science of logic-第43部分

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process；　are　indeed　extinct。　But　since　this　unity　is　essential　to　the　Notion　and　has　at　the　same　time
come　into　concrete　existence；　it　is　still　present；　though　its　place　is　outside　the　neutral　object。　The
process　does　not　spontaneously　re…kindle　itself；　for　it　had　the　difference　only　for　its
presupposition　and　did　not　itself　posit　it。　This　self…subsistent　negativity　outside　the　object；　the
existence　of　the　abstract　individuality　whose　being…for…self　has　its　reality　in　the　indifferent　object；
is　now　tensed　within　itself　against　its　abstraction；　and　is　an　inward　restless　activity　that　turns
outwards　to　consume。　It　relates　itself　immediately　to　the　object　whose　quiescent　neutrality　is　the
real　possibility　of　its　opposition；　that　object　is　now　the　middle　term　of　the　previously　merely
formal　neutrality；　now　inwardly　concrete　and　determinate。

The　more　precise　immediate　relation　of　the　extreme　of　negative　unity　to　the　object　is　that　the
latter　is　determined　by　it　and　thereby　disrupted。　This　disruption　may　in　the　first　instance　be
regarded　as　the　restoration　of　that　opposition　of　the　objects　in　tension　with　which　chemism　began。
But　this　determination　does　not　constitute　the　other　extreme　of　the　syllogism　but　belongs　to　the
immediate　relation　of　the　differentiating　principle　to　the　middle　term　in　which　this　principle　gives
itself　its　immediate　reality；　it　is　the　determinateness　that　the　middle　term　in　the　disjunctive　syllogism
also　possesses　besides　being　the　universal　nature　of　the　object；　and　by　virtue　of　which　the　object　is
both　objective　universality　and　also　determinate　particularity。　The　other　extreme　of　the　syllogism
stands　opposed　to　the　external　self…subsistent　extreme　of　individuality；　it　is　therefore　the　equally
self…subsistent　extreme　of　universality；　hence　the　disruption　suffered　by　the　real　neutrality　of　the
middle　term　in　this　extreme　is　that　it　is　split　up　into　moments　whose　relationship　is　not　that　of
difference；　but　of　indifference。　Accordingly　these　moments　are　the　abstract　indifferent　base　on　the
one　side；　and　its　energising　principle　on　the　other；　which　latter　by　its　separation　from　the　base
attains　likewise　the　form　of　indifferent　objectivity。

This　disjunctive　syllogism　is　the　totality　of　chemism　in　which　the　same　objective　whole　is　exhibited
first　as　self…subsistent　negative　unity；　then　in　the　middle　term　as　real　unity；　and　finally　as　the
chemical　reality　resolved　into　its　abstract　moments。　In　these　latter　the　determinateness　has　not
reached　its　reflection…into…self　in　an　other　as　in　the　neutral　product；　but　has　in　itself　returned　into
its　abstraction；　and　is　an　originally　determinate　element。

3。　These　elementary　objects　are　accordingly　liberated　from　chemical　tension；　in　them；　the　original
basis　of　that　presupposition　with　which　chemism　began　has　been　posited　through　the　real
process。　Now　further；　the　inner　determinateness　as　such　of　these　；objects　is　essentially　the
contradiction　of　their　simple　indifferent　subsistence　and　themselves　as　determinateness；　and　is
the　urge　outwards　that　sunders　itself　and　posits　tension　in　its　object　and　in　another　object　in　order
to　have　something　with　which　it　can　enter　into　a　relation　of　difference　and　in　which　it　can　neutralise
itself　and　give　to　its　simple　determinateness　an　existent　reality。　Consequently；　on　the　one　hand
chemism　has　returned　into　its　beginning　in　which　objects　in　a　state　of　reciprocal　tension　seek　one
another　and　then　by　a　formal；　external　middle　term；　unite　to　form　a　neutral　product。　On　the　other
hand；　chemism　by　this　return　into　its　Notion　sublates　itself　and　has　passed　over　into　a　higher
sphere。

C。　TRANSITION　OF　CHEMISM

Even　ordinary　chemistry　shows　examples　of　chemical　alterations　in　which　a　body；　for　example；
imparts　a　higher　oxidation　to　one　part　of　its　mass　and　thereby　reduces　another　part　to　a　lower
degree　of　oxidation；　in　which　lower　degree　alone　it　can　enter　into　a　neutral　combination　with
another　＇chemically＇　different　body　brought　into　contact　with　it；　a　combination　for　which　it　would
not　have　been　receptive　in　that　first　immediate　degree。　What　happens　here　is　that　the　object　does
not　relate　itself　to　another　in　accordance　with　an　immediate；　one…sided　determinateness；　but　that　in
accordance　with　the　inner　totality　of　an　original　relation　it　posits　the　presupposition　which　it
requires　for　a　real　relation　and　thereby　gives　itself　a　middle　term　through　which　it　unites　its　Notion
with　its　reality；　it　is　absolutely　determined　individuality；　the　concrete　Notion　as　principle　of　the
disjunction　into　extremes　whose　re…union　is　the　activity　of　the　same　negative　principle；　which
thereby　returns　to　its　first　determination；　but　returns　objectified。

