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the　country。　What　is　called　bank　money　is　always　of　more　value

than　the　same　nominal　sum　of　common　currency。　A　thousand　guilders

in　the　Bank　of　Amsterdam；　for　example；　are　of　more　value　than　a

thousand　guilders　of　Amsterdam　currency。　The　difference　between

them　is　called　the　agio　of　the　bank；　which；　at　Amsterdam；　is

generally　about　five　per　cent。　Supposing　the　current　money　of　the

two　countries　equally　near　to　the　standard　of　their　respective

mints；　and　that　the　one　pays　foreign　bills　in　this　common

currency；　while　the　other　pays　them　in　bank　money；　it　is　evident

that　the　computed　exchange　may　be　in　favour　of　that　which　pays　in

bank　money；　though　the　real　exchange　should　be　in　favour　of　that

which　pays　in　current　money；　for　the　same　reason　that　the

computed　exchange　may　be　in　favour　of　that　which　pays　in　better

money；　or　in　money　nearer　to　its　own　standard；　though　the　real

exchange　should　be　in　favour　of　that　which　pays　in　worse。　The

computed　exchange；　before　the　late　reformation　of　the　gold　coin；

was　generally　against　London　with　Amsterdam；　Hamburg；　Venice；

and；　I　believe；　with　all　other　places　which　pay　in　what　is　called

bank　money。　It　will　by　no　means　follow；　however；　that　the　real

exchange　was　against　it。　Since　the　reformation　of　the　gold　coin；

it　has　been　in　favour　of　London　even　with　those　places。　The

computed　exchange　has　generally　been　in　favour　of　London　with

Lisbon；　Antwerp；　Leghorn；　and；　if　you　except　France；　I　believe；

with　most　other　parts　of　Europe　that　pay　in　common　currency；　and

it　is　not　improbable　that　the　real　exchange　was　so　too。　　　

DIGRESSION　CONCERNING　BANKS　OF　DEPOSIT；　PARTICULARLY　CONCERNING

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　THAT　OF　AMSTERDAM　

　　　　　The　currency　of　a　great　state；　such　as　France　or　England；

generally　consists　almost　entirely　of　its　own　coin。　Should　this

currency；　therefore；　be　at　any　time　worn；　clipt；　or　otherwise

degraded　below　its　standard　value；　the　state　by　a　reformation　of

its　coin　can　effectually　re…establish　its　currency。　But　the

currency　of　a　small　state；　such　as　Genoa　or　Hamburg；　can　seldom

consist　altogether　in　its　own　coin；　but　must　be　made　up；　in　a

great　measure；　of　the　coins　of　all　the　neighbouring　states　with

which　its　inhabitants　have　a　continual　intercourse。　Such　a　state；

therefore；　by　reforming　its　coin；　will　not　always　be　able　to

reform　its　currency。　If　foreign　bills　of　exchange　are　paid　in

this　currency；　the　uncertain　value　of　any　sum；　of　what　is　in　its

own　nature　so　uncertain；　must　render　the　exchange　always　very

much　against　such　a　state；　its　currency　being；　in　all　foreign

states；　necessarily　valued　even　below　what　it　is　worth。

　　　　　In　order　to　remedy　the　inconvenience　to　which　this

disadvantageous　exchange　must　have　subjected　their　merchants；

such　small　states；　when　they　began　to　attend　to　the　interest　of

trade；　have　frequently　enacted；　that　foreign　bills　of　exchange　of

a　certain　value　should　be　paid　not　in　common　currency；　but　by　an

order　upon；　or　by　a　transfer　in　the　books　of　a　certain　bank；

established　upon　the　credit；　and　under　the　protection　of　the

state；　this　bank　being　always　obliged　to　pay；　in　good　and　true

money；　exactly　according　to　the　standard　of　the　state。　The　banks

of　Venice；　Genoa；　Amsterdam；　Hamburg；　and　Nuremberg；　seem　to　have

been　all　originally　established　with　this　view；　though　some　of

