the spirit of laws-第21部分

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nour。

Here　the　censors　would　be　spoiled　by　the　very　people　whom　they　ought　to　correct：　they　could　not　prevail　against　the　corruption　of　a　monarchy；　the　corruption　rather　would　be　too　strong　against　them。

Hence　it　is　obvious　that　there　ought　to　be　no　censors　in　despotic　governments。　The　example　of　China　seems　to　derogate　from　this　rule；　but　we　shall　see；　in　the　course　of　this　work；　the　particular　reasons　of　that　institution。

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1。　Plutarch；　Solon。

2。　Ibid。

3。　Philolaus　of　Corinth　made　a　law　at　Athens　that　the　number　of　the　portions　of　land　and　that　of　inheritances　should　be　always　the　same。　　Aristotle；　Politics；　ii。　7；　12。

4。　Laws；　xi。

5。　Cornelius　Nepos；　preface。　This　custom　began　in　the　earliest　times。　Thus　Abraham　says　of　Sarah；　〃She　is　my　sister；　my　father's　daughter；　but　not　my　mother's。〃　The　same　reasons　occasioned　the　establishing　the　same　law　among　different　nations。

6。　De　specialibus　legibus　qu？　pertinent　ad　pr？ceptar　Decalogi。

7。　Book　x。

8。　Athenis　dimidium　licet；　Alexandri？　totum。　　Seneca；　De　Morte　Claudii。

9。　Plato　has　a　law　of　this　kind。　Laws；　v。

10。　Aristotle。　ii。　7。

11。　Solon　made　four　classes：　the　first；　of　those　who　had　an　income　of　500　minas　either　in　corn　or　liquid　fruits；　the　second；　of　those　who　had　300；　and　were　able　to　keep　a　horse；　the　third；　of　such　as　had　only　200；　the　fourth；　of　all　those　who　lived　by　their　manual　labour。　　Plutarch；　Solon。

12。　Solon　excludes　from　public　employments　all　those　of　the　fourth　class。

13。　They　insisted　upon　a　larger　division　of　the　conquered　lands。　　Plutarch；　Lives　of　the　ancient　Kings　and　Commanders。

14。　In　these；　the　portions　or　fortunes　of　women　ought　to　be　very　much　limited。

15。　The　magistrates　there　were　annual；　and　the　senators　for　life。

16。　Lycurgus；　says　Xenophon；　De　Repub。　Laced？m。；　10。　§　1；　2；　ordained　that　the　senators　should　be　chosen　from　amongst　the　old　men；　to　the　end　that　they　might　not　be　neglected　in　the　decline　of　life；　thus　by　making　them　judges　of　the　courage　of　young　people；　he　rendered　the　old　age　of　the　former　more　honourable　than　the　strength　and　vigour　of　the　latter。

17。　Even　the　Areopagus　itself　was　subject　to　their　censure。

18。　De　Repub。　Laced？m。；　8。

19。　We　may　see　in　the　Roman　History　how　useful　this　power　was　to　the　republic。　I　shall　give　an　instance　even　in　the　time　of　its　greatest　corruption。　Aulus　Fulvius　was　set　out　on　his　journey　in　order　to　join　Catiline；　his　father　called　him　back；　and　put　him　to　death。　　Sallust；　De　Bello　Catil。；　xxxiv。

20。　In　our　days　the　Venetians；　who　in　many　respects　may　be　said　to　have　a　very　wise　government；　decided　a　dispute　between　a　noble　Venetian　and　a　gentleman　of　Terra　Firma　in　respect　to　precedency　in　a　church；　by　declaring　that　out　of　Venice　a　noble　Venetian　had　no　pre…eminence　over　any　other　citizen。

21。　It　was　inserted　by　the　decemvirs　in　the　two　last　tables。　See　Dionysius　Helicarnassus；　x。

22。　As　in　some　aristocracies　in　our　time；　nothing　is　more　prejudicial　to　the　government。

23。　See　in　Strabo；　xiv。；　in　what　manner　the　Rhodians　behaved　in　this　respect。

24。　Amelot　de　la　Houssaye；　Of　the　Government　of　Venice；　part　III。　The　Claudian　law　forbade　the　senators　to　have　any　ship　at　sea　that　held　above　forty　bushels。　　Livy；　xxi。　63。

