the science of right-第29部分

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they　have　chosen；　regard　themselves　as　superior　to　civilized

peoples；　and　they　constitute　tribes　and　even　races；　but　not　states。

The　public　right　of　states　（jus　publicum　civitatum）；　in　their

relations　to　one　another；　is　what　we　have　to　consider　under　the

designation　of　the　〃right　of　nations。〃　Wherever　a　state；　viewed　as　a

moral　person；　acts　in　relation　to　another　existing　in　the　condition　of

natural　freedom；　and　consequently　in　a　state　of　continual　war；　such

right　takes　it　rise。

　　The　right　of　nations　in　relation　to　the　state　of　war　may　be

divided　into：　1。　the　right　of　going　to　war；　2。　right　during　war；　and

3。　right　after　war；　the　object　of　which　is　to　constrain　the　nations

mutually　to　pass　from　this　state　of　war　and　to　found　a　common

constitution　establishing　perpetual　peace。　The　difference　between

the　right　of　individual　men　or　families　as　related　to　each　other　in

the　state　of　nature；　and　the　right　of　the　nations　among　themselves；

consists　in　this；　that　in　the　right　of　nations　we　have　to　consider　not

merely　a　relation　of　one　state　to　another　as　a　whole；　but　also　the

relation　of　the　individual　persons　in　one　state　to　the　individuals

of　another　state；　as　well　as　to　that　state　as　a　whole。　This

difference；　however；　between　the　right　of　nations　and　the　right　of

individuals　in　the　mere　state　of　nature；　requires　to　be　determined

by　elements　which　can　easily　be　deduced　from　the　conception　of　the

latter。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　54。　Elements　of　the　Right　of　Nations。



