes　of　the　dogmatists　of　both　parties　has　been

completely　set　aside。

　　The　thesis　might　also　have　been　unfairly　demonstrated；　by　the

introduction　of　an　erroneous　conception　of　the　infinity　of　a　given

quantity。　A　quantity　is　infinite；　if　a　greater　than　itself　cannot

possibly　exist。　The　quantity　is　measured　by　the　number　of　given　units…

which　are　taken　as　a　standard…　contained　in　it。　Now　no　number　can　be

the　greatest；　because　one　or　more　units　can　always　be　added。　It

follows　that　an　infinite　given　quantity；　consequently　an　infinite

world　（both　as　regards　time　and　extension）　is　impossible。　It　is；

therefore；　limited　in　both　respects。　In　this　manner　I　might　have

conducted　my　proof；　but　the　conception　given　in　it　does　not　agree　with

the　true　conception　of　an　infinite　whole。　In　this　there　is　no

representation　of　its　quantity；　it　is　not　said　how　large　it　is；

consequently　its　conception　is　not　the　conception　of　a　maximum。　We

cogitate　in　it　merely　its　relation　to　an　arbitrarily　assumed　unit；

in　relation　to　which　it　is　greater　than　any　number。　Now；　just　as　the

unit　which　is　taken　is　greater　or　smaller；　the　infinite　will　be

greater　or　smaller；　but　the　infinity；　which　consists　merely　in　the

relation　to　this　given　unit；　must　remain　always　the　same；　although　the

absolute　quantity　of　the　whole　is　not　thereby　cognized。

　　The　true　（transcendental）　conception　of　infinity　is：　that　the

successive　synthesis　of　unity　in　the　measurement　of　a　given　quantum

can　never　be　completed。*　Hence　it　follows；　without　possibility　of

mistake；　that　an　eternity　of　actual　successive　states　up　to　a　given

（the　present）　moment　cannot　have　elapsed；　and　that　the　world　must

therefore　have　a　beginning。



　　*The　quantum　in　this　sense　contains　a　congeries　of　given　units；

which　is　greater　than　any　number…　and　this　is　the　mathematical

conception　of　the　infinite。



　　In　regard　to　the　second　part　of　the　thesis；　the　difficulty　as　to

an　infinite　and　yet　elapsed　series　disappears；　for　the　manifold　of　a

world　infinite　in　extension　is　contemporaneously　given。　But；　in

order　to　cogitate　the　total　of　this　manifold；　as　we　cannot　have　the

aid　of　limits　constituting　by　themselves　this　total　in　intuition；　we

are　obliged　to　give　some　account　of　our　conception；　which　in　this　case

cannot　proceed　from　the　whole　to　the　determined　quantity　of　the　parts；

but　must　demonstrate　the　possibility　of　a　whole　by　means　of　a

successive　synthesis　of　the　parts。　But　as　this　synthesis　must

constitute　a　series　that　cannot　be　completed；　it　is　impossible　for

us　to　cogitate　prior　to　it；　and　consequently　not　by　means　of　it；　a

totality。　For　the　conception　of　totality　itself　is　in　the　present　case

the　representation　of　a　completed　synthesis　of　the　parts；　and　this

completion；　and　consequently　its　conception；　is　impossible。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　THE　ANTITHESIS。



