the army of the cumberland-第24部分

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Then　there　were　some　minor　mistakes　that　aided　in　a　great　degree　the　bringing　about　of　that　mishap　which　imperiled　the　safety　of　the　entire　army。　　Even　granting　that　Johnson　was　not　in　any　way　responsible　for　the　position　occupied　by　his　troops　on　the　front　line　of　battle；　still　it　is　hard　to　find　any　excuse　or　even　explanation　for　a　general　officer　in　command　of　a　division　who；　knowing　the　enemy　were　in　force　on　his　front；　and　intending　to　attack　his　command　at　daylight　the　next　morning；　would　place　his　headquarters　a　mile　and　a　half　in　the　rear。　　This　too；　when　he　knew　that　the　post　of　honor　and　responsibility　for　the　safety　of　the　entire　army　had　been　committed　to　his　keeping。　　What　then　shall　be　said　for　him　when　it　appears　by　the　report　of　the　commanding　officer　of　his　reserve　brigade　that　when　it　returned　from　the　support　of　a　cavalry　reconnoissance；　the　general　commanding　the　division　ordered　this　brigade；　on　the　eve　of　the　battle；　to　take　position　in　the　woods；　〃near　the　headquarters　of　the　division；〃　instead　of　in　supporting　distance　of　the　front　line？　　He　could　not　have　thought　that　the　division　headquarters　needed　the　support　of　the　reserve　more　than　the　line　of　battle。　　It　is　safe　to　say　that　had　the　line　of　Johnson's　division　been　properly　formed；　so　as　to　give　the　most　strength　to　the　commandshort　and　well　centered；　with　a　good　brigade　like　that　of　Baldwin's　in　reserve；　with　all　officers　in　their　placesthese　troops　would　have　given　a　very　different　account　of　themselves　when　the　blow　struck　the　right。　　There　was　no　commanding　officer　in　the　front　with　Johnson's　division；　of　greater　command　than　a　regimentsave　General　Kirk。　　The　troops　of　Willich's　brigade　on　the　right　flank　refused　to　come　to　his　assistance；　because　there　was　no　one　there　to　give　them　orders。　　Johnson　says　in　his　official　report　that　〃In　consultation　with　Major…General　McCook；　late　in　the　afternoon　of　December　30th；　he　informed　me　that　he　had　reliable　information　to　the　effect　that　the　centre　of　the　rebel　line　of　battle　was　opposite　our　extreme　right；　and　that　we　would　probably　be　attacked　by　the　entire　rebel　army　early　on　the　following　morning。〃　　Johnson　then　coolly　adds：　　〃His　prediction　proved　true。〃　　Yet　with　these　facts　staring　them　in　the　face；　McCook　and　Johnson　made　no　other　efforts　to　strengthen　the　right　of　the　line；　and　Johnson；　on　the　arrival　of　his　reserve　brigade　later；　posted　it　in　the　woods　a　mile　and　a　half　from　his　front　〃near　his　headquarters。〃　　General　Kirk　was　mortally　wounded　in　the　attack　on　his　command；　but　lived　long　enough　after　the　battle　to　make　a　report　of　the　part　taken　in　the　engagement　by　his　brigade。　　He　states　in　his　report；　that　he　suggested　to　Johnson　to　send　his　reserve　brigade　to　support　the　main　lines；　and　that　Johnson　declined　to　do　so。

The　location　of　Johnson's　headquarters；　and　Johnson　being　there；　makes　him　responsible　for　the　capture　of　Willich；　and　the　breaking　up　of　that　brigade。　　Willich　had　been　on　the　line　for　an　hour　before　daylight　with　his　brigade　under　arms；　and　from　what　he　heard　of　the　movements　of　the　enemy　to　his　front；　he　was　satisfied　that　a　change　should　be　made　in　the　position　of　his　division；　and　started　to　Johnson's　headquarters　to　communicate　with　him。　　Before　he　could　return　to　his　troops；　the　enemy　was　upon　them；　and　drove　them　from　the　position　they　held；　without　their　making　a　stand。　　Being　without　either　division　or　brigade　commander；　they　drifted　to　the　rear。　　Willich　had　a　horse　shot　under　him；　and　was　captured　without　giving　an　order；　before　he　reached　his　command。

