science of logic-第6部分

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which　this　science　is　to　be　considered。

When　logic　is　taken　as　the　science　of　thinking　in　general；　it　is　understood　that　this　thinking
constitutes　the　mere　form　of　a　cognition　that　logic　abstracts　from　all　content　and　that　the
so…called　second　constituent　belonging　to　cognition；　namely　its　matter；　must　come　from
somewhere　else；　and　that　since　this　matter　is　absolutely　independent　of　logic；　this　latter　can
provide　only　the　formal　conditions　of　genuine　cognition　and　cannot　in　its　own　self　contain　any　real
truth；　not　even　be　the　pathway　to　real　truth　because　just　that　which　is　essential　in　truth；　its　content；
lies　outside　logic。？

But　in　the　first　place；　it　is　quite　inept　to　say　that　logic　abstracts　from　all　content；　that　it　teaches　only
the　rules　of　thinking　without　any　reference　to　what　is　thought　or　without　being　able　to　consider　its
nature。　For　as　thinking　and　the　rules　of　thinking　are　supposed　to　be　the　subject　matter　of　logic；
these　directly　constitute　its　peculiar　content；　in　them；　logic　has　that　second　constituent；　a　matter；
about　the　nature　of　which　it　is　concerned。

But　secondly；　the　conceptions　on　which　the　Notion　of　logic　has　rested　hitherto　have　in　part　already
been　discarded；　and　for　the　rest；　it　is　time　that　they　disappeared　entirely　and　that　this　science　were
grasped　from　a　higher　standpoint　and　received　a　completely　changed　shape。

Hitherto；　the　Notion　of　logic　has　rested　on　the　separation；　presupposed　once　and　for　all　in　the
ordinary　consciousness；　of　the　content　of　cognition　and　its　form；　or　of　truth　and　certainty。　First；
it　is　assumed　that　the　material　of　knowing　is　present　on　its　own　account　as　a　ready…made　world
apart　from　thought；　that　thinking　on　its　own　is　empty　and　comes　as　an　external　form　to　the　said
material；　fills　itself　with　it　and　only　thus　acquires　a　content　and　so　becomes　real　knowing。

Further；　these　two　constituents　—　for　they　are　supposed　to　be　related　to　each　other　as
constituents；　and　cognition　is　compounded　from　them　in　a　mechanical　or　at　best　chemical　fashion
—　are　appraised　as　follows：　the　object　is　regarded　as　something　complete　and　finished　on　its　own
account；　something　which　can　entirely　dispense　with　thought　for　its　actuality；　while　thought　on　the
other　hand　is　regarded　as　defective　because　it　has　to　complete　itself　with　a　material　and　moreover；
as　a　pliable　indeterminate　form；　has　to　adapt　itself　to　its　material。　Truth　is　the　agreement　of　thought
with　the　object；　and　in　order　to　bring　about　this　agreement　—　for　it　does　not　exist　on　its　own
account　—　thinking　is　supposed　to　adapt　and　accommodate　itself　to　the　object。

Thirdly；　when　the　difference　of　matter　and　form；　of　object　and　thought　is　not　left　in　that　nebulous
indeterminateness　but　is　taken　more　definitely；　then　each　is　regarded　as　a　sphere　divorced　from　the
other。　Thinking　therefore　in　its　reception　and　formation　of　material　does　not　go　outside　itself；　its
reception　of　the　material　and　the　conforming　of　itself　to　it　remains　a　modification　of　its　own　self；　it
does　not　result　in　thought　becoming　the　other　of　itself；　and　self…conscious　determining　moreover
belongs　only　to　thinking。　In　its　relation　to　the　object；　therefore；　thinking　does　I　not　go　out　of　itself
to　the　object；　this；　as　a　thing…in…itself；　remains　a　sheer　beyond　of　thought。

These　views　on　the　relation　of　subject　and　object　to　each　other　express　the　determinations　which
constitute　the　nature　of　our　ordinary；　phenomenal　consciousness；　but　when　these　prejudices　are
carried　out　into　the　sphere　of　reason　as　if　the　same　relation　obtained　there；　as　if　this　relation　were
something　true　in　its　own　self；　then　they　are　errors　the　—　refutation　of　which　throughout　every　part
of　the　spiritual　and　natural　universe　is　philosophy；　or　rather；　as　they　bar　the　entrance　to
philosophy；　must　be　discarded　at　its　portals。

Ancient　metaphysics　had　in　this　respect　a　higher　conception　of　thinking　than　is　current　today。　For　it
based　itself　on　the　fact　that　the　knowledge　of　things　obtained　through　thinking　is　alone　what　is
really　true　in　them；　that　is；　things　not　in　their　immediacy　but　as　first　raised　into　the　form　of　thought；
as　things　thought。　Thus　this　metaphysics　believed　that　thinking　（and　its　determinations）　is　not
anything　alien　to　the　object；　but　rather　is　its　essential　nature；　or　that　things　and　the　thinking　of　them
—　our　language　too　expresses　their　kinship　—　are　explicitly　in　full　agreement；　thinking　in　its
immanent　determinations　and　the　true　nature　of　things　forming　one　and　the　same　content。

But　reflective　understanding　took　possession　of　philosophy。　We　must　know　exactly　what　is　meant
by　this　expression　which　moreover　is　often　used　as　a　slogan；　in　general　it　stands　for　the
understanding　as　abstracting；　and　hence　as　separating　and　remaining　fixed　in　its　separations。
Directed　against　reason；　it　behaves　as　ordinary　common　sense　and　imposes　its　view　that　truth　rests
on　sensuous　reality；　that　thoughts　are　only　thoughts；　meaning　that　it　is　sense　perception　which　first
gives　them　filling　and　reality　and　that　reason　left　to　its　own　resources　engenders　only　figments　of
the　brain。　In　this　self…renunciation　on　the　part　of　reason；　the　Notion　of　truth　is　lost；　it　is　limited　to
knowing　only　subjective　truth；　only　phenomena；　appearances；　only　something　to　which　the　nature
of　the　object　itself　does　not　correspond：　knowing　has　lapsed　into　opinion。

