the+critique+of+practical+reason-第15部分

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freedom；　and　consequently　belong　to　the　conduct　of　beings　in　and
consequently　the　consequently　belong　to　the　beings　in　the　world　of
intelligence；　yet　on　the　other　side　as　events　in　the　world　of　sense
they　belong　to　phenomena；　hence　the　determinations　of　a　practical
reason　are　only　possible　in　reference　to　the　latter　and；　therefore；　in
accordance　with　the　categories　of　the　understanding；　not　indeed　with　a
view　to　any　theoretic　employment　of　it；　i。e。；　so　as　to　bring　the
manifold　of　（sensible）　intuition　under　one　consciousness　a　priori；　but
only　to　subject　the　manifold　of　desires　to　the　unity　of
consciousness　of　a　practical　reason；　giving　it　mands　in　the　moral
law；　i。e。；　to　a　pure　will　a　priori。
　　These　categories　of　freedom…　for　so　we　choose　to　call　them　in
contrast　to　those　theoretic　categories　which　are　categories　of
physical　nature…　have　an　obvious　advantage　over　the　latter；　inasmuch
as　the　latter　are　only　forms　of　thought　which　designate　objects　in
an　indefinite　manner　by　means　of　universal　concept　of　every　possible
intuition；　the　former；　on　the　contrary；　refer　to　the　determination
of　a　free　elective　will　（to　which　indeed　no　exactly　corresponding
intuition　can　be　assigned；　but　which　has　as　its　foundation　a　pure
practical　a　priori　law；　which　is　not　the　case　with　any　concepts
belonging　to　the　theoretic　use　of　our　cognitive　faculties）；　hence；
instead　of　the　form　of　intuition　（space　and　time）；　which　does　not
lie　in　reason　itself；　but　has　to　be　drawn　from　another　source；　namely；
the　sensibility；　these　being　elementary　practical　concepts　have　as
their　foundation　the　form　of　a　pure　will；　which　is　given　in　reason
and；　therefore；　in　the　thinking　faculty　itself。　From　this　it　happens
that　as　all　precepts　of　pure　practical　reason　have　to　do　only　with　the
determination　of　the　will；　not　with　the　physical　conditions　（of
practical　ability）　of　the　execution　of　one's　purpose；　the　practical
a　priori　principles　in　relation　to　the　supreme　principle　of　freedom
are　at　once　cognitions；　and　have　not　to　wait　for　intuitions　in　order
to　acquire　significance；　and　that　for　this　remarkable　reason；
because　they　themselves　produce　the　reality　of　that　to　which　they
refer　（the　intention　of　the　will）；　which　is　not　the　case　with
theoretical　concepts。　Only　we　must　be　careful　to　observe　that　these
categories　only　apply　to　the　practical　reason；　and　thus　they　proceed
in　order　from　those　which　are　as　yet　subject　to　sensible　conditions
and　morally　indeterminate　to　those　which　are　free　from　sensible
conditions　and　determined　merely　by　the　moral　law。

　　Table　of　the　Categories　of　Freedom　relatively　to　the　Notions　of　Good
and　Evil。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。　QUANTITY。
　　　Subjective；　according　to　maxims　（practical　opinions　of　the
　　　　　individual）
　　　Objective；　according　to　principles　（Precepts）
　　　A　priori　both　objective　and　subjective　principles　of　freedom
　　　　　（laws）

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II。　QUALITY。
　　　Practical　rules　of　action　（praeceptivae）
　　　Practical　rules　of　omission　（prohibitivae）
　　　Practical　rules　of　exceptions　（exceptivae）

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　III。　RELATION。
　　　To　personality　To　the　condition　of　the　person。
　　　Reciprocal；　of　one　person　to　the　others　of　the　others。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　IV。　MODALITY。
　　　The　Permitted　and　the　Forbidden
　　　Duty　and　the　contrary　to　duty。
　　　Perfect　and　imperfect　duty。

