science of logic-第3部分

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To　exhibit　the　realm　of　thought　philosophically；　that　is；　in　its　own　immanent　activity　or　what　is　the
same；　in　its　necessary　development；？　had　therefore　to　be　a　fresh　undertaking；　one　that　had　to　be
started　right　from　the　beginning；　but　this　traditional　material；　the　familiar　forms　of　thought；　must　be
regarded　as　an　extremely　important　source；　indeed　as　a　necessary　condition　and　as　a
presupposition　to　be　gratefully　acknowledged　even　though　what　it　offers　is　only　here　and　there　a
meagre　shred　or　a　disordered　heap　of　dead　bones　？。　

The　forms　of　thought　are；　in　the　first　instance；　displayed　and　stored　as　human　language。
Nowadays　we　cannot　be　too　often　reminded　that　it　is　thinking　which　distinguishes　man　from　the
beasts。　Into　all　that　becomes　something　inward　for　men；　an　image　or　conception　as　such；　into　all
that　he　makes　his　own；　language　has　penetrated；　and　everything　that　he　has　transformed　into
language　and　expresses　in　it　contains　a　category…concealed；　mixed　with　other　forms　or　clearly
determined　as　such；　so　much　is　Logic　his　natural　element；　indeed　his　own　peculiar　nature。　If
nature　as　such；　as　the　physical　world；　is　contrasted　with　the　spiritual　sphere；　then　logic　must
certainly　be　said　to　be　the　supernatural　element　which　permeates　every　relationship　of　man　to
nature；　his　sensation；　intuition；　desire；　need；　instinct；　and　simply　by　so　doing　transforms　it　into
something　human；　even　though　only　formally　human；　into　ideas　and　purposes。　It　is　an　advantage
when　a　language　possesses　an　abundance　of　logical　expressions；　that　is；　specific　and　separate
expressions　for　the　thought　determinations　themselves；　many　prepositions　and　articles　denote
relationships　based　on　thought；　the　Chinese　language　is　supposed　not　to　have　developed　to　this
stage　or　only　to　an　inadequate　extent。　These　particles；　however；　play　quite　a　subordinate　part
having　only　a　slightly　more　independent　form　than　the　prefixes　and　suffixes；　inflections　and　the　like。
It　is　much　more　important　that　in　a　language　the　categories　should　appear　in　the　form　of
substantives　and　verbs　and　thus　be　stamped　with　the　form　of　objectivity。　In　this　respect　German
has　many　advantages　over　other　modern　languages；　some　of　its　words　even　possess　the　further
peculiarity　of　having　not　only　different　but　opposite　meanings　so　that　one　cannot　fail　to　recognise　a
speculative　spirit　of　the　language　in　them：　it　can　delight　a　thinker　to　come　across　such　words　and　to
find　the　union　of　opposites　naively　shown　in　the　dictionary　as　one　word　with　opposite　meanings；
although　this　result　of　speculative　thinking　is　nonsensical　to　the　understanding。　Philosophy　therefore
stands　in　no　need　of　a　special　terminology；　true；　some　words　have　to　be　taken　from　foreign
languages　but　these　have　already　acquired　through　usage　the　right　of　citizenship　in　the　philosophical
realm…and　an　affected　purism　would　be　most　inappropriate　where　it　was　the　distinctive　meaning
which　was　of　decisive　importance。　The　advance　of　culture　generally；　and　of　the　sciences　in
particular；　gradually　brings　into　use　higher　relationships　of　thought；　or　at　least　raises　them　to　greater
universality　and　they　have　thus　attracted　increased　attention。　This　applies　even　to　the　empirical　and
natural　sciences　which　in　general　employ　the　commonest　categories；　for　example；　whole　and　parts；
a　thing　and　its　properties；　and　the　like。

In　physics；　for　example；　the　category　of　force　has　become　predominant；　but　more　recently　the
category　of　polarity　which　is　the　determination　of　a　difference　in　which　the　different　terms　are
inseparably　conjoined；　has　played　the　leading　part　although　it　has　been　used　inordinately　in
connection　with　all　phenomena；　even　with　light。

It　is　a　matter　of　infinite　importance　that　in　this　way　an　advance　has　been　made　beyond　the　form　of
abstraction；　of　identity；　by　which　a　specific　concept；　as；　for　example；　force；　acquires　an
independent　self…subsistence；　and　that　prominence　and　currency　have　been　given　to　the
determinate　form；　the　difference；　which　is　at…the　same　time　an　inseparable　element　in　the　identity。
Because　of　the　fixed　reality　of　natural　objects　the　study　of　nature　compels　us　to　fix　the　categories
which　can　no　longer　be　ignored　in　her；　although　with　complete　inconsistency　towards　other
categories　which　are　also　allowed　to　remain　valid；　and　such　study　does　not　permit　the　further　step
of　abstracting　from　the　opposition　and　indulging　in　generalities　as　so　easily　happens　in　the
intellectual　sphere。

But　while　logical　objects　and　their　expressions　may　be　thoroughly　familiar　to　educated　people　it
does　not　follow；　as　I　have　said　elsewhere；　that　they　are　intelligently　apprehended；　and　to　have　to
occupy　oneself　with　what　is　familiar　can　even　arouse　impatience　—　and　what　is　more　familiar　than
just　those　determinations　of　thought　which　we　employ　on　every　occasion；　which　pass　our　lips　in
every　sentence　we　speak？