When　the　artillery　was　posted　in　line　of　battle　on　the　30th；　roads　were　cut　through　the　cedars　to　allow　the　batteries　to　reach　the　front　line。　　The　heavy　loss　of　guns；　reported　by　Rosecrans；　was　occasioned　by　these　batteries　being　unable　to　reach　the　roads　through　the　cedar　thickets　in　the　retreat；　and　in　many　instances　guns　were　abandoned　in　the　woods；　through　which　it　was　impossible　to　haul　them。

Bragg　alleges　in　his　official　report　that　our　troops　were　surprised；　and　cites　the　fact　that　his　men　passed　through　the　camps　where　breakfast　was　being　prepared。　　He　was　right　as　to　this　fact；　but　wrong　about　his　deduction。　　Willich's　brigade　was　the　only　one　that　was　not　through　the　morning　meal；　and　this　was　by　reason　of　his　troops　being　under　arms　for　nearly　two　hours　prior　to　this　time；　after　which　Willich　gave　them　orders　to　prepare　their　meal。　　Kirk's　brigade　had　been　under　arms　since　five　o'clock　in　the　morning；　ready　for　action　an　hour　before　the　battle　commenced；　and　in　Post's　brigade　the　men　were　in　order　of　battle　for　an　hour　before　the　first　dawn　of　light。　　The　front　of　all　these　brigades　was　covered　with　heavy　picket　lines　well　thrown　out。　　General　Sill　reported　to　General　Sheridan　at　two　o'clock　in　the　morning；　〃great　activity　on　the　part　of　the　enemy　immediately　in　his　front；　with　movements　of　troops　to　their　left；〃　and　from　four　o'clock　in　the　morning　until　seven；　Sheridan's　troops　were　standing　under　arms；　and　the　cannoneeers　were　at　their　places。

It　is　difficult　to　determine　which　to　admire　more；　the　heavy；　quick；　decided　onset　of　the　rebels；　as　with　ranks　well　closed　up；　without　music；　and　almost　noiselessly；　they　moved　in　the　gray　light　of　the　early　December　morning；　out　of　the　cedars；　across　the　open　fields；　hurling　the　full　weight　of　their　advancing　columns　upon　our　right；　with　all　the　dash　of　Southern　troops；　sweeping　on　with　rapid　stride；　and　wild　yells　of　triumph；　to　what　appeared　to　them　an　easy　final　victory；　or；　later　in　the　afternoon；　when　our　troops　that　had　been　driven　from　the　field　early　in　the　morning；　were　reformed　under　the　eye　of　the　commanding　general；　met　and　threw　back　from　the　point　of　the　bayonet；　and　from　the　cannon　mouth；　the　charge　after　charge　of　the　same　victorious　troops　of　the　earlier　portion　of　the　day。　　One　was　like　the　resistless　sweep　of　a　whirlwind　in　its　onward　course　of　destruction；　the　other　the　grand　sturdy　resistance　of　the　rocky　coast；　which　the　waves　only　rush　upon　to　be　dashed　to　pieces。　　In　each　of　these；　the　two　armies　displayed　their　distinctive　feature　to　the　best。　　Under　Thomas；　the　Centre　of　the　army　evinced；　in　a　marked　degree；　the　staying　qualities　of　that　commander；　which　afterward　were　shown　so　conspicuously　at　Chickamauga。





