the commonwealth of oceana-第36部分

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　against　the　judgment　of　Machiavel；　is　obliged　to　give　such　reasons　for　his　enterprise　as　must　not　go　a…begging。　Wherefore　to　repeat　the　politician　very　honestly；　but　somewhat　more　briefly；　he　disputes　thus：　　　　　〃'There　be　two　sorts　of　commonwealths；　the　one　for　preservation；　as　Lacedaemon　and　Venice；　the　other　for　increase；　as　Rome。　　　　　〃'Lacedaemon；　being　governed　by　a　King　and　a　small　Senate；　could　maintain　itself　a　long　time　in　that　condition；　because　the　inhabitants；　being　few；　having　put　a　bar　upon　the　reception　of　strangers；　and　living　in　a　strict　observation　of　the　laws　of　Lycurgus；　which　now　had　got　reputation；　and　taken　away　all　occasion　of　tumults；　might　well　continue　long　in　tranquillity。　For　the　laws　of　Lycurgus　introduced　a　greater　equality　in　estates；　and　a　less　equality　in　honors；　whence　there　was　equal　poverty；　and　the　plebeians　were　less　ambitious；　because　the　honors　or　magistracies　of　the　city　could　extend　but　to　a　few　and　were　not　communicable　to　the　people；　nor　did　the　nobility　by　using　them　ill　ever　give　them　a　desire　to　participate　of　the　same。　This　proceeded　from　the　kings；　whose　principality；　being　placed　in　the　midst　of　the　nobility；　had　no　greater　means　whereby　to　support　itself　than　to　shield　the　people　from　all　injury；　whence　the　people；　not　fearing　empire；　desired　it　not；　and　so　all　occasion　of　enmity　between　the　Senate　and　the　people　was　taken　away。　But　this　union　happened　especially　from　two　causes：　the　one　that　the　inhabitants　of　Lacedaemon　being　few；　could　be　governed　by　the　few；　the　other；　that；　not　receiving　strangers　into　their　commonwealth；　they　did　not　corrupt　it；　nor　increase　it　to　such　a　proportion　as　was　not　governable　by　the　few。　　　　　〃'Venice　has　not　divided　with　her　plebeians；　but　all　are　called　gentlemen　that　be　in　administration　of　the　government；　for　which　government　she　is　more　beholden　to　chance　than　the　wisdom　of　her　law…makers；　for　many　retiring　to　those　islands；　where　that　city　is　now　built；　from　the　inundations　of　barbarians　that　overwhelmed　the　Roman　Empire；　when　they　were　increased　to　such　a　number　that　to　live　together　it　was　necessary　to　have　laws；　they　ordained　a　form　of　government；　whereby　assembling　often　in　council　upon　affairs；　and　finding　their　number　sufficient　for　government；　they　put　a　bar　upon　all　such　as　repairing　afterward　to　their　city　should　become　inhabitants；　excluding　them　from　participation　of　power。　Whence　they　that　were　included　in　the　administration　had　right；　and　they　that　were　excluded；　coming　afterward；　and　being　received　upon　no　other　conditions　to　be　inhabitants；　had　no　wrong；　and　therefore　had　no　occasion；　nor　（being　never　trusted　with　arms）　any　means　to　be　tumultuous。　Wherefore　this　commonwealth　might　very　well　maintain　itself　in　tranquillity。　　　　　〃'These　things　considered；　it　is　plain　that　the　Roman　legislators；　to　have　introduced　a　quiet　state；　must　have　done　one　of　these　two　things：　either　shut　out　strangers；　as　the　Lacedemonians；　or；　as　the　Venetians；　not　allowed　the　people　to　bear　arms。　But　they　did　neither。　By　which　means　the　people；　having　power　and　increase；　were　in　perpetual　tumult。　Nor　is　this　to　be　helped　in　a　commonwealth　for　increase；　seeing　if　Rome　had　cut　off　the　occasion　of　her　tumults；　she　must　have　cut　off　the　means　of　her　increase；　and　by　consequence　of　her　greatness。　　　　　