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another　every　one　who　believes　in　revealed　religion；　a　few　extend



their　charity　a　little　further；　but　stop　at　the　belief　in　a　God　and　in



a　future　state。　Wherever　the　sentiment　of　the　majority　is　still



genuine　and　intense；　it　is　found　to　have　abated　little　of　its　claim　to



be　obeyed。



　　In　England；　from　the　peculiar　circumstances　of　our　political



history；　though　the　yoke　of　opinion　is　perhaps　heavier；　that　of　law　is



lighter；　than　in　most　other　countries　of　Europe；　and　there　is



considerable　jealousy　of　direct　interference；　by　the　legislative　or



the　executive　power；　with　private　conduct；　not　so　much　from　any　just



regard　for　the　independence　of　the　individual；　as　from　the　still



subsisting　habit　of　looking　on　the　government　as　representing　an



opposite　interest　to　the　public。　The　majority　have　not　yet　learnt　to



feel　the　power　of　the　government　their　power；　or　its　opinions　their



opinions。　When　they　do　so；　individual　liberty　will　probably　be　as　much



exposed　to　invasion　from　the　government；　as　it　already　is　from



public　opinion。　But；　as　yet；　there　is　a　considerable　amount　of　feeling



ready　to　be　called　forth　against　any　attempt　of　the　law　to　control



individuals　in　things　in　which　they　have　not　hitherto　been



accustomed　to　be　controlled　by　it；　and　this　with　very　little



discrimination　as　to　whether　the　matter　is；　or　is　not；　within　the



legitimate　sphere　of　legal　control；　insomuch　that　the　feeling；



highly　salutary　on　the　whole；　is　perhaps　quite　as　often　misplaced　as



well　grounded　in　the　particular　instances　of　its　application。　There



is；　in　fact；　no　recognised　principle　by　which　the　propriety　or



impropriety　of　government　interference　is　customarily　tested。　People



decide　according　to　their　personal　preferences。　Some；　whenever　they



see　any　good　to　be　done；　or　evil　to　be　remedied；　would　willingly



instigate　the　government　to　undertake　the　business；　while　others



prefer　to　bear　almost　any　amount　of　social　evil；　rather　than　add　one



to　the　departments　of　human　interests　amenable　to　governmental



control。　And　men　range　themselves　on　one　or　the　other　side　in　any



particular　case；　according　to　this　general　direction　of　their



sentiments；　or　according　to　the　degree　of　interest　which　they　feel



in　the　particular　thing　which　it　is　proposed　that　the　government



should　do；　or　according　to　the　belief　they　entertain　that　the



government　would；　or　would　not；　do　it　in　the　manner　they　prefer；　but



very　rarely　on　account　of　any　opinion　to　which　they　consistently



adhere；　as　to　what　things　are　fit　to　be　done　by　a　government。　And　it



seems　to　me　that　in　consequence　of　this　absence　of　rule　or



principle；　one　side　is　at　present　as　of　wrong　as　the　other；　the



interference　of　government　is；　with　about　equal　frequency；



improperly　invoked　and　improperly　condemned。



　　The　object　of　this　Essay　is　to　assert　one　very　simple　principle；



as　entitled　to　govern　absolutely　the　dealings　of　society　with　the



individual　in　the　way　of　compulsion　and　control；　whether　the　means



used　be　physical　force　in　the　form　of　legal　penalties；　or　the　moral



coercion　of　public　opinion。　That　principle　is；　that　the　sole　end　for



which　mankind　are　warranted；　individually　or　collectively；　in



interfering　with　the　liberty　of　action　of　any　of　their　number；　is



self…protection。　That　the　only　purpose　for　which　power　can　be



rightfully　exercised　over　any　member　of　a　civilised　community；　against



his　will；　is　to　prevent　harm　to　others。　His　own　good；　either



physical　or　moral；　is　not　a　sufficient　warrant。　He　cannot　rightfully



be　compelled　to　do　or　forbear　because　it　will　be　better　for　him　to



do　so；　because　it　will　make　him　happier；　because；　in　the　opinions　of



others；　to　do　so　would　be　wise；　or　even　right。　These　are　good



reasons　for　remonstrating　with　him；　or　reasoning　with　him；　or



persuading　him；　or　entreating　him；　but　not　for　compelling　him；　or



visiting　him　with　any　evil　in　case　he　do　otherwise。　To　justify　that；



the　conduct　from　which　it　is　desired　to　deter　him　must　be　calculated



to　produce　evil　to　some　one　else。　The　only　part　of　the　conduct　of



any　one；　for　which　he　is　amenable　to　society；　is　that　which　concerns



others。　In　the　part　which　merely　concerns　himself；　his　independence



is；　of　right；　absolute。　Over　himself；　over　his　own　body　and　mind；



the　individual　is　sovereign。



　　It　is；　perhaps；　hardly　necessary　to　say　that　this　doctrine　is



meant　to　apply　only　to　human　beings　in　the　maturity　of　their



faculties。　We　are　not　speaking　of　children；　or　of　young　persons



below　the　age　which　the　law　may　fix　as　that　of　manhood　or　womanhood。



Those　who　are　still　in　a　state　to　require　being　taken　care　of　by



others；　must　be　protected　against　their　own　actions　as　well　as　against



external　injury。　For　the　same　reason；　we　may　leave　out　of



consideration　those　backward　states　of　society　in　which　the　race