them　may　have　afterwards　been　made　subservient　to　other　purposes。

The　money　of　such　banks　being　better　than　the　common　currency　of

the　country；　necessarily　bore　an　agio；　which　was　greater　or

smaller　according　as　the　currency　was　supposed　to　be　more　or　less

degraded　below　the　standard　of　the　state。　The　agio　of　the　Bank　of

Hamburg；　for　example；　which　is　said　to　be　commonly　about　fourteen

per　cent　is　the　supposed　difference　between　the　good　standard

money　of　the　state；　and　the　clipt；　worn；　and　diminished　currency

poured　into　it　from　all　the　neighbouring　states。

　　　　　Before　1609　the　great　quantity　of　clipt　and　worn　foreign

coin；　which　the　extensive　trade　of　Amsterdam　brought　from　all

parts　of　Europe；　reduced　the　value　of　its　currency　about　nine　per

cent　below　that　of　good　money　fresh　from　the　mint。　Such　money　no

sooner　appeared　than　it　was　melted　down　or　carried　away；　as　it

always　is　in　such　circumstances。　The　merchants；　with　plenty　of

currency；　could　not　always　find　a　sufficient　quantity　of　good

money　to　pay　their　bills　of　exchange；　and　the　value　of　those

bills；　in　spite　of　several　regulations　which　were　made　to　prevent

it；　became　in　a　great　measure　uncertain。

　　　　　In　order　to　remedy　these　inconveniences；　a　bank　was

established　in　1609　under　the　guarantee　of　the　city。　This　bank

received　both　foreign　coin；　and　the　light　and　worn　coin　of　the

country　at　its　real　intrinsic　value　in　the　good　standard　money　of

the　country；　deducting　only　so　much　as　was　necessary　for

defraying　the　expense　of　coinage；　and　the　other　necessary　expense

of　management。　For　the　value　which　remained；　after　this　small

deduction　was　made；　it　gave　a　credit　in　its　books。　This　credit

was　called　bank　money；　which；　as　it　represented　money　exactly

according　to　the　standard　of　the　mint；　was　always　of　the　same

real　value；　and　intrinsically　worth　more　than　current　money。　It

was　at　the　same　time　enacted；　that　all　bills　drawn　upon　or

negotiated　at　Amsterdam　of　the　value　of　six　hundred　guilders　and

upwards　should　be　paid　in　bank　money；　which　at　once　took　away　all

uncertainty　in　the　value　of　those　bills。　Every　merchant；　in

consequence　of　this　regulation；　was　obliged　to　keep　an　account

with　the　bank　in　order　to　pay　his　foreign　bills　of　exchange；

which　necessarily　occasioned　a　certain　demand　for　bank　money。

　　　　　Bank　money；　over　and　above　its　intrinsic　superiority　to

currency；　and　the　additional　value　which　this　demand　necessarily

gives　it；　has　likewise　some　other　advantages。　It　is　secure　from

fire；　robbery；　and　other　accidents；　the　city　of　Amsterdam　is

bound　for　it；　it　can　be　paid　away　by　a　simple　transfer；　without

the　trouble　of　counting；　or　the　risk　of　transporting　it　from　one

place　to　another。　In　consequence　of　those　different　advantages；

it　seems　from　the　beginning　to　have　borne　agio；　and　it　is

generally　believed　that　all　the　money　originally　deposited　in　the

bank　was　allowed　to　remain　there；　nobody　caring　to　demand　payment

of　a　debt　which　he　could　sell　for　a　premium　in　the　market。　By

demanding　payment　of　the　bank；　the　owner　of　a　bank　credit　would

lose　this　premium。　As　a　shilling　fresh　from　the　mint　will　buy　no

more　goods　in　the　market　than　one　of　our　common　worn　shillings；

so　the　good　and　true　money　which　might　be　brought　from　the

coffers　of　the　bank　into　those　of　a　private　person；　being　mixed

