science of logic-第40部分

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the　difference　of　the　Notion；　but　on　account　of　the　objective　totality；　the　differentiated　moments
are　complete　and　self…subsistent　objects　which　consequently；　even　in　their　relation；　stand　to　one
another　only　as　self…subsistent　things　and　remain　external　to　one　another　in　every　combination。
This　is　what　constitutes　the　character　of　mechanism；　namely；　that　whatever　relation　obtains
between　the　things　combined；　this　relation　is　one　extraneous　to　them　that　does　not　concern　their
nature　at　all；　and　even　if　it　is　accompanied　by　a　semblance　of　unity　it　remains　nothing　more　than
composition；　mixture；　aggregation　and　the　like。　Spiritual　mechanism　also；　like　material；
consists　in　this；　that　the　things　related　in　the　spirit　remain　external　to　one　another　and　to　spirit　itself。
A　mechanical　style　of　thinking；　a　mechanical　memory；　habit；　a　mechanical　way　of　acting；
signify　that　the　peculiar　pervasion　and　presence　of　spirit　is　lacking　in　what　spirit　apprehends　or
does。　Although　its　theoretical　or　practical　mechanism　cannot　take　place　without　its　self…activity；
without　an　impulse　and　consciousness；　yet　there　is　lacking　in　it　the　freedom　of　individuality；　and
because　this　freedom　is　not　manifest　in　it　such　action　appears　as　a　merely　external　one。

A。　The　Mechanical　Object

The　object　is；　as　we　have　seen；　the　syllogism；　whose　mediation　has　been　sublated　＇ausgeglichen＇
and　has　therefore　become　an　immediate　identity。　It　is　therefore　in　and　for　itself　a　universal　—
universality　not　in　the　sense　of　a　community　of　properties；　but　a　universality　that　pervades　the
particularity　and　in　it　is　immediate　individuality。

1。　In　the　first　place　therefore　the　object　does　not　differentiate　itself　into　matter　and　form　—　a
matter　as　the　self…subsistent　universal　side　of　the　object　and　a　form　as　the　particular　and　individual
side；　such　an　abstract　difference　of　individuality　and　universality　is　excluded　by　the　Notion　of
object；　if　it　is　regarded　as　matter　it　must　be　taken　as　in　principle　formed　matter。　Similarly；　it　may　be
defined　as　a　thing　with　properties；　as　a　whole　consisting　of　parts；　as　a　substance　with　accidents；　or
in　terms　of　other　relationships　of　reflection；　but　these　relationships　have　been　altogether
superseded　already　in　the　Notion；　the　object　therefore　has　neither　properties　nor　accidents；　for
these　are　separable　from　the　thing　or　the　substance；　whereas　in　the　object　the　particularity　is
absolutely　reflected　into　the　totality。　In　the　parts　of　a　whole；　there　is　indeed　present　that
self…subsistence　which　belongs　to　the　differences　of　the　object；　but　these　differences　are
themselves　directly　and　essentially　objects；　totalities；　that　are　not；　like　parts；　determined　as　such　in
contrast　to　the　whole。

The　object　is　therefore　in　the　first　instance　indeterminate；　in　so　far　as　it　has　no　determinate
opposition　in　it；　for　it　is　the　mediation　that　has　collapsed　into　immediate　identity。　In　so　far　as　the
Notion　is　essentially　determinate；　the　object　possesses　determinateness　as　a　manifoldness
which　though　complete　is　otherwise　indeterminate；　that　is；　contains　no　relationships；　and　which
constitutes　a　totality　that　at　first　is　similarly　no　further　determined；　sides　or　parts　that　may　be
distinguished　in　it　belong　to　an　external　reflection。　This　quite　indeterminate　difference　therefore
means　only　that　there　are　a　number　of　objects；　each　of　which　only　contains　its　determinateness
reflected　into　its　universality　and　does　not　reflect　itself　outwards。　Because　this　indeterminate
determinateness　is　essential　to　the　object；　the　latter　is　within　itself　a　plurality　of　this　kind；　and　must
therefore　be　regarded　as　a　composite　or　aggregate。　It　does　not　however　consist　of　atoms；　for
these　are　not　objects　because　they　are　not　totalities。　The　Leibnizian　monad　would　be　more　of　an
object　since　it　is　a　total　representation　of　the　world；　but　confined　within　its　intensive　subjectivity
it　is　supposed　at　least　to　be　essentially　one　within　itself。　Nevertheless；　the　monad　determined　as　an
exclusive　one　is　only　a　principle　that　reflection　assumes。　Yet　the　monad　is　an　object；　partly　in
that　the　ground　of　its　manifold　representations　—　of　the　developed；　that　is；　the　posited
determinations　of　its　merely　implicit　totality　lies　outside　it；　and　partly　also　in　that　it　is　indifferent
to　the　monad　that　it　constitutes　an　object　along　with　others；　it　is　thus　in　fact　not　exclusive　or
determined　for　itself。

2。　As　the　object；　then；　in　its　determined　being　is　a　totality　and　yet　on　account　of　its
indeterminateness　and　immediacy　is　not　the　negative　unity　of　that　determined　being；　it　is
indifferent　to　the　determinations　as　individual；　as　determined　in　and　for　themselves；　just　as
these　latter　are　themselves　indifferent　to　one　another。　These；　therefore；　are　not　comprehensible
from　it　nor　from　one　another；　its　totality　is　the　form　of　general　reflectedness　of　its　manifoldness　into
individuality　in　general　which　is　in　its　own　self　indeterminate。　The　determinatenesses；　therefore；　that
it　contains；　do　indeed　belong　to　it；　but　the　form　that　constitutes　their　difference　and　combines　them
into　a　unity　is　an　external；　indifferent　one；　whether　it　be　a　mixture；　or　again　an　order；　a　certain
arrangement　of　parts　and　sides；　all　these　are　combinations　that　are　indifferent　to　what　is　so
related。

