the science of right-第26部分

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justice　and　righteousness　perish；　human　life　would　no　longer　have

any　value　in　the　world。　What；　then；　is　to　be　said　of　such　a　proposal

as　to　keep　a　criminal　alive　who　has　been　condemned　to　death；　on　his

being　given　to　understand　that；　if　he　agreed　to　certain　dangerous

experiments　being　performed　upon　him；　he　would　be　allowed　to　survive

if　he　came　happily　through　them？　It　is　argued　that　physicians　might

thus　obtain　new　information　that　would　be　of　value　to　the

commonweal。　But　a　court　of　justice　would　repudiate　with　scorn　any

proposal　of　this　kind　if　made　to　it　by　the　medical　faculty；　for

justice　would　cease　to　be　justice；　if　it　were　bartered　away　for　any

consideration　whatever。

　　But　what　is　the　mode　and　measure　of　punishment　which　public

justice　takes　as　its　principle　and　standard？　It　is　just　the

principle　of　equality；　by　which　the　pointer　of　the　scale　of　justice　is

made　to　incline　no　more　to　the　one　side　than　the　other。　It　may　be

rendered　by　saying　that　the　undeserved　evil　which　any　one　commits　on

another　is　to　be　regarded　as　perpetrated　on　himself。　Hence　it　may　be

said：　〃If　you　slander　another；　you　slander　yourself；　if　you　steal　from

another；　you　steal　from　yourself；　if　you　strike　another；　you　strike

yourself；　if　you　kill　another；　you　kill　yourself。〃　This　is　the　right

of　retaliation　（jus　talionis）；　and；　properly　understood；　it　is　the

only　principle　which　in　regulating　a　public　court；　as　distinguished

from　mere　private　judgement；　can　definitely　assign　both　the　quality

and　the　quantity　of　a　just　penalty。　All　other　standards　are　wavering

and　uncertain；　and　on　account　of　other　considerations　involved　in

them；　they　contain　no　principle　conformable　to　the　sentence　of　pure

and　strict　justice。　It　may　appear；　however；　that　difference　of

social　status　would　not　admit　the　application　of　the　principle　of

retaliation；　which　is　that　of　〃like　with　like。〃　But　although　the

application　may　not　in　all　cases　be　possible　according　to　the

letter；　yet　as　regards　the　effect　it　may　always　be　attained　in

practice；　by　due　regard　being　given　to　the　disposition　and　sentiment

of　the　parties　in　the　higher　social　sphere。　Thus　a　pecuniary　penalty

on　account　of　a　verbal　injury　may　have　no　direct　proportion　to　the

injustice　of　slander；　for　one　who　is　wealthy　may　be　able　to　indulge

himself　in　this　offence　for　his　own　gratification。　Yet　the　attack

committed　on　the　honour　of　the　party　aggrieved　may　have　its　equivalent

in　the　pain　inflicted　upon　the　pride　of　the　aggressor；　especially　if

he　is　condemned　by　the　judgement　of　the　court；　not　only　to　retract　and

apologize；　but　to　submit　to　some　meaner　ordeal；　as　kissing　the　hand　of

the　injured　person。　In　like　manner；　if　a　man　of　the　highest　rank　has

violently　assaulted　an　innocent　citizen　of　the　lower　orders；　he　may　be

condemned　not　only　to　apologize　but　to　undergo　a　solitary　and

painful　imprisonment；　whereby；　in　addition　to　the　discomfort

endured；　the　vanity　of　the　offender　would　be　painfully　affected；　and

the　very　shame　of　his　position　would　constitute　an　adequate

retaliation　after　the　principle　of　〃like　with　like。〃　But　how　then

would　we　render　the　statement：　〃If　you　steal　from　another；　you　steal

from　yourself？〃　In　this　way；　that　whoever　steals　anything　makes　the

property　of　all　insecure；　he　therefore　robs　himself　of　all　security　in

property；　according　to　the　right　of　retaliation。　Such　a　one　has

nothing；　and　can　acquire　nothing；　but　he　has　the　will　to　live；　and

this　is　only　possible　by　others　supporting　him。　But　as　the　state

should　not　do　this　gratuitously；　he　must　for　this　purpose　yield　his

powers　to　the　state　to　be　used　in　penal　labour；　and　thus　he　falls

for　a　time；　or　it　may　be　for　life；　into　a　condition　of　slavery。　But

whoever　has　committed　murder；　must　die。　There　is；　in　this　case；　no

juridical　substitute　or　surrogate；　that　can　be　given　or　taken　for

the　satisfaction　of　justice。　There　is　no　likeness　or　proportion

between　life；　however　painful；　and　death；　and　therefore　there　is　no

equality　between　the　crime　of　murder　and　the　retaliation　of　it　but

what　is　judicially　accomplished　by　the　execution　of　the　criminal。

His　death；　however；　must　be　kept　free　from　all　maltreatment　that　would

make　the　humanity　suffering　in　his　person　loathsome　or　abominable。

Even　if　a　civil　society　resolved　to　dissolve　itself　with　the　consent

of　all　its　members…　as　might　be　supposed　in　the　case　of　a　people

inhabiting　an　island　resolving　to　separate　and　scatter　themselves

throughout　the　whole　world…　the　last　murderer　lying　in　the　prison

ought　to　be　executed　before　the　resolution　was　carried　out。　This　ought

to　be　done　in　order　that　every　one　may　realize　the　desert　of　his

deeds；　and　that　blood…guiltiness　may　not　remain　upon　the　people；　for

otherwise　they　might　all　be　regarded　as　participators　in　the　murder　as

a　public　violation　of　justice。

　　The　equalization　of　punishment　with　crime　is　therefore　only　possible

by　the　cognition　of　the　judge　extending　even　to　the　penalty　of

