philosophy of right-第50部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


the　sphere　of　the　family　and　civil　society）　but；　for　one　thing；　they　also　pass　over
of　their　own　accord　into　the　interest　of　the　universal；　and；　for　another　thing；　they
know　and　will　the　universal；　they　even　recognise　it　as　their　own　substantive　mind；
they　take　it　as　their　end　and　aim　and　are　active　in　its　pursuit。　The　result　is　that　the
universal　does　not　prevail　or　achieve　completion　except　along　with　particular
interests　and　through　the　co…operation　of　particular　knowing　and　willing；　and
individuals　likewise　do　not　live　as　private　persons　for　their　own　ends　alone；　but　in
the　very　act　of　willing　these　they　will　the　universal　in　the　light　of　the　universal；
and　their　activity　is　consciously　aimed　at　none　but　the　universal　end。　The　principle
of　modern　states　has　prodigious　strength　and　depth　because　it　allows　the　principle
of　subjectivity　to　progress　to　its　culmination　in　the　extreme　of　self…subsistent
personal　particularity；　and　yet　at　the　same　time　brings　it　back　to　the　substantive
unity　and　so　maintains　this　unity　in　the　principle　of　subjectivity　itself。　

Addition：　The　Idea　of　the　state　in　modern　times　has　a　special　character　in　that　the　state　is　the
actualisation　of　freedom　not　in　accordance　with　subjective　whim　but　in　accordance　with　the
concept　of　the　will；　i。e。　in　accordance　with　its　universality　and　divinity。　Immature　states　are　those　in
which　the　Idea　of　the　state　is　still　veiled　and　where　its　particular　determinations　have　not　yet
attained　free　self…subsistence。　In　the　states　of　classical　antiquity；　universality　was　present；　but
particularity　had　not　then　been　released；　given　free　scope；　and　brought　back　to　universality；　i。e。　to
the　Universal　end　of　the　whole。　The　essence　of　the　modern　state　is　that　the　universal　be　bound　up
with　the　complete　freedom　of　its　particular　members　and　with　private　well…being；　that　thus　the
interests　of　family　and　civil　society　must　concentrate　themselves　on　the　state；　although　the
…universal　end　cannot　be　advanced　without　the　personal　knowledge　and　will　of　its　particular
members；　whose　own　rights　must　be　maintained。　Thus　the　universal　must　be　furthered；　but
subjectivity　on　the　other　hand　must　attain　its　full　and　living　development。　It　is　only　when　both　these
moments　subsist　in　their　strength　that　the　state　can　be　regarded　as　articulated　and　genuinely
organised。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　261。　

In　contrast　with　the　spheres　of　private　rights　and　private　welfare　（the　family　and
civil　society）；　the　state　is　from　one　point　of　view　an　external　necessity　and　their
higher　authority；　its　nature　is　such　that　their　laws　and　interests　are　subordinate　to
it　and　dependent　on　it。　On　the　other　hand；　however；　it　is　the　end　immanent　within
them；　and　its　strength　lies　in　the　unity　of　its　own　universal　end　and　aim　with　the
particular　interest　of　individuals；　in　the　fact　that　individuals　have　duties　to　the　state
in　proportion　as　they　have　rights　against　it　（see　§　155）。　

Remark：　In　the　Remark　to　§　3　above；　reference　was　made　to　the　fact　that　it　was　Montesquieu
above　all　who；　in　his　famous　work　L’Esprit　des　Lois；　kept　in　sight　and　tried　to　work　out　in　detail
both　the　thought　of　the　dependence　of　laws　…　in　particular；　laws　concerning　the　rights　of　persons　…
on　the　specific　character　of　the　state；　and　also　the　philosophic　notion　of　always　treating　the　part　in
its　relation　to　the　whole。　

Duty　is　primarily　a　relation　to　something　which　from　my　point　of　view　is　substantive；　absolutely
universal。　A　right；　on　the　other　hand；　is　simply　the　embodiment　of　this　substance　and　thus　is　the
particular　aspect　of　it　and　enshrines　my　particular　freedom。　Hence　at　abstract　levels；　right　and　duty
appear　parcelled　out　on　different　sides　or　in　different　persons。　In　the　state；　as　something　ethical；　as
the　inter…penetration　of　the　substantive　and　the　particular；　my　obligation　to　what　is　substantive　is　at
the　same　time　the　embodiment　of　my　particular　freedom。　This　means　that　in　the　state　duty　and　right
are　united　in　one　and　the　same　relation。　But　further；　since　none　the　less　the　distinct　moments
acquire　in　the　state　the　shape　and　reality　peculiar　to　each；　and　since　therefore　the　distinction
between　right　and　duty　enters　here　once　again；　it　follows　that　while　implicitly；　i。e。　in　form；　identical；
they　at　the　same　time　differ　in　content。　In　the　spheres　of　personal　rights　and　morality；　the　necessary
bearing　of　right　and　duty　on　one　another　falls　short　of　actualisation；　and　hence　there　is　at　that　point
only　an　abstract　similarity　of　content　between　them；　i。e。　in　those　abstract　spheres；　what　is　one
man's　right　ought　also　to　be　another's；　and　what　is　one　man's　duty　ought　also　to　be　another's。　The
absolute　identity　of　right　and　duty　in　the　state　is　present　in　these　spheres　not　as　a　genuine　identity
but　only　as　a　similarity　of　content；　because　in　them　this　content　is　determined　as　quite　general　and
is　simply　the　fundamental　principle　of　both　right　and　duty；　i。e。　the　principle　that　men；　as　persons；
are　free。　Slaves；　therefore；　have　no　duties　because　they　have　no　rights；　and　vice　versa。　（Religious
duties　are　not　here　in　point。）　

