utilitarianism-第9部分

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　by　what　I　have　called　the　external　sanctions；　and　when　those　sanctions　are　wanting；　or　act　in　an　opposite　direction；　constitutes　in　itself　a　powerful　internal　binding　force；　in　proportion　to　the　sensitiveness　and　thoughtfulness　of　the　character；　since　few　but　those　whose　mind　is　a　moral　blank；　could　bear　to　lay　out　their　course　of　life　on　the　plan　of　paying　no　regard　to　others　except　so　far　as　their　own　private　interest　compels。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　4　　　　　　　Of　what　sort　of　Proof　the　Principle　of　Utility　is　Susceptible。

　　IT　HAS　already　been　remarked；　that　questions　of　ultimate　ends　do　not　admit　of　proof；　in　the　ordinary　acceptation　of　the　term。　To　be　incapable　of　proof　by　reasoning　is　common　to　all　first　principles；　to　the　first　premises　of　our　knowledge；　as　well　as　to　those　of　our　conduct。　But　the　former；　being　matters　of　fact；　may　be　the　subject　of　a　direct　appeal　to　the　faculties　which　judge　of　fact…　namely；　our　senses；　and　our　internal　consciousness。　Can　an　appeal　be　made　to　the　same　faculties　on　questions　of　practical　ends？　Or　by　what　other　faculty　is　cognisance　taken　of　them？　　　Questions　about　ends　are；　in　other　words；　questions　what　things　are　desirable。　The　utilitarian　doctrine　is；　that　happiness　is　desirable；　and　the　only　thing　desirable；　as　an　end；　all　other　things　being　only　desirable　as　means　to　that　end。　What　ought　to　be　required　of　this　doctrine…　what　conditions　is　it　requisite　that　the　doctrine　should　fulfil…　to　make　good　its　claim　to　be　believed？　　　The　only　proof　capable　of　being　given　that　an　object　is　visible；　is　that　people　actually　see　it。　The　only　proof　that　a　sound　is　audible；　is　that　people　hear　it：　and　so　of　the　other　sources　of　our　experience。　In　like　manner；　I　apprehend；　the　sole　evidence　it　is　possible　to　produce　that　anything　is　desirable；　is　that　people　do　actually　desire　it。　If　the　end　which　the　utilitarian　doctrine　proposes　to　itself　were　not；　in　theory　and　in　practice；　acknowledged　to　be　an　end；　nothing　could　ever　convince　any　person　that　it　was　so。　No　reason　can　be　given　why　the　general　happiness　is　desirable；　except　that　each　person；　so　far　as　he　believes　it　to　be　attainable；　desires　his　own　happiness。　This；　however；　being　a　fact；　we　have　not　only　all　the　proof　which　the　case　admits　of；　but　all　which　it　is　possible　to　require；　that　happiness　is　a　good：　that　each　person's　happiness　is　a　good　to　that　person；　and　the　general　happiness；　therefore；　a　good　to　the　aggregate　of　all　persons。　Happiness　has　made　out　its　title　as　one　of　the　ends　of　conduct；　and　consequently　one　of　the　criteria　of　morality。　　　But　it　has　not；　by　this　alone；　proved　itself　to　be　the　sole　criterion。　To　do　that；　it　would　seem；　by　the　same　rule；　necessary　to　show；　not　only　that　people　desire　happiness；　but　that　they　never　desire　anything　else。　Now　it　is　palpable　that　they　do　desire　things　which；　in　common　language；　are　decidedly　distinguished　from　happiness。　They　desire；　for　example；　virtue；　and　the　absence　of　vice；　no　less　really　than　pleasure　and　the　absence　of　pain。　The　desire　of　virtue　is　not　as　universal；　but　it　is　as　authentic　a　fact；　as　the　desire　of　happiness。　And　hence　the　opponents　of　the　utilitarian　standard　deem　that　they　have　a　right　to　infer　that　there　are　other　ends　of　human　action　besides　happiness；　and　that　happiness　is　not　the　standard　of　approbation　and　disapprobation。　　　