representative government-第17部分

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derable；　majority　of　the　House　of　Commons　who　never　desire　to　move　an　amendment　or　make　a　speech　would　no　longer　leave　the　whole　regulation　of　business　to　those　who　do；　if　they　would　bethink　themselves　that　better　qualifications　for　legislation　exist；　and　may　be　found　if　sought　for；　than　a　fluent　tongue　and　the　faculty　of　getting　elected　by　a　constituency；　it　would　soon　be　recognised　that；　in　legislation　as　well　as　administration；　the　only　task　to　which　a　representative　assembly　can　possibly　be　competent　is　not　that　of　doing　the　work；　but　of　causing　it　to　be　done；　of　determining　to　whom　or　to　what　sort　of　people　it　shall　be　confided；　and　giving　or　withholding　the　national　sanction　to　it　when　performed。　Any　government　fit　for　a　high　state　of　civilisation　would　have　as　one　of　its　fundamental　elements　a　small　body；　not　exceeding　in　number　the　members　of　a　Cabinet；　who　should　act　as　a　Commission　of　legislation；　having　for　its　appointed　office　to　make　the　laws。　If　the　laws　of　this　country　were；　as　surely　they　will　soon　be；　revised　and　put　into　a　connected　form；　the　Commission　of　Codification　by　which　this　is　effected　should　remain　as　a　permanent　institution；　to　watch　over　the　work；　protect　it　from　deterioration；　and　make　further　improvements　as　often　as　required。　No　one　would　wish　that　this　body　should　of　itself　have　any　power　of　enacting　laws：　the　Commission　would　only　embody　the　element　of　intelligence　in　their　construction；　Parliament　would　represent　that　of　will。　No　measure　would　become　a　law　until　expressly　sanctioned　by　Parliament：　and　Parliament；　or　either　House；　would　have　the　power　not　only　of　rejecting　but　of　sending　back　a　Bill　to　the　Commission　for　reconsideration　or　improvement。　Either　House　might　also　exercise　its　initiative；　by　referring　any　subject　to　the　Commission；　with　directions　to　prepare　a　law。　The　Commission；　of　course；　would　have　no　power　of　refusing　its　instrumentality　to　any　legislation　which　the　country　desired。　Instructions；　concurred　in　by　both　Houses；　to　draw　up　a　Bill　which　should　effect　a　particular　purpose；　would　be　imperative　on　the　Commissioners；　unless　they　preferred　to　resign　their　office。　Once　framed；　however；　Parliament　should　have　no　power　to　alter　the　measure；　but　solely　to　pass　or　reject　it；　or；　if　partially　disapproved　of；　remit　it　to　the　Commission　for　reconsideration。　The　Commissioners　should　be　appointed　by　the　Crown；　but　should　hold　their　offices　for　a　time　certain；　say　five　years；　unless　removed　on　an　address　from　the　two　Houses　of　Parliament；　grounded　either　on　personal　misconduct　（as　in　the　case　of　judges）；　or　on　refusal　to　draw　up　a　Bill　in　obedience　to　the　demands　of　Parliament。　At　the　expiration　of　the　five　years　a　member　should　cease　to　hold　office　unless　reappointed；　in　order　to　provide　a　convenient　mode　of　getting　rid　of　those　who　had　not　been　found　equal　to　their　duties；　and　of　infusing　new　and　younger　blood　into　the　body。　　　The　necessity　of　some　provision　corresponding　to　this　was　felt　even　in　the　Athenian　Democracy；　where；　in　the　time　of　its　most　complete　ascendancy；　the　popular　Ecclesia　could　pass　Psephisms　（mostly　decrees　on　single　matters　of　policy）；　but　laws；　so　called；　could　only　be　made　or　altered　by　a　different　and　less　numerous　body；　renewed　annually；　called　the　Nomothetae；　whose　duty　it　also　was　to　revise　the　whole　of　the　laws；　and　keep　them　consistent　with　one　another。　