philosophy of right-第23部分
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indeterminacy stabilised … then no transition is possible to the specification of particular duties nor；
if some such particular content for acting comes under consideration； is there any criterion in that
principle for deciding whether it is or is not a duty。 On the contrary； by this means any wrong or
immoral line of conduct may be justified。
Kant's further formulations the possibility of visualising an action as a universal maxim； does lead
to the more concrete visualisation of a situation； but in itself it contains no principle beyond
abstract identity and the 'absence of contradiction' already mentioned。
The absence of property contains in itself just as little contradiction as the non…existence of this or
that nation； family； &c。； or the death of the whole human race。 But if it is already established on
other grounds and presupposed that property and human life are to exist and be respected； then
indeed it is a contradiction to commit theft or murder； a contradiction must be a contradiction of
something； i。e。 of some content presupposed from the start as a fixed principle。 It is to a principle
of that kind alone； therefore； that an action can be related either by correspondence or
contradiction。 But if duty is to be willed simply for duty's sake and not for the sake of some
content； it is only a formal identity whose nature it is to exclude all content and specification。
The further antinomies and configurations of this never…ending ought…to…be； in which the
exclusively moral way of thinking … thinking in terms of relation … just wanders to and fro without
being able to resolve them and get beyond the ought…to…be； I have developed in my
Phenomenology of Mind。
Addition： While we laid emphasis above on the fact that the outlook of Kant's philosophy is a
high one in that it propounds a correspondence between duty and rationality； still we must notice
here that this point of view is defective in lacking all articulation。 The proposition： 'Act as if the
maxim of thine action could be laid down as a universal principle'； would be admirable if we
already had determinate principles of conduct。 That is to say； to demand of a principle that it shall
be able to serve in addition as a determinant of universal legislation is to presuppose that it already
possesses a content。 Given the content； then of course the application of the principle would be a
simple matter。 In Kant's case； however； the principle itself is still not available and his criterion of
non…contradiction is productive of nothing； since where there is nothing； there can be no
contradiction either。
§ 136。
Because of the abstract characterisation of the good； the other moment of the
Idea … particularity in general … falls within subjectivity。 Subjectivity in its
universality reflected into itself is the subject's absolute inward certainty
（Gewissheit） of himself； that which establishes the particular and is the
determining and decisive element in him； his conscience （Gewissen）。
Addition： We may speak in a very lofty strain about duty； and talk of the kind is uplifting and
broadens human sympathies； but if it never comes to anything specific it ends in being wearisome。
Mind demands particularity and is entitled to it。 But conscience is this deepest inward solitude with
oneself where everything external and every restriction has disappeared … this complete withdrawal
into oneself。 As conscience； man is no longer shackled by the aims of particularity； and
consequently in attaining that position he has risen to higher ground； the ground of the modern
world； which for the first time has reached this consciousness； reached this sinking into oneself。
The more sensuous consciousness ＇For the distinction between sense…consciousness and 'more
highly developed types of consciousness'； see Remarks to §§ 21 and 35。＇ of earlier epochs had
something external and given confronting it； either religion or law。 But conscience knows itself as
thinking and knows that what alone has obligatory force for me is this that I think。
§ 137。
True conscience is the disposition to will what is absolutely good。 It therefore has
fixed principles and it is aware of these as its explicitly objective determinants and
duties。 In distinction from this its content （i。e。 truth）； conscience is only the
formal side of the activity of the will； which as this will has no special content of
its own。 But the objective system of these principles and duties； and the union of
subjective knowing with this system； is not present until we come to the
standpoint of ethical life。 Here at the abstract standpoint of morality； conscience
lacks this objective content and so its explicit character is that of infinite abstract
self…certainty； which at the same time is for this very reason the self…certainty of
this subject。
Remark： Conscience is the expression of the absolute title of subjective self…consciousness to
know in itself and from within itself what is right and obligatory； to give recognition only to what it
