science of logic-第4部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


contrast　to　the　universality　which　we　are　conscious　ourselves　of　being　and　in　which　we　have　our
freedom；　and　we　are　disposed　to　regard　ourselves　as　caught　up　in　these　particular　states　and
dominated　by　them。

Consequently　it　is　much　more　difficult　to　believe　that　the　forms　of　thought　which　permeate　all　our
ideas　—　whether　these　are　purely　theoretical　or　contain　a　matter　belonging　to　feeling；　impulse；　will
—　are　means　for　us；　rather　than　that　we　serve　them；　that　in　fact　they　have　us　in　their　possession；
what　is　there　more　in　us　as　against　them；　how　shall　we；　how　shall　I；　set　myself　up　as　more
universal　than　they；　which　are　universal　as　such？

When　we　give　ourselves　up　to　a　sensation；　a　purpose；　an　interest；　and　in　it　feel　ourselves　confined
and　unfree；　the　place　into　which　we　can　withdraw　ourselves　back　into　freedom　is　this　region　of
self…certainty；　of　pure　abstraction；　of　thought。　Or　again；　to　speak　of　things；　we　call　the　nature　or
the　essence　of　things　their　notion；　and　this　is　only　for　thought；　but　still　less　shall　we　say　of　the
notions　of　things　that　we　dominate　them；　or　that　the　determinations　of　thought　of　which　they　are　the
complex　are　at　our　service；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　our　thinking　that　must　accommodate　itself　to　them
and　our　caprice　or　freedom　ought　not　to　want　to　mould　them　to　suit　itself。

Since；　therefore；　subjective　thought　is　our　very　own；　innermost；　act；　and　the　objective　notion　of
things　constitutes　their　essential　import；　we　cannot　go　outside　this　our　act；　we　cannot　stand　above
it；　and　just　as　little　can　we　go　beyond　the　nature　of　things。　We　can　however　disregard　the　latter
determination；　in　so　far　as　it　coincides　with　the　first　it　would　yield　a　relation　of　our　thoughts　to　the
object；　but　this　would　be　a　valueless　result　because　it　would　imply　that　the　thing；　the　object；　would
be　set　up　as　a　criterion　for　our　notions　and　yet　for　us　the　object　can　be　nothing　else　but　our　notions
of　it。　The　way　in　which　the　critical　philosophy　understands　the　relationship　of　these　three　terms　is
that　we　place　our　thoughts　as　a　medium　instead　of　connecting　us　with　the　objects　rather　cuts　us　off
from　them。　But　this　view　can　be　countered　by　the　simple　observation　that　these　very　things　which
are　supposed　to　stand　beyond　us；　and　at　the　other　extreme；　beyond　the　thoughts　referring　to　them；
are　themselves　figments　of　subjective　thought；　and　as　wholly　indeterminate　they　are　only　a　single
thought…thing　—　the　so…called　thing…in…itself　of　empty　abstraction。？

Still；　sufficient　has　been　said　of　the　point　of　view　which　no　longer　takes　the　determinations　of
thought　to　be　only　an　instrument　and　a　means；　more　important　is　the　further　point　connected　with
it；　namely　that　it　is　usual　to　regard　them　as　an　external　form。　The　activity　of　thought　which　is　at
work　in　all　our　ideas；　purposes；　interests　and　actions　is；　as　we　have　said；　unconsciously　busy
（natural　logic）；　what　we　consciously　attend　to　is　the　contents；　the　objects　of　our　ideas；　that　in
which　we　are　interested；　on　this　basis；　the　determinations　of　thought　have　the　significance　of　forms
which　are　only　attached　to　the　content；　but　are　not　the　content　itself。　But　if　the　truth　of　the　matter　is
what　we　have　already　stated　and　also　is　generally　admitted；　namely　that　the　nature；　the　peculiar
essence；　that　which　is　genuinely　permanent　and　substantial　in　the　complexity　and　contingency　of
appearance　and　fleeting　manifestation；　is　the　notion　of　the　thing；　the　immanent　universal；　and
that　each　human　being　though　infinitely　unique　is　so　primarily　because　he　is　a　man；　and　each
individual　animal　is　such　individual　primarily　because　it　is　an　animal：　if　this　is　true；　then　it　would　be
impossible　to　say　what　such　an　individual　could　still　be　if　this