In　the　course　of　the　inward　development　of　the　concrete　Idea；　however；　its　moments　become
distinguished　and　their　specific　determinacy　becomes　at　the　same　time　a　difference　of　content。　In
the　family；　the　content　of　a　son's　duties　to　his　father　differs　from　the　content　of　his　rights　against
him；　the　content　of　the　rights　of　a　member　of　civil　society　is　not　the　same　as　the　content　of　his
duties　to　his　prince　and　government。　

This　concept　of　the　union　of　duty　and　right　is　a　point　of　vital　importance　and　in　it　the　inner　strength
of　states　is　contained。　

Duty　on　its　abstract　side　goes　no　farther　than　the　persistent　neglect　and　proscription　of　a　man's
particular　interest；　on　the　ground　that　it　is　the　inessential；　even　the　discreditable；　moment　in　his　life。
Duty；　taken　concretely　as　Idea；　reveals　the　moment　of　particularity　as　itself　essential　and　so
regards　its　satisfaction　as　indisputably　necessary。　In　whatever　way　an　individual　may　fulfil　his　duty；
he　must　at　the　same　time　find　his　account　therein　and　attain　his　personal　interest　and　satisfaction。
Out　of　his　position　in　the　state；　a　right　must　accrue　to　him　whereby　public　affairs　shall　be　his　own
particular　affair。　Particular　interests　should　in　fact　not　be　set　aside　or　completely　suppressed；
instead；　they　should　be　put　in　correspondence　with　the　universal；　and　thereby　both　they　and　the
universal　are　upheld。　The　isolated　individual；　so　far　as　his　duties　are　concerned；　is　in　subjection；
but　as　a　member　of　civil　society　he　finds　in　fulfilling　his　duties　to　it　protection　of　his　person　and
property；　regard　for　his　private　welfare；　the　satisfaction　of　the　depths　of　his　being；　the
consciousness　and　feeling　of　himself　as　a　member　of　the　whole；　and；　in　so　far　as　he　completely
fulfils　his　duties　by　performing　tasks　and　services　for　the　state；　he　is　upheld　and　preserved。　Take
duty　abstractly；　and　the　universal's　interest　would　consist　simply　in　the　completion　as　duties　of　the
tasks　and　services　which　it　exacts。　

Addition：　In　the　state　everything　depends　on　the　unity　of　universal　and　particular。　In　the　states
of　antiquity；　the　subjective　end　simply　coincided　with　the　state's　will。　In　modern　times；　however；
we　make　claims　for　private　judgement；　private　willing；　and　private　conscience。　The　ancients　had
none　of　these　in　the　modern　sense；　the　ultimate　thing　with　them　was　the　will　of　the　state。　Whereas
under　the　despots　of　Asia　the　individual　had　no　inner　life　and　no　justification　in　himself；　in　the
modern　world　Man　insists　on　respect　being　paid　to　his　inner　life。　The　conjunction　of　duty　and　right
has　a　twofold　aspect：　what　the　state　demands　from　us　as　a　duty　is　eo　ipso　our　right　as　individuals；
since　the　state　is　nothing　but　the　articulation　of　the　concept　of　freedom。　The　determinations　of　the
individual　will　are　given　an　objective　embodiment　through　the　state　and　thereby　they　attain　their
truth　and　their　actualisation　for　the　first　time。　The　State　is　the　one　and　only　prerequisite　of　the
attainment　of　particular　ends　and　welfare。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　262。　

The　actual　Idea　is　mind；　which；　sundering　itself　into　the　two　ideal　spheres　of　its
concept；　family　and　civil　society；　enters　upon　its　finite　phase；　but　it　does　so　only
in　order　to　rise　above　its　ideality　and　become　explicit　as　infinite　actual　mind。　It　is
therefore　to　these　ideal　spheres　that　the　actual　Idea　assigns　the　material　of　this　its
finite　actuality；　viz。　human　beings　as　a　mass；　in　such　a　way　that　the　function
assigned　to　any　given　individual　is　visibly　mediated　by　circumstances；　his　caprice
and　his　personal　choice　of　his　station　in　life　（see　§　185　and　the　Remark　thereto）。　

Addition：　In　Plato's　state；　subjective　freedom　does　not　count；　because　people　have　their
occupations　assigned　to　them　by　the　Guardians。　In　many　oriental　states；　this　assignment　is
determined　by　birth。　But　subjective　freedom；　which　must　be　respected；　demands　that　individuals
should　have　free　choice　in　this　matter。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　263。　

In　these　spheres　in　which　its　moments；　particularity　and　individuality；　have　their
immediate　and　reflected　reality；　mind　is　present　as　their　objective　universality
glimmering　in　them　as　the　power　of　reason　in　necessity　（see　§　184）；　i。e。　as　the
institutions　considered　above。　

Addition：　The　state；　as　mind；　sunders　itself　into　the　particular　determinations　of　its　concept；　of
its　mode　of　being。　We　might　use　here　an　illustration　drawn　from　nature。　The　nervous　system　is　the
sensitive　system　proper；　it　is　the　abstract　moment；　the　moment　of　being　by　oneself　and　so　of
having　identity　with　oneself。　But　analysis　of　sensation　reveals；　that　it　has　two　aspects　and　these　are
distinct　in　such　a　way　that　each　of　them　seems　to　be　a　whole　system　by　itself　The　first　is　feeling　in
the　abstract；　keeping　oneself　self…enclosed；　the　dull　movement　which　goes　on　internally；
reproduction；　internal　self…nutrition；　growth；　and　digestion。　The　second　moment　is　that　this
self…related　existence　has　over　against　it　the　moment　of　difference；　a　movement　outwards。　This　is
irritability；　sensation　mo