the+critique+of+practical+reason-第2部分

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be　observed。　Accordingly　considerations　of　this　kind；　including
those　which　are　once　more　directed　to　the　concept　of　freedom　in　the
practical　use　of　the　pure　reason；　must　not　be　regarded　as　an
interpolation　serving　only　to　fill　up　the　gaps　in　the　critical
system　of　speculative　reason　（for　this　is　for　its　own　purpose
plete）；　or　like　the　props　and　buttresses　which　in　a　hastily
constructed　building　are　often　added　afterwards；　but　as　true　members
which　make　the　connexion　of　the　system　plain；　and　show　us　concepts；
here　presented　as　real；　which　there　could　only　be　presented
problematically。　This　remark　applies　especially　to　the　concept　of
freedom；　respecting　which　one　cannot　but　observe　with　surprise　that　so
many　boast　of　being　able　to　understand　it　quite　well　and　to　explain
its　possibility；　while　they　regard　it　only　psychologically；　whereas　if
they　had　studied　it　in　a　transcendental　point　of　view；　they　must
have　recognized　that　it　is　not　only　indispensable　as　a　problematical
concept；　in　the　plete　use　of　speculative　reason；　but　also　quite
inprehensible；　and　if　they　afterwards　came　to　consider　its
practical　use；　they　must　needs　have　e　to　the　very　mode　of
determining　the　principles　of　this；　to　which　they　are　now　so　loth　to
assent。　The　concept　of　freedom　is　the　stone　of　stumbling　for　all
empiricists；　but　at　the　same　time　the　key　to　the　loftiest　practical
principles　for　critical　moralists；　who　perceive　by　its　means　that　they
must　necessarily　proceed　by　a　rational　method。　For　this　reason　I　beg
the　reader　not　to　pass　lightly　over　what　is　said　of　this　concept　at
the　end　of　the　Analytic。
　　I　must　leave　it　to　those　who　are　acquainted　with　works　of　this
kind　to　judge　whether　such　a　system　as　that　of　the　practical　reason；
which　is　here　developed　from　the　critical　examination　of　it；　has
cost　much　or　little　trouble；　especially　in　seeking　not　to　miss　the
true　point　of　view　from　which　the　whole　can　be　rightly　sketched。　It
presupposes；　indeed；　the　Fundamental　Principles　of　the　Metaphysic　of
Morals；　but　only　in　so　far　as　this　gives　a　preliminary　acquaintance
with　the　principle　of　duty；　and　assigns　and　justifies　a　definite
formula　thereof；　in　other　respects　it　is　independent。*　It　results　from
the　nature　of　this　practical　faculty　itself　that　the　plete
classification　of　all　practical　sciences　cannot　be　added；　as　in　the
critique　of　the　speculative　reason。　For　it　is　not　possible　to　define
duties　specially；　as　human　duties；　with　a　view　to　their
classification；　until　the　subject　of　this　definition　（viz。；　man）　is
known　according　to　his　actual　nature；　at　least　so　far　as　is
necessary　with　respect　to　duty；　this；　however；　does　not　belong　to　a
critical　examination　of　the　practical　reason；　the　business　of　which　is
only　to　assign　in　a　plete　manner　the　principles　of　its　possibility；
extent；　and　limits；　without　special　reference　to　human　nature。　The
classification　then　belongs　to　the　system　of　science；　not　to　the
system　of　criticism。

　　*A　reviewer　who　wanted　to　find　some　fault　with　this　work　has　hit　the
truth　better；　perhaps；　than　he　thought；　when　he　says　that　no　new
principle　of　morality　is　set　forth　in　it；　but　only　a　new　formula。
But　who　would　think　of　introducing　a　new　principle　of　all　morality　and
making　himself　as　it　were　the　first　discoverer　of　it；　just　as　if　all
the　world　before　him　were　ignorant　what　duty　was　or　had　been　in
thorough…going　error？　But　whoever　knows　of　what　importance　to　a
mathematician　a　formula　is；　which　defines　accurately　what　is　to　be
done　to　work　a　problem；　will　not　think　that　a　formula　is　insignificant
and　useless　which　does　the　same　for　all　duty　in　general。