It　is　the　purpose　of　this　foreword　to　indicate　the　general　features　of　the　course　followed　by
knowing　in　its　advance　beyond　a　mere　acquaintance　with　its　objects；　of　the　relation　of
philosophical　＇wissenschaftlichen＇　thinking　to　this　natural　thinking。　This　much；　together　with　what
was　contained　in　the　earlier　Introduction；　will　be　sufficient　to　give　a　general　idea　of　what　is　meant
by　logical　cognition；　the　kind　of　preliminary　general　idea　which　is　demanded　in　the　case　of　any
science　prior　to　its　exposition；　that　is；　prior　to　the　import　of　the　science　itself。

In　the　first　place；　we　must　regard　it　as　an　infinite　step　forward　that　the　forms　of　thought　have　been
freed　from　the　material　in　which　they　are　submerged　in　self…conscious　intuition；　figurate　conception；
and　in　our　desiring　and　willing；　or　rather　in　ideational　desiring　and　willing　—　and　there　is　no　human
desiring　or　willing　without　ideation　—　and　that　these　universalities　have　been　brought　into
prominence　for　their　own　sake　and　made　objects　of　contemplation　as　was　done　by　Plato　and　after
him　especially　by　Aristotle；　this　constitutes　the　beginning　of　the　intelligent　apprehension　of　them。　

'It　was　only'；　says　Aristotle；　'after　almost　everything　necessary　and　everything　requisite　for　human
comfort　and　intercourse　was　available；　that　man　began　to　concern　himself　with　philosophical
knowledge'　'In　Egypt'；　he　had　previously　remarked；　'there　was　an　early　development　of　the
mathematical　sciences　because　there　the　priestly　caste　at　an　early　stage　were　in　a　position　to　have
leisure'。　

As　a　matter　of　fact；　the　need　to　occupy　oneself　with　pure　thought　presupposes　that　the　human
spirit　must　already　have　travelled　a　long　road；

In　the　silent　regions　of　thought　which　has　come　to　itself　and　communes　only　with　itself；　the　interests
which　move　the　lives　of　races　and　individuals　are　hushed。？　it　is；　one　may　say；　the　need　of　the
already　satisfied　need　for　the　necessities　to　which　it　must　have　attained；　the　need　of　a　condition
free　from　needs；　of　abstraction　from　the　material　of　intuition；　imagination；　and　so　on；　of　the
concrete　interests　of　desire；　instinct；　will；　in　which　material　the　determinations　of　thought　are　veiled
and　hidden。　In　the　silent　regions　of　thought　which　has　come　to　itself　and　communes　only　with　itself；
the　interests　which　move　the　lives　of　races　and　individuals　are　hushed。

'In　so　many　respects'；　says　Aristotle　in　the　same　context；　'the　nature　of　man　is　in　bondage；　but　this
science；　which　is　not　studied　for　its　utility；　is　the　only　absolutely　free　science　and　seems　therefore
to　be　a　more　than　human　possessions　Philosophical　thinking　in　general　is　still　concerned　with
concrete　objects…God；　nature；　spirit；　but　logic　is　concerned　only　and　solely　with　these　thoughts　as
thoughts；　in　their　complete　abstraction。　For　this　reason　it　is　customary；　to　include　logic　in　the
curriculum　of　youth；　for　youth　is　not　yet　involved　in　the　practical　affairs　of　life；　living　at　leisure　
so　far　as　they　are　concerned；　and　it　is　only　for　its　own　subjective　ends　that　it　has　to　busy　itself　with
acquiring　the　means　to　enable　it　to　become　actively　engaged　with　the　objects　of　those　practical
interests…and　still　theoretically　even　with　these。　Contrary　to　Aristotle's　view　just　mentioned；　the
science　of　logic　is　included　in　these　means；　the　study　of　logic　is　a　preliminary　labour　to　be　carried
out　in　school　and　it　is　not　until　later　that　the　serious　business　of　life　and　the　pursuit　of　substantial
ends　begins。

In　life；　the　categories　are　used；　from　the　honour　of　being　contemplated　for　their　own　sakes　they
are　degraded　to　the　position　where　they　serve　in　the　creation　and　exchange　of　ideas　involved　in
intellectual　exercise　on　a　living　content。　First　they　serve　as　abbreviations　through　their　universality
（for　what　a　host　of　particulars　of　outer　existence　and　actions　is　embraced　by　a　conception　—
battle；　war；　nation；　ocean　or　animal；　for　example　—　and　in　the　conception　of　God　or　of　love　there
is　epitomised　in　the　simplicity　of　such　ideating　an　infinite　host　of　ideas；　actions；　states；　etc。！）。

Secondly；　the　categories　serve　for　the　more　exact　determination　and　discovery　of　objective
relations；　but　in　this　process　the　import　and　purpose；　the　correctness　and　truth　of　the　thought
involved；　are　made　to　depend　entirely　on　the　subject　matter　itself　and　the　thought　determinations
are　not　themselves　credited　with　any　active　part　in　determining　the　content。　Such　a　use　of
categories；　which　above　was　called　natural　logic；　is　unconscious；　and　when　in　philosophical
reflection　the　categories　are　assigned　the　role　of　serving　as　means；　then　thinking　as　such　is　treated
as　something　subordinate　to　the　other　activities　of　mind。　We　do　not　indeed　say　of　our　feelings；
impulses　or　interests　that　they　serve　us；　rather　do　they　count　as　independent　forces　and　powers；　so
that　to　have　this　particular　feeling；　to　desire　this；　is　what　we　are。？　But　probably　we　are　more
conscious　of　obeying　our　feelings；　impulses；　passions；　interests；　not　to　mention　habits；　than　of
having　them　in　our　possession；　still　less；　in　view　of　our　intimate　union　with　them；　of　their　being　at
our　disposal。　Such　determinations　of　feeling　and　mind　soon　show　themselves　as　particular　in
contrast　to　the　universality　which　we　are　conscious　ourselves　of　being　and　in　which