philosophy of right-第21部分

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a　view　of　morality　as　nothing　but　a　bitter；　unending；　struggle　against　self…satisfaction；　as　the
command：　'Do　with　abhorrence　what　duty　enjoins。'　

It　is　just　this　type　of　ratiocination　which　adduces　that　familiar　psychological　view　of　history　which
understands　how　to　belittle　and　disparage　all　great　deeds　and　great　men　by　transforming　into　the
main　intention　and　operative　motive　of　actions　the　inclinations　and　passions　which　likewise　found
their　satisfaction　from　the　achievement　of　something　substantive；　the　fame　and　honour；　&c。；
consequential　on　such　actions；　in　a　word　their　particular　aspect；　the　aspect　which　it　has　decreed　in
advance　to　be　something　in　itself　pernicious。　Such　ratiocination　assures　us　that；　while　great　actions
and　the　efficiency　which　has　subsisted　through　a　series　of　them　have　produced　greatness　in　the
world　and　have　had　as　their　consequences　for　the　individual　agent　power；　honour；　and　fame；　still
what　belongs　to　the　individual　is　not　the　greatness　itself　but　what　has　accrued　to　him　from　it；　this
purely　particular　and　external　result；　because　this　result　is　a　consequence；　it　is　therefore　supposed
to　have　been　the　agent's　end　and　even　his　sole　end。　Reflection　of　this　sort　stops　short　at　the
subjective　side　of　great　men；　since　it　itself　stands　on　purely　subjective　ground；　and　consequently　it
overlooks　what　is　substantive　in　this　emptiness　of　its　own　making。　This　is　the　view　of　those　valet
psychologists　'for　whom　there　are　no　heroes；　not　because　there　are　no　heroes；　but　because　these
psychologists　are　only　valets'。　

Addition：　In　magnis　。。。　voluisse　sat　est　＇In　great　things　to　have　willed　is　enough＇　is　right　in　the
sense　that　we　ought　to　will　something　great。　But　we　must　also　be　able　to　achieve　it；　otherwise　the
willing　is　nugatory。　The　laurels　of　mere　willing　are　dry　leaves　that　never　were　green。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　125。　

The　subjective　element　of　the　will；　with　its　particular　content　…　welfare；　is
reflected　into　itself　and　infinite　and　so　stands　related　to　the　universal　element；　to
the　principle　of　the　will。　This　moment　of　universality；　posited　first　of　all　within
this　particular　content　itself；　is　the　welfare　of　others　also；　or；　specified　completely；
though　quite　emptily；　the　welfare　of　all。　The　welfare　of　many　other　unspecified
particulars　is　thus　also　an　essential　end　and　right　of　subjectivity。　But　since　the
absolutely　universal；　in　distinction　from　such　a　particular　content；　has　not　so　far
been　further　determined　than　as　'the　right'；　it　follows　that　these　ends　of
particularity；　differing　as　they　do　from　the　universal；　may　be　in　conformity　with　it；
but　they　also　may　not。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　126。　

My　particularity；　however；　like　that　of　others；　is　only　a　right　at　all　in　so　far　as　I
am　a　free　entity。　Therefore　it　may　not　make　claims　for　itself　in　contradiction　to
this　its　substantive　basis；　and　an　intention　to　secure　my　welfare　or　that　of　others
（and　it　is　particularly　in　this　latter　case　that　such　an　intention　is　called　moral'）
cannot　justify　an　action　which　is　wrong。　