and　confounded　with　the　common　currency　of　the　country；　would　be

of　no　more　value　than　that　currency　from　which　it　could　no　longer

be　readily　distinguished。　While　it　remained　in　the　coffers　of　the

bank；　its　superiority　was　known　and　ascertained。　When　it　had　come

into　those　of　a　private　person；　its　superiority　could　not　well　be

ascertained　without　more　trouble　than　perhaps　the　difference　was

worth。　By　being　brought　from　the　coffers　of　the　bank；　besides；　it

lost　all　the　other　advantages　of　bank　money；　its　security；　its

easy　and　safe　transferability；　its　use　in　paying　foreign　bills　of

exchange。　Over　and　above　all　this；　it　could　not　be　brought　from

those　coffers；　as　it　will　appear　by　and　by；　without　previously

paying　for　the　keeping。

　　　　　Those　deposits　of　coin；　or　those　deposits　which　the　bank　was

bound　to　restore　in　coin；　constituted　the　original　capital　of　the

bank；　or　the　whole　value　of　what　was　represented　by　what　is

called　bank　money。　At　present　they　are　supposed　to　constitute　but

a　very　small　part　of　it。　In　order　to　facilitate　the　trade　in

bullion；　the　bank　has　been　for　these　many　years　in　the　practice

of　giving　credit　in　its　books　upon　deposits　of　gold　and　silver

bullion。　This　credit　is　generally　about　five　per　cent　below　the

mint　price　of　such　bullion。　The　bank　grants　at　the　same　time　what

is　called　a　recipe　or　receipt；　entitling　the　person　who　makes　the

deposit；　or　the　bearer；　to　take　out　the　bullion　again　at　any　time

within　six　months；　upon　re…transferring　to　the　bank　a　quantity　of

bank　money　equal　to　that　for　which　credit　had　been　given　in　its

books　when　the　deposit　was　made；　and　upon　paying　one…fourth　per

cent　for　the　keeping；　if　the　deposit　was　in　silver；　and　one…half

per　cent　if　it　was　in　gold；　but　at　the　same　time　declaring　that；

in　default　of　such　payment；　and　upon　the　expiration　of　this　term；

the　deposit　should　belong　to　the　bank　at　the　price　at　which　it

had　been　received；　or　for　which　credit　had　been　given　in　the

transfer　books。　What　is　thus　paid　for　the　keeping　of　the　deposit

may　be　considered　as　a　sort　of　warehouse　rent；　and　why　this

warehouse　rent　should　be　so　much　dearer　for　gold　than　for　silver；

several　different　reasons　have　been　assigned。　The　fineness　of

gold；　it　has　been　said；　is　more　difficult　to　be　ascertained　than

that　of　silver。　Frauds　are　more　easily　practised；　and　occasion　a

greater　loss　in　the　more　precious　metal。　Silver；　besides；　being

the　standard　metal；　the　state；　it　has　been　said；　wishes　to

encourage　more　the　making　of　deposits　of　silver　than　those　of

gold。

　　　　　Deposits　of　bullion　are　most　commonly　made　when　the　price　is

somewhat　lower　than　ordinary；　and　they　are　taken　out　again　when

it　happens　to　rise。　In　Holland　the　market　price　of　bullion　is

generally　above　the　mint　price；　for　the　same　reason　that　it　was

so　in　England　before　the　late　reformation　of　the　gold　coin。　The

difference　is　said　to　be　commonly　from　about　six　to　sixteen

stivers　upon　the　mark；　or　eight　ounces　of　silver　of　eleven　parts

fine　and　one　part　alloy。　The　bank　price；　or　the　credit　which　the

bank　gives　for　deposits　of　such　silver　（when　made　in　foreign

coin；　of　which　the　fineness　is　well　known　and　ascertained；　such

as　Mexico　dollars）；　is　twenty…two　guilders　the　mark；　the　mint

price　is　about　twenty…three　guilders；　and　the　market　price　is

from　twenty…three　guilders　six　to　twenty…three　guilders　sixteen

stivers；　or　from　two　to　three　per　cen