the science of right-第2部分

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them　by　figurative　construction　or　representation　of　its

conceptions；　so　it　is　in　like　manner　with　the　principle　of　right。　It

is　not　so　much　the　mere　formal　conception　of　right；　but　rather　that　of

a　universal　and　equal　reciprocal　compulsion　as　harmonizing　with　it；

and　reduced　under　general　laws；　that　makes　representation　of　that

conception　possible。　But　just　as　those　conceptions　presented　in

dynamics　are　founded　upon　a　merely　formal　representation　of　pure

mathematics　as　presented　in　geometry；　reason　has　taken　care　also　to

provide　the　understanding　as　far　as　possible　with　intuitive

presentations　a　priori　in　behoof　of　a　construction　of　the　conception

of　right。　The　right　in　geometrical　lines　（rectum）　is　opposed；　as　the

straight；　to　that　which　is　curved　and　to　that　which　is　oblique。　In　the

first　opposition；　there　is　involved　an　inner　quality　of　the　lines　of

such　a　nature　that　there　is　only　one　straight　or　right　line　possible

between　two　given　points。　In　the　second　case；　again；　the　positions

of　two　intersecting　or　meeting　lines　are　of　such　a　nature　that　there

can　likewise　be　only　one　line　called　the　perpendicular；　which　is　not

more　inclined　to　the　one　side　than　the　other；　and　it　divides　space

on　either　side　into　two　equal　parts。　After　the　manner　of　this　analogy；

the　science　of　right　aims　at　determining　what　every　one　shall　have

as　his　own　with　mathematical　exactness；　but　this　is　not　to　be　expected

in　the　ethical　science　of　virtue；　as　it　cannot　but　allow　a　certain

latitude　for　exceptions。　But；　without　passing　into　the　sphere　of

ethics；　there　are　two　cases…　known　as　the　equivocal　right　of　equity

and　necessity…　which　claim　a　juridical　decision；　yet　for　which　no

one　can　be　found　to　give　such　a　decision；　and　which；　as　regards

their　relation　to　rights；　belong；　as　it　were；　to　the　〃Intermundia〃

of　Epicurus。　These　we　must　at　the　outset　take　apart　from　the　special

exposition　of　the　science　of　right；　to　which　we　are　now　about　to

advance；　and　we　may　consider　them　now　by　way　of　supplement　to　these

introductory　explanations；　in　order　that　their　uncertain　conditions

may　not　exert　a　disturbing　influence　on　the　fixed　principles　of　the

proper　doctrine　of　right。





　　　　　　　　　　F。　Supplementary　Remarks　on　Equivocal　Right。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Jus　Aequivocum）。



　　With　every　right；　in　the　strict　acceptation　（jus　strictum）；　there　is

conjoined　a　right　to　compel。　But　it　is　possible　to　think　of　other

rights　of　a　wider　kind　（jus　latum）　in　which　the　title　to　compel　cannot

be　determined　by　any　law。　Now　there　are　two　real　or　supposed　rights　of

this　kind…　equity　and　the　right　of　necessity。　The　first　alleges　a

right　that　is　without　compulsion；　the　second　adopts　a　compulsion

that　is　without　right。　This　equivocalness；　however；　can　be　easily

shown　to　rest　on　the　peculiar　fact　that　there　are　cases　of　doubtful

right；　for　the　decision　of　which　no　judge　can　be　appointed。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。　Equity。



