the science of right-第11部分

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　　But　what　is　that；　designated　as　external；　which　I　acquire　by

contract？　As　it　is　only　the　causality　of　the　active　will　of　another；

in　respect　of　the　performance　of　something　promised　to　me；　I　do　not

immediately　acquire　thereby　an　external　thing；　but　an　act　of　the

will　in　question；　whereby　a　thing　is　brought　under　my　power　so　that

I　make　it　mine。　By　the　contract；　therefore；　I　acquire　the　promise　of

another；　as　distinguished　from　the　thing　promised；　and　yet　something

is　thereby　added　to　my　having　and　possession。　I　have　become　the　richer

in　possession　（locupletior）　by　the　acquisition　of　an　active　obligation

that　I　can　bring　to　bear　upon　the　freedom　and　capability　of　another。

This　my　right；　however；　is　only　a　personal　right；　valid　only　to　the

effect　of　acting　upon　a　particular　physical　person　and　specially

upon　the　causality　of　his　will；　so　that　he　shall　perform　something　for

me。　It　is　not　a　real　right　upon　that　moral　person；　which　is　identified

with　the　idea　of　the　united　will　of　all　viewed　a　priori；　and　through

which　alone　I　can　acquire　a　right　valid　against　every　possessor　of　the

thing。　For；　it　is　in　this　that　all　right　in　a　thing　consists。



　　The　transfer　or　transmission　of　what　is　mine　to　another　by　contract；

takes　place　according　to　the　law　of　continuity　（lex　continui）。

Possession　of　the　object　is　not　interrupted　for　a　moment　during　this

act；　for；　otherwise；　I　would　acquire　an　object　in　this　state　as　a

thing　that　had　no　possessor；　and　it　would　thus　be　acquired　originally；

which　is　contrary　to　the　idea　of　a　contract。　This　continuity；　however；

implies　that　it　is　not　the　particular　will　of　either　the　promiser　or

the　acceptor；　but　their　united　will　in　common；　that　transfers　what

is　mine　to　another。　And　hence　it　is　not　accomplished　in　such　a

manner　that　the　promiser　first　relinquishes　（derelinquit）　his

possession　for　the　benefit　of　another；　or　renounces　his　right

（renunciat）；　and　thereupon　the　other　at　the　same　time　enters　upon

it；　or　conversely。　The　transfer　（translatio）　is　therefore　an　act　in

which　the　object　belongs　for　a　moment　at　the　same　time　to　both；　just

as　in　the　parabolic　path　of　a　projectile　the　object　on　reaching　its

highest　point　may　be　regarded　for　a　moment　as　at　the　same　time　both

rising　and　falling；　and　as　thus　passing　in　fact　from　the　ascending

to　the　falling　motion。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　21。　Acceptance　and　Delivery。



