an enquiry concerning human understanding-第31部分

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hypothenuse　is　equal　to　the　squares　of　the　other　two　sides》；
cannot　be　known；　let　the　terms　be　ever　so　exactly　defined；
without　a　train　of　reasoning　and　enquiry。　But　to　convince　us
of　this　proposition；　；　it　is　only　necessary　to　define　the
terms；　and　explain　injustice　to　be　a　violation　of　property。
This　proposition　is；　indeed；　nothing　but　a　more　imperfect
definition。　It　is　the　same　case　with　all　those　pretended
syllogistical　reasonings；　which　may　be　found　in　every　other
branch　of　learning；　except　the　sciences　of　quantity　and
number；　and　these　may　safely；　I　think；　be　pronounced　the
only　proper　objects　of　knowledge　and　demonstration。

　　　　　All　other　enquiries　of　men　regard　only　matter　of　fact
and　existence；　and　these　are　evidently　incapable　of
demonstration。　Whatever　　may　。　No　negation　of　a
fact　can　involve　a　contradiction。　The　non…existence　of　any
being；　without　exception；　is　as　clear　and　distinct　an　idea
as　its　existence。　The　proposition；　which　affirms　it　not　to
be；　however　false；　is　no　less　conceivable　and　intelligible；
than　that　which　affirms　it　to　be。　The　case　is　different　with
the　sciences；　properly　so　called。　Every　proposition；　which
is　not　true；　is　there　confused　and　unintelligible。　That　the
cube　root　of　64　is　equal　to　the　half　of　10；　is　a　false
proposition；　and　can　never　be　distinctly　conceived。　But　that
C/AESAR；　or　the　angel　G/ABRIEL；　or　any　being　never
existed；　may　be　a　false　proposition；　but　still　is　perfectly
conceivable；　and　implies　no　contradiction。

　　　　　The　existence；　therefore；　of　any　being　can　only　be
proved　by　arguments　from　its　cause　or　its　effect；　and　these
arguments　are　founded　entirely　on　experience。　If　we　reason
；　any　thing　may　appear　able　to　produce　any　thing。
The　falling　of　a　pebble　may；　for　aught　we　know；　extinguish
the　sun；　or　the　wish　of　a　man　control　the　planets　in　their
orbits。　It　is　only　experience；　which　teaches　us　the　nature
and　bounds　of　cause　and　effect；　and　enables　us　to　infer　the
existence　of　one　object　from　that　of　another。＇40＇　Such　is
the　foundation　of　moral　reasoning；　which　forms　the　greater
part　of　human　knowledge；　and　is　the　source　of　all　human
action　and　behaviour。

　　　　　Moral　reasonings　are　either　concerning　particular　or
general　facts。　All　deliberations　in　life　regard　the　former；
as　also　all　disquisitions　in　history；　chronology；　geography；
and　astronomy。

　　　　　The　sciences；　which　treat　of　general　facts；　are
politics；　natural　philosophy；　physic；　chemistry；　&c。　where
the　qualities；　causes　and　effects　of　a　whole　species　of
objects　are　enquired　into。

　　　　　Divinity　or　Theology；　as　it　proves　the　existence　of　a
Deity；　and　the　immortality　of　souls；　is　composed　partly　of
reasonings　concerning　particular；　partly　concerning　general
facts。　It　has　a　foundation　in　；　so　far　as　it　is
supported　by　experience。　But　its　best　and　most　solid
foundation　is　　and　divine　revelation。

　　　　　Morals　and　criticism　are　not　so　properly　objects　of　the
understanding　as　of　taste　and　sentiment。　Beauty；　whether
moral　or　natural；　is　felt；　more　properly　than　perceived。　Or
if　we　reason　concerning　it；　and　endeavour　to　fix　its
standard；　we　regard　a　new　fact；　to　wit；　the　general　tastes
of　mankind；　or　some　such　fact；　which　may　be　the　object　of
reasoning　and　enquiry。