　　It　will　at　once　be　observed　that　in　this　table　freedom　is　considered
as　a　sort　of　causality　not　subject　to　empirical　principles　of
determination；　in　regard　to　actions　possible　by　it；　which　are
phenomena　in　the　world　of　sense；　and　that　consequently　it　is
referred　to　the　categories　which　concern　its　physical　possibility；
whilst　yet　each　category　is　taken　so　universally　that　the
determining　principle　of　that　causality　can　be　placed　outside　the
world　of　sense　in　freedom　as　a　property　of　a　being　in　the　world　of
intelligence；　and　finally　the　categories　of　modality　introduce　the
transition　from　practical　principles　generally　to　those　of　morality；
but　only　problematically。　These　can　be　established　dogmatically　only
by　the　moral　law。
　　I　add　nothing　further　here　in　explanation　of　the　present　table；
since　it　is　intelligible　enough　of　itself。　A　division　of　this　kind
based　on　principles　is　very　useful　in　any　science；　both　for　the　sake
of　thoroughness　and　intelligibility。　Thus；　for　instance；　we　know
from　the　preceding　table　and　its　first　number　what　we　must　begin
from　in　practical　inquiries；　namely；　from　the　maxims　which　every　one
founds　on　his　own　inclinations；　the　precepts　which　hold　for　a
species　of　rational　beings　so　far　as　they　agree　in　certain
inclinations；　and　finally　the　law　which　holds　for　all　without　regard
to　their　inclinations；　etc。　In　this　way　we　survey　the　whole　plan　of
what　has　to　be　done；　every　question　of　practical　philosophy　that　has
to　be　answered；　and　also　the　order　that　is　to　be　followed。