　　A　thing　is　not　acquired　in　a　case　of　contract　by　the　acceptance

（acceptatio）　of　the　promise；　but　only　by　the　delivery　（traditio）　of

the　object　promised。　For　all　promise　is　relative　to　performance；　and

if　what　was　promised　is　a　thing；　the　performance　cannot　be　executed

otherwise　than　by　an　act　whereby　the　acceptor　is　put　by　the　promiser

into　possession　of　the　thing；　and　this　is　delivery。　Before　the

delivery　and　the　reception　of　the　thing；　the　performance　of　the　act

required　has　not　yet　taken　place；　the　thing　has　not　yet　passed　from

the　one　person　to　the　other　and；　consequently；　has　not　been　acquired

by　that　other。　Hence　the　right　arising　from　a　contract　is　only　a

personal　right；　and　it　only　becomes　a　real　right　by　delivery。



　　A　contract　upon　which　delivery　immediately　follows　（pactum　re

initum）　excludes　any　interval　of　time　between　its　conclusion　and　its

execution；　and　as　such　it　requires　no　further　particular　act　in　the

future　by　which　one　person　may　transfer　to　another　what　is　his。　But　if

there　is　a　time…　definite　or　indefinite…　agreed　upon　between　them

for　the　delivery；　the　question　then　arises　whether　the　thing　has

already　before　that　time　become　the　acceptor's　by　the　contract；　so

that　his　right　is　a　right　in　the　thing；　or　whether　a　further　special

contract　regarding　the　delivery　alone　must　be　entered　upon；　so　that

the　right　that　is　acquired　by　mere　acceptance　is　only　a　personal

right；　and　thus　it　does　not　become　a　right　in　the　thing　until

delivery？　That　the　relation　must　be　determined　according　to　the　latter

alternative　will　be　clear　from　what　follows。

　　Suppose　I　conclude　a　contract　about　a　thing　that　I　wish　to

acquire…　such　as　a　horse…　and　that　I　take　it　immediately　into　my

stable；　or　otherwise　into　my　possession；　then　it　is　mine　（vi　pacti

re　initi）；　and　my　right　is　a　right　in　the　thing。　But　if　I　leave　it

in　the　hands　of　the　seller　without　arranging　with　him　specially　in

whose　physical　possession　or　holding　（detentio）　this　thing　shall　be

before　my　taking　possession　of　it　（apprehensio）；　and　consequently；

before　the　actual　change　of　possession；　the　horse　is　not　yet　mine；　and

the　right　which　I　acquire　is　only　a　right　against　a　particular　person…

namely；　the　seller　of　the　horse…　to　be　put　into　possession　of　the

object　（poscendi　traditionem）　as　the　subjective　condition　of　any　use

of　it　at　my　will。　My　right　is　thus　only　a　personal　right　to　demand

from　the　seller　the　performance　of　his　promise　（praestatio）　to　put

me　into　possession　of　the　thing。　Now；　if　the　contract　does　not　contain

the　condition　of　delivery　at　the　same　time…　as　a　pactum　re　initum…　and

consequently　an　interval　of　time　intervenes　between　the　conclusion

of　the　contract　and　the　taking　possession　of　the　object　of

acquisition；　I　cannot　obtain　possession　of　it　during　this　interval

otherwise　than　by　exercising　the　particular　juridical　activity

called　a　possessory　act　（actum　possessorium）；　which　constitutes　a

special　contract。　This　act　consists　in　my　saying；　〃I　will　send　to

fetch　the　horse；〃　to　which　the　seller　has　to　agree。　For　it　is　not

self…evident　or　universally　reasonable　that　any　one　will　take　a

thing　destined　for　the　use　of　another　into　his　charge　at　his　own　risk。

On　the　contrary；　a　special　contract　is　necessary　for　this　arrangement；

according　to　which　the　alienator　of　a　thing　continues　to　be　its

owner　during　a　certain　definite　time；　and　must　bear　the　risk　of

whatever　may　happen　to　it；　while　the　acquirer　can　only　be　regarded

by　the　seller　as　the　owner　when　he　has　delayed　to　enter　into

possession　beyond　the　date　at　which　he　agreed　to　take　delivery。

Prior　to　the　possessory　act；　therefore；　all　that　is　acquired　by　the

contract　is　only　a　personal　right；　and　the　acceptor　can　acquire　an

external　thing　only　by　delivery。





　　　　　　SECTION　III。　Principles　of　Personal　Right　that　is　Real

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　in　Kind。　（Jus　Realiter　Personale）。