But　does　the　utilitarian　doctrine　deny　that　people　desire　virtue；　or　maintain　that　virtue　is　not　a　thing　to　be　desired？　The　very　reverse。　It　maintains　not　only　that　virtue　is　to　be　desired；　but　that　it　is　to　be　desired　disinterestedly；　for　itself。　Whatever　may　be　the　opinion　of　utilitarian　moralists　as　to　the　original　conditions　by　which　virtue　is　made　virtue；　however　they　may　believe　（as　they　do）　that　actions　and　dispositions　are　only　virtuous　because　they　promote　another　end　than　virtue；　yet　this　being　granted；　and　it　having　been　decided；　from　considerations　of　this　description；　what　is　virtuous；　they　not　only　place　virtue　at　the　very　head　of　the　things　which　are　good　as　means　to　the　ultimate　end；　but　they　also　recognise　as　a　psychological　fact　the　possibility　of　its　being；　to　the　individual；　a　good　in　itself；　without　looking　to　any　end　beyond　it；　and　hold；　that　the　mind　is　not　in　a　right　state；　not　in　a　state　conformable　to　Utility；　not　in　the　state　most　conducive　to　the　general　happiness；　unless　it　does　love　virtue　in　this　manner…　as　a　thing　desirable　in　itself；　even　although；　in　the　individual　instance；　it　should　not　produce　those　other　desirable　consequences　which　it　tends　to　produce；　and　on　account　of　which　it　is　held　to　be　virtue。　This　opinion　is　not；　in　the　smallest　degree；　a　departure　from　the　Happiness　principle。　The　ingredients　of　happiness　are　very　various；　and　each　of　them　is　desirable　in　itself；　and　not　merely　when　considered　as　swelling　an　aggregate。　The　principle　of　utility　does　not　mean　that　any　given　pleasure；　as　music；　for　instance；　or　any　given　exemption　from　pain；　as　for　example　health；　is　to　be　looked　upon　as　means　to　a　collective　something　termed　happiness；　and　to　be　desired　on　that　account。　They　are　desired　and　desirable　in　and　for　themselves；　besides　being　means；　they　are　a　part　of　the　end。　Virtue；　according　to　the　utilitarian　doctrine；　is　not　naturally　and　originally　part　of　the　end；　but　it　is　capable　of　becoming　so；　and　in　those　who　love　it　disinterestedly　it　has　become　so；　and　is　desired　and　cherished；　not　as　a　means　to　happiness；　but　as　a　part　of　their　happiness。　　　To　illustrate　this　farther；　we　may　remember　that　virtue　is　not　the　only　thing；　originally　a　means；　and　which　if　it　were　not　a　means　to　anything　else；　would　be　and　remain　indifferent；　but　which　by　association　with　what　it　is　a　means　to；　comes　to　be　desired　for　itself；　and　that　too　with　the　utmost　intensity。　What；　for　example；　shall　we　say　of　the　love　of　money？　There　is　nothing　originally　more　desirable　about　money　than　about　any　heap　of　glittering　pebbles。　Its　worth　is　solely　that　of　the　things　which　it　will　buy；　the　desires　for　other　things　than　itself；　which　it　is　a　means　of　gratifying。　Yet　the　love　of　money　is　not　only　one　of　the　strongest　moving　forces　of　human　life；　but　money　is；　in　many　cases；　desired　in　and　for　itself；　the　desire　to　possess　it　is　often　stronger　than　the　desire　to　use　it；　and　goes　on　increasing　when　all　the　desires　which　point　to　ends　beyond　it；　to　be　compassed　by　it；　are　falling　off。　It　may；　then；　be　said　truly；　that　money　is　desired　not　for　the　sake　of　an　end；　but　as　part　of　the　end。　From　being　a　means　to　happiness；　it　has　come　to　be　itself　a　principal　ingredient　of　the　individual's　conception　of　happiness。　The　same　may　be　said　of　the　majority　of　the　great　objects　of　human　life…　power；　for　example；　or　fame；　except　that　to　each　of　these　there　is　a　certain　amount　of　immediate　pleasure　annexed；　which　has　at　least　the　semblance　of　being　naturally　inherent　in　them；　a　thing　which　cannot　be　said　of　money。　