the science of right-第21部分

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and；　generally；　every　one　who　is　compelled　to　maintain　himself　not

according　to　his　own　industry；　but　as　it　is　arranged　by　others　（the

state　excepted）；　are　without　civil　personality；　and　their　existence　is

only；　as　it　were；　incidentally　included　in　the　state。　The　woodcutter

whom　I　employ　on　my　estate；　the　smith　in　India　who　carries　his　hammer；

anvil；　and　bellows　into　the　houses　where　he　is　engaged　to　work　in

iron；　as　distinguished　from　the　European　carpenter　or　smith；　who　can

offer　the　independent　products　of　his　labour　as　wares　for　public　sale；

the　resident　tutor　as　distinguished　from　the　schoolmaster；　the

ploughman　as　distinguished　from　the　farmer　and　such　like；　illustrate

the　distinction　in　question。　In　all　these　cases；　the　former　members　of

the　contrast　are　distinguished　from　the　latter　by　being　mere

subsidiaries　of　the　commonwealth　and　not　active　independent　members　of

it；　because　they　are　of　necessity　commanded　and　protected　by　others；

and　consequently　possess　no　political　self…sufficiency　in

themselves。　Such　dependence　on　the　will　of　others　and　the　consequent

inequality　are；　however；　not　inconsistent　with　the　freedom　and

equality　of　the　individuals　as　men　helping　to　constitute　the　people。

Much　rather　is　it　the　case　that　it　is　only　under　such　conditions

that　a　people　can　become　a　state　and　enter　into　a　civil

constitution。　But　all　are　not　equally　qualified　to　exercise　the

right　of　suffrage　under　the　constitution；　and　to　be　full　citizens　of

the　state；　and　not　mere　passive　subjects　under　its　protection。　For；

although　they　are　entitled　to　demand　to　be　treated　by　all　the　other

citizens　according　to　laws　of　natural　freedom　and　equality；　as　passive

parts　of　the　state；　it　does　not　follow　that　they　ought　themselves　to

have　the　right　to　deal　with　the　state　as　active　members　of　it；　to

reorganize　it；　or　to　take　action　by　way　of　introducing　certain　laws。

All　they　have　a　right　in　their　circumstances　to　claim　may　be　no　more

than　that　whatever　be　the　mode　in　which　the　positive　laws　are　enacted；

these　laws　must　not　be　contrary　to　the　natural　laws　that　demand　the

freedom　of　all　the　people　and　the　equality　that　is　conformable

thereto；　and　it　must　therefore　be　made　possible　for　them　to　raise

themselves　from　this　passive　condition　in　the　state　to　the　condition

of　active　citizenship。



　　　　　47。　Dignities　in　the　State　and　the　Original　Contract。



　　All　these　three　powers　in　the　state　are　dignities；　and；　as

necessarily　arising　out　of　the　idea　of　the　state　and　essential

generally　to　the　foundation　of　its　constitution；　they　are　to　be

regarded　as　political　dignities。　They　imply　the　relation　between　a

universal　sovereign　as　head　of　the　state…　which　according　to　the

laws　of　freedom　can　be　none　other　than　the　people　itself　united　into　a

nation…　and　the　mass　of　the　individuals　of　the　nation　as　subjects。　The

former　member　of　the　relation　is　the　ruling　power；　whose　function　is

to　govern　（imperans）；　the　latter　is　the　ruled　constituents　of　the

state；　whose　function　is　to　obey　（subditi）。

　　The　act　by　which　a　people　is　represented　as　constituting　itself　into

a　state；　is　termed　the　original　contract。　This　is　properly　only　an

outward　mode　of　representing　the　idea　by　which　the　rightfulness　of　the

process　of　organizing　the　constitution　may　be　made　conceivable。

According　to　this　representation；　all　and　each　of　the　people　give　up

their　external　freedom　in　order　to　receive　it　immediately　again　as

members　of　a　commonwealth。　The　commonwealth　is　the　people　viewed　as

united　altogether　into　a　state。　And　thus　it　is　not　to　be　said　that　the

individual　in　the　state　has　sacrificed　a　part　of　his　inborn　external

freedom　for　a　particular　purpose；　but　he　has　abandoned　his　wild

lawless　freedom　wholly；　in　order　to　find　all　his　proper　freedom

again　entire　and　undiminished；　but　in　the　form　of　a　regulated　order　of

dependence；　that　is；　in　a　civil　state　regulated　by　laws　of　right。　This

relation　of　dependence　thus　arises　out　of　his　own　regulative　law

giving　will。



　　　　　　　　48。　Mutual　Relations　and　Characteristics　of　the

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Three　Powers。



　　The　three　powers　in　the　state；　as　regards　their　relations　to　each

other；　are；　therefore：　（1）　coordinate　with　one　another　as　so　many

moral　persons；　and　the　one　is　thus　the　complement　of　the　other　in

the　way　of　completing　the　constitution　of　the　state；　（2）　they　are

likewise　subordinate　to　one　another；　so　that　the　one　cannot　at　the

same　time　usurp　the　function　of　the　other　by　whose　side　it　moves；　each

having　its　own　principle　and　maintaining　its　authority　in　a　particular

person；　but　under　the　condition　of　the　will　of　a　superior；　and

further；　（3）　by　the　union　of　both　these　relations；　they　assign

distributively　to　every　subject　in　the　state　his　own　rights。

　　Considered　as　to　their　respective　dignity；　the　three　powers　may　be

thus　described。　The　will　of　the　sovereign　legislator；　in　respect　of

what　constitutes　the　external　mine　and　thine；　is　to　be　regarded　as

irreprehensible；　the　executive　function　of　the　supreme　ruler　is　to

be　regarded　as　irresistible；　and　the　judicial　sentence　of　the

supreme　judge　is　to　be　regarded　as　irreversible；　being　beyond　appeal。



　　　　　　　　　49。　Distinct　Functions　of　the　Three　Powers。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Autonomy　of　the　State