thus knows as good； and at the same time to maintain that whatever in this way it knows and wills
is in truth right and obligatory。 Conscience as this unity of subjective knowing with what is absolute
is a sanctuary which it would be sacrilege to violate。 But whether the conscience of a specific
individual corresponds with this Idea of conscience； or whether what it takes or declares to be
good is actually so； is ascertainable only from the content of the good it seeks to realise。 What is
right and obligatory is the absolutely rational element in the will's volitions and therefore it is not in
essence the particular property of an individual； and its form is not that of feeling or any other
private （i。e。 sensuous） type of knowing； but essentially that of universals determined by thought；
i。e。 the form of laws and principles。 Conscience is therefore subject to the judgement of its truth or
falsity； and when it appeals only to itself for a decision； it is directly at variance with what it wishes
to be； namely the rule for a mode of conduct which is rational； absolutely valid； and universal。 For
this reason； the state cannot give recognition to conscience in its private form as subjective
knowing； any more than science can grant validity to subjective opinion； dogmatism； and the
appeal to a subjective opinion。 In true conscience； its elements are not different； but they may
become so； and it is the determining element； the subjectivity of willing and knowing； which can
sever itself from the true content of conscience； establish its own independence； and reduce that
content to a form and a show。 The ambiguity in connection with conscience lies therefore in this： it
is presupposed to mean the identity of subjective knowing and willing with the true good； and so
is claimed and recognised to be something sacrosanct； and yet at the same time； as the mere
subjective reflection of self…consciousness into itself； it still claims for itself the title due； solely on
the strength of its absolutely valid rational content； to that identity alone。
At the level of morality； distinguished as it is in this book from the level of ethics； it is only formal
conscience that is to be found。 True conscience has been mentioned only to indicate its distinction
from the other and to obviate the possible misunderstanding that here； where it is only formal
conscience that is under consideration； the argument is about true conscience。 The latter is part of
the ethical disposition which comes before us for the first time in the following section。 The
religious conscience； however； does not belong to this sphere at all。
Addition： When we speak of conscience； it may easily be thought that； in virtue of its form；
which is abstract inwardness； conscience is at ties point without more ado true conscience。 But
true conscience determines itself to will what is absolutely good and obligatory and is this
self…determination。 So far； however； it is only with good in the abstract that we have to do and
conscience is still without this objective content and is but the infinite certainty of oneself。
§ 138。
This subjectivity； qua abstract self…determination and pure certainty of oneself
alone； as readily evaporates into itself the whole determinate character of right；
duty； and existence； as it remains both the power to judge； to determine from
within itself alone； what is good in respect of any content； and also the power to
which the good； at first only an ideal and an ought…to…be； owes its actuality。
Remark： The self…consciousness which has attained this absolute reflection into itself knows
itself in this reflection to be the kind of consciousness which is and should be beyond the reach of
every existent and given specific determination。 As one of the commoner features of history （e。g。 in
Socrates；40 the Stoics； and others）； the tendency to look deeper into oneself and to know and
determine from within oneself what is right and good appears in ages when what is recognised as
right and good in contemporary manners cannot satisfy the will of better men。 When the existing
world of freedom has become faithless to the will of better men； that will fails to find itself in the
duties there recognised and must try to find in the ideal world of the inner life alone the harmony
which actuality has lost。 Once self…consciousness has grasped and secured its formal right in this
way； everything depends on the character of the content which it gives to itself。
Addition： If we look more closely at this process of evaporation and see how all specific
determinations disappear into this simple concept and then have to be condensed out of it again；
what we find is that it is primarily due to the fact that everything recognised as right and duty may
be proved by discursive thinking to be nugatory； restricted； and in all respects not absolute。 On the
other hand； just as subjectivity evaporates every content into itself； so it may develop it out of itself
once more。 Everything which arises in the ethical sphere is produced by this acti