　　　　　When　we　run　over　libraries；　persuaded　of　these
principles；　what　havoc　must　we　make？　If　we　take　in　our　hand
any　volume；　of　divinity　or　school　metaphysics；　for　instance；
let　us　ask；　　No。　　No。　Commit　it　then　to　the　flames：　For　it　can
contain　nothing　but　sophistry　and　illusion。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　NOTES
＇1＇＇COPYRIGHT：　（c）　1995；　James　Fieser　（jfieser@utm。edu）；　all
rights　reserved。　Unaltered　copies　of　this　computer　text　file
may　be　freely　distribute　for　personal　and　classroom　use。
Alterations　to　this　file　are　permitted　only　for　purposes　of
computer　printouts；　although　altered　computer　text　files　may
not　circulate。　Except　to　cover　nominal　distribution　costs；
this　file　cannot　be　sold　without　written　permission　from　the
copyright　holder。　This　copyright　notice　supersedes　all
previous　notices　on　earlier　versions　of　this　text　file。　When
quoting　from　this　text；　please　use　the　following　citation：
；　ed。　James　Fieser　（Internet
Release；　1995）。


　　　　　EDITORIAL　CONVENTIONS：　letters　between　slashes　（e。g。；
H/UME）　designate　small　capitalization。　Letters　within
angled　brackets　（e。g。；　）　designate　italics。　Note
references　are　contained　within　square　brackets　（e。g。；　＇1＇）。
Original　pagination　is　contained　within　curly　brackets
（e。g。；　）。　Spelling　and　punctuation　have　not　been
modernized。　Printer's　errors　have　been　corrected　without
note。　Bracketed　comments　within　the　end　notes　are　the
editor's。　This　is　a　working　draft。　Please　report　errors　to
James　Fieser　（jfieser@utm。edu）。＇
　　　　　＇2＇This　is　not　intended　any　way　to　detract　from　the
merit　of　Mr。　L/OCKE；　who　was　really　a　great　philosopher　and
a　just　and　modest　reasoner。　It　is　only　meant　to　show　the
common　fate　of　such　abstract　philosophy。　＇This　note　was
removed　by　Hume　from　later　editions　of　the　。　
J。F。＇
　　　　　＇3＇That　faculty　by　which　we　discern　truth　and
falsehood；　and　that　by　which　we　perceive　vice　and　virtue；
had　long　been　confounded　with　each　other；　and　all　morality
was　supposed　to　be　built　on　external　an　immutable　relations
which；　to　every　intelligent　mind；　were　equally　invariable　as
any　proposition　concerning　quantity　or　number。　But　a　late
philosopher　＇Francis　Hutcheson＇　has　taught　us；　by　the　most
convincing　arguments；　that　morality　is　nothing　in　the
abstract　nature　of　things；　but　is　entirely　relative　to　the
sentiment　or　mental　taste　of　each　particular　being；　in　the
same　manner　as　the　distinctions　of　sweet　and　bitter；　hot　and
cold　arise　from　the　particular　feeling　of　each　sense　or
organ。　Moral　perceptions；　therefore；　ought　not　to　be　classed
with　the　operations　of　the　understanding；　but　with　the
tastes　or　sentiments。