　　Of　the　Typic　of　the　Pure　Practical　Judgement。

　　It　is　the　notions　of　good　and　evil　that　first　determine　an　object　of
the　will。　They　themselves；　however；　are　subject　to　a　practical　rule　of
reason　which；　if　it　is　pure　reason；　determines　the　will　a　priori
relatively　to　its　object。　Now；　whether　an　action　which　is　possible
to　us　in　the　world　of　sense；　es　under　the　rule　or　not；　is　a
question　to　be　decided　by　the　practical　judgement；　by　which　what　is
said　in　the　rule　universally　（in　abstracto）　is　applied　to　an　action　in
concreto。　But　since　a　practical　rule　of　pure　reason　in　the　first　place
as　practical　concerns　the　existence　of　an　object；　and　in　the　second
place　as　a　practical　rule　of　pure　reason　implies　necessity　as
regards　the　existence　of　the　action　and；　therefore；　is　a　practical
law；　not　a　physical　law　depending　on　empirical　principles　of
determination；　but　a　law　of　freedom　by　which　the　will　is　to　be
determined　independently　on　anything　empirical　（merely　by　the
conception　of　a　law　and　its　form）；　whereas　all　instances　that　can
occur　of　possible　actions　can　only　be　empirical；　that　is；　belong　to
the　experience　of　physical　nature；　hence；　it　seems　absurd　to　expect　to
find　in　the　world　of　sense　a　case　which；　while　as　such　it　depends　only
on　the　law　of　nature；　yet　admits　of　the　application　to　it　of　a　law
of　freedom；　and　to　which　we　can　apply　the　supersensible　idea　of　the
morally　good　which　is　to　be　exhibited　in　it　in　concreto。　Thus；　the
judgement　of　the　pure　practical　reason　is　subject　to　the　same
difficulties　as　that　of　the　pure　theoretical　reason。　The　latter；
however；　had　means　at　hand　of　escaping　from　these　difficulties；
because；　in　regard　to　the　theoretical　employment；　intuitions　were
required　to　which　pure　concepts　of　the　understanding　could　be　applied；
and　such　intuitions　（though　only　of　objects　of　the　senses）　can　be
given　a　priori　and；　therefore；　as　far　as　regards　the　union　of　the
manifold　in　them；　conforming　to　the　pure　a　priori　concepts　of　the
understanding　as　schemata。　On　the　other　hand；　the　morally　good　is
something　whose　object　is　supersensible；　for　which；　therefore；　nothing
corresponding　can　be　found　in　any　sensible　intuition。　Judgement
depending　on　laws　of　pure　practical　reason　seems；　therefore；　to　be
subject　to　special　difficulties　arising　from　this；　that　a　law　of
freedom　is　to　be　applied　to　actions；　which　are　events　taking　place
in　the　world　of　sense；　and　which；　so　far；　belong　to　physical　nature。
　　But　here　again　is　opened　a　favourable　prospect　for　the　pure
practical　judgement。　When　I　subsume　under　a　pure　practical　law　an
action　possible　to　me　in　the　world　of　sense；　I　am　not　concerned　with
the　possibility　of　the　action　as　an　event　in　the　world　of　sense。
This　is　a　matter　that　belongs　to　the　decision　of　reason　in　its
theoretic　use　according　to　the　law　of　causality；　which　is　a　pure
concept　of　the　understanding；　for　which　reason　has　a　schema　in　the
sensible　intuition。　Physical　causality；　or　the　condition　under　which
it　takes　place；　belongs　to　the　physical　concepts；　the　schema　of
which　is　sketched　by　transcendental　imagination。　Here；　however；　we
have　to　do；　not　with　the　schema　of　a　case　that　occurs　according　to
laws；　but　with　the　schema　of　a　law　itself　（if　the　word　is　allowable
here）；　since　the　fact　that　the　will　（not　the　action　relatively　to
its　effect）　is　determined　by　the　law　alone　without　any　other
principle；　connects　the　notion　of　causality　with　quite　different
conditions　from　those　which　constitute　physical　connection。
　　The　physical　law　being　a　law　to　which　the　objects　of　sensible
intuition；　as　such；　are　subject；　must　have　a　schema　corresponding　to
it…　that　is；　a　general　procedure　of　the　imagination　（by　which　it
exhibits　a　priori　to　the　senses　the　pure　concept　of　the
understanding　which　the　law　determines）。　But　the　law　of　freedom
（that　is；　of　a　causality　not　subject　to　sensible　conditions）；　and
consequently　the　concept　of　the　unconditionally　good；　cannot　have
any　intuition；　nor　consequently　any　schema　supplied　to　it　for　the
purpose　of　its　application　in　concreto。　Consequently　the　moral　law　has
no　faculty　but　the　understanding　to　aid　its　application　to　physical
objects　（not　the　imagination）；　and　the　understanding　for　the
purposes　of　the　judgement　can　provide　for　an　idea　of　the　reason；　not　a
schema　of　the　sensibility；　but　a　law；　though　only　as　to　its　form　as
law；　such　a　law；　however；　as　can　be　exhibited　in　concreto　in　objects
of　the　senses；　and　therefore　a　law　of　nature。　We　can　therefore　call
this　law　the　type　of　the　moral　law。
　　The　rule　of　the　judgement　according　to　laws　of　pure　practical　reason
is　this：　ask　yourself　whether；　if　the　action　you　propose　were　to
take　place　by　a　law　of　the　system　of　nature　of　which　you　were　yourself
a　part；　you　could　regard　it　as　possible　by　your　own　will。　Everyone
does；　in　fact；　decide　by　this　rule　whether　actions　are　morally　good　or
evil。　Thus；　people　say：　〃If　everyone　permitted　himself　to　deceive；
when　he　thought　it　to　his　advantage；　or　thought　himself　justified　in
shortening　his　life　as　soon　as　he　was　thoroughly　weary　of　it；　or
looked　with　perfect　indifference　on　the　necessity　of　others；　and　if
you　belonged　to　such　an　order　of　things；　would　you　do　so　with　the
assent　of　your　own　will？〃　Now　everyone　knows　well　that　if　he
secretly　allows　himself　to　deceive；　it　does　not　follow