the memorabilia-第30部分

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Yes　（replied　he）；　that　is　the　excellence　I　desirebeyond　measure。

Upon　my　word　（said　Socrates）；　then　you　have　indeed　selected　as　the
object　of　your　ambition　the　noblest　of　virtues　and　the　greatest　of　the
arts；　for　this　is　the　property　of　kings；　and　is　entitled　〃royal〃；　but
（he　continued）　have　you　considered　whether　it　is　possible　to　excel　in
these　matters　without　being　just　and　upright？＇25＇

＇25＇　Just；　｛dikaios｝　=　upright；　righteous。　Justice；　｛dikaiosune｝　=
　　　　social　uprightness　=　righteousness；　N。T。　To　quote　a　friend：　〃The
　　　　Greek　｛dikaios｝　combines　the　active　dealing　out　of　justice　with
　　　　the　self…reflective　idea　of　preserving　justice　in　our　conduct；
　　　　which　is　what　we　mean　by　'upright。'〃

Euth。　Certainly　I　have；　and　I　say　that　without　justice　and　uprightness
it　is　impossible　to　be　a　good　citizen。

No　doubt　（replied　Socrates）　you　have　accomplished　that　initial　step？

Euth。　Well；　Socrates；　I　think　I　could　hold　my　own　against　all　comers
as　an　upright　man。

And　have　upright　men　（continued　Socrates）　their　distinctive　and
appropriate　works　like　those　of　carpenters　or　shoe…makers？

Euth。　To　be　sure　they　have。

Soc。　And　just　as　the　carpenter　is　able　to　exhibit　his　works　and
products；　the　righteous　man　should　be　able　to　expound　and　set　forth
his；　should　he　not？

I　see　（replied　Euthydemus）　you　are　afraid　I　cannot　expound　the　works
of　righteousness！　Why；　bless　me！　of　course　I　can；　and　the　works　of
unrighteousness　into　the　bargain；　since　there　are　not　a　few　of　that
sort　within　reach　of　eye　and　ear　every　day。

Shall　we　then　（proceeded　Socrates）　write　the　letter　R　on　this
side；＇26＇　and　on　that　side　the　letter　W；　and　then　anything　that
appears　to　us　to　be　the　product　of　righteousness　we　will　place　to　the
R　account；　and　anything　which　appears　to　be　the　product　of　wrong…doing
and　iniquity　to　the　account　of　W？

＇26＇　The　letter　R　（to　stand　for　Right；　Righteous；　Upright；　Just）。　The
　　　　letter　W　（to　stand　for　Wrong；　Unrighteous；　Unjust）。

By　all　means　do　so　（he　answered）；　if　you　think　that　it　assists
matters。

Accordingly　Socrates　drew　the　letters；　as　he　had　suggested；　and
continued。

Soc。　Lying　exists　among　men；　does　it　not？

Euth。　Certainly。

To　which　side　of　the　account　then　shall　we　place　it？　（he　asked）。

Euth。　Clearly　on　the　side　of　wrong　and　injustice。

Soc。　Deceit　too　is　not　uncommon？

Euth。　By　no　means。

Soc。　To　which　side　shall　we　place　deceit？

Euth。　Deceit　clearly　on　the　side　of　wrong。

Soc。　Well；　and　chicanery＇27＇　or　mischief　of　any　sort？

＇27＇　Reading　｛to　kakourgein｝　（=　furari；　Sturz）；　al。　｛kleptein｝；　Stob。

Euth。　That　too。

Soc。　And　the　enslavement　of　free…born　men？＇28＇

＇28＇　Or；　〃the　kidnapping　of　men　into　slavery。〃　｛to　andrapodizesthai｝　=
　　　　the　reduction　of　a　free…born　man　to　a　state　of　slavery。　Slavery
　　　　itself　（｛douleia｝）　being　regarded　as　the　normal　condition　of　a
　　　　certain　portion　of　the　human　race　and　not　in　itself　immoral。

Euth。　That　too。

Soc。　And　we　cannot　allow　any　of　these　to　lie　on　the　R　side　of　the
account；　to　the　side　of　right　and　justice；　can　we；　Euthydemus？

It　would　be　monstrous　（he　replied）。

Soc。　Very　good。　But　supposing　a　man　to　be　elected　general；　and　he
succeeds　in　enslaving　an　unjust；　wicked；　and　hostile　state；　are　we　to
say　that　he　is　doing　wrong？