foundation　were　removed；　no　matter　how　richly　endowed　the　individual　might　be　with　other
predicates；　if；　that　is；　this　foundation　can　equally　be　called　a　predicate　like　the　others。　The
indispensable　foundation；　the　notion；　the　universal　which　is　the　thought　itself；　in　so　far　as　one　can
make　abstraction　from　the　general　idea　expressed　by　the　word　'thought'；　cannot　be　regarded　as
only　an　indifferent　form　attached　to　a　content。　But　these　thoughts　of　everything　natural　and
spiritual；　even　the　substantial　content　；　still　contain　a　variety　of　determinatenesses　and　are　still
charged　with　the　difference　of　a　soul　and　a　body；　of　the　notion　and　a　relative　reality；　the
profounder　basis　is　the　soul　itself；　the　pure　Notion　which　is　the　very　heart　of　things；　their　simple
life…pulse；　even　of　subjective　thinking　of　them。　
To　focus　attention　on　this　logical　nature　which　animates　mind；　moves　and　works　in　it；　this　is　the
task。　The　broad　distinction　between　the　instinctive　act　and　the　intelligent　and　free　act　is　that　the
latter　is　performed　with　an　awareness　of　what　is　being　done；　when　the　content　of　the　interest　in
which　one　is　absorbed　is　drawn　out　of　its　immediate　unity　with　oneself　and　becomes　an
independent　object　of　one's　thinking；　then　it　is　that　spirit　begins　to　be　free；　whereas　when　thinking
is　an　instinctive　activity；　spirit　is　enmeshed　in　the　bonds　of　its　categories　and　is　broken　up　into　an
infinitely　varied　material。

Here　and　there　in　this　mesh　there　are　firm　knots　which　give　stability　and　direction　to　the　life　and
consciousness　of　spirit；　these　knots　or　nodes　owe　their　fixity　and　power　to　the　simple　fact　that
having　been　brought　before　consciousness；　they　are　independent；　self…existent　Notions　of　its
essential　nature。　The　most　important　point　for　the　nature　of　spirit　is　not　only　the　relation　of　what　it
is　in　itself　to　what　it　is　actually；　but　the　relation　of　what　it　knows　itself　to　be　to　what　it　actually　is；
because　spirit　is　essentially　consciousness；　this　self…knowing　is　a　fundamental　determination　of　its
actuality。

As　impulses　the　categories　are　only　instinctively　active。　At　first　they　enter　consciousness　separately
and　so　are　variable　and　mutually　confusing；　consequently　they　afford　to　mind　only　a　fragmentary
and　uncertain　actuality；　the　loftier　business　of　logic　therefore　is　to　clarify　these　categories　and　in
them　to　raise　mind　to　freedom　and　truth。

What　we　indicated　as　the　beginning　of　the　science　＇of　logic＇　—　a　beginning　which　we　have　already
recognised　as　having　a　high　value　both　on　its　own　account　and　as　a　condition　of　genuine
knowledge…namely；　the　treatment　of　Notions　generally　and　the　moments　of　the　Notion；　that　is；　the
determinations　of　thought；　primarily　as　forms　which　are　distinct　from　the　matter　of　thought　and　only
attached　to　it；　this　attitude　directly　reveals　itself　as　intrinsically　inadequate　for　the　attainment　of　truth
—　and　the　truth　is　the　declared　object　of　and　aim　of　logic。　For；　as　such　mere　forms；　as　distinct
from　the　content；　they　are　assumed　to　be　standing　in　a　determination　which　stamps　them　as　finite
and　makes　them　incapable　of　holding　the　truth　which　is　in　its　own　self　infinite。　In　whatever　respect
the　true　may　be　associated　with　limitation　and　finitude；　this　is　the　aspect　of　its　negation；　of　its
untruth　and　unreality；　that　is；　of　its　end；　not　of　the　affirmation　which；　as　the　true；　it　is。？