25。　The　informers　throw　their　scrolls　into　it。

26。　See　Livy；　xlix。　A　censor　could　not　be　troubled　even　by　a　censor；　each　made　his　remark　without　taking　the　opinion　of　his　colleague；　and　when　it　otherwise　happened；　the　censorship　was　in　a　manner　abolished。

27。　At　Athens　the　Logist？；　who　made　all　the　magistrates　accountable　for　their　conduct；　gave　no　account　themselves。

28。　It　is　so　practised　at　Venice。　　Amelot　de　la　Houssaye；　pp。　30；　31。

29。　The　main　design　of　some　aristocracies　seems　to　be　less　the　support　of　the　state　than　of　their　nobility。

30。　It　is　tolerated　only　in　the　common　people。　See　Leg。　3；　Cod。　de　comm。　et　mercatoribus；　which　is　full　of　good　sense。　

31。　Testament　polit。

32。　Barbaris　cunctatio　servilis；　statim　exequi　regium　videtur。　　Tacitus；　Annals。；　v。　32。

33。　Memoirs　of　Cardinal　de　Retz；　and　other　histories。

34。　Testament　polit。

35。　Edifying　Letters；　coll。　ii；　p。　315。

36。　Continuation　of　Pufendorf；　Introduction　to　the　History　of　Europe；　in　the　article　on　Sweden；　10。

37。　According　to　Sir　John　Chardin；　there　is　no　council　of　state　in　Persia。

38。　See　Ricaut；　State　of　the　Ottoman　Empire；　p。　196。

39。　See　concerning　the　inheritances　of　the　Turks；　Ancient　and　Modern　Sparta。　See　also　Ricaut　on　the　Ottoman　empire。

40。　Collection　of　Voyages　that　Contributed　to　the　Establishment　of　the　East　India　Company；　i。　The　law　of　Pegu　is　less　cruel；　if　there　happen　to　be　children；　the　king　succeeds　only　to　two…thirds。　Ibid。；　iii；　p。　1。

41。　See　the　different　constitutions；　especially　that　of　1722。

42。　See　Justin。

43。　See　the　book　of　laws　as　relative　to　the　nature　of　the　climate。　Book　xiv；　below。

44。　Laquilletiere；　Ancient　and　Modern　Sparta；　p。　463。

45。　The　same　may　be　said　of　compositions　in　regard　to　fair　bankrupts。

46。　There　was　no　such　establishment　made　till　the　Julian　law；　De　Cessione　bonorum；　which　preserved　them　from　prison　and　from　an　ignominious　division　of　their　goods。　　Cod。；　ii。　tit。　12。

47　They　seem　to　have　been　too　fond　of　confiscations　in　the　republic　of　Athens。

48。　Authentica　bona　damnatorum。　　Cod。　de　bon。　proscript。　seu　damn。

49。　De　la　Republique；　v。　3。

50。　Ut　esse　Phoebi　dulcius　lumen　solet　Jamjam　cadentis　　Seneca；　Troas；　V。　i。　1。

51。　Collection　of　Voyages　that　Contributed　to　the　Establishment　of　the　East　India　Company；　i；　p。　80。

52。　Laws；　xii。

53。　Leg。　6；　§　2；　Dig。　ad　leg。　Jul。　repet。

54。　Munuscula。

55。　Plato；　in　his　Republic；　viii；　ranks　these　refusals　among　the　marks　of　the　corruption　of　a　republic。　In　his　Laws；　vi；　he　orders　them　to　be　punished　by　a　fine；　at　Venice　they　are　punished　with　banishment。

56。　Victor　Amadeus。

57。　Some　centurions　having　appealed　to　the　people　for　the　employments　which　they　had　before　enjoyed；　〃It　is　just；　my　comrades；〃　said　a　centurion；　〃that　you　should　look　upon　every　post　as　honourable　in　which　you　have　an　opportunity　of　defending　the　republic。〃　　Livy；　dec。　5；　xlii；　34。

58。　Ne　imperium　ad　optimos　nobilium　transferretur；　Senatum　militia　vetuit　Gallienus；　etiam　adire　exercitum。　　Aurelius　Victor；　De　C？saribus。

59。　Augustus　deprived　the　senators；　proconsuls；　and　governors　of　the　privilege　of　wearing　arms。　　Dio；　xxxiii。

