science of logic-第58部分

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universality　is　an　immediate　one；　and　for　that　reason　has　equally　the　significance　of　being；　for
being　is　precisely　this　abstract　relation…to…self。　Being　requires　no　further　derivation；　as　though　it
belonged　to　the　abstract　product　of　definition　only　because　it　is　taken　from　sensuous　intuition　or
elsewhere；　and　in　so　far　as　it　is　pointed　out　to　us。　This　pointing　out　and　derivation　is　a　matter　of
mediation；　which　is　more　than　a　mere　beginning；　and　is　a　mediation　of　a　kind　that　does　not　belong
to　a　comprehension　by　means　of　thinking；　but　is　the　elevation　of　ordinary　thinking；　of　the　empirical
and　ratiocinative　consciousness；　to　the　standpoint　of　thought。　According　to　the　current　opposition
of　thought　or　concept　and　being　it　is　regarded　as　an　important　truth　that　no　being　belongs　as　yet　to
the　former；　taken　on　its　own；　and　that　the　latter　has　a　ground　of　its　own　that　is　independent　of
thought。　But　the　simple　determination　of　being　is　in　itself　so　meagre　that；　if　only　for　that　reason；
there　is　no　need　to　make　much　fuss　about　it；　the　universal　is　immediately　itself　this　immediate；　since
as　abstract　it　also　is　merely　the　abstract　relation…to…self；　which　is　being。　As　a　matter　of　fact；　the
demand　that　being　should　be　exhibited　for　us　to　see　has　a　further；　inner　meaning　involving　more
than　this　abstract　determination；　what　is　meant　by　it　is　in　general　the　demand　for　the　realisation　of
the　Notion；　which　realisation　does　not　lie　in　the　beginning　itself；　but　is　rather　the　goal　and　the　task
of　the　entire　further　development　of　cognition。　Further；　since　the　content　of　the　beginning　is
supposed　to　be　justified　and　authenticated　as　something　true　or　correct　by　its　being　pointed　out　in
inner　or　outer　perception；　it　is　no　longer　the　form　of　universality　as　such　that　is　meant；　but　its
determinateness；　of　which　we　shall　need　to　speak　presently。　The　authentication　of　the
determinate　content　with　which　the　beginning　is　made　seems　to　lie　behind　it；　but　in　fact　it　is　to　be
considered　as　an　advance；　that　is；　if　it　belongs　to　philosophical　cognition。　

Hence　the　beginning　has　for　the　method　no　other　determinateness　than　that　of　being　simple　and
universal；　this　is　itself　the　determinateness　by　reason　of　which　it　is　deficient。　Universality　is　the　pure
simple　Notion；　and　the　method；　as　consciousness　of　the　Notion；　knows　that　universality　is　only　a
moment　and　that　in　it　the　Notion　is　not　yet　determined　in　and　for　itself。　But　with　this　consciousness
that　would　carry　the　beginning　further　only　for　the　sake　of　the　method；　the　method　would　be　a
formal　affair；　something　posited　in　external　reflection。　Since　however　it　is　the　objective　immanent
form；　the　immediate　of　the　beginning　must　be　in　its　own　self　deficient　and　endowed　with　the　urge
to　carry　itself　further。　But　in　the　absolute　method　the　universal　has　the　value　not　of　a　mere
abstraction　but　of　the　objective　universal；　that　is；　the　universal　that　is　in　itself　the　concrete
totality；　though　that　totality　is　not　yet　posited；　is　not　yet　for　itself。　Even　the　abstract　universal　as
such；　considered　in　its　Notion；　that　is　in　its　truth；　is　not　merely　the　simple；　but　as　abstract　is
already　posited　as　infected　with　a　negation。　For　this　reason　too　there　is　nothing；　whether　in
actuality　or　in　thought；　that　is　as　simple　and　as　abstract　as　is　commonly　imagined。　A　simple　thing
of　this　kind　is　a　mere　presumption　that　has　its　ground　solely　in　the　unconsciousness　of　what　is
actually　present。　Above；　that　with　which　the　beginning　is　made　was　determined　as　the　immediate；
the　immediacy　of　the　universal　is　the　same　thing　that　is　here　expressed　as　the　in…itself　that　is
without　a　being…for…self。　Hence　it　may　indeed　be　said　that　every　beginning　must　be　made　with　the
absolute；　just　as　all　advance　is　merely　the　exposition　of　it；　in　so　far　as　its　in…itself　is　the　Notion。
But　because　the　absolute　is　at　first　only　in　itself　it　equally　is　not　the　absolute　nor　the　posited
Notion；　and　also　not　the　Idea；　for　what　characterises　these　is　precisely　the　fact　that　in　them　the
in…itself　is　only　an　abstract；　one…sided　moment。　Hence　the　advance　is　not　a　kind　of　superfluity；
this　it　would　be　if　that　with　which　the　beginning　is　made　were　in　truth　already　the　absolute；　the
advance　consists　rather　in　the　universal　determining　itself　and　being　for　itself　the　universal；　that　is；
equally　an　individual　and　a　subject。　Only　in　its　consummation　is　it　the　absolute。　

