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fallacy　of　what　was　fallacious。　Because　he　has　felt；　that　the　only　way



in　which　a　human　being　can　make　some　approach　to　knowing　the　whole



of　a　subject；　is　by　hearing　what　can　be　said　about　it　by　persons　of



every　variety　of　opinion；　and　studying　all　modes　in　which　it　can　be



looked　at　by　every　character　of　mind。　No　wise　man　ever　acquired　his



wisdom　in　any　mode　but　this；　nor　is　it　in　the　nature　of　human



intellect　to　become　wise　in　any　other　manner。　The　steady　habit　of



correcting　and　completing　his　own　opinion　by　collating　it　with　those



of　others；　so　far　from　causing　doubt　and　hesitation　in　carrying　it



into　practice；　is　the　only　stable　foundation　for　a　just　reliance　on



it：　for；　being　cognisant　of　all　that　can；　at　least　obviously；　be



said　against　him；　and　having　taken　up　his　position　against　all



gainsayers…　knowing　that　he　has　sought　for　objections　and



difficulties；　instead　of　avoiding　them；　and　has　shut　out　no　light



which　can　be　thrown　upon　the　subject　from　any　quarter…　he　has　a　right



to　think　his　judgment　better　than　that　of　any　person；　or　any



multitude；　who　have　not　gone　through　a　similar　process。



　　It　is　not　too　much　to　require　that　what　the　wisest　of　mankind；　those



who　are　best　entitled　to　trust　their　own　judgment；　find　necessary　to



warrant　their　relying　on　it；　should　be　submitted　to　by　that



miscellaneous　collection　of　a　few　wise　and　many　foolish　individuals；



called　the　public。　The　most　intolerant　of　churches；　the　Roman　Catholic



Church；　even　at　the　canonisation　of　a　saint；　admits；　and　listens



patiently　to；　a　〃devil's　advocate。〃　The　holiest　of　men；　it　appears；



cannot　be　admitted　to　posthumous　honours；　until　all　that　the　devil



could　say　against　him　is　known　and　weighed。　If　even　the　Newtonian



philosophy　were　not　permitted　to　be　questioned；　mankind　could　not　feel



as　complete　assurance　of　its　truth　as　they　now　do。　The　beliefs　which



we　have　most　warrant　for　have　no　safeguard　to　rest　on；　but　a



standing　invitation　to　the　whole　world　to　prove　them　unfounded。　If　the



challenge　is　not　accepted；　or　is　accepted　and　the　attempt　fails；　we



are　far　enough　from　certainty　still；　but　we　have　done　the　best　that



the　existing　state　of　human　reason　admits　of；　we　have　neglected



nothing　that　could　give　the　truth　a　chance　of　reaching　us：　if　the



lists　are　kept　open；　we　may　hope　that　if　there　be　a　better　truth；　it



will　be　found　when　the　human　mind　is　capable　of　receiving　it；　and　in



the　meantime　we　may　rely　on　having　attained　such　approach　to　truth



as　is　possible　in　our　own　day。　This　is　the　amount　of　certainty



attainable　by　a　fallible　being；　and　this　the　sole　way　of　attaining　it。



　　Strange　it　is；　that　men　should　admit　the　validity　of　the　arguments



for　free　discussion；　but　object　to　their　being　〃pushed　to　an　extreme〃；



not　seeing　that　unless　the　reasons　are　good　for　an　extreme　case；



they　are　not　good　for　any　case。　Strange　that　they　should　imagine



that　they　are　not　assuming　infallibility；　when　they　acknowledge　that



there　should　be　free　discussion　on　all　subjects　which　can　possibly



be　doubtful；　but　think　that　some　particular　principle　or　doctrine



should　be　forbidden　to　be　questioned　because　it　is　so　certain；　that



is；　because　they　are　certain　that　it　is　certain。　To　call　any



proposition　certain；　while　there　is　any　one　who　would　deny　its



certainty　if　permitted；　but　who　is　not　permitted；　is　to　assume　that　we



ourselves；　and　those　who　agree　with　us；　are　the　judges　of　certainty；



and　judges　without　hearing　the　other　side。



　　In　the　present　age…　which　has　been　described　as　〃destitute　of



faith；　but　terrified　at　scepticism〃…　in　which　people　feel　sure；　not



so　much　that　their　opinions　are　true；　as　that　they　should　not　know



what　to　do　without　them…　the　claims　of　an　opinion　to　be　protected



from　public　attack　are　rested　not　so　much　on　its　truth；　as　on　its



importance　to　society。　There　are；　it　is　alleged；　certain　beliefs　so



useful；　not　to　say　indispensable；　to　well…being　that　it　is　as　much　the



duty　of　governments　to　uphold　those　beliefs；　as　to　protect　any　other



of　the　interests　of　society。　In　a　case　of　such　necessity；　and　so



directly　in　the　line　of　their　duty；　something　less　than



infallibility　may；　it　is　maintained；　warrant；　and　even　bind；



governments　to　act　on　their　own　opinion；　confirmed　by　the　general



opinion　of　mankind。　It　is　also　often　argued；　and　still　oftener



thought；　that　none　but　bad　men　would　desire　to　weaken　these　salutary



beliefs；　and　there　can　be　nothing　wrong；　it　is　thought；　in　restraining



bad　men；　and　prohibiting　what　only　such　men　would　wish　to　practise。



This　mode　of　thinking　makes　the　justification　of　restraints　on



discussion　not　a　question　of　the　truth　of　doctrines；　but　of　their



usefulness；　and　flatters　itself　by　that　means　to　escape　the



responsibility　of　claiming　to　be　an　infallible　judge　of　opinions。



