utilitarianism-第13部分

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te；　any　harm　done　or　attempted　against　ourselves；　or　against　those　with　whom　we　sympathise。　The　origin　of　this　sentiment　it　is　not　necessary　here　to　discuss。　Whether　it　be　an　instinct　or　a　result　of　intelligence；　it　is；　we　know；　common　to　all　animal　nature；　for　every　animal　tries　to　hurt　those　who　have　hurt；　or　who　it　thinks　are　about　to　hurt；　itself　or　its　young。　Human　beings；　on　this　point；　only　differ　from　other　animals　in　two　particulars。　First；　in　being　capable　of　sympathising；　not　solely　with　their　offspring；　or；　like　some　of　the　more　noble　animals；　with　some　superior　animal　who　is　kind　to　them；　but　with　all　human；　and　even　with　all　sentient；　beings。　Secondly；　in　having　a　more　developed　intelligence；　which　gives　a　wider　range　to　the　whole　of　their　sentiments；　whether　self…regarding　or　sympathetic。　By　virtue　of　his　superior　intelligence；　even　apart　from　his　superior　range　of　sympathy；　a　human　being　is　capable　of　apprehending　a　community　of　interest　between　himself　and　the　human　society　of　which　he　forms　a　part；　such　that　any　conduct　which　threatens　the　security　of　the　society　generally；　is　threatening　to　his　own；　and　calls　forth　his　instinct　（if　instinct　it　be）　of　self…defence。　The　same　superiority　of　intelligence　joined　to　the　power　of　sympathising　with　human　beings　generally；　enables　him　to　attach　himself　to　the　collective　idea　of　his　tribe；　his　country；　or　mankind；　in　such　a　manner　that　any　act　hurtful　to　them；　raises　his　instinct　of　sympathy；　and　urges　him　to　resistance。　　　The　sentiment　of　justice；　in　that　one　of　its　elements　which　consists　of　the　desire　to　punish；　is　thus；　I　conceive；　the　natural　feeling　of　retaliation　or　vengeance；　rendered　by　intellect　and　sympathy　applicable　to　those　injuries；　that　is；　to　those　hurts；　which　wound　us　through；　or　in　common　with；　society　at　large。　This　sentiment；　in　itself；　has　nothing　moral　in　it；　what　is　moral　is；　the　exclusive　subordination　of　it　to　the　social　sympathies；　so　as　to　wait　on　and　obey　their　call。　For　the　natural　feeling　would　make　us　resent　indiscriminately　whatever　any　one　does　that　is　disagreeable　to　us；　but　when　moralised　by　the　social　feeling；　it　only　acts　in　the　directions　conformable　to　the　general　good：　just　persons　resenting　a　hurt　to　society；　though　not　otherwise　a　hurt　to　themselves；　and　not　resenting　a　hurt　to　themselves；　however　painful；　unless　it　be　of　the　kind　which　society　has　a　common　interest　with　them　in　the　repression　of。　　　It　is　no　objection　against　this　doctrine　to　say；　that　when　we　feel　our　sentiment　of　justice　outraged；　we　are　not　thinking　of　society　at　large；　or　of　any　collective　interest；　but　only　of　the　individual　case。　It　is　common　enough　certainly；　though　the　reverse　of　commendable；　to　feel　resentment　merely　because　we　have　suffered　pain；　but　a　person　whose　resentment　is　really　a　moral　feeling；　that　is；　who　considers　whether　an　act　is　blamable　before　he　allows　himself　to　resent　it…　such　a　person；　though　he　may　not　say　expressly　to　himself　that　he　is　standing　up　for　the　interest　of　society；　certainly　does　feel　that　he　is　asserting　a　rule　which　is　for　the　benefit　of　others　as　well　as　for　his　own。　If　he　is　not　feeling　this…　if　he　is　regarding　the　act　solely　as　it　affects　him　individually…　he　is　not　consciously　just；　he　is　not　concerning　himself　about　the　justice　of　his　actions。　This　is　admitted　even　by　anti…utilitarian　moralists。　