the science of right-第23部分

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case；　he　only　diverges　from　the　law；　although　intentionally。　He　may；

at　the　same　time；　abhor　his　own　transgression；　and　without　formally

renouncing　his　obedience　to　the　law　only　wish　to　avoid　it。　In　the

former　case；　however；　he　rejects　the　authority　of　the　law　itself；

the　validity　of　which；　however；　he　cannot　repudiate　before　his　own

reason；　even　while　he　makes　it　his　rule　to　act　against　it。　His　maxim

is；　therefore；　not　merely　defective　as　being　negatively　contrary　to

the　law；　but　it　is　even　positively　illegal；　as　being　diametrically

contrary　and　in　hostile　opposition　to　it。　So　far　as　we　can　see　into

and　understand　the　relation；　it　would　appear　as　if　it　were

impossible　for　men　to　commit　wrongs　and　crimes　of　a　wholly　useless

form　of　wickedness；　and　yet　the　idea　of　such　extreme　perversity　cannot

be　overlooked　in　a　system　of　moral　philosophy。

　　There　is　thus　a　feeling　of　horror　at　the　thought　of　the　formal

execution　of　a　monarch　by　his　people。　And　the　reason　it　is　that；

whereas　an　act　of　assassination　must　be　considered　as　only　an

exception　from　the　rule　which　has　been　constituted　a　maxim；　such　an

execution　must　be　regarded　as　a　complete　perversion　of　the

principles　that　should　regulate　the　relation　between　a　sovereign　and

his　people。　For　it　makes　the　people；　who　owe　their　constitutional

existence　to　the　legislation　that　issued　from　the　sovereign；　to　be　the

ruler　over　him。　Hence　mere　violence　is　thus　elevated　with　bold　brow；

and　as　it　were　by　principle；　above　the　holiest　right；　and；　appearing

like　an　abyss　to　swallow　up　everything　without　recall；　it　seems　like

suicide　committed　by　the　state　upon　itself　and　a　crime　that　is　capable

of　no　atonement。　There　is　therefore　reason　to　assume　that　the

consent　that　is　accorded　to　such　executions　is　not　really　based　upon　a

supposed　principle　of　right；　but　only　springs　from　fear　of　the

vengeance　that　would　be　taken　upon　the　people　were　the　same　power　to

revive　again　in　the　state。　And　hence　it　may　be　held　that　the

formalities　accompanying　them　have　only　been　put　forward　in　order　to

give　these　deeds　a　look　of　punishment　from　the　accompaniment　of　a

judicial　process；　such　as　could　not　go　along　with　a　mere　murder　or

assassination。　But　such　a　cloaking　of　the　deed　entirely　fails　of　its

purpose；　because　this　pretension　on　the　part　of　the　people　is　even

worse　than　murder　itself；　as　it　implies　a　principle　which　would

necessarily　make　the　restoration　of　a　state；　when　once　overthrown；

an　impossibility。

　　An　alteration　of　the　still　defective　constitution　of　the　state　may

sometimes　be　quite　necessary。　But　all　such　changes　ought　only　to

proceed　from　the　sovereign　power　in　the　way　of　reform；　and　are　not

to　be　brought　about　by　the　people　in　the　way　of　revolution；　and　when

they　take　place；　they　should　only　effect　the　executive；　and　not　the

legislative；　power。　A　political　constitution　which　is　so　modified　that

the　people　by　their　representatives　in　parliament　can　legally　resist

the　executive　power；　and　its　representative　minister；　is　called　a

limited　constitution。　Yet　even　under　such　a　constitution　there　is　no

right　of　active　resistance；　as　by　an　arbitrary　combination　of　the

people　to　coerce　the　government　into　a　certain　active　procedure；　for

this　would　be　to　assume　to　perform　an　act　of　the　executive　itself。　All

that　can　rightly　be　allowed；　is　only　a　negative　resistance；

amounting　to　an　act　of　refusal　on　the　part　of　the　people　to　concede

all　the　demands　which　the　executive　may　deem　it　necessary　to　make　in

behoof　of　the　political　administration。　And　if　this　right　were　never

exercised；　it　would　be　a　sure　sign　that　the　people　were　corrupted；

their　representatives　venal；　the　supreme　head　of　the　government

despotic；　and　his　ministers　practically　betrayers　of　the　people。

　　Further；　when　on　the　success　of　a　revolution　a　new　constitution

has　been　founded；　the　unlawfulness　of　its　beginning　and　of　its

institution　cannot　release　the　subjects　from　the　obligation　of

adapting　themselves；　as　good　citizens；　to　the　new　order　of　things；　and

they　are　not　entitled　to　refuse　honourably　to　obey　the　authority

that　has　thus　attained　the　power　in　the　state。　A　dethroned　monarch；

who　has　survived　such　a　revolution；　is　not　to　be　called　to　account

on　the　ground　of　his　former　administration；　and　still　less　may　he　be

punished　for　it；　when　with　drawing　into　the　private　life　of　a

citizen　he　prefers　his　own　quiet　and　the　peace　of　the　state　to　the

uncertainty　of　exile；　with　the　intention　of　maintaining　his　claims　for

restoration　at　all　hazards；　and　pushing　these　either　by　secret

counter…revolution　or　by　the　assistance　of　other　powers。　However；　if

he　prefers　to　follow　the　latter　course；　his　rights　remain；　because　the

rebellion　that　drove　him　from　his　position　was　inherently　unjust。

But　the　question　then　emerges　as　to　whether　other　powers　have　the

right　to　form　themselves　into　an　alliance　in　behalf　of　such　a

dethroned　monarch　merely　in　order　not　to　leave　the　crime　committed

by　the　people　unavenged；　or　to　do　away　with　it　as　a　scandal　to　all　the

states；　and　whether　they　are　therefore　justified　and　called　upon　to

restore　by　force　to　another　state　a　formerly　existing　constitution

that　has　been　removed　by　a　revolution。　The　discussion　of　this

question；　however；　does　not　belong　to　this　department　of　public　right；

but　to　the　following　section；　concerning　the　right　of　nations。



　　　　　B。　Land　Rights。　Secular　and　Church　Lands；　Rights　of　Taxation；

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Finance；　Police；　Inspection。