　　Equity　（aequitas）；　regarded　objectively；　does　not　properly

constitute　a　claim　upon　the　moral　duty　of　benevolence　or　beneficence

on　the　part　of　others；　but　whoever　insists　upon　anything　on　the　ground

of　equity；　founds　upon　his　right　to　the　same。　In　this　case；　however；

the　conditions　are　awanting　that　are　requisite　for　the　function　of　a

judge　in　order　that　be　might　determine　what　or　what　kind　of

satisfaction　can　be　done　to　this　claim。　When　one　of　the　partners　of

a　mercantile　company；　formed　under　the　condition　of　equal　profits；

has；　however；　done　more　than　the　other　members；　and　in　consequence　has

also　lost　more；　it　is　in　accordance　with　equity　that　he　should

demand　from　the　company　more　than　merely　an　equal　share　of　advantage

with　the　rest。　But；　in　relation　to　strict　right…　if　we　think　of　a

judge　considering　his　case…　he　can　furnish　no　definite　data　to

establish　how　much　more　belongs　to　him　by　the　contract；　and　in　case　of

an　action　at　law；　such　a　demand　would　be　rejected。　A　domestic　servant；

again；　who　might　be　paid　his　wages　due　to　the　end　of　his　year　of

service　in　a　coinage　that　became　depreciated　within　that　period；　so

that　it　would　not　be　of　the　same　value　to　him　as　it　was　when　he

entered　on　his　engagement；　cannot　claim　by　right　to　be　kept　from

loss　on　account　of　the　unequal　value　of　the　money　if　he　receives　the

due　amount　of　it。　He　can　only　make　an　appeal　on　the　ground　of　equity；…

a　dumb　goddess　who　cannot　claim　a　bearing　of　right；…　because　there　was

nothing　bearing　on　this　point　in　the　contract　of　service；　and　a

judge　cannot　give　a　decree　on　the　basis　of　vague　or　indefinite

conditions。

　　Hence　it　follows；　that　a　court　of　equity；　for　the　decision　of

disputed　questions　of　right；　would　involve　a　contradiction。　It　is　only

where　his　own　proper　rights　are　concerned；　and　in　matters　in　which

he　can　decide；　that　a　judge　may　or　ought　to　give　a　hearing　to

equity。　Thus；　if　the　Crown　is　supplicated　to　give　an　indemnity　to

certain　persons　for　loss　or　injury　sustained　in　its　service；　it　may

undertake　the　burden　of　doing　so；　although；　according　to　strict　right；

the　claim　might　be　rejected　on　the　ground　of　the　pretext　that　the

parties　in　question　undertook　the　performance　of　the　service

occasioning　the　loss；　at　their　own　risk。

　　The　dictum　of　equity　may　be　put　thus：　〃The　strictest　right　is　the

greatest　wrong〃　（summum　jus　summa　injuria）。　But　this　evil　cannot　be

obviated　by　the　forms　of　right；　although　it　relates　to　a　matter　of

right；　for　the　grievance　that　it　gives　rise　to　can　only　be　put

before　a　〃court　of　conscience〃　（forum　poli）；　whereas　every　question　of

right　must　be　taken　before　a　civil　court　（forum　soli）。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II。　The　Right　of　Necessity。