　　　　　　　　　　22。　Nature　of　Personal　Right　of　a　Real　Kind。



　　Personal　right　of　a　real　kind　is　the　right　to　the　possession　of　an

external　object　as　a　thing；　and　to　the　use　of　it　as　a　person。　The　mine

and　thine　embraced　under　this　right　relate　specially　to　the　family　and

household；　and　the　relations　involved　are　those　of　free　beings　in

reciprocal　real　interaction　with　each　other。　Through　their　relations

and　influence　as　persons　upon　one　another；　in　accordance　with　the

principle　of　external　freedom　as　the　cause　of　it；　they　form　a

society　composed　as　a　whole　of　members　standing　in　community　with　each

other　as　persons；　and　this　constitutes　the　household。　The　mode　in

which　this　social　status　is　acquired　by　individuals；　and　the　functions

which　prevail　within　it；　proceed　neither　by　arbitrary　individual

action　（facto）；　nor　by　mere　contract　（pacto）；　but　by　law　（lege）。　And

this　law　as　being　not　only　a　right；　but　also　as　constituting

possession　in　reference　to　a　person；　is　a　right　rising　above　all

mere　real　and　personal　right。　It　must；　in　fact；　form　the　right　of

humanity　in　our　own　person；　and；　as　such；　it　has　as　its　consequence

a　natural　permissive　law；　by　the　favour　of　which　such　acquisition

becomes　possible　to　us。



　　　　　　　　　　　　23。　What　is　acquired　in　the　household。



　　The　acquisition　that　is　founded　upon　this　law　is；　as　regards　its

objects；　threefold。　The　man　acquires　a　wife；　the　husband　and　wife

acquire　children；　constituting　a　family；　and　the　family　acquire

domestics。　All　these　objects；　while　acquirable；　are　inalienable；　and

the　right　of　possession　in　these　objects　is　the　most　strictly　personal

of　all　rights。



　　　　　　　　The　Rights　of　the　Family　as　a　Domestic　Society



　　　　　　　　　Title　I。　Conjugal　Right。　（Husband　and　Wife）

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　24。　The　Natural　Basis　of　Marriage。



　　The　domestic　relations　are　founded　on　marriage；　and　marriage　is

founded　upon　the　natural　reciprocity　or　intercommunity　（commercium）　of

the　sexes。*　This　natural　union　of　the　sexes　proceeds　according　to

the　mere　animal　nature　（vaga　libido；　venus　vulgivaga；　fornicatio）；

or　according　to　the　law。　The　latter　is　marriage　（matrimonium）；　which

is　the　union　of　two　persons　of　different　sex　for　life…long

reciprocal　possession　of　their　sexual　faculties。　The　end　of

producing　and　educating　children　may　be　regarded　as　always　the　end

of　nature　in　implanting　mutual　desire　and　inclination　in　the　sexes；

but　it　is　not　necessary　for　the　rightfulness　of　marriage　that　those

who　marry　should　set　this　before　themselves　as　the　end　of　their　union；

otherwise　the　marriage　would　be　dissolved　of　itself　when　the

production　of　children　ceased。



　　*Commercium　sexuale　est　usus　membrorum　et　facultatum　sexualium

alterius。　This　〃usus〃　is　either　natural；　by　which　human　beings　may

reproduce　their　own　kind；　or　unnatural；　which；　again；　refers　either　to

a　person　of　the　same　sex　or　to　an　animal　of　another　species　than

man。　These　transgressions　of　all　law；　as　crimina　carnis　contra

naturam；　are　even　〃not　to　be　named〃；　and；　as　wrongs　against　all

humanity　in　the　person；　they　cannot　be　saved；　by　any　limitation　or

exception　whatever；　from　entire　reprobation。



　　And　even　assuming　that　enjoyment　in　the　reciprocal　use　of　the　sexual

endowments　is　an　end　of　marriage；　yet　the　contract　of　marriage　is

not　on　that　account　a　matter　of　arbitrary　will；　but　is　a　contract

necessary　in　its　nature　by　the　law　of　humanity。　In　other　words；　if　a

man　and　a　woman　have　the　will　to　enter　on　reciprocal　enjoyment　in

accordance　with　their　sexual　nature；　they　must　necessarily　marry

each　other；　and　this　necessity　is　in　accordance　with　the　juridical

laws　of　pure　rea