　　The　proof　in　favour　of　the　infinity　of　the　cosmical　succession　and

the　cosmical　content　is　based　upon　the　consideration　that；　in　the

opposite　case；　a　void　time　and　a　void　space　must　constitute　the　limits

of　the　world。　Now　I　am　not　unaware；　that　there　are　some　ways　of

escaping　this　conclusion。　It　may；　for　example；　be　alleged；　that　a

limit　to　the　world；　as　regards　both　space　and　time；　is　quite　possible；

without　at　the　same　time　holding　the　existence　of　an　absolute　time

before　the　beginning　of　the　world；　or　an　absolute　space　extending

beyond　the　actual　world…　which　is　impossible。　I　am　quite　well

satisfied　with　the　latter　part　of　this　opinion　of　the　philosophers

of　the　Leibnitzian　school。　Space　is　merely　the　form　of　external

intuition；　but　not　a　real　object　which　can　itself　be　externally

intuited；　it　is　not　a　correlate　of　phenomena；　it　is　the　form　of

phenomena　itself。　Space；　therefore；　cannot　be　regarded　as　absolutely

and　in　itself　something　determinative　of　the　existence　of　things；

because　it　is　not　itself　an　object；　but　only　the　form　of　possible

objects。　Consequently；　things；　as　phenomena；　determine　space；　that

is　to　say；　they　render　it　possible　that；　of　all　the　possible

predicates　of　space　（size　and　relation）；　certain　may　belong　to

reality。　But　we　cannot　affirm　the　converse；　that　space；　as　something

self…subsistent；　can　determine　real　things　in　regard　to　size　or　shape；

for　it　is　in　itself　not　a　real　thing。　Space　（filled　or　void）*　may

therefore　be　limited　by　phenomena；　but　phenomena　cannot　be　limited

by　an　empty　space　without　them。　This　is　true　of　time　also。　All　this

being　granted；　it　is　nevertheless　indisputable；　that　we　must　assume

these　two　nonentities；　void　space　without　and　void　time　before　the

world；　if　we　assume　the　existence　of　cosmical　limits；　relatively　to

space　or　time。



　　*It　is　evident　that　what　is　meant　here　is；　that　empty　space；　in　so

far　as　it　is　limited　by　phenomena…　space；　that　is；　within　the　world…

does　not　at　least　contradict　transcendental　principles；　and　may

therefore；　as　regards　them；　be　admitted；　although　its　possibility

cannot　on　that　account　be　affirmed。



　　For；　as　regards　the　subterfuge　adopted　by　those　who　endeavour　to

evade　the　consequence…　that；　if　the　world　is　limited　as　to　space　and

time；　the　infinite　void　must　determine　the　existence　of　actual

things　in　regard　to　their　dimensions…　it　arises　solely　from　the　fact

that　instead　of　a　sensuous　world；　an　intelligible　world…　of　which

nothing　is　known…　is　cogitated；　instead　of　a　real　beginning　（an

existence；　which　is　preceded　by　a　period　in　which　nothing　exists）；

an　existence　which　presupposes　no　other　condition　than　that　of　time；

and；　instead　of　limits　of　extension；　boundaries　of　the　universe。　But

the　question　relates　to　the　mundus　phaenomenon；　and　its　quantity；

and　in　this　case　we　cannot　make　abstraction　of　the　conditions　of

sensibility；　without　doing　away　with　the　essential　reality　of　this

world　itself。　The　world　of　sense；　if　it　is　limited；　must　necessarily

lie　in　the　infinite　void。　If　this；　and　with　it　space　as　the　a　priori

condition　of　the　possibility　of　phenomena；　is　left　out　of　view；　the

whole　world　of　sense　disappears。　In　our　problem　is　this　alone

considered　as　given。　The　mundus　intelligibilis　is　nothing　but　the

general　conception　of　a　world；　in　which　abstraction　has　been　made　of

all　conditions　of　intuition；　and　in　relation　to　which　no　synthetical

proposition…　either　affirmative　or　negative…　is　possible。





　　　　　　　　　SECOND　CONFLICT　OF　TRANSCENDENTAL　IDEAS。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　THESIS。



　　Every　composite　substance　in　the　world　consists　of　simple　parts；　and

there　exists　nothing　that　is　not　either　itself　simple；　or　composed

of　simple　parts。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PROOF。



　　For；　grant　that　composite　substances　do　not　consist　of　simple　parts；

in　this　case；　if　all　combination　or　composition　were　annihilated　in

thought；　no　composite　part；　and　（as；　by　the　supposition；　there　do

not　exist　simple　parts）　no　simple　part　would　exist。　Consequently；　no

substance；　consequently；　nothing　would　exist。　Either；　then；　it　is

impossible　to　annihilate　composition　in　thought；　or；　after　such

annihilation；　there　must　remain　something　that　subsists　without

composition；　that　is；　something　that　is　simple。　But　in　the　former　case

the　composite　could　not　itself　consist　of　substances；　because　with

substances　composition　is　merely　a　contingent　relation；　apart　from

which　they　must　still　exist　as　self…subsistent　beings。　Now；　as　this

case　contradicts　the　supposition；　the　second　must　contain　the　truth…

that　the　substantial　composite　in　the　world　consists　of　simple　parts。

　　It　follows；　as　an　immediate　inference；　that　the　things　in　the

world　are　all；　without　exception；　simple　beings…　that　composition　is

merely　an　external　condition　pertaining　to　them…　and　that；　although　we

never　can　separate　and　isolate　the　elementary　substances　from　the

state　of　composition；　reason　must　cogitate　these　as　the　primary

subjects　of　all　composition；　and　consequently；　as　prior　thereto…　and

as　simple　substances。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ANTITHESIS。



　　No　composite　thing　in　the　world　consists　of　simple　parts；　and

there　does　not　exist　in　the　world　any　simple　substance。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PROOF。



　　Let　it　be　supposed　that　a　composite　thing　（as　substance）　consists　of

simple　parts。　Inasmuch　as　all　exter