Still；　however；　the　strongest　natural　attraction；　both　of　power　and　of　fame；　is　the　immense　aid　they　give　to　the　attainment　of　our　other　wishes；　and　it　is　the　strong　association　thus　generated　between　them　and　all　our　objects　of　desire；　which　gives　to　the　direct　desire　of　them　the　intensity　it　often　assumes；　so　as　in　some　characters　to　surpass　in　strength　all　other　desires。　In　these　cases　the　means　have　become　a　part　of　the　end；　and　a　more　important　part　of　it　than　any　of　the　things　which　they　are　means　to。　What　was　once　desired　as　an　instrument　for　the　attainment　of　happiness；　has　come　to　be　desired　for　its　own　sake。　In　being　desired　for　its　own　sake　it　is；　however；　desired　as　part　of　happiness。　The　person　is　made；　or　thinks　he　would　be　made；　happy　by　its　mere　possession；　and　is　made　unhappy　by　failure　to　obtain　it。　The　desire　of　it　is　not　a　different　thing　from　the　desire　of　happiness；　any　more　than　the　love　of　music；　or　the　desire　of　health。　They　are　included　in　happiness。　They　are　some　of　the　elements　of　which　the　desire　of　happiness　is　made　up。　Happiness　is　not　an　abstract　idea；　but　a　concrete　whole；　and　these　are　some　of　its　parts。　And　the　utilitarian　standard　sanctions　and　approves　their　being　so。　Life　would　be　a　poor　thing；　very　ill　provided　with　sources　of　happiness；　if　there　were　not　this　provision　of　nature；　by　which　things　originally　indifferent；　but　conducive　to；　or　otherwise　associated　with；　the　satisfaction　of　our　primitive　desires；　become　in　themselves　sources　of　pleasure　more　valuable　than　the　primitive　pleasures；　both　in　permanency；　in　the　space　of　human　existence　that　they　are　capable　of　covering；　and　even　in　intensity。　　　Virtue；　according　to　the　utilitarian　conception；　is　a　good　of　this　description。　There　was　no　original　desire　of　it；　or　motive　to　it；　save　its　conduciveness　to　pleasure；　and　especially　to　protection　from　pain。　But　through　the　association　thus　formed；　it　may　be　felt　a　good　in　itself；　and　desired　as　such　with　as　great　intensity　as　any　other　good；　and　with　this　difference　between　it　and　the　love　of　money；　of　power；　or　of　fame；　that　all　of　these　may；　and　often　do；　render　the　individual　noxious　to　the　other　members　of　the　society　to　which　he　belongs；　whereas　there　is　nothing　which　makes　him　so　much　a　blessing　to　them　as　the　cultivation　of　the　disinterested　love　of　virtue。　And　consequently；　the　utilitarian　standard；　while　it　tolerates　and　approves　those　other　acquired　desires；　up　to　the　point　beyond　which　they　would　be　more　injurious　to　the　general　happiness　than　promotive　of　it；　enjoins　and　requires　the　cultivation　of　the　love　of　virtue　up　to　the　greatest　strength　possible；　as　being　above　all　things　important　to　the　general　happiness。　　　It　results　from　the　preceding　considerations；　that　there　is　in　reality　nothing　desired　except　happiness。　Whatever　is　desired　otherwise　than　as　a　means　to　some　end　beyond　itself；　and　ultimately　to　happiness；　is　desired　as　itself　a　part　of　happiness；　and　is　not　desired　for　itself　until　it　has　become　so。　Those　who　desire　virtue　for　its　own　sake；　desire　it　either　because　the　consciousness　of　it　is　a　pleasure；　or　because　the　consciousness　of　being　without　it　is　a　pain；　or　for　both　reasons　united；　as　in　truth　the　pleasure　and　pain　seldom　exist　separately；　but　almost　always　together；　the　same　person　feeling　pleasure　in　the　degree　of　virtue　attained；　and　pain　in　not　having　a