Euth。　By　no　means。

Soc。　Shall　we　not　admit　that　he　is　doing　what　is　right？

Euth。　Certainly。

Soc。　Again；　suppose　he　deceives　the　foe　while　at　war　with　them？

Euth。　That　would　be　all　fair　and　right　also。

Soc。　Or　steals　and　pillages　their　property？　would　he　not　be　doing　what
is　right？

Euth。　Certainly；　when　you　began　I　thought　you　were　limiting　the
question　to　the　case　of　friends。

Soc。　So　then　everything　which　we　set　down　on　the　side　of　Wrong　will
now　have　to　be　placed　to　the　credit　of　Right？

Euth。　Apparently。

Soc。　Very　well　then；　let　us　so　place　them；　and　please；　let　us　make　a
new　definitionthat　while　it　is　right　to　do　such　things　to　a　foe；　it
is　wrong　to　do　them　to　a　friend；　but　in　dealing　with　the　latter　it
behoves　us　to　be　as　straightforward　as　possible。＇29＇

＇29＇　Or；　〃an　absolutely　straightforward　course　is　necessary。〃

I　quite　assent　（replied　Euthydemus）。

So　far　so　good　（remarked　Socrates）；　but　if　a　general；　seeing　his
troops　demoralised；　were　to　invent　a　tale　to　the　effect　that
reinforcements　were　coming；　and　by　means　of　this　false　statement
should　revive　the　courage　of　his　men；　to　which　of　the　two　accounts
shall　we　place　that　act　of　fraud？＇30＇

＇30＇　Cf。　〃Hell。〃　IV。　iii。　10；　〃Cyrop。〃　I。　vi。　31。

On　the　side　of　right；　to　my　notion　（he　replied）。

Soc。　Or　again；　if　a　man　chanced　to　have　a　son　ill　and　in　need　of
medicine；　which　the　child　refused　to　take；　and　supposing　the　father　by
an　act　of　deceit　to　administer　it　under　the　guise　of　something　nice　to
eat；　and　by　service　of　that　lie　to　restore　the　boy　to　health；　to　which
account　shall　we　set　down　this　fraud？

Euth。　In　my　judgment　it　too　should　be　placed　to　the　same　account。

Soc。　Well；　supposing　you　have　a　friend　in　deplorably　low　spirits；　and
you　are　afraid　he　will　make　away　with　himselfaccordingly　you　rob　him
of　his　knife　or　other　such　instrument：　to　which　side　ought　we　to　set
the　theft？

Euth。　That　too　must　surely　be　placed　to　the　score　of　right　behaviour。

Soc。　I　understand　you　to　say　that　a　straightforward　course　is　not　in
every　case　to　be　pursued　even　in　dealing　with　friends？

Heaven　forbid！　（the　youth　exclaimed）。　If　you　will　allow　me；　I　rescind
my　former　statement。＇31＇

＇31＇　See　above；　I。　ii。　44　（｛anatithemai｝）。

Soc。　Allow　you！　Of　course　you　mayanything　rather　than　make　a　false
entry　on　our　lists。　。　。　。　But　there　is　just　another　point　we　ought　not
to　leave　uninvestigated。　Let　us　take　the　case　of　deceiving　a　friend　to
his　detriment：　which　is　the　more　wrongfulto　do　so　voluntarily　or
unintentionally？

Euth。　Really；　Socrates；　I　have　ceased　to　believe　in　my　own　answers；
for　all　my　former　admissions　and　conceptions　seem　to　me　other　than　I
first　supposed　them。＇32＇　Still；　if　I　may　hazard　one　more　opinion；　the
intentional　deceiver；　I　should　say；　is　worse　than　the　involuntary。

＇32＇　Or；　〃all　my　original　positions　seem　to　me　now　other　than　I　first
　　　　conceived　them〃；　or；　〃everything　I　first　asserted　seems　now　to　be
　　　　twisted　topsy…turvy。〃

Soc。　And　is　it　your　opinion　that　there　is　a　lore　and　science　of　Right
and　Justice　just　as　there　is　of　letters　and　grammar？＇33＇

＇33＇　｛mathesis　kai　episteme　tou　dikaiou｝a　doctrine　and　a　knowledge
　　　　of　the　Just。

Euth。　That　is　my　opinion。

Soc。　And　which　should　you　say　was　more　a　man　of　letters＇34＇he　who
intentionally　misspells　or　misreads；　or　he　who　does　so　unconsciously？

＇34＇　Or；　〃more　grammatical〃；　〃the　better　grammarian。〃

Euth。　He　who　does　so　intentionally；　I　should　say；　because　he　can　spell
or　read　correctly　whenever　he　chooses。

Soc。　Then　the　voluntary　misspeller　may　be　a　lettered　person；　but　the
involuntary　offender　is　an　illiterate？＇35＇