When　Kant　（as　before　remarked）　propounds　as　the　fundamental　principle　of　morals；　〃So　act；　that　thy　rule　of　conduct　might　be　adopted　as　a　law　by　all　rational　beings；〃　he　virtually　acknowledges　that　the　interest　of　mankind　collectively；　or　at　least　of　mankind　indiscriminately；　must　be　in　the　mind　of　the　agent　when　conscientiously　deciding　on　the　morality　of　the　act。　Otherwise　he　uses　words　without　a　meaning：　for；　that　a　rule　even　of　utter　selfishness　could　not　possibly　be　adopted　by　all　rational　beings…　that　there　is　any　insuperable　obstacle　in　the　nature　of　things　to　its　adoption…　cannot　be　even　plausibly　maintained。　To　give　any　meaning　to　Kant's　principle；　the　sense　put　upon　it　must　be；　that　we　ought　to　shape　our　conduct　by　a　rule　which　all　rational　beings　might　adopt　with　benefit　to　their　collective　interest。　　　To　recapitulate：　the　idea　of　justice　supposes　two　things；　a　rule　of　conduct；　and　a　sentiment　which　sanctions　the　rule。　The　first　must　be　supposed　common　to　all　mankind；　and　intended　for　their　good。　The　other　（the　sentiment）　is　a　desire　that　punishment　may　be　suffered　by　those　who　infringe　the　rule。　There　is　involved；　in　addition；　the　conception　of　some　definite　person　who　suffers　by　the　infringement；　whose　rights　（to　use　the　expression　appropriated　to　the　case）　are　violated　by　it。　And　the　sentiment　of　justice　appears　to　me　to　be；　the　animal　desire　to　repel　or　retaliate　a　hurt　or　damage　to　oneself；　or　to　those　with　whom　one　sympathises；　widened　so　as　to　include　all　persons；　by　the　human　capacity　of　enlarged　sympathy；　and　the　human　conception　of　intelligent　self…interest。　From　the　latter　elements；　the　feeling　derives　its　morality；　from　the　former；　its　peculiar　impressiveness；　and　energy　of　self…assertion。　　　I　have；　throughout；　treated　the　idea　of　a　right　residing　in　the　injured　person；　and　violated　by　the　injury；　not　as　a　separate　element　in　the　composition　of　the　idea　and　sentiment；　but　as　one　of　the　forms　in　which　the　other　two　elements　clothe　themselves。　These　elements　are；　a　hurt　to　some　assignable　person　or　persons　on　the　one　hand；　and　a　demand　for　punishment　on　the　other。　An　examination　of　our　own　minds；　I　think；　will　show；　that　these　two　things　include　all　that　we　mean　when　we　speak　of　violation　of　a　right。　When　we　call　anything　a　person's　right；　we　mean　that　he　has　a　valid　claim　on　society　to　protect　him　in　the　possession　of　it；　either　by　the　force　of　law；　or　by　that　of　education　and　opinion。　If　he　has　what　we　consider　a　sufficient　claim；　on　whatever　account；　to　have　something　guaranteed　to　him　by　society；　we　say　that　he　has　a　right　to　it。　If　we　desire　to　prove　that　anything　does　not　belong　to　him　by　right；　we　think　this　done　as　soon　as　it　is　admitted　that　society　ought　not　to　take　measures　for　securing　it　to　him；　but　should　leave　him　to　chance；　or　to　his　own　exertions。　Thus；　a　person　is　said　to　have　a　right　to　what　he　can　earn　in　fair　professional　competition；　because　society　ought　not　to　allow　any　other　person　to　hinder　him　from　endeavouring　to　earn　in　that　manner　as　much　as　he　can。　But　he　has　not　a　right　to　three　hundred　a…year；　though　he　may　happen　to　be　earning　it；　because　society　is　not　called　on　to　provide　that　he　shall　earn　that　sum。　On　the　contrary；　if　he　owns　ten　thousand　pounds　three　per　cent　stock；　he　has　a　right　to　three　hundred　a…year；　because　society　has　come　under　an　obligation　to　provide　him　with　an　income　of　that　amount。　　　To　have　a　right；　then；　is；　I　conceive；　to　have　something　which　society　ought　to　defend　me　in　the　possession　of。　