the science of right-第31部分

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Jus　Cosmopoliticum）

　　　　　　62。　Nature　and　Conditions　of　Cosmopolitical　Right。



　　The　rational　idea　of　a　universal；　peaceful；　if　not　yet　friendly；

union　of　all　the　nations　upon　the　earth　that　may　come　into　active

relations　with　each　other；　is　a　juridical　principle；　as

distinguished　from　philanthropic　or　ethical　principles。　Nature　has

enclosed　them　altogether　within　definite　boundaries；　in　virtue　of

the　spherical　form　of　their　abode　as　a　globus　terraqueus；　and　the

possession　of　the　soil　upon　which　an　inhabitant　of　the　earth　may

live　can　only　be　regarded　as　possession　of　a　part　of　a　limited　whole

and；　consequently；　as　a　part　to　which　every　one　has　originally　a

right。　Hence　all　nations　originally　hold　a　community　of　the　soil；

but　not　a　juridical　community　of　possession　（communio）；　nor

consequently　of　the　use　or　proprietorship　of　the　soil；　but　only　of　a

possible　physical　intercourse　（commercium）　by　means　of　it。　In　other

words；　they　are　placed　in　such　thoroughgoing　relations　of　each　to

all　the　rest　that　they　may　claim　to　enter　into　intercourse　with　one

another；　and　they　have　a　right　to　make　an　attempt　in　this　direction；

while　a　foreign　nation　would　not　be　entitled　to　treat　them　on　this

account　as　enemies。　This　right；　in　so　far　as　it　relates　to　a

possible　union　of　all　nations；　in　respect　of　certain　laws

universally　regulating　their　intercourse　with　each　other；　may　be

called　〃cosmopolitical　right〃　（jus　cosmopoliticum）。

　　It　may　appear　that　seas　put　nations　out　of　all　communion　with　each

other。　But　this　is　not　so；　for　by　means　of　commerce；　seas　form　the

happiest　natural　provision　for　their　intercourse。　And　the　more　there

are　of　neighbouring　coastlands；　as　in　the　case　of　the　Mediterranean

Sea；　this　intercourse　becomes　the　more　animated。　And　hence

communications　with　such　lands；　especially　where　there　are　settlements

upon　them　connected　with　the　mother　countries　giving　occasion　for　such

communications；　bring　it　about　that　evil　and　violence　committed　in　one

place　of　our　globe　are　felt　in　all。　Such　possible　abuse　cannot；

however；　annul　the　right　of　man　as　a　citizen　of　the　world　to　attempt

to　enter　into　communion　with　all　others；　and　for　this　purpose　to　visit

all　the　regions　of　the　earth；　although　this　does　not　constitute　a

right　of　settlement　upon　the　territory　of　another　people　（jus

incolatus）；　for　which　a　special　contract　is　required。

　　But　the　question　is　raised　as　to　whether；　in　the　case　of　newly

discovered　countries；　a　people　may　claim　the　right　to　settle

（accolatus）；　and　to　occupy　possessions　in　the　neighbourhood　of　another

people　that　has　already　settled　in　that　region；　and　to　do　this　without

their　consent。

　　Such　a　right　is　indubitable；　if　the　new　settlement　takes　place　at

such　a　distance　from　the　seat　of　the　former　that　neither　would

restrict　or　injure　the　other　in　the　use　of　their　territory。　But　in　the

case　of　nomadic　peoples；　or　tribes　of　shepherds　and　hunters　（such　as

the　Hottentots；　the　Tungusi；　and　most　of　the　American　Indians）；

whose　support　is　derived　from　wide　desert　tracts；　such　occupation

should　never　take　place　by　force；　but　only　by　contract；　and　any　such

contract　ought　never　to　take　advantage　of　the　ignorance　of　the

original　dwellers　in　regard　to　the　cession　of　their　lands。　Yet　it　is

commonly　alleged　that　such　acts　of　violent　appropriation　may　be

justified　as　subserving　the　general　good　of　the　world。　It　appears　as

if　sufficiently　justifying　grounds　were　furnished　for　them；　partly

by　reference　to　the　civilization　of　barbarous　peoples　（as　by　a　pretext

of　this　kind　even　Busching　tries　to　excuse　the　bloody　introduction

of　the　Christian　religion　into　Germany）；　and　partly　by　founding　upon

the　necessity　of　purging　one's　own　country　from　depraved　criminals；

and　the　hope　of　their　improvement　or　that　of　their　posterity；　in

another　continent　like　New　Holland。　But　all　these　alleged　good

purposes　cannot　wash　out　the　stain　of　injustice　in　the　means

employed　to　attain　them。　It　may　be　objected　that；　had　such

scrupulousness　about　making　a　beginning　in　founding　a　legal　state　with

force　been　always　maintained；　the　whole　earth　would　still　have　been　in

a　state　of　lawlessness。　But　such　an　objection　would　as　little　annul

the　conditions　of　right　in　question　as　the　pretext　of　the　political

revolutionaries　that；　when　a　constitution　has　become　degenerate；　it

belongs　to　the　people　to　transform　it　by　force。　This　would　amount

generally　to　being　unjust　once　and　for　all；　in　order　thereafter　to

found　justice　the　more　surely；　and　to　make　it　flourish。

CONCLUSION

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Conclusion。