　　The　so…called　right　of　necessity　（jus　necessitatis）　is　the

supposed　right　or　title；　in　case　of　the　danger　of　losing　my　own

life；　to　take　away　the　life　of　another　who　has；　in　fact；　done　me　no

harm。　It　is　evident　that；　viewed　as　a　doctrine　of　right；　this　must

involve　a　contradiction；　For　this　is　not　the　case　of　a　wrongful

aggressor　making　an　unjust　assault　upon　my　life；　and　whom　I　anticipate

by　depriving　him　of　his　own　（jus　inculpatae　tutelae）；　nor　consequently

is　it　a　question　merely　of　the　recommendation　of　moderation　which

belongs　to　ethics　as　the　doctrine　of　virtue；　and　not　to

jurisprudence　as　the　doctrine　of　right。　It　is　a　question　of　the

allowableness　of　using　violence　against　one　who　has　used　none

against　me。

　　It　is　clear　that　the　assertion　of　such　a　right　is　not　to　be

understood　objectively　as　being　in　accordance　with　what　a　law　would

prescribe；　but　merely　subjectively；　as　proceeding　on　the　assumption　of

how　a　sentence　would　be　pronounced　by　a　court　in　the　case。　There

can；　in　fact；　be　no　criminal　law　assigning　the　penalty　of　death　to　a

man　who；　when　shipwrecked　and　struggling　in　extreme　danger　for　his

life；　and　in　order　to　save　it；　may　thrust　another　from　a　plank　on

which　he　had　saved　himself。　For　the　punishment　threatened　by　the　law

could　not　possibly　have　greater　power　than　the　fear　of　the　loss　of

life　in　the　case　in　question。　Such　a　penal　law　would　thus　fail

altogether　to　exercise　its　intended　effect；　for　the　threat　of　an

evil　which　is　still　uncertain…　such　as　death　by　a　judicial　sentence…

could　not　overcome　the　fear　of　an　evil　which　is　certain；　as　drowning

is　in　such　circumstances。　An　act　of　violent　self…preservation；　then；

ought　not　to　be　considered　as　altogether　beyond　condemnation

（inculpabile）；　it　is　only　to　be　adjudged　as　exempt　from　punishment

（impunibile）。　Yet　this　subjective　condition　of　impunity；　by　a

strange　confusion　of　ideas；　has　been　regarded　by　jurists　as　equivalent

to　objective　lawfulness。

　　The　dictum　of　the　right　of　necessity　is　put　in　these　terms：

〃Necessity　has　no　law〃　（Necessitas　non　habet　legem）。　And　yet　there

cannot　be　a　necessity　that　could　make　what　is　wrong　lawful。

　　It　is　apparent；　then；　that　in。　judgements　relating　both　to

〃equity〃　and　〃the　right　of　necessity；〃　the　equivocations　involved

arise　from　an　interchange　of　the　objective　and　subjective　grounds　that

enter　into　the　application　of　the　principles　of　right；　when　viewed

respectively　by　reason　or　by　a　judicial　tribunal。　What　one　may　have

good　grounds　for　recognising　as　right；　in　itself；　may　not　find

confirmation　in　a　court　of　justice；　and　what　he　must　consider　to　be

wrong；　in　itself；　may　obtain　recognition　in　such　a　court。　And　the

reason　of　this　is　that　the　conception　of　right　is　not　taken　in　the　two

cases　in　one　and　the　same　sense。

DIVISION

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　DIVISION　OF　THE　SCIENCE　OF　RIGHT。





　　　　　　　　　A。　General　Division　of　the　Duties　of　Right。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Juridical　Duties）。



　　In　this　division　we　may　very　conveniently　follow　Ulpian；　if　his

three　formulae　are　taken　in　a　general　sense；　which　may　not　have　been

quite　clearly　in　his　mind；　but　which　they　are　capable　of　being

developed　into　or　of　receiving。　They　are　the　following：

　　1。　Honeste　vive。　〃Live　rightly。〃　juridical　rectitude；　or　honour

（honestas　juridica）；　consists　in　maintaining　one's　own　worth　as　a

man　in　relation　to　others。　This　duty　may　be　rendered　by　the

proposition：　〃Do　not　make　thyself　a　mere　means　for　the　use　of

others；　but　be　to　them　likewise　an　end。〃　This　duty　will　be　explained

in　the　next　formula　as　an　obligation　arising　out　of　the　right　of

humanity　in　our　own　person　（lex　justi）。

　　2。　Neminem　laede。　〃Do　wrong　to　no　one。〃　This　formula　may　be　rendered

so　as　to　mean：　〃Do　no　wrong　to　any　one；　even　if　thou　shouldst　be　under

the　necessity；　in　observing　this　duty；　to　cease　from　all　connection

with　others　and　to　avoid　all　society〃　（lex　juridica）。

　　3。　Suum　cuique　tribue。　〃Assign　to　every　one　what　is　his　own。〃　This

may　be　rendered；　〃Enter；　if　wrong　cannot　be　avoided；　into　a　society

with　others　in　which　every　one　may　have　secured　to　him　what　is　his

own。〃　If　this　formula　were　to　be　simply　translated；　〃Give　every　one

his　own；〃　it　would　express　an　absurdity；　for　we　cannot　give　any　one

what　he　already