If　the　objector　goes　on　to　ask；　why　it　ought？　I　can　give　him　no　other　reason　than　general　utility。　If　that　expression　does　not　seem　to　convey　a　sufficient　feeling　of　the　strength　of　the　obligation；　nor　to　account　for　the　peculiar　energy　of　the　feeling；　it　is　because　there　goes　to　the　composition　of　the　sentiment；　not　a　rational　only；　but　also　an　animal　element；　the　thirst　for　retaliation；　and　this　thirst　derives　its　intensity；　as　well　as　its　moral　justification；　from　the　extraordinarily　important　and　impressive　kind　of　utility　which　is　concerned。　The　interest　involved　is　that　of　security；　to　every　one's　feelings　the　most　vital　of　all　interests。　All　other　earthly　benefits　are　needed　by　one　person；　not　needed　by　another；　and　many　of　them　can；　if　necessary；　be　cheerfully　foregone；　or　replaced　by　something　else；　but　security　no　human　being　can　possibly　do　without　on　it　we　depend　for　all　our　immunity　from　evil；　and　for　the　whole　value　of　all　and　every　good；　beyond　the　passing　moment；　since　nothing　but　the　gratification　of　the　instant　could　be　of　any　worth　to　us；　if　we　could　be　deprived　of　anything　the　next　instant　by　whoever　was　momentarily　stronger　than　ourselves。　Now　this　most　indispensable　of　all　necessaries；　after　physical　nutriment；　cannot　be　had；　unless　the

machinery　for　providing　it　is　kept　unintermittedly　in　active　play。　Our　notion；　therefore；　of　the　claim　we　have　on　our　fellow…creatures　to　join　in　making　safe　for　us　the　very　groundwork　of　our　existence；　gathers　feelings　around　it　so　much　more　intense　than　those　concerned　in　any　of　the　more　common　cases　of　utility；　that　the　difference　in　degree　（as　is　often　the　case　in　psychology）　becomes　a　real　difference　in　kind。　The　claim　assumes　that　character　of　absoluteness；　that　apparent　infinity；　and　incommensurability　with　all　other　considerations；　which　constitute　the　distinction　between　the　feeling　of　right　and　wrong　and　that　of　ordinary　expediency　and　inexpediency。　The　feelings　concerned　are　so　powerful；　and　we　count　so　positively　on　finding　a　responsive　feeling　in　others　（all　being　alike　interested）；　that　ought　and　should　grow　into　must；　and　recognised　indispensability　becomes　a　moral　necessity；　analogous　to　physical；　and　often　not　inferior　to　it　in　binding　force　exhorted；

　　If　the　preceding　analysis；　or　something　resembling　it；　be　not　the　correct　account　of　the　notion　of　justice；　if　justice　be　totally　independent　of　utility；　and　be　a　standard　per　se；　which　the　mind　can　recognise　by　simple　introspection　of　itself；　it　is　hard　to　understand　why　that　internal　oracle　is　so　ambiguous；　and　why　so　many　things　appear　either　just　or　unjust；　according　to　the　light　in　which　they　are　regarded。　　　We　are　continually　informed　that　Utility　is　an　uncertain　standard；　which　every　different　person　interprets　differently；　and　that　there　is　no　safety　but　in　the　immutable；　ineffaceable；　and　unmistakable　dictates　of　justice；　which　carry　their　evidence　in　themselves；　and　are　independent　of　the　fluctuations　of　opinion。　One　would　suppose　from　this　that　on　questions　of　justice　there　could　be　no　controversy；　that　if　we　take　that　for　our　rule；　its　application　to　any　given　case　could　leave　us　in　as　little　doubt　as　a　mathematical　demonstration。　So　far　is　this　from　being　the　fact；　that　there　is　as　much　difference　of　opinion；　and　as　much　discussion；　about　what　is　just；　as　about　what　is　useful　to　society。　Not　only　have　different　nations　and　individuals