philosophy of right-第8部分

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necessity　of　the　self…contained　and　self…developed　object；　and　as　regards　the　form　there　is
discarded　the　nature　of　the　conception。　In　philosophic　knowledge　the　necessity　of　a；　conception　is
the　main　thing；　and　the　process；　by　which　it；　as　a　result；　has　come　into　being　is　the　proof　and
deduction。　After　the　content　is　seen　to　be　necessary　independently；　the　second　point　is　to　look
about　for　that　which　corresponds　to　it　in　existing　ideas　and　modes　of　speech。　But　the　way　in　which
a　conception　exists　in　its　truth；　and　the　way　it　presents　itself　in　random　ideas　not　only　are　but　must
be　different　both　in　form　and　structure。　If　a　notion　is　not　in　its　content　false；　the　conception　can　be
shown　to　be　contained　in　it　and　to　be　already　there　in　its　essential　traits。　

A　notion　may　thus　be　raised　to　the　form　of　a　conception。　But　so　little　is　any　notion　the　measure
and　criterion　of　an　independently　necessary　and　true　conception；　that　it　must　accept　truth　from　the
conception；　be　justified　by　it；　and　know　itself　through　it。　If　the　method　of　knowing；　which　proceeds
by　formal　definition；　inference　and　proof；　has　more　or　less　disappeared；　a　worse　one　has　come　to
take　its　place。　This　new　method　maintains　that　ideas；　as；　e。g。；　the　idea　of　right　in　all　its　aspects；　are
to　be　directly　apprehended　as　mere　facts　of　consciousness；　and　that　natural　feeling　or　that
heightened　form　of　it　which　is　known　as　the　inspiration　of　one's　own　breast；　is　the　source　of　right。
This　method　may　be　the　most　convenient　of　all；　but　it　is　also　the　most　unphilosophic。　Other
features　of　this　view；　referring　not　merely　to　knowledge　but　directly　to　action；　need　not　detain　us
here。　While　the　first　or　formal　method　went　so　far　as　to　require　in　definition　the　form　of　the
conception；　and　in　proof　the　form　of　a　necessity　of　knowledge；　the　method　of　the　intuitive
consciousness　and　feeling　takes　for　its　principle　the　arbitrary　contingent　consciousness　of　the
subject。　In　this　treatise　we　take　for　granted　the　scientific　procedure　of　philosophy；　which　has　been
set　forth　in　the　philosophic　logic。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　3。　

Right　is　positive　in　general　（a）　in　its　form；　since　it　has　validity　in　a　state；　and　this
established　authority　is　the　principle　for　the　knowledge　of　right。　Hence　we　have
the　positive　science　of　right。　（b）　On　the　side　of　content　this　right　receives　a
positive　element　＇a＇　through　the　particular　character　of　a　nation；　the　stage　of　its
historical　development；　and　the　interconnection　of　all　the　relations　which　are
necessitated　by　nature：　＇b＇　through　the　necessity　that　a　system　of　legalised　right
must　contain　the　application　of　the　universal　conception　to　objects　and　cases
whose　qualities　are　given　externally。　Such　an　application　is　not　the　speculative
thought　or　the　development　of　the　conception；　but　a　subsumption　made　by　the
understanding：　＇c＇　through　the　ultimate　nature　of　a　decision　which　has　become　a
reality。　

Remark：　Philosophy　at　least　cannot　recognise　the　authority　of　feeling；　inclination　and　caprice；
when　they　are　set　in　opposition　to　positive　right　and　the　laws。　It　is　an　accident；　external　to　the
nature　of　positive　right；　when　force　or　tyranny　becomes　an　element　of　it。　It　will　be　shown　later　（§§
211　…　214）；　at　what　point　right　must　become　positive。　The　general　phases　which　are　there
deduced；　are　here　only　mentioned；　in　order　to　indicate　the　limit　of　philosophic　right；　and　also　to
forestall　the　idea　or　indeed　the　demand　that　by　a　systematic　development　of　right　should　be
produced　a　law…book；　such　as　would　be　needed　by　in　actual　state。　To　convert　the　differences
between　right　of　nature　and　positive　right；　or　those　between　philosophic　right　and　positive　right；
into　open　antagonism　would　be　a　complete　misunderstanding。　

