philosophy of right-第31部分

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atomistically　and　build　on　the　basis　of　s　ingle　individuals。　This　second　point　of　view　excludes　mind
because　it　leads　only　to　a　juxtaposition。　Mind；　however；　is　not　something　single；　but　is　the　unity　of
the　single　and　the　universal。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　157。

The　concept　of　this　Idea　has　being　only　as　mind；　as　something　knowing　itself　and
actual；　because　it　is　the　objectification　of　itself；　the　movement　running　through　the
form　of　its　moments。　It　is　therefore　

（A）　ethical　mind　in　its　natural　or　immediate　phase　—　the　Family。　This
substantiality　loses　its　unity；　passes　over　into　division；　and　into　the　phase　of
relation；　i。e。　into　

（B）　Civil　Society　—　an　association　of　members　as　self…subsistent　individuals　in　a
universality　which；　because　of　their　self…subsistence；　is　only　abstract。　Their
association　is　brought　about　by　their　needs；　by　the　legal　system　—　the　means　to
security　of　person　and　property　—　and　by　an　external　organisation　for　attaining
their　particular　and　common　interests。　This　external　state　

（C）　is　brought　back；　to　and　welded　into　unity　in　the　Constitution　of　the　State
which　is　the　end　and　actuality　of　both　the　substantial　universal　order　and　the
public　life　devoted　thereto。　




Third　Part：　Ethical　Life
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　i　The　Family

　（a）：　Marriage　…　（b）　Family　Capital　…　C：　Children　&　Dissolution


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　158。

The　family；　as　the　immediate　substantiality　of　mind；　is　specifically　characterised
by　love；　which　is　mind's　feeling　of　its　own　unity。　Hence　in　a　family；　one's　frame
of　mind　is　to　have　self…consciousness　of　one's　individuality　within　this　unity　as　the
absolute　essence　of　oneself；　with　the　result　that　one　is　in　it　not　as　an　independent
person　but　as　a　member。　

Addition：　Love　means　in　general　terms　the　consciousness　of　my　unity　with　another；　so　that　I　am
not　in　selfish　isolation　but　win　my　self…consciousness　only　as　the　renunciation　of　my　independence
and　through　knowing　myself　as　the　unity　of　myself　with　another　and　of　the　other　with　me。　Love；
however；　is　feeling；　i。e。　ethical　life　in　the　form　of　something　natural。　In　the　state；　feeling　disappears；
there　we　are　conscious　of　unity　as　law；　there　the　content　must　be　rational　and　known　to　us。　The
first　moment　in　love　is　that　I　do　not　wish　to　be　a　self…subsistent　and　independent　person　and　that；　if
I　were；　then　I　would　feel　defective　and　incomplete。　The　second　moment　is　that　I　find　myself　in
another　person；　that　I　count　for　something　in　the　other；　while　the　other　in　turn　comes　to　count　for
something　in　me。　Love；　therefore；　is　the　most　tremendous　contradiction；　the　Understanding　cannot
resolve　it　since　there　is　nothing　more　stubborn　than　this　point　（Punktualit？t）　of　self…consciousness
which　is　negated　and　which　nevertheless　I　ought　to　possess　as　affirmative。　Love　is　at　once　the
propounding　and　the　resolving　of　this　contradiction。　As　the　resolving　of　it；　love　is　unity　of　an　ethical
type。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　159。

The　right　which　the　individual　enjoys　on　the　strength　of　the　family　unity　and
which　is　in　the　first　place　simply　the　individual's　life　within　this　unity；　takes　on　the
form　of　right　（as　the　abstract　moment　of　determinate　individuality）　only　when　the
family　begins　to　dissolve。　At　that　point　those　who　should　be　family…members　both
in　their　inclination　and　in　actuality　begin　to　be　self…subsistent　persons；　and
whereas　they　formerly　constituted　one　specific　moment　within　the　whole；　they
now　receive　their　share　separately　and　so　only　in　an　external　fashion　by　way　of
money；　food；　educational　expenses；　and　the　like。　

Addition：　The　right　of　the　family　properly　consists　in　the　fact　that　its　substantiality　should　have
determinate　existence。　Thus　it　is　a　right　against　externality　and　against　secessions　from　the　family
unity。　On　the　other　hand；　to　repeat；　love　is　a　feeling；　something　subjective；　against　which　unity
cannot　make　itself　effective。　The　demand　for　unity　can　be　sustained；　then；　only　in　relation　to　such
things　as　are　by　nature　external　and　not　conditioned　by　feeling。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　160。

The　family　is　completed　in　these　three　phases：　

（a）　Marriage；　the　form　assumed　by　the　concept　of　the　family　in　its　immediate
phase；　
（b）　Family　Property　and　Capital　（the　external　embodiment　of　the　concept）　and
attention　to　these；　
（c）　The　Education　of　Children　and　the　Dissolution　of　the　Family。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　A。　Marriage
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　161。

Marriage；　as　the　immediate　type　of　ethical　relationship；　contains　first；　the　moment
of　physical　life；　and　since　marriage　is　a　substantial　tie；　the　life　involved　in　it　is　life
in　its　totality；　i。e。　as　the　actuality　of　the　race　and　its　life…process。　But；　secondly；　in
self…consciousness　the　natural　sexual　union…a　union　purely　inward　or　implicit　and
for　that　very　reason　existent　as　purely　external　…is　changed　into　a　union　on　the
level　of　mind；　into　self…conscious　love。　