＇35＇　Or；　〃In　fact；　he　who　sins　against　the　lore　of　grammer
　　　　intentionally　may　be　a　good　grammarian　and　a　man　of　letters；　but
　　　　he　who　does　so　involuntarily　is　illiterate　and　a　bad　grammarian？〃

Euth。　True；　he　must　be。　I　do　not　see　how　to　escape　from　that
conclusion。

Soc。　And　which　of　the　two　knows　what　is　righthe　who　intentionally
lies　and　deceives；　or　he　who　lies　and　deceives　unconsciously？＇36＇

＇36＇　Or；　Soc。　And　does　he　who　lies　and　deceives　with　intent　know　what
　　　　is　right　rather　than　he　who　does　either　or　both　unconsciously？

　　　　Euth。　Clearly　he　does。

Euth。　The　intentional　and　conscious　liar　clearly。

Soc。　Well　then；　your　statement　is　this：　on　the　one　hand；　the　man　who
has　the　knowledge　of　letters　is　more　lettered　than　he　who　has　no　such
knowledge？＇37＇

＇37＇　　Or；　Soc。　It　is　a　fair　inference；　is　it　not；　that　he　who　has　the
　　　　｛episteme｝　of　grammar　is　more　grammatical　than　he　who　has　no　such
　　　　｛episteme｝？

　　　　Euth。　Yes。

　　　　Soc。　And　he　who　has　the　｛episteme｝　of　things　rightful　is　more
　　　　righteous　than　he　who　lacks　the　｛episteme｝？　See　Plat。　〃Hipp。
　　　　min。〃；　Arist。　〃Eth。　Eud。〃　VI。　v。　7。

Euth。　Yes。

Soc。　And；　on　the　other；　he　who　has　the　knowledge　of　what　is　right　is
more　righteous　than　he　who　lacks　that　knowledge？

Euth。　I　suppose　it　is；　but　for　the　life　of　me　I　cannot　make　head　or
tail　of　my　own　admission。＇38＇

＇38＇　Lit。　〃Apparently；　but　I　appear　to　myself　to　be　saying　this　also；
　　　　heaven　knows　how。〃　See　Jowett；　〃Plato；〃　ii。　p。　416　（ed。　2）。

Soc。　Well　（look　at　it　like　this）。　Suppose　a　man　to　be　anxious　to　speak
the　truth；　but　he　is　never　able　to　hold　the　same　language　about　a
thing　for　two　minutes　together。　First　he　says：　〃The　road　is　towards
the　east；〃　and　then　he　says；　〃No；　it's　towards　the　west〃；　or；　running
up　a　column　of　figures；　now　he　makes　the　product　this；　and　again　he
makes　it　that；　now　more；　now　lesswhat　do　you　think　of　such　a　man？

Euth。　Heaven　help　us！　clearly　he　does　not　know　what　he　thought　he
knew。

Soc。　And　you　know　the　appellation　given　to　certain　people
〃slavish；〃＇39＇　or；　〃little　better　than　a　slave？〃

＇39＇　｛andropododeis｝；　which　has　the　connotation　of　mental　dulness；　and
　　　　a　low　order　of　intellect；　cf。　〃boorish；'　〃rustic；〃　〃loutish；〃
　　　　（〃pariah；〃　conceivably）。　〃Slavish；〃　〃servile；〃　with　us　connote
　　　　moral　rather　than　intellectual　deficiency；　I　suppose。　Hence　it　is
　　　　impossible　to　preserve　the　humour　of　the　Socratic　argument。　See
　　　　Newman；　op。　cit。　i。　107。

Euth。　I　do。

Soc。　Is　it　a　term　suggestive　of　the　wisdom　or　the　ignorance　of　those
to　whom　it　is　applied？

Euth。　Clearly　of　their　ignorance。

Soc。　Ignorance；　for　instance；　of　smithying？

Euth。　No；　certainly　not。

Soc。　Then　possibly　ignorance　of　carpentering？

Euth。　No；　nor　yet　ignorance　of　carpentering。

Soc。　Well；　ignorance　of　shoemaking？

Euth。　No；　nor　ignorance　of　any　of　these：　rather　the　reverse；　for　the
majority　of　those　who　do　know　just　these　matters　are　〃little　better
than　slaves。〃

Soc。　You　mean　it　is　a　title　particularly　to　those　who　are　ignorant　of
the　beautiful；　the　good；　the　just？＇40＇

＇40＇　Cf。　Goethe's　〃Im　Ganzen　Guten　Schonen　resolut　zu　leben。〃

It　is；　in　my　opinion　（he　replied）。

Soc。　Then　we　must　in　every　way　strain　every　nerve　to　avoi