It　is　to　be　recalled　that　the　beginning；　which　is　in　itself　a　concrete　totality；　may　as　beginning　also
be　free　and　its　immediacy　have　the　determination　of　an　external　existence；　the　germ　of　the
living　being　and　the　subjective　end　in　general　have　proved　themselves　to　be　such　beginnings　and
therefore　both　are　themselves　urges。　

The　non…spiritual　and　inanimate；　on　the　contrary；　are　the　Notion　only　as　real　possibility；　cause　is
the　highest　stage　in　which　the　concrete　Notion；　as　a　beginning　in　the　sphere　of　necessity　has　an
immediate　existence；　but　it　is　not　yet　a　subject　that　maintains　itself　as　such　even　in　its　actual
realisation。　The　sun；　for　example；　and　in　general　all　inanimate　things；　are　determinate　concrete
existences　in　which　real　possibility　remains　an　inner　totality　and　the　moments　of　the　totality　are　not
posited　in　subjective　form　in　them　and；　in　so　far　as　they　realise　themselves；　attain　an　existence　by
means　of　other　corporeal　individuals。　

2。　The　concrete　totality　which　makes　the　beginning　contains　as　such　within　itself　the　beginning　of
the　advance　and　development。　As　concrete；　it　is　differentiated　within　itself：　but　by　reason　of　its
first　immediacy　the　first　differentiated　determinations　are　in　the　first　instance　merely　a　diversity。　

The　immediate；　however；　as　self…related　universality；　as　subject；　is　also　the　unity　of　these　diverse
determinations。　This　reflection　is　the　first　stage　of　the　movement　onwards　…　the　emergence　of　real
difference；　judgement；　the　process　of　determining　in　general。　The　essential　point　is　that　the
absolute　method　finds　and　cognises　the　determination　of　the　universal　within　the　latter　itself。　The
procedure　of　the　finite　cognition　of　the　understanding　here　is　to　take　up　again；　equally　externally；
what　it　has　left　out　in　its　creation　of　the　universal　by　a　process　of　abstraction。　
The　absolute　method；　on　the　contrary；　does　not　behave　like　external　reflection　but　takes　the
determinate　element　from　its　own　subject　matter；　since　it　is　itself　that　subject　matter's　immanent
principle　and　soul。　This　is　what　Plato　demanded　of　cognition；　that　it　should　consider　things　in　and
for　themselves；　that　is；　should　consider　them　partly　in　their　universality；　but　also　that　it　should　not
stray　away　from　them　catching　at　circumstances；　examples　and　comparisons；　but　should　keep
before　it　solely　the　things　themselves　and　bring　before　consciousness　what　is　immanent　in　them。　