　　If　one　cannot　prove　that　a　thing　is；　he　may　try　to　prove　that　it

is　not。　And　if　he　succeeds　in　doing　neither　（as　often　occurs）；　he

may　still　ask　whether　it　is　in　his　interest　to　accept　one　or　other

of　the　alternatives　hypothetically；　from　the　theoretical　or　the

practical　point　of　view。　In　other　words；　a　hypothesis　may　be

accepted　either　in　order　to　explain　a　certain　phenomenon　（as　in

astronomy　to　account　for　the　retrogression　and　stationariness　of　the

planets）；　or　in　order　to　attain　a　certain　end；　which　again　may　be

either　pragmatic；　as　belonging　merely　to　the　sphere　of　art；　or

moral；　as　involving　a　purpose　which　it　is　a　duty　to　adopt　as　a　maxim

of　action。　Now　it　is　evident　that　the　assumption　（suppositio）　of　the

practicability　of　such　an　end；　though　presented　merely　as　a

theoretical　and　problematical　judgement；　may　be　regarded　as

constituting　a　duty；　and　hence　it　is　so　regarded　in　this　case。　For

although　there　may　be　no　positive　obligation　to　believe　in　such　an

end；　yet　even　if　there　were　not　the　least　theoretical　probability　of

action　being　carried　out　in　accordance　with　it；　so　long　as　its

impossibility　cannot　be　demonstrated；　there　still　remains　a　duty

incumbent　upon　us　with　regard　to　it。

　　Now；　as　a　matter　of　fact；　the　morally　practical　reason　utters　within

us　its　irrevocable　veto：　There　shall　be　no　war。　So　there　ought　to　be

no　war；　neither　between　me　and　you　in　the　condition　of　nature；　nor

between　us　as　members　of　states　which；　although　internally　in　a

condition　of　law；　are　still　externally　in　their　relation　to　each　other

in　a　condition　of　lawlessness；　for　this　is　not　the　way　by　which　any

one　should　prosecute　his　right。　Hence　the　question　no　longer　is　as

to　whether　perpetual　peace　is　a　real　thing　or　not　a　real　thing；　or

as　to　whether　we　may　not　be　deceiving　ourselves　when　we　adopt　the

former　alternative；　but　we　must　act　on　the　supposition　of　its　being

real。　We　must　work　for　what　may　perhaps　not　be　realized；　and　establish

that　constitution　which　yet　seems　best　adapted　to　bring　it　about

（mayhap　republicanism　in　all　states；　together　and　separately）。　And

thus　we　may　put　an　end　to　the　evil　of　wars；　which　have　been　the

chief　interest　of　the　internal　arrangements　of　all　the　states

without　exception。　And　although　the　realization　of　this　purpose　may

always　remain　but　a　pious　wish；　yet　we　do　certainly　not　deceive

ourselves　in　adopting　the　maxim　of　action　that　will　guide　us　in

working　incessantly　for　it；　for　it　is　a　duty　to　do　this。　To　suppose

that　the　moral　law　within　us　is　itself　deceptive；　would　be

sufficient　to　excite　the　horrible　wish　rather　to　be　deprived　of　all

reason　than　to　live　under　such　deception；　and　even　to　see　oneself；

according　to　such　principles；　degraded　like　the　lower　animals　to　the

level　of　the　mechanical　play　of　nature。

　　It　may　be　said　that　the　universal　and　lasting　establishment　of　peace

constitutes　not　merely　a　part；　but　the　whole　final　purpose　and　end

of　the　science　of　right　as　viewed　within　the　limits　of　reason。　The

state　of　peace　is　the　only　condition　of　the　mine　and　thine　that　is

secured　and　guaranteed　by　laws　in　the　relationship　of　men　living　in

numbers　contiguous　to　each　other；　and　who　are　thus　combined　in　a

constitution　whose　rule　is　derived　not　from　the　mere　experience　of

those　who　have　found　it　the　best　as　a　normal　guide　for　others；　but

which　must　be　taken　by　the　reason　a　priori　from　the　ideal　of　a

juridical　union　of　men　under　public　laws　generally。　For　all　particular

examples　or　instances；　being　able　only　to　furnish　illustration　but　not

proof；　are　deceptive；　and　at　all　events　require　a　metaphysic　to

establish　them　by　its　necessary　principles。　And　this　is　conceded

indirectly　even　by　those　who　turn　metaphysics　into　ridicule；　when　they

say；　as　they　often　do：　〃The　best　constitution　is　that　in　which　not　men

but　laws　exercise　the　power。〃　For　what　can　be　more　metaphysically

sublime　in　its　own　way　than　this　very　idea　of　theirs；　which

according　to　their　own　assertion　has；　notwithstanding；　the　most

objective　reality？　This　may　be　easily　shown　by　reference　to　actual

instances。　And　it　is　this　very　idea；　which　alone　can　be　carried　out

practically；　if　it　is　not　forced　on　in　a　revolutionary　and　sudden

way　by　violent　overthrow　of　the　existing　defective　constitution；　for

this　would　produce　for　the　time　the　momentary　annihilation　of　the

whole　juridical　state　of　society。　But　if　the　idea　is　carried　forward

by　gradual　reform　and　in　accordance　with　fixed　principles；　it　may　lead

by　a　continuous　approximation　to　the　highest　political　good；　and　to

perpetual　peace。





　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　…THE　END…