60。　Constantine。　See　Zozimus；　ii。

61。　Ammianus　Marcellinus；　xxvi；　Et　Civilia；　more　veterum；　et　bella　recturo。

62。　Republic；　viii。

63。　We　see　the　laziness　of　Spain；　where　all　public　employments　are　given　away。




Book　VI。　Consequences　of　the　Principles　of　Different　Governments　with　Respect　to　the　Simplicity　of　Civil　and　Criminal　Laws；　the　Form　of　Judgments；　and　the　Inflicting　of　Punishments

1。　Of　the　Simplicity　of　Civil　Laws　in　different　Governments。　Monarchies　do　not　permit　of　so　great　a　simplicity　of　laws　as　despotic　governments。　For　in　monarchies　there　must　be　courts　of　judicature；　these　must　give　their　decisions；　the　decisions　must　be　preserved　and　learned；　that　we　may　judge　in　the　same　manner　to…day　as　yesterday；　and　that　the　lives　and　property　of　the　citizens　may　be　as　certain　and　fixed　as　the　very　constitution　of　the　state。

In　monarchies；　the　administration　of　justice；　which　decides　not　only　in　whatever　belongs　to　life　and　property；　but　likewise　to　honour；　demands　very　scrupulous　inquiries。　The　delicacy　of　the　judge　increases　in　proportion　to　the　increase　of　his　trust；　and　of　the　importance　of　the　interests　on　which　he　determines。

We　must　not；　therefore；　be　surprised　to　find　so　many　rules；　restrictions；　and　extensions　in　the　laws　of　those　countries　　rules　that　multiply　the　particular　cases；　and　seem　to　make　of　reason　itself　an　art。

The　difference　of　rank；　birth；　and　condition　established　in　monarchical　governments　is　frequently　attended　with　distinctions　in　the　nature　of　property；　and　the　laws　relating　to　the　constitution　of　this　government　may　augment　the　number　of　these　distinctions。　Hence；　among　us　goods　are　divided　into　real　estates；　purchases；　dowries；　paraphernalia；　paternal　and　maternal　inheritances；　movables　of　different　kinds；　estates　held　in　fee…simple；　or　in　tail；　acquired　by　descent　or　conveyance；　allodial；　or　held　by　soccage；　ground　rents；　or　annuities。　Each　sort　of　goods　is　subject　to　particular　rules；　which　must　be　complied　with　in　the　disposal　of　them。　These　things　must　needs　diminish　the　simplicity　of　the　laws。

In　our　governments　the　fiefs　have　become　hereditary。　It　was　necessary　that　the　nobility　should　have　a　fixed　property；　that　is；　the　fief　should　have　a　certain　consistency；　to　the　end　that　the　proprietor　might　be　always　in　a　capacity　of　serving　the　prince。　This　must　have　been　productive　of　great　varieties；　for　instance；　there　are　countries　where　fiefs　could　not　be　divided　among　the　brothers；　in　others；　the　younger　brothers　may　be　allowed　a　more　generous　subsistence。

The　monarch　who　knows　each　of　his　provinces　may　establish　different　laws；　or　tolerate　different　customs。　But　as　the　despotic　prince　knows　nothing；　and　can　attend　to　nothing；　he　must　take　general　measures；　and　govern　by　a　rigid　and　inflexible　will；　which　throughout　his　whole　dominions　produces　the　same　effect；　in　short；　everything　bends　under　his　feet。

In　proportion　as　the　decisions　of　the　courts　of　judicature　are　multiplied　in　monarchies；　the　law　is　loaded　with　decrees　that　sometimes　contradict　one　another；　either　because　succeeding　judges　are　of　a　different　way　of　thinking；　or　because　the　same　causes　are　sometimes　well；　and　at　other　times　ill；　defended；　or；　in　fine；　by　reason　of　an　infinite　number　of　abuses；　to　which　all　human　regulations　are　liable。　This　is　a　necessary　evil；　which　the　legislator　redresses　from　time　to　time；　as　contrary　even　to　the　spirit　of　moderate　governments。　For　when　people　are　obliged　to　have　recourse　to　courts　of　judicature；　this　should　come　from　the　nature　of　the　constitution；　and　not　from　the　contradiction　or　uncertainty　of　the　law。

In　governments　where　there　are　necessary　distinctions　of　persons；　there　must　likewise　be　privileges。　This　also　diminishes　the　simplicity；　and　creates　a　thousand　exceptions。