representative government-第21部分

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t　would　be　for　him　if　he　were　an　eagle。　　　Now　it　is　a　universally　observed　fact　that　the　two　evil　dispositions　in　question；　the　disposition　to　prefer　a　man's　selfish　interests　to　those　which　he　shares　with　other　people；　and　his　immediate　and　direct　interests　to　those　which　are　indirect　and　remote；　are　characteristics　most　especially　called　forth　and　fostered　by　the　possession　of　power。　The　moment　a　man；　or　a　class　of　men；　find　themselves　with　power　in　their　hands；　the　man's　individual　interest；　or　the　class's　separate　interest；　acquires　an　entirely　new　degree　of　importance　in　their　eyes。　Finding　themselves　worshipped　by　others；　they　become　worshippers　of　themselves；　and　think　themselves　entitled　to　be　counted　at　a　hundred　times　the　value　of　other　people；　while　the　facility　they　acquire　of　doing　as　they　like　without　regard　to　consequences　insensibly　weakens　the　habits　which　make　men　look　forward　even　to　such　consequences　as　affect　themselves。　This　is　the　meaning　of　the　universal　tradition；　grounded　on　universal　experience；　of　men's　being　corrupted　by　power。　Every　one　knows　how　absurd　it　would　be　to　infer　from　what　a　man　is　or　does　when　in　a　private　station；　that　he　will　be　and　do　exactly　the　like　when　a　despot　on　a　throne；　where　the　bad　parts　of　his　human　nature；　instead　of　being　restrained　and　kept　in　subordination　by　every　circumstance　of　his　life　and　by　every　person　surrounding　him；　are　courted　by　all　persons；　and　ministered　to　by　all　circumstances。　It　would　be　quite　as　absurd　to　entertain　a　similar　expectation　in　regard　to　a　class　of　men；　the　Demos；　or　any　other。　Let　them　be　ever　so　modest　and　amenable　to　reason　while　there　is　a　power　over　them　stronger　than　they；　we　ought　to　expect　a　total　change　in　this　respect　when　they　themselves　become　the　strongest　power。　　　Governments　must　be　made　for　human　beings　as　they　are；　or　as　they　are　capable　of　speedily　becoming：　and　in　any　state　of　cultivation　which　mankind；　or　any　class　among　them；　have　yet　attained；　or　are　likely　soon　to　attain；　the　interests　by　which　they　will　be　led；　when　they　are　thinking　only　of　self…interest；　will　be　almost　exclusively　those　which　are　obvious　at　first　sight；　and　which　operate　on　their　present　condition。　It　is　only　a　disinterested　regard　for　others；　and　especially　for　what　comes　after　them；　for　the　idea　of　posterity；　of　their　country；　or　of　mankind；　whether　grounded　on　sympathy　or　on　a　conscientious　feeling；　which　ever　directs　the　minds　and　purposes　of　classes　or　bodies　of　men　towards　distant　or　unobvious　interests。　And　it　cannot　be　maintained　that　any　form　of　government　would　be　rational　which　required　as　a　condition　that　these　exalted　principles　of　action　should　be　the　guiding　and　master　motives　in　the　conduct　of　average　human　beings。　A　certain　amount　of　conscience；　and；　of　disinterested　public　spirit；　may　fairly　be　calculated　on　in　the　citizens　of　any　community　ripe　for　representative　government。　But　it　would　be　ridiculous　to　expect　such　a　degree　of　it；　combined　with　such　intellectual　discernment；　as　would　be　proof　against　any　plausible　fallacy　tending　to　make　that　which　was　for　their　class　interest　appear　the　dictate　of　justice　and　of　the　general　good。　　　We　all　know　what　specious　fallacies　may　be　urged　in　defence　of　every　act　of　injustice　yet　proposed　for　the　imaginary　benefit　of　the　mass。　We　know　how　many；　not　otherwise　fools　or　bad　men；　have　thought　it　justifiable　to　repudiate　the　national　debt。　We　know　how　many；　not　destitute　of　ability；　and　of　considerable　popular　influence；　think　it　fair　to　throw　the　whole　burthen　of　taxation　upon　savings；　under　the　name　of　realised　property；　allowing　those　whose　progenitors　and　themselves　have　always　spent　all　they　received　to　remain；　as　a　reward　for　such　exemplary　conduct；　wholly　untaxed。　We　know　what　powerful　arguments；　the　more　dangerous　because　there　is　a　portion　of　truth　in　them；　may　be　brought　against　all　inheritance；　against　the　power　of　bequest；　against　every　advantage　which　one　person　seems　to　have　over　another。　We　know　how　easily　the　uselessness　of　almost　every　branch　of　knowledge　may　be　proved；　to　the　complete　satisfaction　of　those　who　do　not　possess　it。　How　many；　not　altogether　stupid　men；　think　the　scientific　study　of　languages　useless；　think　ancient　literature　useless；　all　erudition　useless；　logic　and　metaphysics　useless；　poetry　and　the　fine　arts　idle　and　frivolous；　political　economy　purely　mischievous？　Even　history　has　been　pronounced　useless　and　mischievous　by　able　men。　Nothing　but　that　acquaintance　with　external　nature；　empirically　acquired；　which　serves　directly　for　the　production　of　objects　necessary　to　existence　or　agreeable　to　the　senses；　would　get　its　utility　recognised　if　people　had　the　least　encouragement　to　disbelieve　it。　Is　it　reasonable　to　think　that　even　much　more　cultivated　minds　than　those　of　the　numerical　majority　can　be　expected　to　be　will　have　so　delicate　a　conscience；　and　so　just　an　appreciation　of　what　is　against　their　own　apparent　interest；　that　they　will　reject　these　and　the　innumerable　other　fallacies　which　will　press　in　upon　them　from　all　quarters　as　soon　as　they　come　into　power；　to　induce　them　to　follow　their　own　selfish　inclinations　and　short…sighted　notions　of　their　own　good；　in　opposition　to　justice；　at　the　expense　of　all　other　classes　and　of　posterity？　　　