the critique of pure reason-第19部分

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thought；　that　is；　to　contradict　itself。　These　criteria；　however；　apply

solely　to　the　form　of　truth；　that　is；　of　thought　in　general；　and　in　so

far　they　are　perfectly　accurate；　yet　not　sufficient。　For　although　a

cognition　may　be　perfectly　accurate　as　to　logical　form；　that　is；　not

self…contradictory；　it　is　notwithstanding　quite　possible　that　it　may

not　stand　in　agreement　with　its　object。　Consequently；　the　merely

logical　criterion　of　truth；　namely；　the　accordance　of　a　cognition　with

the　universal　and　formal　laws　of　understanding　and　reason；　is

nothing　more　than　the　conditio　sine　qua　non；　or　negative　condition

of　all　truth。　Farther　than　this　logic　cannot　go；　and　the　error　which

depends　not　on　the　form；　but　on　the　content　of　the　cognition；　it　has

no　test　to　discover。

　　General　logic；　then；　resolves　the　whole　formal　business　of

understanding　and　reason　into　its　elements；　and　exhibits　them　as

principles　of　all　logical　judging　of　our　cognitions。　This　part　of

logic　may；　therefore；　be　called　analytic；　and　is　at　least　the　negative

test　of　truth；　because　all　cognitions　must　first　of　an　be　estimated

and　tried　according　to　these　laws　before　we　proceed　to　investigate

them　in　respect　of　their　content；　in　order　to　discover　whether　they

contain　positive　truth　in　regard　to　their　object。　Because；　however；

the　mere　form　of　a　cognition；　accurately　as　it　may　accord　with　logical

laws；　is　insufficient　to　supply　us　with　material　（objective）　truth；　no

one；　by　means　of　logic　alone；　can　venture　to　predicate　anything　of

or　decide　concerning　objects；　unless　he　has　obtained；　independently　of

logic；　well…grounded　information　about　them；　in　order　afterwards　to

examine；　according　to　logical　laws；　into　the　use　and　connection；　in

a　cohering　whole；　of　that　information；　or；　what　is　still　better；

merely　to　test　it　by　them。　Notwithstanding；　there　lies　so　seductive

a　charm　in　the　possession　of　a　specious　art　like　this…　an　art　which

gives　to　all　our　cognitions　the　form　of　the　understanding；　although

with　respect　to　the　content　thereof　we　may　be　sadly　deficient…　that

general　logic；　which　is　merely　a　canon　of　judgement；　has　been　employed

as　an　organon　for　the　actual　production；　or　rather　for　the　semblance

of　production；　of　objective　assertions；　and　has　thus　been　grossly

misapplied。　Now　general　logic；　in　its　assumed　character　of　organon；　is

called　dialectic。

　　Different　as　are　the　significations　in　which　the　ancients　used

this　term　for　a　science　or　an　art；　we　may　safely　infer；　from　their

actual　employment　of　it；　that　with　them　it　was　nothing　else　than　a

logic　of　illusion…　a　sophistical　art　for　giving　ignorance；　nay；　even

intentional　sophistries；　the　colouring　of　truth；　in　which　the

thoroughness　of　procedure　which　logic　requires　was　imitated；　and　their

topic　employed　to　cloak　the　empty　pretensions。　Now　it　may　be　taken

as　a　safe　and　useful　warning；　that　general　logic；　considered　as　an

organon；　must　always　be　a　logic　of　illusion；　that　is；　be

dialectical；　for；　as　it　teaches　us　nothing　whatever　respecting　the

content　of　our　cognitions；　but　merely　the　formal　conditions　of　their

accordance　with　the　understanding；　which　do　not　relate　to　and　are

quite　indifferent　in　respect　of　objects；　any　attempt　to　employ　it　as

an　instrument　（organon）　in　order　to　extend　and　enlarge　the　range　of

our　knowledge　must　end　in　mere　prating；　any　one　being　able　to　maintain

or　oppose；　with　some　appearance　of　truth；　any　single　assertion

whatever。

　　Such　instruction　is　quite　unbecoming　the　dignity　of　philosophy。

For　these　reasons　we　have　chosen　to　denominate　this　part　of　logic

dialectic；　in　the　sense　of　a　critique　of　dialectical　illusion；　and

we　wish　the　term　to　be　so　understood　in　this　place。



　　IV。　Of　the　Division　of　Transcendental　Logic　into　Transcendental

　　　　　　Analytic　and　Dialectic。



　　In　transcendental　logic　we　isolate　the　understanding　（as　in

transcendental　aesthetic　the　sensibility）　and　select　from　our

cognition　merely　that　part　of　thought　which　has　its　origin　in　the

understanding　alone。　The　exercise　of　this　pure　cognition；　however；

depends　upon　this　as　its　condition；　that　objects　to　which　it　may　be

applied　be　given　to　us　in　intuition；　for　without　intuition　the　whole

of　our　cognition　is　without　objects；　and　is　therefore　quite　void。　That

part　of　transcendental　logic；　then；　which　treats　of　the　elements　of

pure　cognition　of　the　understanding；　and　of　the　principles　without

which　no　object　at　all　can　be　thought；　is　transcendental　analytic；　and

at　the　same　time　a　logic　of　truth。　For　no　cognition　can　contradict　it；

without　losing　at　the　same　time　all　content；　that　is；　losing　all

reference　to　an　object；　and　therefore　all　truth。　But　because　we　are

very　easily　seduced　into　employing　these　pure　cognitions　and

principles　of　the　understanding　by　themselves；　and　that　even　beyond

the　boundaries　of　experience；　which　yet　is　the　only　source　whence　we

can　obtain　matter　（objects）　on　which　those　pure　conceptions　may　be

employed…　understanding　runs　the　risk　of　making；　by　means　of　empty