　　In　the　second　part　of　the　Analytic　I　have　given；　as　I　trust；　a
sufficient　answer　to　the　objection　of　a　truth…loving　and　acute　critic*
of　the　Fundamental　Principles　of　the　Metaphysic　of　Morals…　a　critic
always　worthy　of　respect　the　objection；　namely；　that　the　notion　of
good　was　not　established　before　the　moral　principle；　as　be　thinks　it
ought　to　have　been。*＇2＇　I　have　also　had　regard　to　many　of　the
objections　which　have　reached　me　from　men　who　show　that　they　have　at
heart　the　discovery　of　the　truth；　and　I　shall　continue　to　do　so　（for
those　who　have　only　their　old　system　before　their　eyes；　and　who　have
already　settled　what　is　to　be　approved　or　disapproved；　do　not　desire
any　explanation　which　might　stand　in　the　way　of　their　own　private
opinion。）

　　*＇See　Kant's　〃Das　mag　in　der　Theoric　ricktig　seyn；〃　etc。　Werke；　vol。
vii；　p。　182。＇
　　*＇2＇　It　might　also　have　been　objected　to　me　that　I　have　not　first
defined　the　notion　of　the　faculty　of　desire；　or　of　the　feeling　of
Pleasure；　although　this　reproach　would　be　unfair；　because　this
definition　might　reasonably　be　presupposed　as　given　in　psychology。
However；　the　definition　there　given　might　be　such　as　to　found　the
determination　of　the　faculty　of　desire　on　the　feeling　of　pleasure
（as　is　monly　done）；　and　thus　the　supreme　principle　of　practical
philosophy　would　be　necessarily　made　empirical；　which；　however；
remains　to　be　proved　and　in　this　critique　is　altogether　refuted。　It
will；　therefore；　give　this　definition　here　in　such　a　manner　as　it
ought　to　be　given；　in　order　to　leave　this　contested　point　open　at
the　beginning；　as　it　should　be。　LIFE　is　the　faculty　a　being　has　of
acting　according　to　laws　of　the　faculty　of　desire。　The　faculty　of
DESIRE　is　the　being's　faculty　of　being　by　means　of　its　ideas　the
cause　of　the　actual　existence　of　the　objects　of　these　ideas。
PLEASURE　is　the　idea　of　the　agreement　of　the　object；　or　the　action
with　the　subjective　conditions　of　life；　i。e。；　with　the　faculty　of
causality　of　an　idea　in　respect　of　the　actuality　of　its　object　（or
with　the　determination　of　the　forces　of　the　subject　to　action　which
produces　it）。　I　have　no　further　need　for　the　purposes　of　this　critique
of　notions　borrowed　from　psychology；　the　critique　itself　supplies
the　rest。　It　is　easily　seen　that　the　question　whether　the　faculty　of
desire　is　always　based　on　pleasure；　or　whether　under　certain
conditions　pleasure　only　follows　the　determination　of　desire；　is　by
this　definition　left　undecided；　for　it　is　posed　only　of　terms
belonging　to　the　pure　understanding；　i。e。；　of　categories　which　contain
nothing　empirical。　Such　precaution　is　very　desirable　in　all　philosophy
and　yet　is　often　neglected；　namely；　not　to　prejudge　questions　by
adventuring　definitions　before　the　notion　has　been　pletely
analysed；　which　is　often　very　late。　It　may　be　observed　through　the
whole　course　of　the　critical　philosophy　（of　the　theoretical　as　well　as
the　practical　reason）　that　frequent　opportunity　offers　of　supplying
defects　in　the　old　dogmatic　method　of　philosophy；　and　of　correcting
errors　which　are　not　observed　until　we　make　such　rational　use　of　these
notions　viewing　them　as　a　whole。