　　1。　The　executive　power　belongs　to　the　governor　or　regent　of　the

state；　whether　it　assumes　the　form　of　a　moral　or　individual　person；　as

the　king　or　prince　（rex；　princeps）。　This　executive　authority；　as　the

supreme　agent　of　the　state；　appoints　the　magistrates；　and　prescribes

the　rules　to　the　people；　in　accordance　with　which　individuals　may

acquire　anything　or　maintain　what　is　their　own　conformably　to　the　law；

each　case　being　brought　under　its　application。　Regarded　as　a　moral

person；　this　executive　authority　constitutes　the　government。　The

orders　issued　by　the　government　to　the　people　and　the　magistrates；

as　well　as　to　the　higher　ministerial　administrators　of　the　state

（gubernatio）；　are　rescripts　or　decrees；　and　not　laws；　for　they

terminate　in　the　decision　of　particular　cases；　and　are　given　forth

as　unchangeable。　A　government　acting　as　an　executive；　and　at　the

same　time　laying　down　the　law　as　the　legislative　power；　would　be　a

despotic　government；　and　would　have　to　be　contradistinguished　from　a

patriotic　government。　A　patriotic　government；　again；　is　to　be

distinguished　from　a　paternal　government　（regimen　paternale）　which

is　the　most　despotic　government　of　all；　the　citizens　being　dealt

with　by　it　as　mere　children。　A　patriotic　government；　however；　is　one

in　which　the　state；　while　dealing　with　the　subjects　as　if　they　were

members　of　a　family；　still　treats　them　likewise　as　citizens；　and

according　to　laws　that　recognize　their　independence；　each　individual

possessing　himself　and　not　being　dependent　on　the　absolute　will　of

another　beside　him　or　above　him。

　　2。　The　legislative　authority　ought　not　at　the　same　time　to　be　the

executive　or　governor；　for　the　governor；　as　administrator；　should

stand　under　the　authority　of　the　law；　and　is　bound　by　it　under　the

supreme　control　of　the　legislator。　The　legislative　authority　may

therefore　deprive　the　governor　of　his　power；　depose　him；　or　reform　his

administration；　but　not　punish　him。　This　is　the　proper　and　only

meaning　of　the　common　saying　in　England；　〃The　King…　as　the　supreme

executive　power…　can　do　no　wrong。〃　For　any　such　application　of

punishment　would　necessarily　be　an　act　of　that　very　executive　power　to

which　the　supreme　right　to　compel　according　to　law　pertains；　and　which

would　itself　be　thus　subjected　to　coercion；　which　is

self…contradictory。

　　3。　Further；　neither　the　legislative　power　nor　the　executive　power

ought　to　exercise　the　judicial　function；　but　only　appoint　judges　as

magistrates。　It　is　the　people　who　ought　to　judge　themselves；　through

those　of　the　citizens　who　are　elected　by　free　choice　as　their

representatives　for　this　purpose；　and　even　specially　for　every　process

or　cause。　For　the　judicial　sentence　is　a　special　act　of　public

distributive　justice　performed　by　a　judge　or　court　as　a　constitutional

administrator　of　the　law；　to　a　subject　as　one　of　the　people。　Such　an

act　is　not　invested　inherently　with　the　power　to　determine　and

assign　to　any　one　what　is　his。　Every　individual　among　the　people　being

merely　passive　in　this　relation　to　the　supreme　power；　either　the

executive　or　the　legislative　authority　might　do　him　wrong　in　their

determinations　in　cases　of　dispute　regarding　the　property　of

individuals。　It　would　not　be　the　people　themselves　who　thus

determined；　or　who　pronounced　the　judgements　of　〃guilty〃　or　〃not

guilty〃　regarding　their　fellow…citizens。　For　it　is　to　the

determination　of　this　issue　in　a　cause　that　the　court　has　to　apply　the

law；　and　it　is　by　means　of　the　executive　authority；　that　the　judge

holds　power　to　assign　to　every　one　his　own。　Hence　it　is　only　the

people　that　properly　can　judge　in　a　cause…　although　indirectly

representatives　elected　and　deputed　by　themselves；　as　in　a　jury。　It

would　even　be　beneath　the　dignity　of　the　sovereign　head　of　the　state

to　play　the　judge；　for　this　would　be　to　put　himself　into　a　position　in

which　it　would　be　possible　to　do　wrong；　and　thus　to　subject　himself　to

the　demand　for　an　appeal　to　a　still　higher　power　（a　rege　male

informato　ad　regem　melius　informandum）。

　　It　is　by　the　co…operation　of　these　three　powers…　the　legislative；

the　executive；　and　the　judicial…　that　the　state　realizes　its　autonomy。

This　autonomy　consists　in　its　organizing；　forming；　and　maintaining

itself　in　accordance　with　the　laws　of　freedom。　In　their　union　the

welfare　of　the　state　is　realized。　Salus　reipublicae　suprema　lex。*　By

this　is　not　to　be　understood　merely　the　individual　well…being　and

happiness　of　the　citizens　of　the　state；　for…　as　Rousseau　asserts…　this

end　may　perhaps　be　more　agreeably　and　more　desirably　attained　in　the

state　of　nature；　or　even　under　a　despotic　government。　But　the

welfare