〃'Wherefore　let　a　legislator　consider　with　himself　whether　he　would　make　his　commonwealth　for　preservation；　in　which　case　she　may　be　free　from　tumults；　or　for　increase；　in　which　case　she　must　be　infested　with　them。　　　　　〃'If　he　makes　her　for　preservation；　she　may　be　quiet　at　home；　but　will　be　in　danger　abroad。　First；　because　her　foundation　must　be　narrow；　and　therefore　weak；　as　that　of　Lacedaemon；　which　lay　but　upon　30；000　citizens；　or　that　of　Venice；　which　lies　but　upon　3；000。　Secondly；　such　a　commonwealth　must　either　be　in　peace；　or　war；　if　she　be　in　peace；　the　few　are　soonest　effeminated　and　corrupted　and　so　obnoxious　also　to　faction。　If　in　war；　succeeding　ill；　she　is　an　easy　prey；　or　succeeding　well；　ruined　by　increase：　a　weight　which　her　foundation　is　not　able　to　bear。　For　Lacedaemon；　when　she　had　made　herself　mistress　upon　the　matter　of　all　Greece；　through　a　slight　accident；　the　rebellion　of　Thebes；　occasioned　by　the　conspiracy　of　Pelopidas　discovering　this　infirmity　of　her　nature；　the　rest　of　her　conquered　cities　immediately　fell　off；　and　in　the　turn　as　it　were　of　a　hand　reduced　her　from　the　fullest　tide　to　the　lowest　ebb　of　her　fortune。　And　Venice　having　possessed　herself　of　a　great　part　of　Italy　by　her　purse；　was　no　sooner　in　defence　of　it　put　to　the　trial　of　arms　than　she　lost　all　in　one　battle。　　　　　〃'Whence　I　conclude　that　in　the　ordination　of　a　commonwealth　a　legislator　is　to　think　upon　that　which　is　most　honorable；　and；　laying　aside　models　for　preservation；　to　follow　the　example　of　Rome　conniving　at；　and　temporizing　with；　the　enmity　between　the　Senate　and　the　people；　as　a　necessary　step　to　the　Roman　greatness。　For　that　any　man　should　find　out　a　balance　that　may　take　in　the　conveniences　and　shut　out　the　inconveniences　of　both；　I　do　not　think　it　possible。'　These　are　the　words　of　the　author；　though　the　method　be　somewhat　altered；　to　the　end　that　I　may　the　better　turn　them　to　my　purpose。　　　　　〃My　lords；　I　do　not　know　how　you　hearken　to　this　sound；　but　to　hear　the　greatest　artist　in　the　modern　world　giving　sentence　against　our　commonwealth　is　that　with　which　I　am　nearly　concerned。　Wherefore；　with　all　honor　due　to　the　prince　of　politicians；　let　us　examine　his　reasoning　with　the　same　liberty　which　he　has　asserted　to　be　the　right　of　a　free　people。　But　we　shall　never　come　up　to　him；　except　by　taking　the　business　a　little　lower；　we　descend　from　effects　to　their　causes。　The　causes　of　commotion　in　a　commonwealth　are　either　external　or　internal。　External　are　from　enemies；　from　subjects；　or　from　servants。　To　dispute　then　what　was　the　cause　why　Rome　was　infested　by　the　Italian；　or　by　the　servile　wars；　why　the　slaves　took　the　capitol；　why　the　Lacedaemonians　were　near　as　frequently　troubled　with　their　helots　as　Rome　with　all　those；　or　why　Venice；　whose　situation　is　not　trusted　to　the　faith　of　men；　has　as　good　or　better　quarter　with　them　whom　she　governs；　than　Rome　had　with　the　Latins；　were　to　dispute　upon　external　causes。　The　question　put　by　Machiavel　is　of　internal　causes；　whether　the　enmity　that　Was　between　the　Senate　and　the　people　of　Rome　might　have　been　removed。　And　to　determine　otherwise　of　this　question　than　he　does；　I　must　lay　down　other　principles　than　he　has　done。　To　which　end　I　affirm　that　a　commonwealth；　internally　considered；　is　either　equal　or　unequal。　A　commonwealth　that　is　internally　equal；　has　no　internal　cause　of　commotion；　and　therefore　can　have　no　such　effect　but　from　without。　A　commonwealth　internally　unequal　has　no　internal　cause　of　quiet；　and　therefore　can　have　no　such　effect　but　by　diversion。　　　　　