Natural　right　or　philosophic　right　stands　to　positive　right　as　institutions　to　pandects。　With　regard　to
the　historical　element　in　positive　right；　referred　to　in　the　paragraph；　it　may　be　said　that　the　true
historical　view　and　genuine　philosophic　standpoint　have　been　presented　by　Montesquieu。　He
regards　legislation　and　its　specific　traits　not　in　an　isolated　and　abstract　way；　but　rather　as　a
dependent　element　of　one　totality；　connecting　it　with　all　the　other　elements　which　form　the
character　of　a　nation　and　an　epoch。　In　this　interrelation　the　various　elements　receive　their　meaning
and　justification。　The　purely　historical　treatment　of　the　phases　of　right；　as　they　develop　in　time；　and
a　comparison　of　their　results　with　existing　relations　of　right　have　their　own　value；　but　they　are　out
of　place　in　a　philosophic　treatise；　except　in　so　far　as　the　development　out　of　historic　grounds
coincides　with　the　development　out　of　the　conception；　and　the　historical　exposition　and　justification
can　be　made　to　cover　a　justification　which　is　valid　in　itself　and　independently。　

This　distinction　is　as　manifest　as　it　is　weighty。　A　phase　of　right　may　be　shown　to　rest　upon　and
follow　from　the　circumstances　and　existing　institutions　of　right；　and　yet　may　be　absolutely
unreasonable　and　void　of　right。　This　is　the　case　in　Roman　law　with　many　aspects　of　private　right；
which　were　the　logical　results　of　its　interpretation　of　paternal　power　and　of　marriage。　Further；　if　the
aspects　of　right　are　really　right　and　reasonable；　it　is　one　thing　to　point　out　what　with　regard　to　them
can　truly　take　place　through　the　conception；　and　quite　another　thing　to　portray　the　manner　of　their
appearance　in　history；　along　with　the　circumstances；　cases；　wants　and　events；　which　they　have
called　forth。　Such　a　demonstration　and　deduction　from　nearer　or　more　remote　historic　causes；
which　is　the　occupation　of　pragmatic　history；　is　frequently　called　exposition；　or　preferably
conception；　under　the　opinion　that　in　such　an　indication　of　the　historic　elements　is　found　all　that　is
essential　to　a　conception　of　law　and　institutions　of　right。　In　point　of　fact　that　which　is　truly　essential；
the　conception　of　the　matter；　has　not　been　so　much　as　mentioned。　So　also　we　are　accustomed　to
hear　of　Roman　or　German　conceptions　of　right；　and　of　conceptions　of　right　as　they　are　laid　down
in　this　or　that　statute…book；　when　indeed　nothing　about　conceptions　can　be　found　in　them；　but　only
general　phases　of　right；　propositions　derived　from　the　understanding；　general　maxims；　and　laws。　

By　neglect　of　the　distinction；　just　alluded　to；　the　true　standpoint　is　obscured　and　the　question　of　a
valid　justification　is　shifted　into　a　justification　based　upon　circumstances；　results　are　founded　on
presuppositions；　which　in　themselves　are　of　little　value；　and　in　general　the　relative　is　put　in　place　of
the　absolute；　and　external　appearance　in　place　of　the　nature　of　the　thing。　When　the　historical
vindication　substitutes　the　external　origin　for　the　origin　from　the　conception；　it　unconsciously　does
the　opposite　of　what　it　intends。　Suppose　that　an　institution；　originating　under　definite
circumstances；　is　shown　to　be　necessary　and　to　answer　its　purpose；　and　that　it　accomplishes　all
that　is　required　of　it　by　the　historical　standpoint。　When　such　a　proof　is　made　to　stand　for　a
justification　of　the　thing　itself；　it　follows　that；　when　the　circumstances　are　removed；　the　institution
has　lost　its　meaning　and　its　right。　When；　e。g。；　it　is　sought　to　support　and　defend　cloisters　on　the
grounds　that　they　have　served　to　clear　and　people　the　wilderness　and　by　teaching　and　transcribing
to　preserve　scholarship；　it　follows　that　just　in　so　far　as　the　circumstances　are　changed；　cloisters
have　become　aimless　and　superfluous。　

