the+critique+of+practical+reason-第34部分

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resist　the　inclinations　by　a　lively　representation　of　the　dignity　of
the　law：　hence　most　of　the　actions　that　conformed　to　the　law　would
be　done　from　fear；　a　few　only　from　hope；　and　none　at　all　from　duty；
and　the　moral　worth　of　actions；　on　which　alone　in　the　eyes　of
supreme　wisdom　the　worth　of　the　person　and　even　that　of　the　world
depends；　would　cease　to　exist。　As　long　as　the　nature　of　man　remains
what　it　is；　his　conduct　would　thus　be　changed　into　mere　mechanism；
in　which；　as　in　a　puppet…show；　everything　would　gesticulate　well；
but　there　would　be　no　life　in　the　figures。　Now；　when　it　is　quite
otherwise　with　us；　when　with　all　the　effort　of　our　reason　we　have　only
a　very　obscure　and　doubtful　view　into　the　future；　when　the　Governor　of
the　world　allows　us　only　to　conjecture　his　existence　and　his
majesty；　not　to　behold　them　or　prove　them　clearly；　and　on　the　other
hand；　the　moral　law　within　us；　without　promising　or　threatening
anything　with　certainty；　demands　of　us　disinterested　respect；　and　only
when　this　respect　has　bee　active　and　dominant；　does　it　allow　us
by　means　of　it　a　prospect　into　the　world　of　the　supersensible；　and
then　only　with　weak　glances：　all　this　being　so；　there　is　room　for　true
moral　disposition；　immediately　devoted　to　the　law；　and　a　rational
creature　can　bee　worthy　of　sharing　in　the　summum　bonum　that
corresponds　to　the　worth　of　his　person　and　not　merely　to　his
actions。　Thus　what　the　study　of　nature　and　of　man　teaches　us
sufficiently　elsewhere　may　well　be　true　here　also；　that　the
unsearchable　wisdom　by　which　we　exist　is　not　less　worthy　of　admiration
in　what　it　has　denied　than　in　what　it　has　granted。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　PART。

　　　　　　　　　　Methodology　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　By　the　methodology　of　pure　practical　reason　we　are　not　to　understand
the　mode　of　proceeding　with　pure　practical　principles　（whether　in
study　or　in　exposition）；　with　a　view　to　a　scientific　knowledge　of
them；　which　alone　is　what　is　properly　called　method　elsewhere　in
theoretical　philosophy　（for　popular　knowledge　requires　a　manner；
science　a　method；　i。e。；　a　process　according　to　principles　of　reason　by
which　alone　the　manifold　of　any　branch　of　knowledge　can　bee　a
system）。　On　the　contrary；　by　this　methodology　is　understood　the　mode
in　which　we　can　give　the　laws　of　pure　practical　reason　access　to　the
human　mind　and　influence　on　its　maxims；　that　is；　by　which　we　can
make　the　objectively　practical　reason　subjectively　practical　also。
　　Now　it　is　clear　enough　that　those　determining　principles　of　the　will
which　alone　make　maxims　properly　moral　and　give　them　a　moral　worth；
namely；　the　direct　conception　of　the　law　and　the　objective　necessity
of　obeying　it　as　our　duty；　must　be　regarded　as　the　proper　springs　of
actions；　since　otherwise　legality　of　actions　might　be　produced；　but
not　morality　of　character。　But　it　is　not　so　clear；　on　the　contrary；　it
must　at　first　sight　seem　to　every　one　very　improbable　that　even
subjectively　that　exhibition　of　pure　virtue　can　have　more　power　over
the　human　mind；　and　supply　a　far　stronger　spring　even　for　effecting
that　legality　of　actions；　and　can　produce　more　powerful　resolutions　to
prefer　the　law；　from　pure　respect　for　it；　to　every　other
consideration；　than　all　the　deceptive　allurements　of　pleasure　or　of