Remark：　It　is　one　of　the　most　prominent　of　the　corrupt　maxims　of　our　time　to　enter　a　plea　for
the　so…called　'moral'　intention　behind　wrong　actions　and　to　imagine　bad　men　with　well…meaning
hearts；　i。e。　hearts　willing　their　own　welfare　and　perhaps　that　of　others　also。　This　doctrine　is　rooted
in　the　'benevolence'　（guten　Herzens）　of　the　pre…Kantian　philosophers　and　constitutes；　e。g。；　the
quintessence　of　well…known　touching　dramatic　productions；　but　today　it　has　been　resuscitated　in　a
more　extravagant　form；　and　inner　enthusiasm　and　the　heart；　i。e。　the　form　of　particularity　as　such；
have　been　made　the　criterion　of　right；　rationality；　and　excellence。　The　result　is　that　crime　and　the
thoughts　that　lead　to　it；　be　they　fancies　however　trite　and　empty；　or　opinions　however　wild；　are　to
be　regarded　as　right；　rational；　and　excellent；　simply　because　they　issue　from　men's　hearts　and
enthusiasms。　（See　the　Remark　to　§　140；　where　more　details　are　given。）　；　Incidentally；　however；
attention　must　be　paid　to　the　point　of　view　from　which　right　and　welfare　are　being　treated　here。
We　are　considering　right　as　abstract　right　and　welfare　as　the　particular　welfare　of　the　single　agent。
The　so…called　'general　good'；　the　welfare　of　the　state；　i。e。　the　right　of　mind　actual　and　concrete；　is
quite　a　different　sphere；　a　sphere　in　which　abstract　right　is　a　subordinate　moment　like　particular
welfare　and　the　happiness　of　the　individual。　As　was　remarked　above；　it　is　one　of　the　commonest
blunders　of　abstract　thinking　to　make　private　rights　and　private　welfare　count　as　absolute　in
opposition　to　the　universality　of　the　state。　

Addition：　The　famous　answer：　Je　n'en　vois　pas　la　nécessité；　given　＇by　Richelieu＇　to　the
lampooner　who　excused　himself　with　the　words：　Il　faut　donc　que　je　vive；　is　apposite　at　this　point。
Life　ceases　to　be　necessary　in　face　of　the　higher　realm　of　freedom。　When　St。　Crispin　stole　leather
to　make　shoes　for　the　poor；　his　action　was　moral　but　wrong　and　so　inadmissible。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　127。　

The　particularity　of　the　interests　of　the　natural　will；　taken　in　their　entirety　as　a
single　whole；　is　personal　existence　or　life。　In　extreme　danger　and　in　conflict　with
the　rightful　property　of　someone　else；　this　life　may　claim　（as　a　right；　not　a　mercy）
a　right　of　distress；　because　in　such　a　situation　there　is　on　the　one　hand　an　infinite
injury　to　a　man's　existence　and　the　consequent　loss　of　rights　altogether；　and　on
the　other　hand　only　an　injury　to　a　single　restricted　embodiment　of　freedom；　and
this　implies　a　recognition　both　of　right　as　such　and　also　of　the　injured　man's
capacity　for　rights；　because　the　injury　affects　only　this　property　of　his。　

Remark：　The　right　of　distress　is　the　basis　of　beneficium　competentiae　whereby　a　debtor　is
allowed　to　retain　of　his　tools；　farming　implements；　clothes；　or；　in　short；　of　his　resources；　i。e。　of　his
creditor's　property；　so　much　as　is　regarded　as　indispensable　if　he　is　to　continue　to　support　life　…　to
support　it；　of　course；　on　his　own　social　level。　