death；　according　to　the　right　of　retaliation。　This　is　manifest　from

the　fact　that　it　is　only　thus　that　a　sentence　can　be　pronounced　over

all　criminals　proportionate　to　their　internal　wickedness；　as　may　be

seen　by　considering　the　case　when　the　punishment　of　death　has　to　be

inflicted；　not　on　account　of　a　murder；　but　on　account　of　a　political

crime　that　can　only　be　punished　capitally。　A　hypothetical　case；

founded　on　history；　will　illustrate　this。　In　the　last　Scottish

rebellion　there　were　various　participators　in　it…　such　as　Balmerino

and　others…　who　believed　that　in　taking　part　in　the　rebellion　they

were　only　discharging　their　duty　to　the　house　of　Stuart；　but　there

were　also　others　who　were　animated　only　by　private　motives　and

interests。　Now；　suppose　that　the　judgement　of　the　supreme　court

regarding　them　had　been　this：　that　every　one　should　have　liberty　to

choose　between　the　punishment　of　death　or　penal　servitude　for　life。　In

view　of　such　an　alternative；　I　say　that　the　man　of　honour　would　choose

death；　and　the　knave　would　choose　servitude。　This　would　be　the

effect　of　their　human　nature　as　it　is；　for　the　honourable　man　values

his　honour　more　highly　than　even　life　itself；　whereas　a　knave

regards　a　life；　although　covered　with　shame；　as　better　in　his　eyes

than　not　to　be。　The　former　is；　without　gainsaying；　less　guilty　than

the　other；　and　they　can　only　be　proportionately　punished　by　death

being　inflicted　equally　upon　them　both；　yet　to　the　one　it　is　a　mild

punishment　when　his　nobler　temperament　is　taken　into　account；

whereas　it　is　a　hard　punishment　to　the　other　in　view　of　his　baser

temperament。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　were　they　all　equally　condemned

to　penal　servitude　for　life；　the　honourable　man　would　be　too

severely　punished；　while　the　other；　on　account　of　his　baseness　of

nature；　would　be　too　mildly　punished。　In　the　judgement　to　be

pronounced　over　a　number　of　criminals　united　in　such　a　conspiracy；　the

best　equalizer　of　punishment　and　crime　in　the　form　of　public　justice

is　death。　And　besides　all　this；　it　has　never　been　heard　of　that　a

criminal　condemned　to　death　on　account　of　a　murder　has　complained　that

the　sentence　inflicted　on　him　more　than　was　right　and　just；　and　any

one　would　treat　him　with　scorn　if　he　expressed　himself　to　this

effect　against　it。　Otherwise　it　would　be　necessary　to　admit　that；

although　wrong　and　injustice　are　not　done　to　the　criminal　by　the

law；　yet　the　legislative　power　is　not　entitled　to　administer　this　mode

of　punishment；　and　if　it　did　so；　it　would　be　in　contradiction　with

itself。

　　However　many　they　may　be　who　have　committed　a　murder；　or　have　even

commanded　it；　or　acted　as　art　and　part　in　it；　they　ought　all　to　suffer

death；　for　so　justice　wills　it；　in　accordance　with　the　idea　of　the

juridical　power；　as　founded　on　the　universal　laws　of　reason。　But　the

number　of　the　accomplices　（correi）　in　such　a　deed　might　happen　to　be

so　great　that　the　state；　in　resolving　to　be　without　such　criminals；

would　be　in　danger　of　soon　also　being　deprived　of　subjects。　But　it

will　not　thus　dissolve　itself；　neither　must　it　return　to　the　much

worse　condition　of　nature；　in　which　there　would　be　no　external

justice。　Nor；　above　all；　should　it　deaden　the　sensibilities　of　the

people　by　the　spectacle　of　justice　being　exhibited　in　the　mere　carnage

of　a　slaughtering　bench。　In　such　circumstances　the　sovereign　must

always　be　allowed　to　have　it　in　his　power　to　take　the　part　of　the

judge　upon　himself　as　a　case　of　necessity…　and　to　deliver　a

judgement　which；　instead　of　the　penalty　of　death；　shall　assign　some

other　punishment　to　the　criminals　and　thereby　preserve　a　multitude

of　the　people。　The　penalty　of　deportation　is　relevant　in　this

connection。　Such　a　form　of　judgement　cannot　be　carried　out　according

to　a　public　law；　but　only　by　an　authoritative　act　of　the　royal

prerogative；　and　it　may　only　be　applied　as　an　act　of　grace　in

individual　cases。

　　Against　these　doctrines；　the　Marquis　Beccaria　has　given　forth　a

different　view。　Moved　by　the　compassionate　sentimentality　of　a

humane　feeling；　he　has　asserted　that　all　capital　punishment　is　wrong

in　itself　and　unjust。　He　has　put　forward　this　view　on　the　ground

that　the　penalty　of　death　could　not　be　contained　in　the　original　civil

contract；　for；　in　that　case；　every　one　of　the　people　would　have　had　to

consent　to　lose　his　life　if　be　murdered　any　of　his　fellow　citizens。

But；　it　is　argued；　such　a　consent　is　impossible；　because　no　one　can

thus　dispose　of　his　own　life。　All　this　is　mere　sophistry　and

perversion　of　right。　No　one　undergoes　punishment　because　he　has　willed

to　be　punished；　but　because　he　has　willed　a　punishable　action；　for

it　is　in　fact　no　punishment　when　any　one　experiences　what　he　wills；

and　it　is　impossible　for　any　one　to　will　to　be　punished。　To　say；　〃I

will　to　be　punished；　if　I　murder　any　one；〃　can　mean　nothing　more　than；

〃I　submit　myself　along　with　all　the　other　citizens　to　the　laws〃；　and

if　there　are　any　criminals　among　the　pe