the+critique+of+practical+reason-第32部分

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world　as　the　most　perfect　whole　possible；　and　for　this　purpose
should　also　know　all　possible　worlds　（in　order　to　be　able　to　pare
them　with　this）；　in　other　words；　we　should　be　omniscient。　It　is
absolutely　impossible；　however；　to　know　the　existence　of　this　Being
from　mere　concepts；　because　every　existential　proposition；　that　is；
every　proposition　that　affirms　the　existence　of　a　being　of　which　I
frame　a　concept；　is　a　synthetic　proposition；　that　is；　one　by　which　I
go　beyond　that　conception　and　affirm　of　it　more　than　was　thought　in
the　conception　itself；　namely；　that　this　concept　in　the
understanding　has　an　object　corresponding　to　it　outside　the
understanding；　and　this　it　is　obviously　impossible　to　elicit　by　any
reasoning。　There　remains；　therefore；　only　one　single　process
possible　for　reason　to　attain　this　knowledge；　namely；　to　start　from
the　supreme　principle　of　its　pure　practical　use　（which　in　every　case
is　directed　simply　to　the　existence　of　something　as　a　consequence　of
reason）　and　thus　determine　its　object。　Then　its　inevitable　problem；
namely；　the　necessary　direction　of　the　will　to　the　summum　bonum；
discovers　to　us　not　only　the　necessity　of　assuming　such　a　First
Being　in　reference　to　the　possibility　of　this　good　in　the　world；
but；　what　is　most　remarkable；　something　which　reason　in　its　progress
on　the　path　of　physical　nature　altogether　failed　to　find；　namely；　an
accurately　defined　conception　of　this　First　Being。　As　we　can　know　only
a　small　part　of　this　world；　and　can　still　less　pare　it　with　all
possible　worlds；　we　may　indeed　from　its　order；　design；　and
greatness；　infer　a　wise；　good；　powerful；　etc。；　Author　of　it；　but　not
that　He　is　all…wise；　all…good；　all…powerful；　etc。　It　may　indeed　very
well　be　granted　that　we　should　be　justified　in　supplying　this
inevitable　defect　by　a　legitimate　and　reasonable　hypothesis；　namely；
that　when　wisdom；　goodness；　etc；　are　displayed　in　all　the　parts　that
offer　themselves　to　our　nearer　knowledge；　it　is　just　the　same　in　all
the　rest；　and　that　it　would　therefore　be　reasonable　to　ascribe　all
possible　perfections　to　the　Author　of　the　world；　but　these　are　not
strict　logical　inferences　in　which　we　can　pride　ourselves　on　our
insight；　but　only　permitted　conclusions　in　which　we　may　be　indulged
and　which　require　further　remendation　before　we　can　make　use　of
them。　On　the　path　of　empirical　inquiry　then　（physics）；　the
conception　of　God　remains　always　a　conception　of　the　perfection　of　the
First　Being　not　accurately　enough　determined　to　be　held　adequate　to
the　conception　of　Deity。　（With　metaphysic　in　its　transcendental　part
nothing　whatever　can　be　acplished。）
　　When　I　now　try　to　test　this　conception　by　reference　to　the　object　of
practical　reason；　I　find　that　the　moral　principle　admits　as　possible
only　the　conception　of　an　Author　of　the　world　possessed　of　the　highest
perfection。　He　must　be　omniscient；　in　order　to　know　my　conduct　up　to
the　inmost　root　of　my　mental　state　in　all　possible　cases　and　into
all　future　time；　omnipotent；　in　order　to　allot　to　it　its　fitting
consequences；　similarly　He　must　be　omnipresent；　eternal；　etc。　Thus　the
moral　law；　by　means　of　the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum　as　the
object　of　a　pure　practical　reason；　determines　the　concept　of　the　First
Being　as　the　Supreme　Being；　a　thing　which　the　physical　（and　in　its