　　Is　the　sovereign；　viewed　as　embodying　the　legislative　power；　to　be

regarded　as　the　supreme　proprietor　of　the　soil；　or　only　as　the　highest

ruler　of　the　people　by　the　laws？　As　the　soil　is　the　supreme

condition　under　which　it　is　alone　possible　to　have　external　things

as　one's　own；　its　possible　possession　and　use　constitute　the　first

acquirable　basis　of　external　right。　Hence　it　is　that　all　such　rights

must　be　derived　from　the　sovereign　as　overlord　and　paramount

superior　of　the　soil；　or；　as　it　may　be　better　put；　as　the　supreme

proprietor　of　the　land　（dominus　territorii）。　The　people；　as　forming

the　mass　of　the　subjects；　belong　to　the　sovereign　as　a　people；　not

in　the　sense　of　his　being　their　proprietor　in　the　way　of　real　right；

but　as　their　supreme　commander　or　chief　in　the　way　of　personal

right。　This　supreme　proprietorship；　however；　is　only　an　idea　of　the

civil　constitution；　objectified　to　represent；　in　accordance　with

juridical　conceptions；　the　necessary　union　of　the　private　property

of　all　the　people　under　a　public　universal　possessor。　The　relation

is　so　represented　in　order　that　it　may　form　a　basis　for　the

determination　of　particular　rights　in　property。　It　does　not　proceed；

therefore；　upon　the　principle　of　mere　aggregation；　which　advances

empirically　from　the　parts　to　the　whole；　but　from　the　necessary　formal

principle　of　a　division　of　the　soil　according　to　conceptions　of　right。

In　accordance　with　this　principle；　the　supreme　universal　proprietor

cannot　have　any　private　property　in　any　part　of　the　soil；　for

otherwise　he　would　make　himself　a　private　person。　Private　property

in　the　soil　belongs　only　to　the　people；　taken　distributively　and　not

collectively；　from　which　condition；　however；　a　nomadic　people　must

be　excepted　as　having　no　private　property　at　all　in　the　soil。　The

supreme　proprietor　accordingly　ought　not　to　hold　private　estates；

either　for　private　use　or　for　the　support　of　the　court。　For；　as　it

would　depend　upon　his　own　pleasure　how　far　these　should　extend；　the

state　would　be　in　danger　of　seeing　all　property　in　the　land　taken　into

the　hands　of　the　government；　and　all　the　subjects　treated　as

bondsmen　of　the　soil　（glebae　adscripti）。　As　possessors　only　of　what

was　the　private　property　of　another；　they　might　thus　be　deprived　of

all　freedom　and　regarded　as　serfs　or　slaves。　Of　the　supreme　proprietor

of　the　land；　it　may　be　said　that　he　possesses　nothing　as　his　own；

except　himself；　for　if　he　possessed　things　in　the　state　alongside　of

others；　dispute　and　litigation　would　be　possible　with　these　others

regarding　those　things；　and　there　would　be　no　independent　judge　to

settle　the　cause。　But　it　may　also　be　said　that　he　possesses

everything；　for　he　has　the　supreme　right　of　sovereignty　over　the　whole

people；　to　whom　all　external　things　severally　（divisim）　belong；　and　as

such　he　assigns　distributively　to　every　one　what　is　to　be　his。

　　Hence　there　cannot　be　any　corporation　in　the　state；　nor　any　class　or

order；　that　as　proprietors　can　transmit　the　land　for　a　sole

exclusive　use　to　the　following　generations　for　all　time　（ad

infinitum）；　according　to　certain　fixed　statutes。　The　state　may　annul

and　abrogate　all　such　statutes　at　any　time；　only　under　the　condition

of　indemnifying　survivors　for　their　interests。　The　order　of　knights；

constituting　the　nobility　regarded　as　a　mere　rank　or　class　of

specially　titled　individuals；　as　well　as　the　order　of　the　clergy；

called　the　church；　are　both　subject　to　this　relation。　They　can　never

be　entitled　by　any　hereditary　privileges　with　which　they　may　be

favoured；　to　acquire　an　absolute　property　in　the　soil　transmissible　to

their　successors。　They　can　only　acquire　the　use　of　such　property　for

the　time　being。　If　public　opinion　has　ceased；　on　account　of　other

arrangements；　to　impel　the　state　to　protect　itself　from　negligence

in　the　national　defence　by　appeal　to　the　military　honour　of　the

knightly　order；　the　estates　granted　on　that　condition　may　be　recalled。

And；　in　like　manner；　the　church　lands　or　spiritualities　may　be

reclaimed　by　the　state　without　scruple；　if　public　opinion　has　ceased

to　impel　the　members　of　the　state　to　maintain　masses　for　the　souls

of　the　dead；　prayers　for　the　living；　and　a　multitude　of　clergy；　as

means　to　protect　themselves　from　eternal　fire。　But　in　both　cases；

the　condition　of　indemnifying　existing　interests　must　be　observed。

Those　who　in　this　connection　fall　under　the　movement　of　reform　are　not

entitled