　　　　　It　had　been　usual　with　philosophers　to　divide　all　the
passions　of　the　mind　into　two　classes；　the　selfish　and
benevolent；　which　were　supposed　to　stand　in　constant
opposition　and　contrariety；　nor　was　it　thought　that　the
latter　could　ever　attain　their　proper　object　but　at　the
expense　of　the　former。　Among　the　selfish　passions　were
ranked　avarice；　ambition；　revenge；　among　the　benevolent；
natural　affection；　friendship；　public　spirit。　Philosophers
may　now　perceive　the　impropriety　of　this　division。　＇See
Butler's　。＇　It　has　been　proved；　beyond　all
controversy；　that　even　the　passions　commonly　esteemed
selfish　carry　the　mind　beyond　self　directly　to　the　object；
that　though　the　satisfaction　of　these　passions　gives　us
enjoyment；　yet　the　prospect　of　this　enjoyment　is　not　the
cause　of　the　passion；　but；　on　the　contrary；　the　passion　is
antecedent　to　the　enjoyment；　and　without　the　former　the
latter　could　never　possibly　exist；　that　the　case　is
precisely　the　same　with　passions　denominated　benevolent；　and
consequently　that　a　man　is　no　more　interested　when　he　seeks
his　own　glory　than　when　the　happiness　of　his　friend　is　the
object　of　his　wishes；　nor　is　he　any　more　disinterested　when
he　sacrifices　his　ease　and　quiet　to　public　good　than　when　he
labors　for　the　gratification　of　avarice　or　ambition。　Here；
therefore；　is　a　considerable　adjustment　in　the　boundaries　of
the　passions；　which　had　been　confounded　by　the　negligence　or
inaccuracy　of　former　philosophers。　These　two　instances　may
suffice　to　show　us　the　nature　and　importance　of　that　species
of　philosophy。　＇This　note　was　removed　by　Hume　from　later
editions　of　the　。　…　…　J。F。＇
　　　　　＇4＇I/T　is　probable　that　no　more　was　meant　by　these；
who　denied　innate　ideas；　than　that　all　ideas　were　copies　of
our　impressions；　though　it　must　be　confessed；　that　the
terms；　which　they　employed；　were　not　chosen　with　such
caution；　nor　so　exactly　defined；　as　to　prevent　all　mistakes
about　their　doctrine。　For　what　is　meant　by　？　If
innate　be　equivalent　to　natural；　then　all　the　perceptions
and　ideas　of　the　mind　must　be　allowed　to　be　innate　or
natural；　in　whatever　sense　we　take　the　latter　word；　whether
in　opposition　to　what　is　uncommon；　artificial；　or
miraculous。　If　by　innate　be　meant；　contemporary　to　our
birth；　the　dispute　seems　to　be　frivolous；　nor　is　it　worth
while　to　enquire　at　what　time　thinking　begins；　whether
before；　at；　or　after　our　birth。　Again；　the　word　；
seems　to　be　commonly　taken　in　a　very　loose　sense；　by　L/OCKE
and　others；　as　standing　for　any　of　our　perceptions；　our
sensations　and　passions；　as　well　as　thoughts。　Now　in　this
sense；　I　should　desire　to　know；　what　can　be　meant　by
asserting；　that　self…love；　or　resentment　of　injuries；　or　the
passion　between　the　sexes　is　not　innate？
　　　　　But　admitting　these　terms；　　and　；
in　the　sense　above　explained；　and　understanding　by　；
what　is　original　or　copied　from　no　precedent　perception；
then　may　we　assert　that　all　our　impressions　are　innate；　and
our　ideas　not　innate。
　　　　　To　be　ingenuous；　I　must　own　it　to　be　my　opinion；　that
L/OCKE　was　betrayed　into　this　question　by　the　schoolmen；
who；　making　use　of　undefined　terms；　draw　out　their　disputes
to　a　tedious　length；　without　ever　touching　the　point　in
question。　A　like　ambiguity　and　circumlocution　seem　to　run
through　that　philosopher's　reasonings　on　this　as　well　as
most　other　subjects。
　　　　　＇5＇Resemblance。
　　　　　＇6＇Contiguity。
　　　　　＇7＇Cause　and　Effect。
　　　　　＇8＇For　instance；　Contrast　or　Contrariety　is　also　a
connexion　among　Ideas：　but　it　may　perhaps；　be　considered　as
a　mixture　of　　and　。　Where　two
objects　are　contrary；　the　one　destroys　the　other；　that　is；
the　cause　of　its　annihilation；　and　the　idea　of　the
annihilation　of　an　object；　implies　the　idea　of　its　former
existence。
　　　　　＇9＇＇The　remainder　of　this　section　was　removed　from　the
final　two　editions　of