The　method　of　absolute　cognition　is　to　this　extent　analytic。　That　it　finds　the　further　determination
of　its　initial　universal　simply　and　solely　in　that　universal；　is　the　absolute　objectivity　of　the　Notion；　of
which　objectivity　the　method　is　the　certainty。　But　the　method　is　no　less　synthetic；　since　its　subject
matter；　determined　immediately　as　a　simple　universal；　by　virtue　of　the　determinateness　which　it
possesses　in　its　very　immediacy　and　universality；　exhibits　itself　as　an　other。　
This　relation　of　differential　elements　which　the　subject　matter　thus　is　within　itself；　is　however　no
longer　the　same　thing　as　is　meant　by　synthesis　in　finite　cognition；　the　mere　fact　of　the　subject
matter's　no　less　analytic　determination　in　general；　that　the　relation　is　relation　within　the　Notion；
completely　distinguishes　it　from　the　latter　synthesis。　
This　no　less　synthetic　than　analytic　moment　of　judgement；　by　which　the　universal　of　the　beginning
of　its　own　accord　determines　itself　as　the　other　of　itself；　is　to　be　named　the　dialectical　moment。


　　　　　　　　　　＇Lenin's　Summary　of　Dialectics　appears　at　this　point　in　Lenin's　annotations＇

Dialectic　is　one　of　those　ancient　sciences　that　have　been　most　misunderstood　in　the　metaphysics　of
the　moderns；　as　well　as　by　popular　philosophy　in　general；　ancient　and　modern　alike。　
Diogenes　Laertius　says　of　Plato　that；　just　as　Thales　was　the　founder　of　natural　philosophy　and
Socrates　of　moral　philosophy；　so　Plato　was　the　founder　of　the　third　science　pertaining　to
philosophy；　namely；　dialectic　…　a　service　which　the　ancient　world　esteemed　his　highest；　but　which
often　remains　quite　overlooked　by　those　who　have　most　to　say　about　him。　
Dialectic　has　often　been　regarded　as　an　art；　as　though　it　rested　on　a　subjective　talent　and　did　not
belong　to　the　objectivity　of　the　Notion。　The　shape　it　takes　and　the　result　it　reaches　in　Kantian
philosophy　have　already　been　pointed　out　in　the　specific　examples　of　the　Kantian　view　of　it。　It
must　be　regarded　as　a　step　of　infinite　importance　that　dialectic　is　once　more　recognised　as
necessary　to　reason；　although　the　result　to　be　drawn　from　it　must　be　the　opposite　of　that　arrived　at
by　Kant。　

Besides　the　fact　that　dialectic　is　generally　regarded　as　contingent；　it　usually　takes　the　following
more　precise　form。　It　is　shown　that　there　belongs　to　some　subject　matter　or　other；　for　example　the
world；　motion；　point；　and　so　on；　some　determination　or　other；　for　example　（taking　the　objects　in
the　order　named）；　finite　in　space　or　time；　presence　in　this　place；　absolute　negation　of　space；　but
further；　that　with　equal　necessity　the　opposite　determination　also　belongs　to　the　subject　matter；　for
example；　infinity　in　space　and　time；　non…presence　in　this　place；　relation　to　space　and　so　spatiality。
The　older　Eleatic　school　directed　its　dialectic　chiefly　against　motion。　Plato　frequently　against　the
general　ideas　and　notions　of　his　time；　especially　those　of　the　Sophists；　but　also　against　the　pure
categories　and　the　determinations　of　reflection；　the　more　cultivated　scepticism　of　a　later　period
extended　it　not　only　to　the　immediate　so…called　facts　of　consciousness　and　maxims　of　common　life；
but　also　to　all　the　notions　of　science。　

Now　the　conclusion　drawn　from　dialectic　of　this　kind　is　in　general　the　contradiction　and　nullity　of
the　assertion　made。　But　this　conclusion　can　be　drawn　in　either　of　two　sens