However；　this　turn　taken　by　cognition；　which　appears　as　a　loss　and　a　retrograde　step；　is　based　on
something　more　profound　on　which　rests　the　elevation　of　reason　into　the　loftier　spirit　of　modern
philosophy。　The　basis　of　that　universally　held　conception　is；　namely；　to　be　sought　in　the　insight　into
the　necessary　conflict　of　the　determinations　of　the　understanding　with　themselves。　The　reflection
already　referred　to　is　this；　to　transcend　the　concrete　immediate　object　and　to　determine　it　and
separate　it。　But　equally　it　must　transcend　these　its　separating　determinations　and　straightway
connect　them。　It　is　at　the　stage　of　this　connecting　of　the　determinations　that　their　conflict　emerges。
This　connecting　activity　of　reflection　belongs　in　itself　to　reason　and　the　rising　above　those
determinations　which　attains　to　an　insight　into　their　conflict　is　the　great　negative　step　towards　the
true　Notion　of　reason。　But　the　insight；　when　not　thorough…going；　commits　the　mistake　of　thinking
that　it　is　reason　which　is　in　contradiction　with　itself；　it　does　not　recognise　that　the　contradiction　is
precisely　the　rising　of　reason　above　the　limitations　of　the　understanding　and　the　resolving　of　them；
Cognition；　instead　of　taking　from　this　stage　the　final　step　into　the　heights；　has　fled　from　the
unsatisfactoriness　of　the　categories　of　the　understanding　to　sensuous　existence；　imagining　that　in
this　it　possesses　what　is　solid　and　self…consistent。　But　on　the　other　hand；　since　this　knowledge　is
self…confessedly　knowledge　only　of　appearances；　the　unsatisfactoriness　of　the　latter　is　admitted；
but　at　the　same　time　presupposed：　as　much　as　to　say　that　admittedly；　we　have　no　proper
knowledge　of　things…in…themselves　but　we　do　have　a　proper　knowledge　of　them　within　the　sphere
of　appearances；　as　if；　so　to　speak；　only　the　kind　of　objects　were　different；　and　one　kind；　namely
things…in…themselves；　did　not　fall　within　the　scope　of　our　knowledge　but　the　other　kind；
phenomena；　did。　This　is　like　attributing　to　someone　a　correct　perception；　with　the　rider　that
nevertheless　he　is　incapable　of　perceiving　what　is　true　but　only　what　is　false。　Absurd　as　this　would
be；　it　would　not　be　more　so　than　a　true　knowledge　which　did　not　know　the　object　as　it　is　in　itself。

The　criticism　of　the　forms　of　the　understanding　has　had　the　result　already　mentioned；　that　these
forms　do　not　apply　to　things…in…themselves。　This　can　have　no　other　meaning　than　that　these　forms
are　in　themselves　something　untrue。　But　then　if　they　are　'allowed　to　remain　valid　for　subjective
reason　and　experience；　the　criticism　has　not　produced　any　alteration　in　them：　they　are　left　in　the
same　shape　for　the　subject　knower　as　they　formerly　possessed　for　the　object。　If；　however；　they
are　inadequate　for　the　thing…in…itself；　still　less　must　the　understanding　to　which　they　are　supposed
to　belong　put　up　with　them　and　rest　content　with　them。　If　they　cannot　be　determinations　of　the
thing…in…itself；　still　less　can　they　be　determinations　of　the　understanding　to　which　one　ought　at　least
to　concede　the　dignity　of　a　thing…in…itself。　The　determinations　of　finite　and　infinite　conflict　in　the
same　way；　whether　they　are　applied　to　time　and　space；　to　the　world；　or　are　determinations　within
the　mind　—　just　as　black　and　white　produce　grey　whether　they　are　mixed　on　a　canvas　or　on　the
palette。　If　our　conception　of　the　world　is　dissolved　by　the　transference　to　it　of　the　determinations
of　infinite　and　finite；　still　more　is　spirit　itself；　which　contains　both　of　them；　inwardly
self…contradictory　and　self…dissolving：　it　is　not　the　nature　of　the　material　or　the　object　to　which　they
are　applied　or　in　which　they　occur　that　can　make　a　difference　for　it　is　only　through　those
determinations　and　in　accordance　with　them　that　the　object　contains　the　contradiction。

The　forms　of　objective　thinking；　therefore；　have　been　removed　by　this　criticism　only　from　the　thing；
but　they　have　been　left　in　the　subject　just　as　they　were　originally。　That　is　to　say；　this　criticism　did
not　consider　these　forms　on　their　own　merits　and　according　to　their　own　peculiar　content；　but
simply　took　them　as　accepted　starting　points　from　subjective　logic：　so　that　there　was　no　question
of　an　immanent　deduction　of　them　as　forms　of　subjective　logic；　still　less　of　a　dialectical
consideration　of　them。

Transcendental　idealism　in　its　more　consistent　development；　recognised　the　nothingness　of　the
spectral　thing…in…itself　left　over　by　the　Kantian　philosophy；　this　abstract　shadow　divorced　from　all
content；　and　intended　to　destroy　it　completely。　This　philosophy　also　made　a　start　at　letting　reason
itself　exhibit　its　own　determinations。　But　this　attempt；　because　it　proceeded　from　a　subjective
standpoint；　could　not　be　brought　to　a　successful　conclusion。？　Later　this　standpoint；　and　with　it　too
the　attempt　to　develop　the　con