an enquiry concerning human understanding-第30部分

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science　of　quantity。＇39＇

　　　　　The　sceptical　objections　to　　evidence；　or　to　the
reasonings　concerning　matter　of　fact；　are　either　
or　。　The　popular　objections　are　derived　from
the　natural　weakness　of　human　understanding；　the
contradictory　opinions；　which　have　been　entertained　in
different　ages　and　nations；　the　variations　of　our　judgement
in　sickness　and　health；　youth　and　old　age；　prosperity　and
adversity；　the　perpetual　contradiction　of　each　particular
man's　opinions　and　sentiments；　with　many　other　topics　of
that　kind。　It　is　needless　to　insist　farther　on　this　head。
These　objections　are　but　weak。　For　as；　in　common　life；　we
reason　every　moment　concerning　fact　and　existence；　and
cannot　possibly　subsist；　without　continually　employing　this
species　of　argument；　any　popular　objections；　derived　from
thence；　must　be　insufficient　to　destroy　that　evidence。　The
great　subverter　of　　or　the　excessive　principles
of　scepticism　is　action；　and　employment；　and　the　occupations
of　common　life。　These　principles　may　flourish　and　triumph　in
the　schools；　where　it　is；　indeed；　difficult；　if　not
impossible；　to　refute　them。　But　as　soon　as　they　leave　the
shade；　and　by　the　presence　of　the　real　objects；　which
actuate　our　passions　and　sentiments；　are　put　in　opposition
to　the　more　powerful　principles　of　our　nature；　they　vanish
like　smoke；　and　leave　the　most　determined　sceptic　in　the
same　condition　as　other　mortals。

　　　　　The　sceptic；　therefore；　had　better　keep　within　his
proper　sphere；　and　display　those　　objections；
which　arise　from　more　profound　researches。　Here　he　seems　to
have　ample　matter　of　triumph；　while　he　justly　insists；　that
all　our　evidence　for　any　matter　of　fact；　which　lies　beyond
the　testimony　of　sense　or　memory；　is　derived　entirely　from
the　relation　of　cause　and　effect；　that　we　have　no　other　idea
of　this　relation　than　that　of　two　objects；　which　have　been
frequently　　together；　that　we　have　no　argument　to
convince　us；　that　objects；　which　have；　in　our　experience；
been　frequently　conjoined；　will　likewise；　in　other
instances；　be　conjoined　in　the　same　manner；　and　that　nothing
leads　us　to　this　inference　but　custom　or　a　certain　instinct
of　our　nature；　which　it　is　indeed　difficult　to　resist；　but
which；　like　other　instincts；　may　be　fallacious　and
deceitful。　While　the　sceptic　insists　upon　these　topics；　he
shows　his　force；　or　rather；　indeed；　his　own　and　our
weakness；　and　seems；　for　the　time　at　least；　to　destroy　all
assurance　and　conviction。　These　arguments　might　be　displayed
at　greater　length；　if　any　durable　good　or　benefit　to　society
could　ever　be　expected　to　result　from　them。

　　　　　For　here　is　the　chief　and　most　confounding　objection　to
　scepticism；　that　no　durable　good　can　ever　result
from　it；　while　it　remains　in　its　full　force　and　vigour。　We
need　only　ask　such　a　sceptic；　？　He　is
immediately　at　a　loss；　and　knows　not　what　to　answer。　A
C/OPERNICAN　or　P/TOLEMAIC；　who　supports　each　his　different
system　of　astronomy；　may　hope　to　produce　a　conviction；　which
will　remain　constant　and　durable；　with　his　audience。　A
S/TOIC　or　E/PICUREAN　displays　principles；　which　may　not　be
durable；　but　which　have　an　effect　on　conduct　and　behaviour。
But　a　P/YRRHONIAN　cannot　expect；　that　his　philosophy　will
have　any　constant　influence　on　the　mind：　Or　if　it　had；　that
its　influence　would　be　beneficial　to　society。　On　the
contrary；　he　must　acknowledge；　if　he　will　acknowledge　any
thing；　that　all　human　life　must　perish；　were　his　principles
universally　and　steadily　to　prevail。　All　discourse；　all
action　would　immediately　cease；　and　men　remain　in　a　total
lethargy；　till　the　necessities　of　nature；　unsatisfied；　put
an　end　to　their　miserable　existence。　It　is　true；　so　fatal　an
event　is　very　little　to　be　dreaded。　Nature　is　always　too
strong　for　principle。　And　though　a　P/YRRHONIAN　may　throw
himself　or　others　into　a　momentary　amazement　and　confusion
by　his　profound　reasonings；　the　first　and　most　trivial　event
in　life　will　put　to　flight　all　his　doubts　and　scruples；　and
leave　him　the　same；　in　every　point　of　action　and
speculation；　with　the　philosophers　of　every　other　sect；　or
with　those　who　never　concerned　themselves　in　any
philosophical　researches。　When　he　awakes　from　his　dream；　he
will　be　the　first　to　join　in　the　laugh　against　himself；　and
to　confess；　that　all　his　objections　are　mere　amusement；　and
can　have　no　other　tendency　than　to　show　the　whimsical
condition　of　mankind；　who　must　act　and　reason　and　believe；
though　they　are　not　able；　by　their　most　diligent　enquiry；　to
satisfy　themselves　concerning　the　foundation　of　these
operations；　or　to　remove　the　objections；　which　may　be　raised
against　them。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　III。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　T/HERE　is；　indeed；　a　more　　scepticism　or
　philosophy；　which　may　be　both　durable　and
useful；　and　which　may；　in　part；　be　the　result　of　this
P/YRRHONISM；　or　　scepticism；　when　its
undistinguished　doubts　are；　in　some　measure；　corrected　by
common　sense　and　reflection。　The　greater　part　of　mankind　are
naturally　apt　to　be　affirmative　and　dogmatical　in　their
opinions；　and　while　they　see　objects　only　on　one　side；　and
have　no　idea　of　any　counterpoising　argument；　they　throw
themselves　precipitately　into　the　principles；　to　which　they
are　inclined；　nor　have　they　any　indulgence　for　those　who
entertain　opposite　sentiments。　To　hesitate　or　balance
perplexes　their　understanding；　checks　their　passion；　and
suspends　their　action。　They　are；　therefore；　impatient　till
they　escape　from　a　state；　which　to　them　is　so　uneasy：　And
they　think；　that　they　could　never　remove　themselves　far
enough　from　it；　by　the　violence　of　their　affirmations　and
obstinacy　of　their　belief。　But　could　such　dogmatical
reasoners　become　sensible　of　the　strange　infirmities　of
human　understanding；　even　in　its　most　perfect　state；　and
when　most　accurate　and　cautious　in　its　determinations；　such
a　reflection　would　naturally　inspire　them　with　more　modesty
and　reserve；　and　diminish　their　fond　opinion　of　themselves；
and　their　prejudice　against　antagonists。　The　illiterate　may
reflect　on　the　disposition　of　the　learned；　who；　amidst　all
the　advantages　of　study　and　reflection；　are　commonly　still
diffident　in　their　determinations：　And　if　any　of　the　learned
be　inclined；　from　their　natural　temper；　to　haughtiness　and
obstinacy；　a　small　tincture　of　P/YRRHONISM　might　abate
their　pride；　by　showing　them；　that　the　few　advantages；　which
they　may　have　attained　over　their　fellows；　are　but
inconsiderable；　if　compared　with　the　universal　perplexity
and　confusion；　which　is　inherent　in　human　nature。　In
general；　there　is　a　degree　of　doubt；　and　caution；　and
modesty；　which；　in　all　kinds　of　scrutiny　and　decision；　ought
for　ever　to　accompany　a　just　reasoner。