　　The　elements　of　the　right　of　nations　are　as　follows：

　　1。　States；　viewed　as　nations；　in　their　external　relations　to　one

another…　like　lawless　savages…　are　naturally　in　a　non…juridical

condition；

　　2。　This　natural　condition　is　a　state　of　war　in　which　the　right　of

the　stronger　prevails；　and　although　it　may　not　in　fact　be　always　found

as　a　state　of　actual　war　and　incessant　hostility；　and　although　no　real

wrong　is　done　to　any　one　therein；　yet　the　condition　is　wrong　in　itself

in　the　highest　degree；　and　the　nations　which　form　states　contiguous　to

each　other　are　bound　mutually　to　pass　out　of　it；

　　3。　An　alliance　of　nations；　in　accordance　with　the　idea　of　an

original　social　contract；　is　necessary　to　protect　each　other　against

external　aggression　and　attack；　but　not　involving　interference　with

their　several　internal　difficulties　and　disputes；

　　4。　This　mutual　connection　by　alliance　must　dispense　with　a

distinct　sovereign　power；　such　as　is　set　up　in　the　civil　constitution；

it　can　only　take　the　form　of　a　federation；　which　as　such　may　be

revoked　on　any　occasion；　and　must　consequently　be　renewed　from　time　to

time。

　　This　is　therefore　a　right　which　comes　in　as　an　accessory　（in

subsidium）　of　another　original　right；　in　order　to　prevent　the

nations　from　falling　from　right　and　lapsing　into　the　state　of　actual

war　with　each　other。　It　thus　issues　in　the　idea　of　a　foedus

amphictyonum。



　　　　　　　　　55。　Right　of　Going　to　War　as　related　to　the

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Subjects　of　the　State。



　　We　have　then　to　consider；　in　the　first　place；　the　original　right

of　free　states　to　go　to　war　with　each　other　as　being　still　in　a

state　of　nature；　but　as　exercising　this　right　in　order　to　establish

some　condition　of　society　approaching　the　juridical　And；　first　of　all；

the　question　arises　as　to　what　right　the　state　has　in　relation　to

its　own　subjects；　to　use　them　in　order　to　make　war　against　other

states；　to　employ　their　property　and　even　their　lives　for　this

purpose；　or　at　least　to　expose　them　to　hazard　and　danger；　and　all　this

in　such　a　way　that　it　does　not　depend　upon　their　own　personal

judgement　whether　they　will　march　into　the　field　of　war　or　not；　but

the　supreme　command　of　the　sovereign　claims　to　settle　and　dispose　of

them　thus。

　　This　right　appears　capable　of　being　easily　established。　It　may　be

grounded　upon　the　right　which　every　one　has　to　do　with　what　is　his　own

as　he　will。　Whatever　one　has　made　substantially　for　himself；　he

holds　as　his　incontestable　property。　The　following；　then；　is　such　a

deduction　as　a　mere　jurist　would　put　forward。

　　There　are　various　natural　products　in　a　country　which；　as　regards

the　number　and　quantity　in　which　they　exist；　must　be　considered　as

specially　produced　（artefacta）　by　the　work　of　the　state；　for　the

country　would　not　yield　them　to　such　extent　were　it　not　under　the

constitution　of　the　state　and　its　regular　administrative　government；

or　if　the　inhabitants　were　still　living　in　the　state　of　nature。　Sheep；

cattle；　domestic　fowl　the　most　useful　of　their　kind…　swine；　and　such

like；　would　either　be　used　up　as　necessary　food　or　destroyed　by　beasts

of　prey　in　the　district　in　which　I　live；　so　that　they　would　entirely

disappear；　or　be　found　in　very　scant　supplies；　were　it　not　for　the

government　securing　to　the　inhabitants　their　acquisitions　and

property。　This　holds　likewise　of　the　population　itself；　as　we　see　in

the　case　of　the　American　deserts；　and　even　were　the　greatest

industry　applied　in　those　regions…　which　is　not　yet　done…　there

might　be　but　a　scanty　population。　The　inhabitants　of　any　country　would

be　but　sparsely　sown　here　and　there　were　it　not　for　the　protection

of　government；　because　without　it　they　could　not　spread　themselves

with　their　households　upon　a　territory　which　was　always　in　danger　of

being　devastated　by　enemies　or　by　wild　beasts　of　prey；　and　further；　so

great　a　multitude　of　men　as　now　live　in　any　one　country　could　not

otherwise　obtain　sufficient　means　of　support。　Hence；　as　it　can　be　said

of　vegetable　growths；　such　as　potatoes；　as　well　as　of　domesticated

animals；　that　because　the　abundance　in　which　they　are　found　is　a

product　of　human　labour；　they　may　be　used；　destroyed；　and　consumed

by　man；　so　it　seems　that　it　may　be　said　of　the　sovereign；　as　the

supreme　power　in　the　state；　that　he　has　the　right　to　lead　his

subjects；　as　being　for　the　most　part　productions　of　his　own；　to　war；

as　if　it　were　to　the　chase；　and　even　to　march　them　to　the　field　of

battle；　as　if　it　were　on　a　pleasure　excursion。

　　This　principle　of　right　may　be　supposed　to　float　dimly　before　the

mind　of　the　monarch；　and　it　certainly　holds　true　at　least　of　the　lower

animals　which　may　become　the　property　of　man。　But　such　a　principle

will　not　at　all　apply　to　men；　especially　when　viewed　as　citizens　who

must　be　regarded　as　members　of　the　state；　with　a　share　in　the

legislation；　and　not　merely　as　means　for　others　but　as　ends　in

themselves。　As　such　they　must　give　their　free　consent；　through　their

representatives；　not　only　to　the　carrying　on　of　war　generally；　but

to　every　separate　declaration　of　war；　and　it　is　only　under　this

limiting　condition　that　the　state　has　a　right　to　demand　their　services

in　undertakings　so　full　of　danger。

　　We　would　therefore　deduce　this　right　rather　from　the　duty　of　the

sovereign　to　the　people　than　conversely。　Under　this　relation；　the

people　must　be　regarded　as　having　given　their　sanction；　and；　having

the　right　of　voting；　they　may　be　considered；　although　thus　passive

in　reference　to　themselves　individually；　to　be　active　in　so　far　as

they　represent　the　sovereignty　itself。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　56。　Right　of　Going　to　War　in　relation

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　to　Hostile　States。



　　Viewed　as　in　the　state　of　nature；　the　right　of　nations　to　go　to

war　and　to　carry　on　hostilities　is　the　legitimate　way　by　which　they

prosecute　their　rights　by　their　own　power　when　they　regard

themselves　as　injured；　and　this　is　done　because　in　that　state　the

method　of　a　juridical　process；　although　the　only　one　proper　to

settle　such　disputes；　cannot　be　adopted。

　　The　threatening　of　war　is　to　be　distinguished　from　the　active　injury

of　a　first　aggression；　which　again　is　distinguished　from　the　general

outbreak　of　hostilities。　A　threat　or　menace　may　be　given　by　the　active

preparation　of　armaments；　upon　which　a　right　of　prevention　（jus

praeventionis）　is　founded　on　the　other　side；　or　merely　by　the

formidable　increase　of　the　power　of　another　state　（potestas

tremenda）　by　acquisition　of　territory。　Lesion　of　a　less　powerful

country　may　be　involved　merely　in　the　condition　of　a　more　powerful

neighbour　prior　to　any　action　at　all；　and　in　the　state　of　nature　an

attack　under　such　circumstances　would　be　warrantable。　This

international　relation　is　the　foundation　of　the　right　of

equilibrium；　or　of　the　〃balance　of　power；〃　among　all　the　states　that

are　in　active　contiguity　to　each　other。

　　The　right　to　go　to　war　is　constituted　by　any　overt　act　of　injury。

This　includes　any　arbitrary　retaliation　or　act　of　reprisal

（retorsio）　as　a　satisfaction　taken　by　one　people　for　an　offence

committed　by　another；　without　any　attempt　being　made　to　obtain

reparation　in　a　peaceful　way。　Such　an　act　of　retaliation　would　be

similar　in　kind　to　an　outbreak　of　hostilities　without　a　previous

declaration　of　war。　For　if　there　is　to　be　any　right　at　all　during

the　state　of　war；　something　analogous　to　a　contract　must　be　assumed；

involving　acceptance　on　the　side　of　the　declaration　on　the　other；

and　amounting　to　the　fact　that　they　both　will　to　seek　their　right　in

this　way。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　57。　Right　during　War。



　　The　determination　of　what　constitutes　right　in　war；　is　the　most

difficult　problem　of　the　right　of　nations　and　international　law。　It　is

very　difficult　even　to　form　a　conception　of　such　a　right；　or　to

think　of　any　law　in　this　lawless　state　without　falling　into　a

contradiction。　Inter　arma　silent　leges。*　It　must　then　be　just　the

right　to　carry　on　war　according　to　such　principles　as　render　it　always

still　possible　to　pass　out　of　that　natural　condition　of　the　states

in　their　external　relations　to　each　other；　and　to　enter　into　a

condition　of　right。



　　*＇〃In　the　midst　of　arms　the　laws　are　silent。〃　Cicero。＇



　　No　war　of　independent　states　against　each　other　can　rightly　be　a　war

of　punishment　（bellum　punitivum）。　For　punishment　is　only　in　place

under　the　relation　of　a　superior　（imperantis）　to　a　subject　（subditum）