Thus　the　object；　like　any　determinate　being　in　general；　has　the　determinateness　of　its　totality
outside　it　in　other　objects；　and　these　in　turn　have　theirs　outside　them；　and　so　on　to　infinity。　The
return…into…self　of　this　progression　to　infinity　must　indeed　likewise　be　assumed　and　represented　as
a　totality；　a　world；　but　that　world　is　nothing　but　the　universality　that　is　confined　within　itself　by
indeterminate　individuality；　that　is；　a　universe。

The　object；　therefore；　being　in　its　determinateness　equally　indifferent　to　it；　it　is　the　object's　own
nature　that　points　it　outside　and　beyond　itself　to　other　objects　for　its　determination；　but　to　these
others；　their　determinant　function　is　similarly　a　matter　of　indifference。　Consequently；　a　principle
of　self…determination　is　nowhere　to　be　found；　determinism　—　the　standpoint　occupied　by
cognition　when　it　takes　the　object；　just　as　we　have　found　it　here；　to　be　the　truth　—　assigns　for　each
determination　of　the　object　that　of　another　object；　but　this　other　is　likewise　indifferent　both　to　its
being　determined　and　to　its　active　determining。　For　this　reason　determinism　itself　is　also
indeterminate　in　the　sense　that　it　involves　the　progression　to　infinity；　it　can　halt　and　be　satisfied　at
any　point　at　will；　because　the　object　it　has　reached　in　its　progress；　being　a　formal　totality；　is　shut　up
within　itself　and　indifferent　to　its　being　determined　by　another。　Consequently；　the　explanation　of
the　determination　of　an　object　and　the　progressive　determining　of　the　object　made　for　the　purpose
of　the　explanation；　is　only　an　empty　word；　since　in　the　other　object　to　which　it　advances　there
resides　no　self…determination。

3。　Now　as　the　determinateness　of　an　object　lies　in　an　other；　no　determinate　difference　is　to　be
found　between　them；　the　determinateness　is　merely　doubled；　once　in　one　object　and　again　in　the
other；　something　utterly　identical；　so　that　the　explanation　or　comprehension　is　tautological。　This
tautology　is　an　external　futile　see…saw；　since　the　determinateness　obtains　from　the　objects　which
are　indifferent　to　it　no　peculiar　distinctiveness　and　is　therefore　only　identical；　there　is　before　us　only
one　determinateness；　and　its　being　doubled　expresses　just　this　externality　and　nullity　of　a
difference。　But　at　the　same　time　the　objects　are　self…subsistent　in　regard　to　one　another；　therefore
in　the　identity　above…mentioned　they　remain　absolutely　external　to　one　another。　Here；　then；　we
have　the　manifest　contradiction　between　the　complete　mutual　indifference　of　the　objects　and　the
identity　of　their　determinateness；　or　the　contradiction　of　their　complete　externality　in　the
identity　of　their　determinateness。　This　contradiction　is；　therefore；　the　negative　unity　of　a　number
of　objects　which；　in　that　unity；　simply　repel　one　another：　this　is　the　mechanical　process。

B。　The　Mechanical　Process

If　objects　are　regarded　merely　as　self…enclosed　totalities；　they　cannot　act　on　one　another。　In　this
determination　they　are　the　same　thing　as　the　monads；　which　for　this　very　reason　were　thought　of
as　exercising　no　influence　whatever　on　one　another。　But　the　concept　of　a　monad　is；　just　for　this
reason；　a　defective　reflection。　For　first　it　is　a　determinate　conception　of　the　monad's　merely
implicit　totality；　as　a　certain　degree　of　the　development　and　positedness　of　its　representation　of
the　world；　it　is　determinate；　now　while　it　is　a　self…enclosed　totality；　it　is　also　indifferent　to　this
determinateness；　therefore　the　determinateness　is　not　its　own；　but　one　that　is　posited　by　another
object。　Secondly　it　is　an　immediate　in　general；　in　so　far　as　it　is　supposed　to　be　merely　a
mirroring　entity；　its　relation　to　itself　is　therefore　abstract　universality；　hence　it　is　a　determinate
being　open　to　others。　To　gain　the　freedom　of　substance　it　is　not　sufficient　to　represent　it　as　a
totality　that　is　complete　within　itself　and　has　nothing　to　receive　from　without。　On　the　contrary；
the　mechanical　＇begrifflose＇；　merely　mirrored　relation　to　itself　is　precisely　a　passivity　towards
another。　Similarly　determinateness；　whether　taken　as　the　determinateness　of　something　that　is　or
of　a　mirroring　entity；　that　is　a　degree　of　the　monad's　own　spontaneous　development；　is　something
external；　the　degree　that　the　development　reaches　has　its　limit　in　an　other。　To　shift　the　reciprocity
of　substances　on　to　a　predetermined　harmony　means　nothing　more　than　to　convert　it　into　a
presupposition；　that　is；　to　withdraw　it　from　the　Notion。　The　need　to　avoid　the　interaction　of
substances　was　based　on　the　moment　of　absolute　self…subsistence　and　originality　which　was
made　a　fundamental　assumption。　But　since　the　positedness；　the　degree　of　development；　does　not
correspond　to　this　in…itself；　it　has　for　that　very　reason　its　ground　in　an　other。

When　treating　of　the　relationship　of　substantiality；　we　showed　that　it　passes　over　into　the　causal
relationship。　But　here　what　is；