Addition：　Life　as　the　sum　of　ends　has　a　right　against　abstract　right。　If　for　example　it　is　only　by
stealing　bread　that　the　wolf　can　be　kept　from　the　door；　the　action　is　of　course　an　encroachment　on
someone's　property；　but　it　would　be　wrong　to　treat　this　action　as　an　ordinary　theft。　To　refuse　to
allow　a　man　in　jeopardy　of　his　life　to　take　such　steps　for　self…preservation　would　be　to　stigmatise
him　as　without　rights；　and　since　he　would　be　deprived　of　his　life；　his　freedom　would　be　annulled
altogether。　Many　diverse　details　have　a　bearing　on　the　preservation　of　life；　and　when　we　have　our
eyes　on　the　future　we　have　to　engage　ourselves　in　these　details。　But　the　only　thing　that　is　necessary
is　to　live　now；　the　future　is　not　absolute　but　ever　exposed　to　accident。　Hence　it　is　only　the
necessity　of　the　immediate　present　which　can　justify　a　wrong　action；　because　not　to　do　the　action
would　in　turn　be　to　commit　an　offence；　indeed　the　most　wrong　of　all　offences；　namely　the　complete
destruction　of　the　embodiment　of　freedom。　Beneficium　competentiae　is　relevant　here；　because
kinship　and　other　close　relationships　imply　the　right　to　demand　that　no　one　shall　be　sacrificed
altogether　on　the　altar　of　right。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　128。　

This　distress　reveals　the　finitude　and　therefore　the　contingency　of　both　right　and
welfare　of　right　as　the　abstract　embodiment　of　freedom　without　embodying　the
particular　person；　and　of　welfare　as　the　sphere　of　the　particular　will　without　the
universality　of　right。　In　this　way　they　are　established　as　one…sided　and　ideal；　the
character　which　in　conception　they　already　possessed。　Right　has　already　（see　§
106）　determined　its　embodiment　as　the　particular　will；　and　subjectivity；　in　its
particularity　as　a　comprehensive　whole；　is　itself　the　embodiment　of　freedom　（see
§　127）；　while　as　the　infinite　relation　of　the　will　to　itself；　it　is　implicitly　the
universal　element　in　freedom。　The　two　moments　present　in　right　and　subjectivity；
thus　integrated　and　attaining　their　truth；　their　identity；　though　in　the　first　instance
still　remaining　relative　to　one　another；　are　（a）　the　good　（as　the　concrete；
absolutely　determinate；　universal）；　and　（b）　conscience　（as　infinite　subjectivity
inwardly　conscious　and　inwardly　determining　its　content）。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　iii　Good　&　Conscience
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　129。　

The　good　is　the　Idea　as　the　unity　of　the　concept　of　the　will　with　the　particular
will。　In　this　unity；　abstract　right；　welfare；　the　subjectivity　of　knowing　and　the
contingency　of　external　fact；　have　their　independent　self…subsistence　superseded；
though　at　the　same　time　they　are　still　contained　and　retained　within　it　in　their
essence。　The　good　is　thus　freedom　realised；　the　absolute　end　and　aim　of　the
world。　

Addition：　Every　stage　is　really　the　Idea；　but　the　earlier　stages　contain　it　only　in　rather　an
abstract　form。　Thus　for　example；　even　the　ego；　as　personality；　is　already　the　Idea；　though　in　its
most　abstract　shape。　The　good；　therefore；　is　the　Idea　further　determined；　the　unity　of　the　concept
of　the　will　with　the　particular　will。　It　is　not　something　abstractly　right；　but　something　concrete
whose　contents　are　made　up　of　both　right　and　welfare　alike。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　130。　

In　this　Idea；　welfare　has　no　independent　validity　as　the　embodiment　of　a　single
particular　will　but　only　as　universal　welfare　and　essentially　as　universal　in
principle；　i。e。　as　according　with　freedom。　Welfare　without　right　is　not　a　good。
Similarly；　right　without　welfare　is　not　the　good；　fiat　justitia　should　not　be
followed　by　pereat　mundus。　Consequently；　since　the　good　must　of　necessity　be
actualised　through　the　particular　will　and　is　at　the　same　time　its　substance；　it　has
absolute　right　in　contrast　with　the　abstract　right　of　property　and　the　particular
aims　of　welfare。　If　either　of　these　moments　becomes　distinguished　from　the　good；
it　has　validity　only　in　so　far　as　it　accords　with　the　good　and　is　subordinated　to　it。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　131。　

For　the　subjective　will；　the　good　and　th