In　the　English　Constitution　there　is　great　difficulty　in　introducing　any　arrangement　which　is　new　both　in　form　and　in　substance；　but　comparatively　little　repugnance　is　felt　to　the　attainment　of　new　purposes　by　an　adaptation　of　existing　forms　and　traditions。　　　It　appears　to　me　that　the　means　might　be　devised　of　enriching　the　Constitution　with　this　great　improvement　through　the　machinery　of　the　House　of　Lords。　A　Commission　for　preparing　Bills　would　in　itself　be　no　more　an　innovation　on　the　Constitution　than　the　Board　for　the　administration　of　the　Poor　Laws；　or　the　Inclosure　Commission。　If；　in　consideration　of　the　great　importance　and　dignity　of　the　trust；　it　were　made　a　rule　that　every　person　appointed　a　member　of　the　Legislative　Commission；　unless　removed　from　office　on　an　address　from　Parliament；　should　be　a　Peer　for　life；　it　is　probable　that　the　same　good　sense　and　taste　which　leave　the　judicial　functions　of　the　Peerage　practically　to　the　exclusive　care　of　the　law　lords；　would　leave　the　business　of　legislation；　except　on　questions　involving　political　principles　and　interests；　to　the　professional　legislators；　that　Bills　originating　in　the　Upper　House　would　always　be　drawn　up　by　them；　that　the　Government　would　devolve　on　them　the　framing　of　all　its　Bills；　and　that　private　members　of　the　House　of　Commons　would　gradually　find　it　convenient；　and　likely　to　facilitate　the　passing　of　their　measures　through　the　two　Houses；　if　instead　of　bringing　in　a　Bill　and　submitting　it　directly　to　the　House；　they　obtained　leave　to　introduce　it　and　have　it　referred　to　the　Legislative　Commission。　For　it　would；　of　course；　be　open　to　the　House　to　refer　for　the　consideration　of　that　body　not　a　subject　merely；　but　any　specific　proposal；　or　a　Draft　of　a　Bill　in　extenso；　when　any　member　thought　himself　capable　of　preparing　one　such　as　ought　to　pass；　and　the　House　would　doubtless　refer　every　such　draft　to　the　Commission；　if　only　as　materials；　and　for　the　benefit　of　the　suggestions　it　might　contain：　as　they　would；　in　like　manner；　refer　every　amendment　or　objection　which　might　be　proposed　in　writing　by　any　member　of　the　House　after　a　measure　had　left　the　Commissioners'　hands。　The　alteration　of　Bills　by　a　Committee　of　the　whole　House　would　cease；　not　by　formal　abolition；　but　by　desuetude；　the　right　not　being　abandoned；　but　laid　up　in　the　same　armoury　with　the　royal　veto；　the　right　of　withholding　the　supplies；　and　other　ancient　instruments　of　political　warfare；　which　no　one　desires　to　see　used；　but　no　one　likes　to　part　with；　lest　they　should　any　time　be　found　to　be　still　needed　in　an　extraordinary　emergency。　By　such　arrangements　as　these；　legislation　would　assume　its　proper　place　as　a　work　of　skilled　labour　and　special　study　and　experience；　while　the　most　important　liberty　of　the　nation；　that　of　being　governed　only　by　laws　assented　to　by　its　elected　representatives；　would　be　fully　preserved；　and　made　more　valuable　by　being　detached　from　the　serious；　but　by　no　means　unavoidable；　drawbacks　which　now　accompany　it　in　the　form　of　ignorant　and　ill…considered　legislation。　　　Instead　of　the　function　of　governing；　for　which　it　is　radically　unfit；　the　proper　office　of　a　representative　assembly　is　to　watch　and　control　the　government：　to　throw　the　light　of　publicity　on　its　acts：　to　compel　a　full　exposition　and　justification　of　all　of　them　which　any　one　considers　questionable；　to　censure　them　if　found　condemnable；　and；　if　the　men　who　compose　the　government　abuse　their　trust；　or　fulfil　it　in　a　manner　which　conflicts　with　the　deliberate　sense　of　the　nation；　to　expel　them　from　office；　and　either　expressly　or　virtually　appoint　their　successors。　