representative government-第6部分

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ublicity　which　allows　observation　and　criticism　of　whatever　is　amiss；　the　liberty　of　discussion　and　censure　through　the　press；　the　mode　of　taking　evidence；　according　as　it　is　well　or　ill　adapted　to　elicit　truth；　the　facilities；　whatever　be　their　amount；　for　obtaining　access　to　the　tribunals；　the　arrangements　for　detecting　crimes　and　apprehending　offenders；…　all

these　things　are　not　the　power；　but　the　machinery　for　bringing　the　power　into　contact　with　the　obstacle：　and　the　machinery　has　no　action　of　itself；　but　without　it　the　power；　let　it　be　ever　so　ample；　would　be　wasted　and　of　no　effect。　　　A　similar　distinction　exists　in　regard　to　the　constitution　of　the　executive　departments　of　administration。　Their　machinery　is　good；　when　the　proper　tests　are　prescribed　for　the　qualifications　of　officers；　the　proper　rules　for　their　promotion；　when　the　business　is　conveniently　distributed　among　those　who　are　to　transact　it；　a　convenient　and　methodical　order　established　for　its　transaction；　a　correct　and　intelligible　record　kept　of　it　after　being　transacted；　when　each　individual　knows　for　what　he　is　responsible；　and　is　known　to　others　as　responsible　for　it；　when　the　best…contrived　checks　are　provided　against　negligence；　favouritism；　or　jobbery；　in　any　of　the　acts　of　the　department。　But　political　checks　will　no　more　act　of　themselves　than　a　bridle　will　direct　a　horse　without　a　rider。　If　the　checking　functionaries　are　as　corrupt　or　as　negligent　as　those　whom　they　ought　to　check；　and　if　the　public；　the　mainspring　of　the　whole　checking　machinery；　are　too　ignorant；　too　passive；　or　too　careless　and　inattentive；　to　do　their　part；　little　benefit　will　be　derived　from　the　best　administrative　apparatus。　Yet　a　good　apparatus　is　always　preferable　to　a　bad。　It　enables　such　insufficient　moving　or　checking　power　as　exists　to　act　at　the　greatest　advantage；　and　without　it；　no　amount　of　moving　or　checking　power　would　be　sufficient。　Publicity；　for　instance；　is　no　impediment　to　evil　nor　stimulus　to　good　if　the　public　will　not　look　at　what　is　done；　but　without　publicity；　how　could　they　either　check　or　encourage　what　they　were　not　permitted　to　see？　The　ideally　perfect　constitution　of　a　public　office　is　that　in　which　the　interest　of　the　functionary　is　entirely　coincident　with　his　duty。　No　mere　system　will　make　it　so；　but　still　less　can　it　be　made　so　without　a　system；　aptly　devised　for　the　purpose。　　　What　we　have　said　of　the　arrangements　for　the　detailed　administration　of　the　government　is　still　more　evidently　true　of　its　general　constitution。　All　government　which　aims　at　being　good　is　an　organisation　of　some　part　of　the　good　qualities　existing　in　the　individual　members　of　the　community　for　the　conduct　of　its　collective　affairs。　A　representative　constitution　is　a　means　of　bringing　the　general　standard　of　intelligence　and　honesty　existing　in　the　community；　and　the　individual　intellect　and　virtue　of　its　wisest　members；　more　directly　to　bear　upon　the　government；　and　investing　them　with　greater　influence　in　it；　than　they　would　in　general　have　under　any　other　mode　of　organisation；　though；　under　any；　such　influence　as　they　do　have　is　the　source　of　all　good　that　there　is　in　the　government；　and　the　hindrance　of　every　evil　that　there　is　not。　The　greater　the　amount　of　these　good　qualities　which　the　institutions　of　a　country　succeed　in　organising；　and　the　better　the　mode　of　organisation；　the　better　will　be　the　government。　　　We　have　now；　therefore；　obtained　a　foundation　for　a　twofold　division　of　the　merit　which　any　set　of　political　institutions　can　possess。　It　consists　partly　of　the　degree　in　which　they　promote　the　general　mental　advancement　of　the　community；　including　under　that　phrase　advancement　in　intellect；　in　virtue；　and　in　practical　activity　and　efficiency；　and　partly　of　the　degree　of　perfection　with　which　they　organise　the　moral；　intellectual；　and　active　worth　already　existing；　so　as　to　operate　with　the　greatest　effect　on　public　affairs。　A　government　is　to　be　judged　by　its　action　upon　men；　and　by　its　action　upon　things；　by　what　it　makes　of　the　citizens；　and　what　it　does　with　them；　its　tendency　to　improve　or　deteriorate　the　people　themselves；　and　the　goodness　or　badness　of　the　work　it　performs　for　them；　and　by　means　of　them。　Government　is　at　once　a　great　influence　acting　on　the　human　mind；　and　a　set　of　organised　arrangements　for　public　business：　in　the　first　capacity　its　beneficial　action　is　chiefly　indirect；　but　not　therefore　less　vital；　while　its　mischievous　action　may　be　direct。　　　The　difference　between　these　two　functions　of　a　government　is　not；　like　that　between　Order　and　Progress；　a　difference　merely　in　degree；　but　in　kind。　We　must　not；　however；　suppose　that　they　have　no　intimate　connection　with　one　another。　The　institutions　which　ensure　the　best　management　of　public　affairs　practicable　in　the　existing　state　of　cultivation　tend　by　this　alone　to　the　further　improvement　of　that　state。　A　people　which　had　the　most　just　laws；　the　purest　and　most　efficient　judicature；　the　most　enlightened　administration；　the　most　equitable　and　least　onerous　system　of　finance；　compatible　with　the　stage　it　had　attained　in　moral　and　intellectual　advancement；　would　be　in　a　fair　way　to　pass　rapidly　into　a　higher　stage。　