the science of right-第6部分

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having　it　as　mine；　must　either　be　to　assert　that　it　is　not　possible　at

all　to　have　anything　external　as　one's　own；　which　is　contrary　to　the

postulate　in　SS　2；　or　to　require；　in　order　that　this　external

possession　may　be　possible；　that　I　shall　be　in　two　places　at　the

same　time。　But　this　amounts　to　saying　that　I　must　be　in　a　place　and

also　not　in　it；　which　is　contradictory　and　absurd。

　　This　position　may　be　applied　to　the　case　in　which　I　have　accepted

a　promise；　for　my　having　and　possession　in　respect　of　what　has　been

promised　become　established　on　the　ground　of　external　right。　This

right　is　not　to　be　annulled　by　the　fact　that　the　promiser　having

said　at　one　time；　〃This　thing　shall　be　yours；〃　again　at　a　subsequent

time　says；　〃My　will　now　is　that　the　thing　shall　not　be　yours。〃　In　such

relations　of　rational　right；　the　conditions　hold　just　the　same　as　if

the　promiser　had；　without　any　interval　of　time　between　them；　made

the　two　declarations　of　his　will；　〃This　shall　be　yours；〃　and　also

〃This　shall　not　be　yours〃；　which　manifestly　contradicts　itself。

　　The　same　thing　holds；　in　like　manner；　of　the　conception　of　the

juridical　possession　of　a　person　as　belonging　to　the　Having　of　a

subject；　whether　it　be　a　wife；　a　child；　or　a　servant。　The　relations　of

right　involved　in　a　household；　and　the　reciprocal　possession　of　all

its　members；　are　not　annulled　by　the　capability　of　separating　from

each　other　in　space；　because　it　is　by　juridical　relations　that　they

are　connected；　and　the　external　mine　and　thine；　as　in　the　former

cases；　rests　entirely　upon　the　assumption　of　the　possibility　of　a

purely　rational　possession；　without　the　accompaniment　of　physical

detention　or　holding　of　the　object。

　　Reason　is　forced　to　a　critique　of　its　juridically　practical　function

in　special　reference　to　the　conception　of　the　external　mine　and　thine；

by　the　antinomy　of　the　propositions　enunciated　regarding　the

possibility　of　such　a　form　of　possession。　For　these　give　rise　to　an

inevitable　dialectic；　in　which　a　thesis　and　an　antithesis　set　up　equal

claims　to　the　validity　of　two　conflicting　conditions。　Reason　is　thus

compelled；　in　its　practical　function　in　relation　to　right…　as　it　was

in　its　theoretical　function…　to　make　a　distinction　between

possession　as　a　phenomenal　appearance　presented　to　the　senses；　and

that　possession　which　is　rational　and　thinkable　only　by　the

understanding。

　　Thesis。…　The　thesis；　in　this　case；　is：　〃It　is　possible　to　have

something　external　as　mine；　although　I　am　not　in　possession　of　it。〃

　　Antithesis。…　The　antithesis　is：　〃It　is　not　possible　to　have　anything

external　as　mine；　if　I　am　not　in　possession　of　it。〃

　　Solution。…　The　solution　is：　〃Both　Propositions　are　true〃；　the　former

when　I　mean　empirical　possession　（possessio　phaenomenon）；　the　latter

when　I　understand　by　the　same　term；　a　purely　rational　possession

（possessio　noumenon）。

　　But　the　possibility　of　a　rational　possession；　and　consequently　of　an

external　mine　and　thine；　cannot　be　comprehended　by　direct　insight；　but

must　be　deduced　from　the　practical　reason。　And　in　this　relation　it

is　specially　noteworthy　that　the　practical　reason　without

intuitional　perceptions；　and　even　without　requiring　such　an　element

a　priori；　can　extend　its　range　by　the　mere　elimination　of　empirical

conditions；　as　justified　by　the　law　of　freedom；　and　can　thus　establish

synthetical　propositions　a　priori。　The　proof　of　this　in　the

practical　connection；　as　will　be　shown　afterwards；　can　be　adduced　in

an　analytical　manner。



　　　　　8。　To　Have　Anything　External　as　One's　Own　is　only　Possible

　　　　　　　　　in　a　Juridical　or　Civil　State　of　Society　under　the

　　　　　　　　　　　　Regulation　of　a　Public　Legislative　Power。



　　If；　by　word　or　deed；　I　declare　my　will　that　some　external　thing

shall　be　mine；　I　make　a　declaration　that　every　other　person　is　obliged

to　abstain　from　the　use　of　this　object　of　my　exercise　of　will；　and

this　imposes　an　obligation　which　no　one　would　be　under；　without　such　a

juridical　act　on　my　part。　But　the　assumption　of　this　act　at　the　same

time　involves　the　admission　that　I　am　obliged　reciprocally　to

observe　a　similar　abstention　towards　every　other　in　respect　of　what　is

externally　theirs；　for　the　obligation　in　question　arises　from　a

universal　rule　regulating　the　external　juridical　relations。　Hence　I　am

not　obliged　to　let　alone　what　another　person　declares　to　be　externally

his；　unless　every　other　person　likewise　secures　me　by　a　guarantee　that

he　will　act　in　relation　to　what　is　mine；　upon　the　same　principle。　This

guarantee　of　reciprocal　and　mutual　abstention　from　what　belongs　to

others　does　not　require　a　special　juridical　act　for　its　establishment；

but　is　already　involved　in　the　conception　of　an　external　obligation　of

right；　on　account　of　the　universality　and　consequently　the　reciprocity

of　the　obligatoriness　arising　from　a　universal　Rule。　Now　a　single

will；　in　relation　to　an　external　and　consequently　contingent