higher　development　the　metaphysical）；　in　other　words；　the　whole
speculative　course　of　reason；　was　unable　to　effect。　The　conception
of　God；　then；　is　one　that　belongs　originally　not　to　physics；　i。e。；
to　speculative　reason；　but　to　morals。　The　same　may　be　said　of　the
other　conceptions　of　reason　of　which　we　have　treated　above　as
postulates　of　it　in　its　practical　use。
　　In　the　history　of　Grecian　philosophy　we　find　no　distinct　traces　of　a
pure　rational　theology　earlier　than　Anaxagoras；　but　this　is　not
because　the　older　philosophers　had　not　intelligence　or　penetration
enough　to　raise　themselves　to　it　by　the　path　of　speculation；　at
least　with　the　aid　of　a　thoroughly　reasonable　hypothesis。　What　could
have　been　easier；　what　more　natural；　than　the　thought　which　of
itself　occurs　to　everyone；　to　assume　instead　of　several　causes　of
the　world；　instead　of　an　indeterminate　degree　of　perfection；　a
single　rational　cause　having　all　perfection？　But　the　evils　in　the
world　seemed　to　them　to　be　much　too　serious　objections　to　allow　them
to　feel　themselves　justified　in　such　a　hypothesis。　They　showed
intelligence　and　penetration　then　in　this　very　point；　that　they　did
not　allow　themselves　to　adopt　it；　but　on　the　contrary　looked　about
amongst　natural　causes　to　see　if　they　could　not　find　in　them　the
qualities　and　power　required　for　a　First　Being。　But　when　this　acute
people　had　advanced　so　far　in　their　investigations　of　nature　as　to
treat　even　moral　questions　philosophically；　on　which　other　nations　had
never　done　anything　but　talk；　then　first　they　found　a　new　and
practical　want；　which　did　not　fail　to　give　definiteness　to　their
conception　of　the　First　Being：　and　in　this　the　speculative　reason
played　the　part　of　spectator；　or　at　best　had　the　merit　of　embellishing
a　conception　that　had　not　grown　on　its　own　ground；　and　of　applying　a
series　of　confirmations　from　the　study　of　nature　now　brought　forward
for　the　first　time；　not　indeed　to　strengthen　the　authority　of　this
conception　（which　was　already　established）；　but　rather　to　make　a
show　with　a　supposed　discovery　of　theoretical　reason。

　　From　these　remarks；　the　reader　of　the　Critique　of　Pure　Speculative
Reason　will　be　thoroughly　convinced　how　highly　necessary　that
laborious　deduction　of　the　categories　was；　and　how　fruitful　for
theology　and　morals。　For　if；　on　the　one　hand；　we　place　them　in　pure
understanding；　it　is　by　this　deduction　alone　that　we　can　be
prevented　from　regarding　them；　with　Plato；　as　innate；　and　founding
on　them　extravagant　pretensions　to　theories　of　the　supersensible；　to
which　we　can　see　no　end；　and　by　which　we　should　make　theology　a
magic　lantern　of　chimeras；　on　the　other　hand；　if　we　regard　them　as
acquired；　this　deduction　saves　us　from　restricting；　with　Epicurus；　all
and　every　use　of　them；　even　for　practical　purposes；　to　the　objects　and
motives　of　the　senses。　But　now　that　the　Critique　has　shown　by　that
deduction；　first；　that　they　are　not　of　empirical　origin；　but　have
their　seat　and　source　a　priori　in　the　pure　understanding；　secondly；
that　as　they　refer　to　objects　in　general　independently　of　the
intuition　of　them；　hence；　although　they　cannot　effect　theoretical
knowledge；　except　in　application　to　empirical　objects；　yet　when
applied　to　an　object　given　by　pure　practical　reason　they　enable　us
to　conceive　the　supersensible　definitely；　only　so　far；　however；　as
it　is　defined　by　such　predicates　as　are　necessarily　connected　with　the