Chapter　IX。




In　Murfreesboro。

During　the　first　six　months　of　1863；　the　military　operations　of　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland　were　of　a　minor　character。　　The　exhaustion　attending　the　severe　fighting　of　the　last　week　of　the　previous　year；　kept　that　army　in　camp　for　some　time　to　restore　the　losses　of　arms　and　material；　to　reclothe　the　army；　to　recruit　the　strength　of　the　troops；　to　forward　the　needed　supplies；　and　to　build　the　necessary　works　to　fortify　Murfreesboro　as　a　new　base。　　The　rebuilding　of　the　Muldraughs　Hills'　trestleworks；　and　the　heavy　repairs　elsewhere　needed　on　the　railroad　north　of　Nashville；　together　with　having　the　road　from　Nashville　to　Murfreesboro　placed　in　proper　order；　all　required　time　and　were　necessary　to　be　done；　to　supply　the　wants　of　the　army　in　the　immediate　present。　　But　the　future　was　what　demanded　the　greatest　thought　and　most　careful　planning。　　The　problem　that　gave　Buell　the　greatest　trouble　to　solvethe　protection　of　his　lines　of　communication　and　supplieswas　now　forced　upon　Rosecrans。　　The　enemy　with　more　than　one…half　of　his　cavalry　force　absent　during　the　battle　of　Stone's　River；　under　Morgan　in　Kentucky　and　Forrest　in　West　Tennessee；　outnumbered　that　arm　of　the　service　of　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland　during　the　battle　almost　two　to　one。　　These　troopers　were　nearly　all　old　veterans；　accustomed　to　the　severest　hardships　of　service；　and　it　was　wonderful　the　rapidity　with　which　they　got　over　ground　and　the　amount　of　fatigue　they　could　undergo。　　To　afford　perfect　protection　to　his　line　supplying　the　army　from　its　base　at　Louisville；　as　against　these　raiding　bands；　if　infantry　was　to　be　employed；　Rosecrans's　entire　force　was　needed；　posted　by　brigades　at　the　vulnerable　points。　To　make　an　advance　and　thus　lengthen　his　lines；　simply　increased　the　present　difficulties。　　Without　making　the　necessary　preparation　to　protect　his　line　of　supplies；　Rosecrans　would　hamper　his　forward　movement　and　retard　and　cripple　his　advance　when　commenced。　　The　only　proper　force　to　meet　the　enemy's　troopers　was　cavalry。　　In　the　early　days　of　the　Army　of　the　Ohio；　under　Buell；　a　number　of　unsuccessful　attempts　were　made　to　chase　and　fight　cavalry　with　infantry；　and　in　every　instance　the　effort　was　crowned　with　failure；　the　only　result　being　the　discomfort　and　complete　exhaustion　of　the　marching　troops。

The　repair　of　the　most　complete　wrecking　the　Louisville　road　ever　suffered；　demanded　Rosecrans's　attention　the　first　thing　after　the　Battle　of　Stone's　River。　　When　the　army　left　Nashville；　on　the　advance　to　meet　Bragg；　the　supplies　in　that　city　were　very　limited。　With　the　disabling　of　the　road　it　was　impossible　at　that　time　to　forward　sufficient　supplies　to　meet　the　wants　of　the　command；　and　for　the　first　few　weeks　while　the　army　remained　at　Murfreesboro　the　troops　were　on　half　rations；　and　many　of　the　articles　constituting　the　〃ration〃　entirely　dispensed　with；　leaving　but　three　or　four　on　the　list。　　The　surrounding　country　for　miles　was　scoured　for　forage　and　provisions。　　Everything　of　that　kind　was　gathered　in　by　raiding　parties；　not　leaving　sufficient　for　the　actual　necessities　of　the　inhabitants。　　To　such　an　extent　did　this　go；　that　to　the　officers　with　means　to　purchase　such　provisions　as　were　to　be　had；　potatoes　and　onions　became　luxuries。　　The　whole　army　was　threatened　with　scurvy。

The　number　and　extent　of　these　raids；　and　the　damage　sustained　by　the　Louisville　and　Nashville　Railroad　during　the　year　from　July　1；　1862；　is　concisely　set　forth　in　the　report　of　the　superintendent　of　that　road。　　His　report　shows　that　during　this　time　〃the　road　has　been　operated　for　its　entire　length　only　seven　months　and　twelve　days；〃　〃all　the　bridges　and　trestleworks　on　the　main　stem　and　branches；　with　the　exception　of　the　bridge　over　Barren　River　and　four　small　bridges；　were　destroyed　and　rebuilt　during　the　year。　Some　of　the　structures　were　destroyed　twice　and　some　three　times。　In　addition　to　this；　most　of　the　water　stat