One　of　the　greatest　dangers；　therefore；　of　democracy；　as　of　all　other　forms　of　government；　lies　in　the　sinister　interest　of　the　holders　of　power：　it　is　the　danger　of　class　legislation；　of　government　intended　for　（whether　really　effecting　it　or　not）　the　immediate　benefit　of　the　dominant　class；　to　the　lasting　detriment　of　the　whole。　And　one　of　the　most　important　questions　demanding　consideration；　in　determining　the　best　constitution　of　a　representative　government；　is　how　to　provide　efficacious　securities　against　this　evil。　　　If　we　consider　as　a　class；　politically　speaking；　any　number　of　persons　who　have　the　same　sinister　interest…　that　is；　whose　direct　and　apparent　interest　points　towards　the　same　description　of　bad　measures；　the　desirable　object　would　be　that　no　class；　and　no　combination　of　classes　likely　to　combine；　should　be　able　to　exercise　a　preponderant　influence　in　the　government。　A　modern　community；　not　divided　within　itself　by　strong　antipathies　of　race；　language；　or　nationality；　may　be　considered　as　in　the　main　divisible　into　two　sections；　which；　in　spite　of　partial　variations；　correspond　on　the　whole　with　two　divergent　directions　of　apparent　interest。　Let　us　call　them　（in　brief　general　terms）　labourers　on　the　one　hand；　employers　of　labour　on　the　other：　including　however　along　with　employers　of　labour；　not　only　retired　capitalists；　and　the　possessors　of　inherited　wealth；　but　all　that　highly　paid　description　of　labourers　（such　as　the　professions）　whose　education　and　way　of　life　assimilate　them　with　the　rich；　and　whose　prospect　and　ambition　it　is　to　raise　themselves　into　that　class。　With　the　labourers；　on　the　other　hand；　may　be　ranked　those　smaller　employers　of　labour；　who　by　interests；　habits；　and　educational　impressions　are　assimilated　in　wishes；　tastes；　and　objects　to　the　labouring　classes；　comprehending　a　large　proportion　of　petty　tradesmen。　In　a　state　of　society　thus　composed；　if　the　representative　system　could　be　made　ideally　perfect；　and　if　it　were　possible　to　maintain　it　in　that　state；　its　organisation　must　be　such　that　these　two　classes；　manual　labourers　and　their　affinities　on　one　side；　employers　of　labour　and　their　affinities　on　the　other；　should　be；　in　the　arrangement　of　the　representative　system；　equally　balanced；　each　influencing　about　an　equal　number　of　votes　in　Parliament：　since；　assuming　that　the　majority　of　each　class；　in　any　difference　between　them；　would　be　mainly　governed　by　their　class　interests；　there　would　be　a　minority　of　each　in　whom　that　consideration　would　be　subordinate　to　reason；　justice；　and　the　good　of　the　whole；　and　this　minority　of　either；　joining　with　the　whole　of　the　other；　would　turn　the　scale　against　any　demands　of　their　own　majority　which　were　not　such　as　ought　to　prevail。　　　The　reason　why；　in　any　tolerable　constituted　society；　justice　and　the　general　interest　mostly　in　the　end　carry　their　point；　is　that　the　separate　and　selfish　interests　of　mankind　are　almost　always　divided；　some　are　interested　in　what　is　wrong；　but　some；　also；　have　their　private　interest　on　the　side　of　what　is　right：　and　those　who　are　governed　by　higher　considerations；　though　too　few　and　weak　to　prevail　against　the　whole　of　the　others；　usually　after　sufficient　discussion　and　agitation　become　strong　enough　to　turn　the　balance　in　favour　of　the　body　of　private　interests　which　is　on　the　same　side　with　them。　The　representative　system　ought　to　be　so　constituted　as　to　maintain　this　state　of　things：　it　ought　not　to　allow　any　of　the　various　sectional　interests　to　be　so　powerful　as　to　be　capable　of　prevailing　against　truth　and　justice　and　the　other　sectional　interests　combined。　There　ought　always　to　be　such　a　balance　preserved　among　personal　interests　as　may　render　any　one　of　them　dependent　for　its　successes　on　carrying　with　it　at　least　a　large　proportion　of　those　who　act　on　higher　motives　and　more　comprehensive　and　distant　views。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　7　　　　　　Of　True　and　False　Democracy；　Representation　of　All；　and　Representation　of　the　Majority　only。

　　IT　HAS　been　seen　that　the　dangers　incident　to　a　representative　democracy　are　of　two　kinds：　danger　of　a　low　grade　of　intelligence　in　the　representative　body；　and　in　the　popular　opinion　which　controls　it；　and　danger　of　class　legislation　on　the　part　of　the　numerical　majority；　these　being　all　composed　of　the　same　class。　We　have　next　to　consider　how　far　it　is　possible　so　to　organise　the　democracy　as；　without　interfering　materially　with　the　characteristic　benefits　of　democratic　government；　to　do　away　with　these　two　great　evils；　or　at　least　to　abate　them；　in　the　utmost　degree　attainable　by　human　contrivance。　　　The　common　mode　of　attempting　this　is　by　limiting　the　democratic　character　of　the　representation；　through　a　more　or　less　restricted　suffrage。　But　there　is　a　previous　consideration　which；　duly　kept　in　view；　considerably　modifies　the　circumstances　which　are　supposed　to　render　such　a　restriction　necessary。　A　completely　equal　democracy；　in　a　nation　in　which　a　single　c