all　that　may　be　reckoned　as　happiness；　or　even　than　all　threatenings
of　pain　and　misfortune。　Nevertheless；　this　is　actually　the　case；　and
if　human　nature　were　not　so　constituted；　no　mode　of　presenting　the　law
by　roundabout　ways　and　indirect　remendations　would　ever　produce
morality　of　character。　All　would　be　simple　hypocrisy；　the　law　would　be
hated；　or　at　least　despised；　while　it　was　followed　for　the　sake　of
one's　own　advantage。　The　letter　of　the　law　（legality）　would　be　found
in　our　actions；　but　not　the　spirit　of　it　in　our　minds　（morality）；
and　as　with　all　our　efforts　we　could　not　quite　free　ourselves　from
reason　in　our　judgement；　we　must　inevitably　appear　in　our　own　eyes
worthless；　depraved　men；　even　though　we　should　seek　to　pensate
ourselves　for　this　mortification　before　the　inner　tribunal；　by
enjoying　the　pleasure　that　a　supposed　natural　or　divine　law　might　be
imagined　to　have　connected　with　it　a　sort　of　police　machinery；
regulating　its　operations　by　what　was　done　without　troubling　itself
about　the　motives　for　doing　it。
　　It　cannot　indeed　be　denied　that　in　order　to　bring　an　uncultivated　or
degraded　mind　into　the　track　of　moral　goodness　some　preparatory
guidance　is　necessary；　to　attract　it　by　a　view　of　its　own　advantage；
or　to　alarm　it　by　fear　of　loss；　but　as　soon　as　this　mechanical　work；
these　leading…strings　have　produced　some　effect；　then　we　must　bring
before　the　mind　the　pure　moral　motive；　which；　not　only　because　it　is
the　only　one　that　can　be　the　foundation　of　a　character　（a
practically　consistent　habit　of　mind　with　unchangeable　maxims）；　but
also　because　it　teaches　a　man　to　feel　his　own　dignity；　gives　the
mind　a　power　unexpected　even　by　himself；　to　tear　himself　from　all
sensible　attachments　so　far　as　they　would　fain　have　the　rule；　and　to
find　a　rich　pensation　for　the　sacrifice　he　offers；　in　the
independence　of　his　rational　nature　and　the　greatness　of　soul　to　which
he　sees　that　he　is　destined。　We　will　therefore　show；　by　such
observations　as　every　one　can　make；　that　this　property　of　our　minds；
this　receptivity　for　a　pure　moral　interest；　and　consequently　the
moving　force　of　the　pure　conception　of　virtue；　when　it　is　properly
applied　to　the　human　heart；　is　the　most　powerful　spring　and；　when　a
continued　and　punctual　observance　of　moral　maxims　is　in　question；
the　only　spring　of　good　conduct。　It　must；　however；　be　remembered
that　if　these　observations　only　prove　the　reality　of　such　a　feeling；
but　do　not　show　any　moral　improvement　brought　about　by　it；　this　is
no　argument　against　the　only　method　that　exists　of　making　the
objectively　practical　laws　of　pure　reason　subjectively　practical；
through　the　mere　force　of　the　conception　of　duty；　nor　does　it　prove
that　this　method　is　a　vain　delusion。　For　as　it　has　never　yet　e　into
vogue；　experience　can　say　nothing　of　its　results；　one　can　only　ask　for
proofs　of　the　receptivity　for　such　springs；　and　these　I　will　now
briefly　present；　and　then　sketch　the　method　of　founding　and
cultivating　genuine　moral　dispositions。
　　When　we　attend　to　the　course　of　conversation　in　mixed　panies；
consisting　not　merely　of　learned　persons　and　subtle　reasoners；　but
also　of　men　of　business　or　of　women；　we　observe　that；　besides
story…telling　and　jesting；　another　kind　of　entertainment　finds　a　place
in　them；　namely；　argument；　for　stories；　if　they　are　to　have　novelty
and　interest；　are　soon　exhausted；　and　jesting　is　likely　to　bee
insipid。　Now　of　all　argument　there　is　none　in　which　persons　are　more