　　When　we　have　to　study　a　particular　faculty　of　the　human　mind　in
its　sources；　its　content；　and　its　limits；　then　from　the　nature　of
human　knowledge　we　must　begin　with　its　parts；　with　an　accurate　and
plete　exposition　of　them；　plete；　namely；　so　far　as　is　possible
in　the　present　state　of　our　knowledge　of　its　elements。　But　there　is
another　thing　to　be　attended　to　which　is　of　a　more　philosophical　and
architectonic　character；　namely；　to　grasp　correctly　the　idea　of　the
whole；　and　from　thence　to　get　a　view　of　all　those　parts　as　mutually
related　by　the　aid　of　pure　reason；　and　by　means　of　their　derivation
from　the　concept　of　the　whole。　This　is　only　possible　through　the
most　intimate　acquaintance　with　the　system；　and　those　who　find　the
first　inquiry　too　troublesome；　and　do　not　think　it　worth　their　while
to　attain　such　an　acquaintance；　cannot　reach　the　second　stage；　namely；
the　general　view；　which　is　a　synthetical　return　to　that　which　had
previously　been　given　analytically。　It　is　no　wonder　then　if　they
find　inconsistencies　everywhere；　although　the　gaps　which　these
indicate　are　not　in　the　system　itself；　but　in　their　own　incoherent
train　of　thought。
　　I　have　no　fear；　as　regards　this　treatise；　of　the　reproach　that　I
wish　to　introduce　a　new　language；　since　the　sort　of　knowledge　here
in　question　has　itself　somewhat　of　an　everyday　character。　Nor　even
in　the　case　of　the　former　critique　could　this　reproach　occur　to　anyone
who　had　thought　it　through　and　not　merely　turned　over　the　leaves。　To
invent　new　words　where　the　language　has　no　lack　of　expressions　for
given　notions　is　a　childish　effort　to　distinguish　oneself　from　the
crowd；　if　not　by　new　and　true　thoughts；　yet　by　new　patches　on　the
old　garment。　If；　therefore；　the　readers　of　that　work　know　any　more
familiar　expressions　which　are　as　suitable　to　the　thought　as　those
seem　to　me　to　be；　or　if　they　think　they　can　show　the　futility　of　these
thoughts　themselves　and　hence　that　of　the　expression；　they　would；　in
the　first　case；　very　much　oblige　me；　for　I　only　desire　to　be
understood：　and；　in　the　second　case；　they　would　deserve　well　of
philosophy。　But；　as　long　as　these　thoughts　stand；　I　very　much　doubt
that　suitable　and　yet　more　mon　expressions　for　them　can　be　found。*

　　*I　am　more　afraid　in　the　present　treatise　of　occasional
misconception　in　respect　of　some　expressions　which　I　have　chosen
with　the　greatest　care　in　order　that　the　notion　to　which　they　point
may　not　be　missed。　Thus；　in　the　table　of　categories　of　the　Practical
reason　under　the　title　of　Modality；　the　Permitted；　and　forbidden　（in　a
practical　objective　point　of　view；　possible　and　impossible）　have
almost　the　same　meaning　in　mon　language　as　the　next　category；
duty　and　contrary　to　duty。　Here；　however；　the　former　means　what
coincides　with；　or　contradicts；　a　merely　possible　practical　precept
（for　example；　the　solution　of　all　problems　of　geometry　and　mechanics）；
the　latter；　what　is　similarly　related　to　a　law　actually　present　in　the
reason；　and　this　distinction　is　not　quite　foreign　even　to　mon
language；　although　somewhat　unusual。　For　example；　it　is　forbidden　to
an　orator；　as　such；　to　forge　new　words　or　constructions；　in　a
certain　degree　this　is　permitted　to　a　poet；　in　neither　case　is　there
any　question　of　duty。　For　if　anyone　chooses　to　forfeit　his
reputation　as　an　orator；　no　one　can　prevent　him。　We　have　here　only
to　do　with　the　distinction　of　imperatives　into　problematical；
assertorial；　and　a