〃To　prove　my　assertions；　I　shall　at　this　time　make　use　of　no　other　than　his　examples。　Lacedaemon　was　externally　unquiet；　because　she　was　externally　unequal；　that　is　as　to　her　helots；　and　she　was　internally　at　rest；　because　she　was　equal　in　herself；　both　in　root　and　branch；　in　the　root　by　her　agrarian；　and　in　branch　by　the　Senate；　inasmuch　as　no　man　was　thereto　qualified　but　by　election　of　the　people。　Which　institution　of　Lycurgus　is　mentioned　by　Aristotle；　where　he　says　that　rendering　his　citizens　emulous　（not　careless）　of　that　honor；　he　assigned　to　the　people　the　election　of　the　Senate。　Wherefore　Machiavel　in　this；　as　in　other　places；　having　his　eye　upon　the　division　of　patrician　and　plebeian　families　as　they　were　in　Rome；　has　quite　mistaken　the　orders　of　this　commonwealth；　where　there　was　no　such　thing。　Nor　did　the　quiet　of　it　derive　from　the　power　of　the　kings；　who　were　so　far　from　shielding　the　people　from　the　injury　of　the　nobility；　of　which　there　was　none　in　his　sense　but　the　Senate；　that　one　declared　end　of　the　Senate　at　the　institution　was　to　shield　the　people　from　the　kings；　who　from　that　time　had　but　single　votes。　Neither　did　it　proceed　from　the　straitness　of　the　Senate；　or　their　keeping　the　people　excluded　from　the　government；　that　they　were　quiet；　but　from　the　equality　of　their　administration；　seeing　the　Senate　（as　is　plain　by　the　oracle；　their　fundamental　law）　had　no　more　than　the　debate；　and　the　result　of　the　commonwealth　belonged　to　the　people。　　　　　〃Wherefore　when　Theopompus　and　Polydorus；　Kings　of　Lacedaemon；　would　have　kept　the　people　excluded　from　the　government　by　adding　to　the　ancient　law　this　clause；　'If　the　determination　of　the　people　be　faulty；　it　shall　be　lawful　for　the　Senate　to　resume　the　debate；'　the　people　immediately　became　unquiet；　and　resumed　that　debate；　which　ended　not　till　they　had　set　up　their　ephors；　and　caused　that　magistracy　to　be　confirmed　by　their　kings。'　For　when　Theopompus　first　ordained　that　the　ephori　or　overseers　should　be　created　at　Lacedaemon；　to　be　such　a　restraint　upon　the　kings　there　as　the　tribunes　were　upon　the　consuls　at　Rome；　the　Queen　complained　to　him；　that　by　this　means　he　transmitted　the　royal　authority　greatly　diminished　to　his　children：　〃I　leave　indeed　less；〃　answered　he；　〃but　more　lasting。〃　And　this　was　excellently　said；　for　that　power　only　is　safe　which　is　limited　from　doing　hurt。　Theopompus　therefore；　by　confining　the　kingly　power　within　the　bounds　of　the　laws；　did　recommend　it　by　so　much　to　the　people's　affection　as　he　removed　it　from　being　arbitrary。'　By　which　it　may　appear　that　a　commonwealth　for　preservation；　if　she　comes　to　be　unequal；　is　as　obnoxious　to　enmity　between　the　Senate　and　the　people　as　a　commonwealth　for　increase；　and　that　the　tranquillity　of　Lacedaemon　was　derived　from　no　other　cause　than　her　equality。　　　　　〃For　Venice；　to　say　that　she　is　quiet　　because　she　disarms　her　subjects；　is　to　forget　that　Lacedaemon　disarmed　her　helots；　and　yet　could　not　in　their　regard　be　quiet；　wherefore　if　Venice　be　defended　from　external　causes　of　commotion；　it　is　first　through　her　situation；　in　which　respect　her　subjects　have　no　hope　（and　this　indeed　may　be　attributed　to　her　fortune）；　and；　secondly；　through　her　exquisite　justice；　whence　they　have　no　will　to　invade　her。　But　this　can　be　attributed　to　no　other　cause　than　her　prudence；　which　will　appear　to　be　greater；　as　we　look　nearer；　for　the　effects　that　p