ready　to　join　who　find　any　other　subtle　discussion　tedious；　none
that　brings　more　liveliness　into　the　pany；　than　that　which　concerns
the　moral　worth　of　this　or　that　action　by　which　the　character　of
some　person　is　to　be　made　out。　Persons；　to　whom　in　other　cases
anything　subtle　and　speculative　in　theoretical　questions　is　dry　and
irksome；　presently　join　in　when　the　question　is　to　make　out　the
moral　import　of　a　good　or　bad　action　that　has　been　related；　and　they
display　an　exactness；　a　refinement；　a　subtlety；　in　excogitating
everything　that　can　lessen　the　purity　of　purpose；　and　consequently　the
degree　of　virtue　in　it；　which　we　do　not　expect　from　them　in　any
other　kind　of　speculation。　In　these　criticisms；　persons　who　are
passing　judgement　on　others　often　reveal　their　own　character：　some；　in
exercising　their　judicial　office；　especially　upon　the　dead；　seem
inclined　chiefly　to　defend　the　goodness　that　is　related　of　this　or
that　deed　against　all　injurious　charges　of　insincerity；　and　ultimately
to　defend　the　whole　moral　worth　of　the　person　against　the　reproach
of　dissimulation　and　secret　wickedness；　others；　on　the　contrary；
turn　their　thoughts　more　upon　attacking　this　worth　by　accusation　and
fault　finding。　We　cannot　always；　however；　attribute　to　these　latter
the　intention　of　arguing　away　virtue　altogether　out　of　all　human
examples　in　order　to　make　it　an　empty　name；　often；　on　the　contrary；　it
is　only　well…meant　strictness　in　determining　the　true　moral　import
of　actions　according　to　an　unpromising　law。　parison　with　such
a　law；　instead　of　with　examples；　lowers　self…conceit　in　moral
matters　very　much；　and　not　merely　teaches　humility；　but　makes　every
one　feel　it　when　he　examines　himself　closely。　Nevertheless；　we　can　for
the　most　part　observe；　in　those　who　defend　the　purity　of　purpose　in
giving　examples　that　where　there　is　the　presumption　of　uprightness
they　are　anxious　to　remove　even　the　least　spot；　lest；　if　all
examples　had　their　truthfulness　disputed；　and　if　the　purity　of　all
human　virtue　were　denied；　it　might　in　the　end　be　regarded　as　a　mere
phantom；　and　so　all　effort　to　attain　it　be　made　light　of　as　vain
affectation　and　delusive　conceit。
　　I　do　not　know　why　the　educators　of　youth　have　not　long　since　made
use　of　this　propensity　of　reason　to　enter　with　pleasure　upon　the
most　subtle　examination　of　the　practical　questions　that　are　thrown　up；
and　why　they　have　not；　after　first　laying　the　foundation　of　a　purely
moral　catechism；　searched　through　the　biographies　of　ancient　and
modern　times　with　the　view　of　having　at　hand　instances　of　the　duties
laid　down；　in　which；　especially　by　parison　of　similar　actions　under
different　circumstances；　they　might　exercise　the　critical　judgement　of
their　scholars　in　remarking　their　greater　or　less　moral
significance。　This　is　a　thing　in　which　they　would　find　that　even　early
youth；　which　is　still　unripe　for　speculation　of　other　kinds；　would
soon　Bee　very　acute　and　not　a　little　interested；　because　it　feels
the　progress　of　its　faculty　of　judgement；　and；　what　is　most　important；
they　could　hope　with　confidence　that　the　frequent　practice　of
knowing　and　approving　good　conduct　in　all　its　purity；　and　on　the　other
hand　of　remarking　with　regret　or　contempt　the　least　deviation　from　it；
although　it　may　be　pursued　only　as　a　sport　in　which　children　may
pete　with　one　another；　yet　will　leave　a　lasting　impression　of
esteem　on　the　one　hand　and　disgust　on　the　other；　and　so；　by　the　mere
habit　of