possession；　cannot　serve　as　a　compulsory　law　for　all；　because　that

would　be　to　do　violence　to　the　freedom　which　is　in　accordance　with

universal　laws。　Therefore　it　is　only　a　will　that　binds　every　one；

and　as　such　a　common；　collective；　and　authoritative　will；　that　can

furnish　a　guarantee　of　security　to　all。　But　the　state　of　men　under　a

universal；　external；　and　public　legislation；　conjoined　with

authority　and　power；　is　called　the　civil　state。　There　can　therefore　be

an　external　mine　and　thine　only　in　the　civil　state　of　society。

　　Consequence。…　It　follows；　as　a　corollary；　that；　if　it　is　juridically

possible　to　have　an　external　object　as　one's　own；　the　individual

subject　of　possession　must　be　allowed　to　compel　or　constrain　every

person　with　whom　a　dispute　as　to　the　mine　or　thine　of　such　a

possession　may　arise；　to　enter　along　with　himself　into　the　relations

of　a　civil　constitution。



　　　　9。　There　May；　However；　Be　an　External　Mine　and　Thine　Found　as

　　　　　　a　Fact　in　the　State　of　Nature；　but　it　is　only　Provisory。



　　Natural　right　in　the　state　of　a　civil　constitution　means　the　forms

of　right　which　may　be　deduced　from　principles　a　priori　as　the

conditions　of　such　a　constitution。　It　is　therefore　not　to　be　infringed

by　the　statutory　laws　of　such　a　constitution；　and　accordingly　the

juridical　principle　remains　in　force；　that；　〃Whoever　proceeds　upon　a

maxim　by　which　it　becomes　impossible　for　me　to　have　an　object　of　the

exercise　of　my　will　as　mine；　does　me　a　lesion　or　injury。〃　For　a

civil　constitution　is　only　the　juridical　condition　under　which　every

one　has　what　is　his　own　merely　secured　to　him；　as　distinguished　from

its　being　specially　assigned　and　determined　to　him。　All　guarantee；

therefore；　assumes　that　everyone　to　whom　a　thing　is　secured　is　already

in　possession　of　it　as　his　own。　Hence；　prior　to　the　civil

constitution…　or　apart　from　it…　an　external　mine　and　thine　must　be

assumed　as　possible；　and　along　with　it　a　right　to　compel　everyone　with

whom　we　could　come　into　any　kind　of　intercourse　to　enter　with　us

into　a　constitution　in　which　what　is　mine　or　thine　can　be　secured。

There　may　thus　be　a　possession　in　expectation　or　in　preparation　for

such　a　state　of　security；　as　can　only　be　established　on　the　law　of　the

common　will；　and　as　it　is　therefore　in　accordance　with　the　possibility

of　such　a　state；　it　constitutes　a　provisory　or　temporary　juridical

possession；　whereas　that　possession　which　is　found　in　reality　in　the

civil　state　of　society　will　be　a　peremptory　or　guaranteed

possession。　Prior　to　entering　into　this　state；　for　which　he　is

naturally　prepared；　the　individual　rightfully　resists　those　who　will

not　adapt　themselves　to　it；　and　who　would　disturb　him　in　his　provisory

possession；　because；　if　the　will　of　all　except　himself　were　imposing

upon　him　an　obligation　to　withdraw　from　a　certain　possession；　it　would

still　be　only　a　one…sided　or　unilateral　will；　and　consequently　it

would　have　just　as　little　legal　title…　which　can　be　properly　based

only　on　the　universalized　will…　to　contest　a　claim　of　right　as　he

would　have　to　assert　it。　Yet　be　has　the　advantage　on　his　side；　of

being　in　accord　with　the　conditions　requisite　to　the　introduction

and　institution　of　a　civil　form　of　society。　In　a　word；　the　mode　in

which　anything　external　may　be　held　as　one's　own　in　the　state　of

nature；　is　just　physical　possession　with　a　presumption　of　right　thus

far　in　its　favour；　that　by　union　of　the　wills　of　all　in　a　public

legislation　it　will　be　made　juridical；　and　in　this　expectation　it

holds　comparatively；　as　a　kind　of　potential　juridical　possession。

　　This　prerogative　of　right；　as　arising　from　the　fact　of　empirical

possession；　is　in　accordance　with　the　formula：　〃It　is　well　for　those

who　are　in　possession〃　（Beati　possidentes）。　It　does　not　consist　in　the

fact　that；　because　the　possessor　has　the　presumption　of　being　a

rightful　man；　it　is　unnecessary　for　him　to　bring　forward　proof　that　he

possesses　a　certain　thing　rightfully；　for　this　position　applies　only

to　a　case　of　disputed　right。　But　it　is　because　it　accords　with　the

postulate　of　the　practical　reason；　that　everyone　is　invested　with

the　faculty　of　having　as　his　own　any　external　object　upon　which　he　has

exerted　his　will；　and；　consequently；　all　actual　possession　is　a

state　whose　rightfulness　is　established　upon　that　postulate　by　an

anterior　act　of　will。　And　such　an　act；　if　there　be　no　prior　possession

of　the　same　object　by　another　opposed　to　it；　does；　therefore；

provisionally　justify　and　entitle　me；　according　to　the　law　of　external

freedom；　to　restrain　anyone　who　refuses　to　enter　with　me　into　a

state　of　public　legal　freedom　from　all　pretension　to　the　use　of　such

an　object。　For　such　a　procedure　is　requisite；　in　conformity　with　the

postulate　of　reason；　in　order　to　subject　to　my　proper　use　a　thing

which　would　otherwise　be　practically　annihilated；　as　regards　all

proper　use　of　it。

CH2

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART。　PRIVATE　RIGHT。

　　The　System　of　those　Laws　Which　Require　No　External　Pro