Chemism　itself　is　the　first　negation　of　indifferent　objectivity　and　of　the　externality　of
determinateness；　it　is　therefore　still　infected　with　the　immediate　self…subsistence　of　the　object　and
with　externality。　Consequently　it　is　not　yet　for　itself　that　totality　of　self…determination　that　proceeds
from　it　and　in　which　rather　it　is　sublated。　The　three　syllogisms　yielded　by　the　foregoing　exposition
constitute　its　totality；　the　first　has　for　middle　term　formal　neutrality　and　for　extremes　the　objects　in
tension；　the　second　has　for　middle　term　the　product　of　the　first；　real　neutrality；　and　for　extremes
the　sundering　activity　and　its　product；　the　indifferent　element；　while　the　third　is　the　self…realising
Notion；　which　posits　for　itself　the　presupposition　by　which　the　process　of　its　realisation　is
conditioned　—　a　syllogism　that　has　the　universal　for　its　essence。　On　account；　however；　of　the
immediacy　and　externality　attaching　to　chemical　objectivity；　these　syllogisms　still　fall　apart。　The
first　process　whose　product　is　the　neutrality　of　the　objects　in　tension　is　extinguished　in　its　product；
and　it　is　an　externally　applied　differentiation　that　re…kindles　it；　conditioned　by　an　immediate
presupposition；　it　exhausts　itself　in　it。　Similarly；　the　separation　of　the　＇chemically＇　different　extremes
out　of　the　neutral　product；　as　also　their　decomposition　into　their　abstract　elements；　must　proceed
from　conditions　and　stimulations　of　activity　externally　brought　into　play。　Also；　although　the　two
essential　moments　of　the　process；　on　the　one　side　neutralisation；　on　the　other　separation　and
reduction；　are　combined　in　one　and　the　same　process；　and　the　union　of　the　extremes　by
weakening　of　the　tension　between　them　is　also　a　sundering　into　such　extremes；　yet　on　account　of
the　still　underlying　externality　they　constitute　two　different　sides；　the　extremes　that　are　separated
in　that　same　process　are　different　objects　or　materials　from　those　that　unite　in　it；　in　so　far　as　the
former　emerge　again　from　the　process　as　＇chemically＇　different　they　must　turn　outwards；　their　new
neutralisation　is　a　different　process　from　the　neutralisation　that　took　place　in　the　first　process。

But　these　various　processes；　which　have　proved　themselves　necessary；　are　so　many　stages　by
which　externality　and　conditionedness　are　sublated　and　from　which　the　Notion　emerges　as　a
totality　determined　in　and　for　itself　and　not　conditioned　by　externality。　In　the　first　process；　the
mutual　externality　of　the　different　extremes　that　constitute　the　whole　reality；　or　the　distinction
between　the　implicitly　determinate　Notion　and　its　existent　determinateness；　is　sublated；　in　the
second；　the　externality　of　the　real　unity；　the　union　as　merely　neutral；　is　sublated；　more　precisely；
the　formal　activity　in　the　first　instance　sublates　itself　in　equally　formal　bases　or　indifferent
determinatenesses；　whose　inner　Notion　is　now　the　indrawn　absolute　activity　as　inwardly
self…realising；　that　is；　the　activity　that　posits　the　determinate　differences　within　itself　and　through　this
mediation　constitutes　itself　as　real　unity　—　a　mediation　which　is　thus　the　Notion's　own　mediation；　its
self…determination；　and　in　respect　of　its　reflection　thence　into　itself；　an　immanent　presupposing。
The　third　syllogism；　which　on　the　one　hand　is　the　restoration　of　the　preceding　processes；　on　the
other　hand　sublates　the　last　remaining　moment　of　indifferent　bases　the　wholly　abstract　external
immediacy；　which　in　this　way　becomes　the　Notion's　own　moment　of　self…mediation。　The　Notion
which　has　thus　sublated　all　the　moments　of　its　objective　existence　as　external；　and　posited　them
within　its　simple　unity；　is　thereby　completely　liberated　from　objective　externality；　to　which　it　relates
itself　only　as　to　an　unessential　reality。　This　objective　free　Notion　is　end。




THE　DOCTRINE　OF　THE　NOTION
　　　　　　Section　Two：　Objectivity；　continued

Chapter　3　Teleology

　　　　　Subjective　End　…　The　Means　…　The　Realised　End



Where　purposiveness　is　discerned；　an　intelligence　＇Verstand＇　is　assumed　as　its　author；　and　for
the　end　we　therefore　demand　the　Notion's　own　free　Existence。　Teleology　is　especially　contrasted
with　mechanism；　in　which　the　determinateness　posited　in　the　object；　being　external；　is　essentially
one　in　which　no　self…determination　is　manifested。　The　opposition　between　causae　efficientes
and　causae　finalis；　between　merely　efficient　and　final　causes；　relates　to　this　distinction；　and　this
distinction；　taken　in　a　concrete　form；　is　also　made　the　criterion　for　deciding　whether　the　absolute
essence　of　the　world　is　to　be　conceived　as　blind　natural　mechanism　or　as　an　intelligence　that
determines　itself　in　accordance　with　ends。　The　antinomy　between　fatalism；　along　with
determinism　and　freedom；　is　likewise　concerned　with　the　opposition　of　mechanism　and
teleology；　for　the　free　is　the　Notion　in　its　Existence。

Earlier　metaphysics　has　treated　these　concepts　as　it　has　treated　others；　it　has　for　one　thing
presupposed　a　certain　conception　of　the　world　and　laboured　to　show　that　one　or　the　other
concept　fitted　it；　while　the　opposite　one　was　defective　because　it　failed　to　explain　that　conception；
and　again；　while　doing　this；　it　has　not　examined　the　concept　of　mechanical　cause　and　of　end；　to　see
which　possesses　truth　in　and　for　itself。　When　this　has　been　established　independently；　the
objective　world　may　present　us　with　mechanical　and　final　causes；　but　their　existence　is　not　the
standard　of　truth：　on　the　contrary；　truth　is　the　criterion　that　d