Nor　is　there　any　mode　in　which　political　institutions　can　contribute　more　effectually　to　the　improvement　of　the　people　than　by　doing　their　more　direct　work　well。　And；　reversely；　if　their　machinery　is　so　badly　constructed　that　they　do　their　own　particular　business　ill；　the　effect　is　felt　in　a　thousand　ways　in　lowering　the　morality　and　deadening　the　intelligence　and　activity　of　the　people。　But　the　distinction　is　nevertheless　real；　because　this　is　only　one　of　the　means　by　which　political　institutions　improve　or　deteriorate　the　human　mind；　and　the　causes　and　modes　of　that　beneficial　or　injurious　influence　remain　a　distinct　and　much　wider　subject　of　study。　　　Of　the　two　modes　of　operation　by　which　a　form　of　government　or　set　of　political　institutions　affects　the　welfare　of　the　community…　its　operation　as　an　agency　of　national　education；　and　its　arrangements　for　conducting　the　collective　affairs　of　the　community　in　the　state　of　education　in　which　they　already　are；　the　last　evidently　varies　much　less；　from　difference　of　country　and　state　of　civilisation；　than　the　first。　It　has　also　much　less　to　do　with　the　fundamental　constitution　of　the　government。　The　mode　of　conducting　the　practical　business　of　government；　which　is　best　under　a　free　constitution；　would　generally　be　best　also　in　an　absolute　monarchy：　only　an　absolute　monarchy　is　not　so　likely　to　practise　it。　The　laws　of　property；　for　example；　the　principles　of　evidence　and　judicial　procedure；　the　system　of　taxation　and　of　financial　administration；　need　not　necessarily　be　different　in　different　forms　of　government。　Each　of　these　matters　has　principles　and　rules　of　its　own；　which　are　a　subject　of　separate　study。　General　jurisprudence；　civil　and　penal　legislation；　financial　and　commercial　policy；　are　sciences　in　themselves；　or　rather；　separate　members　of　the　comprehensive　science　or　art　of　government：　and　the　most　enlightened　doctrines　on　all　these　subjects；　though　not　equally　likely　to　be　understood；　or　acted　on　under　all　forms　of　government；　yet；　if　understood　and　acted　on；　would　in　general　be　equally　beneficial　under　them　all。　It　is　true　that　these　doctrines　could　not　be　applied　without　some　modifications　to　all　states　of　society　and　of　the　human　mind：　nevertheless；　by　far　the　greater　number　of　them　would　require　modifications　solely　of　details；　to　adapt　them　to　any　state　of　society　sufficiently　advanced　to　possess　rulers　capable　of　understanding　them。　A　government　to　which　they　would　be　wholly　unsuitable　must　be　one　so　bad　in　itself；　or　so　opposed　to　public　feeling；　as　to　be　unable　to　maintain　itself　in　existence　by　honest　means。　　　It　is　otherwise　with　that　portion　of　the　interests　of　the　community　which　relate　to　the　better　or　worse　training　of　the　people　themselves。　Considered　as　instrumental　to　this；　institutions　need　to　be　radically　different；　according　to　the　stage　of　advancement　already　reached。　The　recognition　of　this　truth；　though　for　the　most　part　empirically　rather　than　philosophically；　may　be　regarded　as　the　main　point　of　superiority　in　the　political　theories　of　the　present　above　those　of　the　last　age；　in　which　it　customary　to　claim　representative　democracy　for　England　or　France　by　arguments　which　would　equally　have　proved　it　the　only　fit　form　of　government　for　Bedouins　or　Malays。　The　state　of　different　communities；　in　point　of　culture　and　development；　ranges　downwards　to　a　condition　very　little　above　the　highest　of　the　beasts。　The　upward　range；　too；　is　considerable；　and　the　future　possible　extension　vastly　greater。　A　community　can　only　be　developed　out　of　one　of　these　states　into　a　higher　by　a　concourse　of　influences；　among　the　principal　of　which　is　the　government　to　which　they　are　subject。　In　all　states　of　human　improvement　ever　yet　attained；　the　nature　and　degree　of　authority　exercised　over　individuals；　the　distribution　of　power；　and　the　conditions　of　command　and　obedience；　are　the　most　powerful　of　the　influences；　except　their　religious　belief；　which　make　them　what　they　are；　and　enable　them　to　become　what　they　can　be。　They　may　be　stopped　short　at　any　point　in　their　progress　by　defective　adaptation　of　their　government　to　that　particular　stage　of　advancement。　And　the　one　indispensable　merit　of　a　government；　in　favour　of　which　it　may　be　forgiven　almost　any　amount　of　other　demerit　compatible　with　progress；　is　that　its　operation　on　the　people　is　favourable；　or　not　unfavourable；　to　the　next　step　which　it　is　necessary　for　them　to　take；　in　order　to　raise　themselves　to　a　higher　level。　　　Thus　（to　repeat　a　former　example）；　a　people　in　a　state　of　savage　independence；　in　which　every　one　lives　for　himself；　exempt；　unless　by　fits；　from　any　external　control；　is　practically　incapable　of　making　any　progress　in　civilisation　until　it　has　learnt　to　obey。　The　indispensable　virtue；　therefore；　in　a　government　which　establishes　itself　over　a　people　of　this　sort　is；　that　it　make　itself　obeyed。　To　enable　it　to　do　this；　the　constitution　of　the　government　must　be　nearly；　or　quite；　despotic。　A　constitution　in　any　degree　popular；　dependent　on　the　voluntary　surre