sophisms；　a　material　and　objective　use　of　the　mere　formal　principles

of　the　pure　understanding；　and　of　passing　judgements　on　objects

without　distinction…　objects　which　are　not　given　to　us；　nay；　perhaps

cannot　be　given　to　us　in　any　way。　Now；　as　it　ought　properly　to　be　only

a　canon　for　judging　of　the　empirical　use　of　the　understanding；　this

kind　of　logic　is　misused　when　we　seek　to　employ　it　as　an　organon　of

the　universal　and　unlimited　exercise　of　the　understanding；　and　attempt

with　the　pure　understanding　alone　to　judge　synthetically；　affirm；

and　determine　respecting　objects　in　general。　In　this　case　the　exercise

of　the　pure　understanding　becomes　dialectical。　The　second　part　of

our　transcendental　logic　must　therefore　be　a　critique　of　dialectical

illusion；　and　this　critique　we　shall　term　transcendental　dialectic…

not　meaning　it　as　an　art　of　producing　dogmatically　such　illusion　（an

art　which　is　unfortunately　too　current　among　the　practitioners　of

metaphysical　juggling）；　but　as　a　critique　of　understanding　and

reason　in　regard　to　their　hyperphysical　use。　This　critique　will　expose

the　groundless　nature　of　the　pretensions　of　these　two　faculties；　and

invalidate　their　claims　to　the　discovery　and　enlargement　of　our

cognitions　merely　by　means　of　transcendental　principles；　and　show　that

the　proper　employment　of　these　faculties　is　to　test　the　judgements

made　by　the　pure　understanding；　and　to　guard　it　from　sophistical

delusion。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　Transcendental　Logic。　FIRST　DIVISION。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　TRANSCENDENTAL　ANALYTIC。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　I。



　　Transcendental　analytic　is　the　dissection　of　the　whole　of　our　a

priori　knowledge　into　the　elements　of　the　pure　cognition　of　the

understanding。　In　order　to　effect　our　purpose；　it　is　necessary：　（1）

That　the　conceptions　be　pure　and　not　empirical；　（2）　That　they　belong

not　to　intuition　and　sensibility；　but　to　thought　and　understanding；

（3）　That　they　be　elementary　conceptions；　and　as　such；　quite

different　from　deduced　or　compound　conceptions；　（4）　That　our　table

of　these　elementary　conceptions　be　complete；　and　fill　up　the　whole

sphere　of　the　pure　understanding。　Now　this　completeness　of　a　science

cannot　be　accepted　with　confidence　on　the　guarantee　of　a　mere　estimate

of　its　existence　in　an　aggregate　formed　only　by　means　of　repeated

experiments　and　attempts。　The　completeness　which　we　require　is

possible　only　by　means　of　an　idea　of　the　totality　of　the　a　priori

cognition　of　the　understanding；　and　through　the　thereby　determined

division　of　the　conceptions　which　form　the　said　whole；　consequently；

only　by　means　of　their　connection　in　a　system。　Pure　understanding

distinguishes　itself　not　merely　from　everything　empirical；　but　also

completely　from　all　sensibility。　It　is　a　unity　self…subsistent；

self…sufficient；　and　not　to　be　enlarged　by　any　additions　from　without。

Hence　the　sum　of　its　cognition　constitutes　a　system　to　be　determined

by　and　comprised　under　an　idea；　and　the　completeness　and

articulation　of　this　system　can　at　the　same　time　serve　as　a　test　of

the　correctness　and　genuineness　of　all　the　parts　of　cognition　that

belong　to　it。　The　whole　of　this　part　of　transcendental　logic

consists　of　two　books；　of　which　the　one　contains　the　conceptions；

and　the　other　the　principles　of　pure　understanding。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　BOOK　I。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Analytic　of　Conceptions。　SS　2



　　By　the　term　Analytic　of　Conceptions；　I　do　not　understand　the

analysis　of　these；　or　the　usual　process　in　philosophical

investigations　of　dissecting　the　conceptions　which　present　themselves；

according　to　their　content；　and　so　making　them　clear；　but　I　mean　the

hitherto　little　attempted　dissection　of　the　faculty　of　understanding

itself；　in　order　to　investigate　the　possibility　of　conceptions　a

priori；　by　looking　for　them　in　the　understanding　alone；　as　their

birthplace；　and　analysing　the　pure　use　of　this　faculty。　For　this　is

the　proper　duty　of　a　transcendental　philosophy；　what　remains　is　the

logical　treatment　of　the　conceptions　in　philosophy　in　general。　We

shall　therefore　follow　up　the　pure　conceptions　even　to　their　germs　and

beginnings　in　the　human　understanding；　in　which　they　lie；　until　they

are　developed　on　occasions　presented　by　experience；　and；　freed　by

the　same　understanding　from　the　empirical　conditions　attaching　to

them；　are　set　forth　in　their　unalloyed　purity。

　　CHAPTER　I。　Of　the　Transcendental　Clue　to　the　Discovery　of　all　Pure

　　　　　　　　　　　　　Conceptions　of　the　Understanding。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Introductory。　SS　3



　　When　we　call　into　play　a　faculty　of　cognition；　different　conceptions

manifest　themselves　according　to　the　different　circumstances；　and　make

known　this　faculty；　and　assemble　themselves　into　a　more　or　less

extensive　collection；　according　to　the　time　or　penetration　that　has

been　applied　to　the　consideration　of　them。　Where　this　process；

conducted　as　it　is　mechanically；　s