pure　practical　purpose　given　a　priori　and　with　its　possibility。　The
speculative　restriction　of　pure　reason　and　its　practical　extension
bring　it　into　that　relation　of　equality　in　which　reason　in　general　can
be　employed　suitably　to　its　end；　and　this　example　proves　better　than
any　other　that　the　path　to　wisdom；　if　it　is　to　be　made　sure　and　not　to
be　impassable　or　misleading；　must　with　us　men　inevitably　pass
through　science；　but　it　is　not　till　this　is　plete　that　we　can　be
convinced　that　it　leads　to　this　goal。

　　　　　　VIII。　Of　Belief　from　a　Requirement　of　Pure　Reason。

　　A　want　or　requirement　of　pure　reason　in　its　speculative　use　leads
only　to　a　hypothesis；　that　of　pure　practical　reason　to　a　postulate；
for　in　the　former　case　I　ascend　from　the　result　as　high　as　I　please　in
the　series　of　causes；　not　in　order　to　give　objective　reality　to　the
result　（e。g。；　the　causal　connection　of　things　and　changes　in　the
world）；　but　in　order　thoroughly　to　satisfy　my　inquiring　reason　in
respect　of　it。　Thus　I　see　before　me　order　and　design　in　nature；　and
need　not　resort　to　speculation　to　assure　myself　of　their　reality；
but　to　explain　them　I　have　to　presuppose　a　Deity　as　their　cause；　and
then　since　the　inference　from　an　effect　to　a　definite　cause　is
always　uncertain　and　doubtful；　especially　to　a　cause　so　precise　and　so
perfectly　defined　as　we　have　to　conceive　in　God；　hence　the　highest
degree　of　certainty　to　which　this　pre…supposition　can　be　brought　is
that　it　is　the　most　rational　opinion　for　us　men。*　On　the　other　hand；　a
requirement　of　pure　practical　reason　is　based　on　a　duty；　that　of
making　something　（the　summum　bonum）　the　object　of　my　will　so　as　to
promote　it　with　all　my　powers；　in　which　case　I　must　suppose　its
possibility　and；　consequently；　also　the　conditions　necessary
thereto；　namely；　God；　freedom；　and　immortality；　since　I　cannot　prove
these　by　my　speculative　reason；　although　neither　can　I　refute　them。
This　duty　is　founded　on　something　that　is　indeed　quite　independent
of　these　suppositions　and　is　of　itself　apodeictically　certain；　namely；
the　moral　law；　and　so　far　it　needs　no　further　support　by　theoretical
views　as　to　the　inner　constitution　of　things；　the　secret　final　aim
of　the　order　of　the　world；　or　a　presiding　ruler　thereof；　in　order　to
bind　me　in　the　most　perfect　manner　to　act　in　unconditional
conformity　to　the　law。　But　the　subjective　effect　of　this　law；
namely；　the　mental　disposition　conformed　to　it　and　made　necessary　by
it；　to　promote　the　practically　possible　summum　bonum；　this
pre…supposes　at　least　that　the　latter　is　possible；　for　it　would　be
practically　impossible　to　strive　after　the　object　of　a　conception
which　at　bottom　was　empty　and　had　no　object。　Now　the　above…mentioned
postulates　concern　only　the　physical　or　metaphysical　conditions　of　the
possibility　of　the　summum　bonum；　in　a　word；　those　which　lie　in　the
nature　of　things；　not；　however；　for　the　sake　of　an　arbitrary
speculative　purpose；　but　of　a　practically　necessary　end　of　a　pure
rational　will；　which　in　this　case　does　not　choose；　but　obeys　an
inexorable　mand　of　reason；　the　foundation　of　which　is　objective；　in
the　constitution　of　things　as　they　must　be　universally　judged　by
pure　reason；　and　is　not　based　on　inclination；　for　we　are　in　nowise
justified　in　assuming；　on　account　of　what　we　wish　on　merely　subjective
grounds；　that　the　means　thereto　are　possible　or　that　its　object　is
real。　This；　then；　is　an　absolutely　necessary　requirement；　and　what
it　pre…supposes　is　not