itself　may　be　considered　as　in　its　nonage。　The　early　difficulties　in



the　way　of　spontaneous　progress　are　so　great；　that　there　is　seldom　any



choice　of　means　for　overcoming　them；　and　a　ruler　full　of　the　spirit　of



improvement　is　warranted　in　the　use　of　any　expedients　that　will　attain



an　end；　perhaps　otherwise　unattainable。　Despotism　is　a　legitimate　mode



of　government　in　dealing　with　barbarians；　provided　the　end　be　their



improvement；　and　the　means　justified　by　actually　effecting　that　end。



Liberty；　as　a　principle；　has　no　application　to　any　state　of　things



anterior　to　the　time　when　mankind　have　become　capable　of　being



improved　by　free　and　equal　discussion。　Until　then；　there　is　nothing



for　them　but　implicit　obedience　to　an　Akbar　or　a　Charlemagne；　if



they　are　so　fortunate　as　to　find　one。　But　as　soon　as　mankind　have



attained　the　capacity　of　being　guided　to　their　own　improvement　by



conviction　or　persuasion　（a　period　long　since　reached　in　all　nations



with　whom　we　need　here　concern　ourselves）；　compulsion；　either　in　the



direct　form　or　in　that　of　pains　and　penalties　for　non…compliance；　is



no　longer　admissible　as　a　means　to　their　own　good；　and　justifiable



only　for　the　security　of　others。



　　It　is　proper　to　state　that　I　forego　any　advantage　which　could　be



derived　to　my　argument　from　the　idea　of　abstract　right；　as　a　thing



independent　of　utility。　I　regard　utility　as　the　ultimate　appeal　on　all



ethical　questions；　but　it　must　be　utility　in　the　largest　sense；



grounded　on　the　permanent　interests　of　a　man　as　a　progressive　being。



Those　interests；　I　contend；　authorise　the　subjection　of　individual



spontaneity　to　external　control；　only　in　respect　to　those　actions　of



each；　which　concern　the　interest　of　other　people。　If　any　one　does　an



act　hurtful　to　others；　there　is　a　prima　facie　case　for　punishing



him；　by　law；　or；　where　legal　penalties　are　not　safely　applicable；　by



general　disapprobation。　There　are　also　many　positive　acts　for　the



benefit　of　others；　which　he　may　rightfully　be　compelled　to　perform；



such　as　to　give　evidence　in　a　court　of　justice；　to　bear　his　fair　share



in　the　common　defence；　or　in　any　other　joint　work　necessary　to　the



interest　of　the　society　of　which　he　enjoys　the　protection；　and　to



perform　certain　acts　of　individual　beneficence；　such　as　saving　a



fellow　creature's　life；　or　interposing　to　protect　the　defenceless



against　ill…usage；　things　which　whenever　it　is　obviously　a　man's



duty　to　do；　he　may　rightfully　be　made　responsible　to　society　for　not



doing。　A　person　may　cause　evil　to　others　not　only　by　his　actions　but



by　his　inaction；　and　in　either　case　he　is　justly　accountable　to　them



for　the　injury。　The　latter　case；　it　is　true；　requires　a　much　more



cautious　exercise　of　compulsion　than　the　former。　To　make　any　one



answerable　for　doing　evil　to　others　is　the　rule；　to　make　him



answerable　for　not　preventing　evil　is；　comparatively　speaking；　the



exception。　Yet　there　are　many　cases　clear　enough　and　grave　enough　to



justify　that　exception。　In　all　things　which　regard　the　external



relations　of　the　individual；　he　is　de　jure　amenable　to　those　whose



interests　are　concerned；　and；　if　need　be；　to　society　as　their



protector。　There　are　often　good　reasons　for　not　holding　him　to　the



responsibility；　but　these　reasons　must　arise　from　the　special



expediencies　of　the　case：　either　because　it　is　a　kind　of　case　in　which



he　is　on　the　whole　likely　to　act　better；　when　left　to　his　own



discretion；　than　when　controlled　in　any　way　in　which　society　have　it



in　their　power　to　control　him；　or　because　the　attempt　to　exercise



control　would　produce　other　evils；　greater　than　those　which　it　would



prevent。　When　such　reasons　as　these　preclude　the　enforcement　of



responsibility；　the　conscience　of　the　agent　himself　should　step　into



the　vacant　judgment　seat；　and　protect　those　interests　of　others



which　have　no　external　protection；　judging　himself　all　the　more



rigidly；　because　the　case　does　not　admit　of　his　being　made　accountable



to　the　judgment　of　his　fellow　creatures。



　　But　there　is　a　sphere　of　action　in　which　society；　as　distinguished



from　the　individual；　has；　if　any；　only　an　indirect　interest；



comprehending　all　that　portion　of　a　person's　life　and　conduct　which



affects　only　himself；　or　if　it　also　affects　others；　only　with　their



free；　voluntary；　and　undeceived　consent　and　participation。　When　I



say　only　himself；　I　mean　directly；　and　in　the　first　instance；　for



whatever　affects　himself；　may　affect　others　through　himself；　and　the



objection　which　may　be　grounded　on　this　contingency；　will　receive



consideration　in　the　sequel。　This；　then；　is　the　appropriate　region



of　human　liberty。　It　comprises；　first；　the　inward　domain　of



consciousness；　demanding　liberty　of　conscience　in　the　most



comprehensive　sense；　liberty　of　thought　and　feeling；　absolute



freedom　of　opinion　and　sentiment　on　all　subjects；　practical　or



speculative；　scientific；　m