Faced　with　the　baldness　of　the　merely　formal　categories；　the　instinct　of　healthy　common　sense　has；
in　the　end；　felt　itself　to　be　so　much　in　the　right　that　it　has　contemptuously　abandoned
acquaintanceship　with　them　to　the　domain　of　school　logic　and　metaphysics；　at　the　same　time；
common　sense　fails　to　appreciate　the　value　even　of　a　proper　awareness　of　these　fragments　and　is
quite　unaware　that　in　the　instinctive　thinking　of　natural　logic；　and　still　more　in　the　deliberate
rejection　of　any　acquaintance　with　or　knowledge　of　the　thought　determinations　themselves；　it　is　in
bondage　to　unclarified　and　therefore　unfree　thinking。　The　simple　basic　determination　or　common
form　of　the　collection　of　such　forms　is　identity　which；　in　the　logic　of　this　collection；　is　asserted　as
the　law　of　identity；　as　A　=　A；　and　as　the　principle　of　contradiction。　Healthy　common　sense　has　so
much　lost　its　respect　for　the　school　which　claims　possession　of　such　laws　of　truth　and　still　busies
itself　with　them　that　it　ridicules　it　and　its　laws　and　regards　anyone　as　insufferable　who　can　utter
truths　in　accordance　with　such　laws：　the　plant　is…a　plant；　science　is…science。　It　has　also　formed　an
equally　just　estimate　of　the　significance　of　the　formulas　which　constitute　the　rules　of　syllogising
which　in　fact　is　a　cardinal　function　of　the　understanding　（although　it　would　be　a　mistake　not　to
recognise　that　these　have　their　place　in　cognition　where　they　must　be　obeyed）；　it　knows　that　the
formulas　quite　as　well　serve　impartially　error　and　sophistry　and　that　however　truth　may　be　defined；
they　cannot　serve　higher；　for　example；　religious　truth…that　generally　speaking　they　concern　only　the
correctness　of　the　knowledge　of　facts；　not　truth　itself。

The　inadequacy　of　this　way　of　regarding　thought　which　leaves　truth　on　one　side　can　only　be　made
good　by　including　in　our　conception　of　thought　not　only　that　which　is　usually　reckoned　as
belonging　to　the　external　form　but　the　content　as　well。　It　is　soon　evident　that　what　at　first　to
ordinary　reflection　is；　as　content；　divorced　from　form；　cannot　in　fact　be　formless；　cannot　be　devoid
of　inner　determination；　if　it　were；　then　it　would　be　only　vacuity；　the　abstraction　of　the　thing…in…itself；
that；　on　the　contrary；　the　content　in　its　own　self　possesses　form；　in　fact　it　is　through　form　alone　that
it　has　soul　and　meaning；　and　that　it　is　form　itself　which　is　transformed　only　into　the　semblance　of　a
content；　hence　into　the　semblance　of　something　external　to　this　semblance。　With　this　introduction
of　the　content　into　the　logical　treatment；　the　subject　matter　is　not　things　but　their　import；　the
Notion　of　them。　But　in　this　connection　we　can　be　reminded　that　there　is　a　multitude　of　Notions；　a
multitude　of　objects　＇Sache＇。　We　have；　however；　already　said　how　it　is　that　restrictions　are
imposed　on　this　multitude；　that　the　Notion；　simply　as　thought；　as　a　universal；　is　the　immeasurable
abbreviation　of　the　multitudes　of　particular　things　which　are　vaguely　present　to　intuition　and
pictorial　thought；　but　also　a　Notion　is；　first；　in　its　own　self　the　Notion；　and　this　is　only　one