　　But　those　who　thus　satisfy　themselves；　do　not　perceive　that　the



assumption　of　infallibility　is　merely　shifted　from　one　point　to



another。　The　usefulness　of　an　opinion　is　itself　matter　of　opinion：



as　disputable；　as　open　to　discussion；　and　requiring　discussion　as　much



as　the　opinion　itself。　There　is　the　same　need　of　an　infallible　judge



of　opinions　to　decide　an　opinion　to　be　noxious；　as　to　decide　it　to



be　false；　unless　the　opinion　condemned　has　full　opportunity　of



defending　itself。　And　it　will　not　do　to　say　that　the　heretic　may　be



allowed　to　maintain　the　utility　or　harmlessness　of　his　opinion；　though



forbidden　to　maintain　its　truth。　The　truth　of　an　opinion　is　part　of



its　utility。　If　we　would　know　whether　or　not　it　is　desirable　that　a



proposition　should　be　believed；　is　it　possible　to　exclude　the



consideration　of　whether　or　not　it　is　true？　In　the　opinion；　not　of　bad



men；　but　of　the　best　men；　no　belief　which　is　contrary　to　truth　can



be　really　useful：　and　can　you　prevent　such　men　from　urging　that



plea；　when　they　are　charged　with　culpability　for　denying　some　doctrine



which　they　are　told　is　useful；　but　which　they　believe　to　be　false？



Those　who　are　on　the　side　of　received　opinions　never　fail　to　take



all　possible　advantage　of　this　plea；　you　do　not　find　them　handling　the



question　of　utility　as　if　it　could　be　completely　abstracted　from



that　of　truth：　on　the　contrary；　it　is；　above　all；　because　their



doctrine　is　〃the　truth；〃　that　the　knowledge　or　the　belief　of　it　is



held　to　be　so　indispensable。　There　can　be　no　fair　discussion　of　the



question　of　usefulness　when　an　argument　so　vital　may　be　employed　on



one　side；　but　not　on　the　other。　And　in　point　of　fact；　when　law　or



public　feeling　do　not　permit　the　truth　of　an　opinion　to　be　disputed；



they　are　just　as　little　tolerant　of　a　denial　of　its　usefulness。　The



utmost　they　allow　is　an　extenuation　of　its　absolute　necessity；　or　of



the　positive　guilt　of　rejecting　it。



　　In　order　more　fully　to　illustrate　the　mischief　of　denying　a



hearing　to　opinions　because　we；　in　our　own　judgment；　have　condemned



them；　it　will　be　desirable　to　fix　down　the　discussion　to　a　concrete



case；　and　I　choose；　by　preference；　the　cases　which　are　least



favourable　to　me…　in　which　the　argument　against　freedom　of　opinion；



both　on　the　score　of　truth　and　on　that　of　utility；　is　considered　the



strongest。　Let　the　opinions　impugned　be　the　belief　in　a　God　and　in　a



future　state；　or　any　of　the　commonly　received　doctrines　of　morality。



To　fight　the　battle　on　such　ground　gives　a　great　advantage　to　an



unfair　antagonist；　since　he　will　be　sure　to　say　（and　many　who　have



no　desire　to　be　unfair　will　say　it　internally）；　Are　these　the



doctrines　which　you　do　not　deem　sufficiently　certain　to　be　taken　under



the　protection　of　law？　Is　the　belief　in　a　God　one　of　the　opinions　to



feel　sure　of　which　you　hold　to　be　assuming　infallibility？　But　I　must



be　permitted　to　observe；　that　it　is　not　the　feeling　sure　of　a　doctrine



（be　it　what　it　may）　which　I　call　an　assumption　of　infallibility。　It　is



the　undertaking　to　decide　that　question　for　others；　without　allowing



them　to　hear　what　can　be　said　on　the　contrary　side。　And　I　denounce　and



reprobate　this　pretension　not　the　less；　if　put　forth　on　the　side　of　my



most　solemn　convictions。　However　positive　any　one's　persuasion　may　be；



not　only　of　the　falsity　but　of　the　pernicious　consequences…　not　only



of　the　pernicious　consequences；　but　（to　adopt　expressions　which　I



altogether　condemn）　the　immorality　and　impiety　of　an　opinion；　yet



if；　in　pursuance　of　that　private　judgment；　though　backed　by　the　public



judgment　of　his　country　or　his　contemporaries；　he　prevents　the　opinion



from　being　heard　in　its　defence；　he　assumes　infallibility。　And　so



far　from　the　assumption　being　less　objectionable　or　less　dangerous



because　the　opinion　is　called　immoral　or　impious；　this　is　the　case



of　all　others　in　which　it　is　most　fatal。　These　are　exactly　the



occasions　on　which　the　men　of　one　generation　commit　those　dreadful



mistakes　which　excite　the　astonishment　and　horror　of　posterity。　It



is　among　such　that　we　find　the　instances　memorable　in　history；　when



the　arm　of　the　law　has　been　employed　to　root　out　the　best　men　and



the　noblest　doctrines；　with　deplorable　success　as　to　the　men；　though



some　of　the　doctrines　have　survived　to　be　（as　if　in　mockery）　invoked



in　defence　of　similar　conduct　towards　those　who　dissent　from　them；



or　from　their　received　interpretation。



　　Mankind　can　hardly　be　too　often　reminded；　that　there　was　once　a



man　named　Socrates；　between　whom　and　the　legal　authorities　and



public　opinion　of　his　time　there　took　place　a　memorable　collision。



Born　in　an　age　and　country　abounding　in　individual　greatness；　this　man



has　been　handed　down　to　us　by　those　who　best　knew　both　him　and　the



age；　as　the　most　virtuous　man　in　it；　while　we　know　him　as　the　head　and



prototype　of　all　subsequent　teachers　of　virtue；　the　sour