Addition：　Marriage　is　in　essence　an　ethical　tie。　Formerly；　especially　in　most　systems　of　natural
law；　attention　was　paid　only　to　the　physical　side　of　marriage　or　to　its　natural　character。
Consequently；　it　was　treated　only　as　a　sex　relationship；　and　this　completely　barred　the　way　to　its
other　characteristics。　This　is　crude　enough；　but　it　is　no　less　so　to　think　of　it　as　only　a　civil　contract；
and　even　Kant　does　this。　On　this　view；　the　parties　are　bound　by　a　contract　of　mutual　caprice；　and
marriage　is　thus　degraded　to　the　level　of　a　contract　for　reciprocal　use。　A　third　view　of　marriage　is
that　which　bases　it　on　love　alone；　but　this　must　be　rejected　like　the　other　two；　since　love　is　only　a
feeling　and　so　is　exposed　in　every　respect　to　contingency；　a　guise　which　ethical　life　may　not
assume。　Marriage；　therefore；　is　to　be　more　precisely　characterised　as　ethico…legal　（rechtlich
sittliche）　love；　and　this　eliminates　from　marriage　the　transient；　fickle；　and　purely　subjective　aspects
of　love。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　162。

On　the　subjective　side；　marriage　may　have　a　more　obvious　source　in　the
particular　inclination　of　the　two　persons　who　are　entering　upon　the　marriage　tie；
or　in　the　foresight　and　contrivance　of　the　parents；　and　so　forth。　But　its　objective
source　lies　in　the　free　consent　of　the　persons；　especially　in　their　consent　to　make
themselves　one　person；　to　renounce　their　natural　and　individual　personality　to　this
unity　of　one　with　the　other。　From　this　point　of　view；　their　union　is　a
self…restriction；　but　in　fact　it　is　their　liberation；　because　in　it　they　attain　their
substantive　self…consciousness。　

Remark：　Our　objectively　appointed　end　and　so　our　ethical　duty　is　to　enter　the　married　state。
The　external　origin　of　any　particular　marriage　is　in　the　lure　of　the　case　contingent；　and　it　depends
principally　on　the　extent　which　reflective　thought　has　been　developed。　At　one　extreme；　the　step　is
that　the　marriage　is　arranged　by　the　contrivance　of　benevolent　parents；　the　appointed　end　of　the
parties　is　a　union　of　mutual　love；　their　inclination　to　marry　arises　from　the　fact　that　each　grows
acquainted　with　the　other　from　the　first　as　a　destined　partner。　At　the　other　extreme；　it　is　the
inclination　of　the　parties　which　comes　first；　appearing　in　them　as　these　two　infinitely　particularised
individuals。　The　more　ethical　way　to　matrimony　may　be　taken　to　be　the　former　extreme　or　any
way　at　all　whereby　the　decision　to　marry　comes　first　and　the　inclination　to　do　so　follows；　so　that　in
the　actual　wedding　both　decision　and　inclination　coalesce。　In　the　latter　extreme；　it　is　the　uniqueness
of　the　infinitely　particularised　which　makes　good　its　claims　in　accordance　with　the　subjective
principle　of　the　modern　world　（see　Remark　to　§　124）。　

But　those　works　of　modern　art；　dramatic　and　other；　in　which　the　love　of　the　sexes　is　the　main
interest；　are　pervaded　by　a　chill　despite　the　heat　of　passion　they　portray；　for　they　associate　the
passion　with　accident　throughout　and　represent　the　entire　dramatic　interest　as　if　it　rested　solely　on
the　characters　as　these　individuals；　what　rests　on　them　may　indeed　be　of　infinite　importance　to
them；　but　is　of　none　whatever　in　itself。　

Addition：　Amongst　peoples　who　hold　the　female　sex　in　scant　respect；　marriages　are　arranged
by　the　parents　at　will　without　consulting　the　young　people。　The　latter　raise　no　objection；　since　at
that　level　of　culture　the　particularity　of　feeling　makes　no　claims　for　itself。　For　the　woman　it　is　only　a
matter　of　getting　a　husband；　for　the　man；　of　getting　a　wife。　In　other　social　conditions；
considerations　of　wealth；　connections；　political　ends；　may　be　the　determining　factor。　In　such
circumstances；　great　hardships　may　arise　through　making　marriage　a　means　to　other　ends。
Nowadays；　however；　the　subjective　origin　of　marriage；　the　state　of　being　in　love；　is　regarded　as
the　only　important　originating　factor。　Here　the　position　is　represented　to　be　that　a　man　must　wait
until　his　hour　has　struck　and　that　he　can　bestow　his　love　only　on　one　specific　individual。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　163。　

The　ethical　aspect　of　marriage　consists　in　the　parties'　consciousness　of　this　unity
as　their　substantive　aim；　and　so　in　their　love；　trust；　and　common　sharing　of　their
entire　existence　as　individuals。　When　the　parties　are　in　this　frame　of　mind　and
their　union　is　actual；　their　physical　passion　sinks　to　the　level　of　a　physical
moment；　destined　to　vanish　in　its　very　satisfaction。　On　the　other　hand；　the
spiritual　bond　of　union　secures　its　rights　as　the　substance　of　marriage　and　thus
rises；　inherently　indissoluble；　to　a　plane　above　the　contingency　of　passion　and　the
transience　of　particular　caprice。　

Remark：　It　was　noted　above　（in　§　75）　that　marriage；　so　far　as　its　essential　basis　is　concerned；　is
not　a　contractual　relation。　On　the　contrary；　though　marriage　begins　in　contract；　it　is　precisely　a
contract　to　transcend　the　standpoint　of　contract；　the　standpoint　from　which　persons　are　regarded
in　their　individuality　as　self…subsistent　units。　The　identification　of　personalities；　whereby　the　family
becomes　one　person　and　its　members　become　its　accidents　（though　substance　is　in　essence　the
relat