　　　　　Another　species　of　　scepticism　which　may　be
of　advantage　to　mankind；　and　which　may　be　the　natural　result
of　the　P/YRRHONIAN　doubts　and　scruples；　is　the　limitation
of　our　enquiries　to　such　subjects　as　are　best　adapted　to　the
narrow　capacity　of　human　understanding。　The　　of
man　is　naturally　sublime；　delighted　with　whatever　is　remote
and　extraordinary；　and　running；　without　control；　into　the
most　distant　parts　of　space　and　time　in　order　to　avoid　the
objects；　which　custom　has　rendered　too　familiar　to　it。　A
correct　　observes　a　contrary　method；　and　avoiding
all　distant　and　high　enquiries；　confines　itself　to　common
life；　and　to　such　subjects　as　fall　under　daily　practice　and
experience；　leaving　the　more　sublime　topics　to　the
embellishment　of　poets　and　orators；　or　to　the　arts　of
priests　and　politicians。　To　bring　us　to　so　salutary　a

determination；　nothing　can　be　more　serviceable；　than　to　be
once　thoroughly　convinced　of　the　force　of　the　P/YRRHONIAN
doubt；　and　of　the　impossibility；　that　any　thing；　but　the
strong　power　of　natural　instinct；　could　free　us　from　it。
Those　who　have　a　propensity　to　philosophy；　will　still
continue　their　researches；　because　they　reflect；　that；
besides　the　immediate　pleasure　attending　such　an　occupation；
philosophical　decisions　are　nothing　but　the　reflections　of
common　life；　methodized　and　corrected。　But　they　will　never
be　tempted　to　go　beyond　common　life；　so　long　as　they
consider　the　imperfection　of　those　faculties　which　they
employ；　their　narrow　reach；　and　their　inaccurate　operations。
While　we　cannot　give　a　satisfactory　reason；　why　we　believe；
after　a　thousand　experiments；　that　a　stone　will　fall；　or
fire　burn；　can　we　ever　satisfy　ourselves　concerning　any
determination；　which　we　may　form；　with　regard　to　the　origin
of　worlds；　and　the　situation　of　nature；　from；　and　to
eternity？

　　　　　This　narrow　limitation；　indeed；　of　our　enquiries；　is；
in　every　respect；　so　reasonable；　that　it　suffices　to　make
the　slightest　examination　into　the　natural　powers　of　the
human　mind　and　to　compare　them　with　their　objects；　in　order
to　recommend　it　to　us。　We　shall　then　find　what　are　the
proper　subjects　of　science　and　enquiry。

　　　　　It　seems　to　me；　that　the　only　objects　of　the　abstract
science　or　of　demonstration　are　quantity　and　number；　and
that　all　attempts　to　extend　this　more　perfect　species　of
knowledge　beyond　these　bounds　are　mere　sophistry　and
illusion。　As　the　component　parts　of　quantity　and　number　are
entirely　similar；　their　relations　become　intricate　and
involved；　and　nothing　can　be　more　curious；　as　well　as
useful；　than　to　trace；　by　a　variety　of　mediums；　their
equality　or　inequality；　through　their　different　appearances。
But　as　all　other　ideas　are　clearly　distinct　and　different
from　each　other；　we　can　never　advance　farther；　by　our　utmost
scrutiny；　than　to　observe　this　diversity；　and；　by　an　obvious
reflection；　pronounce　one　thing　not　to　be　another。　Or　if
there　be　any　difficulty　in　these　decisions；　it　proceeds
entirely　from　the　undeterminate　meaning　of　words；　which　is
corrected　by　juster　definitions。　That　；
cannot　be　known；　let　the　terms　be　ever　s