In　so　far　as　the　historic　significance；　or　the　historical　exposition　and　interpretation　of　the　origin　of
anything　is　in　different　spheres　at　home　with　the　philosophic　view　of　the　origin　and　conception　of
the　thing　one　might　tolerate　the　other。　But；　in　illustration　of　the　fact　that　they　neither　here　nor　in
science；　preserve　this　peaceful　attitude；　I　quote　from　Mr。　Hugo's　Textbook　of　the　History　of
Roman　Law。　In　this　work　Mr。　Hugo　says　（5th　edition　§　53）　that　〃Cicero　praises　the　twelve　tables
with　a　side　glance　at　philosophy；　。。。　but　the　philosopher　Phavorinus　treats　them　exactly　as　many　a
great　philosopher　since　has　treated　positive　right。〃　Mr。　Hugo　makes　the　ultimate　reply　to　such　a
method　as　that　of　Phavorinus；　when　he　says　of　him　that　he　〃understood　the　twelve　tables　just　as
little　as　the　philosophers　understood　positive　right。〃　The　correction　of　the　philosopher　Phavorinus
by　the　jurist　Sextus　Caecilius　（Gellius。　〃Noct。　Attic。〃　xx。　1）　expresses　the　lasting　and　true　principle
of　the　justification　of　that　which　is　in　its　content　merely　positive。　〃Non　ignoras；〃　as　Caecilius
felicitously　remarks　to　Phavorinus；　〃legum　opportunitates　et　medelas　pro　temporum　moribus；
et　pro　rerum　publicarum　generibus；　ac　pro　utilitatum　praesentium　rationibus；　proque
vitiorum；　quibus　medendum　est；　fervoribus　mutari　ae　flecti；　neque　uno　statu　consistere；
quin；　ut　facies　coeli　et　maris；　ita　rerum　atque　fortunae　tempestatibus　varientur。　Quid
salubrius　visuin　est　rogatione　illa　Stolonis；　etc。；　quid　utilius　plebiscite　Voconio；　etc。；　quid
tam　necessarium　existimatum　est；　quam　lex　Licinia；　etc。？　Omnia　tamen　haec　obliterate　et
operta　sunt　civitatis　opulentia；〃　etc。　These　laws　are　Positive　so　far　as　they　have　meaning　and
appropriateness　under　the　circumstances；　and　thus　have　only　an　historic　value。　For　this　reason　they
are　in　their　nature　transient。　Whether　the　legislator　or　government　was　wise　or　not　in　what　it　did　for
its　own　immediate　time　and　circumstances　is　a　matter　quite　by　itself　and　is　for　history　to　say。　

History　will　the　more　profoundly　recognise　the　action　of　the　legislator　in　proportion　as　its　estimate
receives　support　from　the　philosophic　standpoint。　From　the　vindications　of　the　twelve　tables
against　the　judgment　of　Phavorinus　I　shall　give　further　examples；　because　in　them　Caecilius
furnishes　an　illustration　of　the　fraud　which　is　indissolubly　bound　up　with　the　methods　of　the
understanding　and　its　reasoning。　He　adduces　a　good　reason　for　a　bad　thing；　and　supposes　that　lie
has　in　that　way　justified　the　thing。　Take　the　horrible　law　which　permitted　a　creditor；　after　the　lapse
of　a　fixed　term　of　respite；　to　kill　a　debtor　or　sell　him　into　slavery。　Nay；　furth