This　is　surely　ample　power；　and　security　enough　for　the　liberty　of　the　nation。　In　addition　to　this；　the　Parliament　has　an　office；　not　inferior　even　to　this　in　importance；　to　be　at　once　the　nation's　Committee　of　Grievances；　and　its　Congress　of　Opinions；　an　arena　in　which　not　only　the　general　opinion　of　the　nation；　but　that　of　every　section　of　it；　and　as　far　as　possible　of　every　eminent　individual　whom　it　contains；　can　produce　itself　in　full　light　and　challenge　discussion；　where　every　person　in　the　country　may　count　upon　finding　somebody　who　speaks　his　mind；　as　well　or　better　than　he　could　speak　it　himself…　not　to　friends　and　partisans　exclusively；　but　in　the　face　of　opponents；　to　be　tested　by　adverse　controversy；　where　those　whose　opinion　is　overruled；　feel　satisfied　that　it　is　heard；　and　set　aside　not　by　a　mere　act　of　will；　but　for　what　are　thought　superior　reasons；　and　commend　themselves　as　such　to　the　representatives　of　the　majority　of　the　nation；　where　every　party　or　opinion　in　the　country　can　muster　its　strength；　and　be　cured　of　any　illusion　concerning　the　number　or　power　of　its　adherents；　where　the　opinion　which　prevails　in　the　nation　makes　itself　manifest　as　prevailing；　and　marshals　its　hosts　in　the　presence　of　the　government；　which　is　thus　enabled　and　compelled　to　give　way　to　it　on　the　mere　manifestation；　without　the　actual　employment；　of　its　strength；　where　statesmen　can　assure　themselves；　far　more　certainly　than　by　any　other　signs；　what　elements　of　opinion　and　power　are　growing；　and　what　declining；　and　are　enabled　to　shape　their　measures　with　some　regard　not　solely　to　present　exigencies；　but　to　tendencies　in　progress。　　　Representative　assemblies　are　often　taunted　by　their　enemies　with　being　places　of　mere　talk　and　bavardage。　There　has　seldom　been　more　misplaced　derision。　I　know　not　how　a　representative　assembly　can　more　usefully　employ　itself　than　in　talk；　when　the　subject　of　talk　is　the　great　public　interests　of　the　country；　and　every　sentence　of　it　represents　the　opinion　either　of　some　important　body　of　persons　in　the　nation；　or　of　an　individual　in　whom　some　such　body　have　reposed　their　confidence。　A　place　where　every　interest　and　shade　of　opinion　in　the　country　can　have　its　cause　even　passionately　pleaded；　in　the　face　of　the　government　and　of　all　other　interests　and　opinions；　can　compel　them　to　listen；　and　either　comply；　or　state　clearly　why　they　do　not；　is　in　itself；　if　it　answered　no　other　purpose；　one　of　the　most　important　political　institutions　that　can　exist　anywhere；　and　one　of　the　foremost　benefits　of　free　government。　Such　〃talking〃　would　never　be　looked　upon　with　disparagement　if　it　were　not　allowed　to　stop　〃doing〃；　which　it　never　would；　if　assemblies　knew　and　acknowledged　that　talking　and　discussion　are　their　proper　business；　while　doing；　as　the　result　of　discussion；　is　the　task　not　of　a　miscellaneous　body；　but　of　individuals　specially　trained　to　it；　that　the　fit　office　of　an　assembly　is　to　see　that　those　individuals　are　honestly　and　intelligently　chosen；　and　to　interfere　no　further　with　them；　except　by　unlimited　latitude　of　suggestion　and　criticism；　and　by　applying　or　withholding　the　final　seal　of　national　assent。　It　is　for　want　of　this　judicious　reserve　that　popular　assemblies　attempt　to　do　what　they　ca