science of logic-第50部分

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transitory　and　untrue。　Although　therefore　the　Idea　has　its　reality　in　a　material　externality；　this　is　not
an　abstract　being　subsisting　on　its　own　account　over　against　the　Notion；　on　the　contrary；　it　exists
only　as　a　becoming　through　the　negativity　of　indifferent　being；　as　a　simple　determinateness　of　the
Notion。　

This　yields　the　following　more　precise　definitions　of　the　Idea。　First；　it　is　the　simple　truth；　the　identity
of　the　Notion　and　objectivity　as　a　universal　in　which　the　opposition　and　subsistence　of　the
particular　is　dissolved　into　its　self…identical　negativity　and　is　equality　with　itself。　Secondly；　it　is　the
relation　of　the　explicit　subjectivity　of　the　simple　Notion　and　its　objectivity　which　is　distinguished
therefrom；　the　former　is　essentially　the　urge　to　sublate　this　separation；　and　the　latter　is　the
indifferent　positedness；　the　subsistence　that　is　in　and　for　itself　null。　As　this　relation；　the　Idea　is　the
process　of　sundering　itself　into　individuality　and　its　inorganic　nature；　and　again　of　bringing　this
inorganic　nature　under　the　power　of　the　subject　and　returning　to　the　first　simple　universality。　The
identity　of　the　Idea　with　itself　is　one　with　the　process；　the　thought　which　liberates　actuality　from
the　illusory　show　of　purposeless　mutability　and　transfigures　it　into　the　Idea　must　not　represent　this
truth　of　actuality　as　a　dead　repose；　as　a　mere　picture；　lifeless；　without　impulse　or　movement；　as　a
genius　or　number；　or　an　abstract　thought；　by　virtue　of　the　freedom　which　the　Notion　attains　in　the
Idea；　the　Idea　possesses　within　itself　also　the　most　stubborn　opposition；　its　repose　consists　in　the
security　and　certainty　with　which　it　eternally　creates　and　eternally　overcomes　that　opposition；　in　it
meeting　with　itself。　

In　the　first　instance；　however；　the　Idea　is　once　again　only　immediate　or　only　in　its　Notion；
objective　reality　is；　it　is　true；　conformable　to　the　Notion；　but　it　is　not　yet　liberated　into　the　Notion；
and　the　latter　does　not　exist　explicitly　for　itself　as　Notion。　

Thus　though　the　Notion　is　soul；　it　is　soul　in　the　guise　of　an　immediate；　that　is；　its　determinateness
does　not　appear　as　soul　itself；　it　has　not　grasped　itself　as　soul；　it　does　not　possess　its　objective
reality　within　itself；　the　Notion　is　as　a　soul　that　is　not　yet　fully　a　soul。　

At　this　first　stage　the　Idea　is　Life：　the　Notion　that；　distinguished　from　its　objectivity；　simple　within
itself；　pervades　its　objectivity　and；　as　its　own　end；　possesses　its　means　in　the　objectivity　and　posits
the　latter　as　its　means；　yet　is　immanent　in　this　means　and　is　therein　the　realised　end　that　is　identical
with　itself。　This　Idea；　on　account　of　its　immediacy；　has　individuality　for　the　form　of　its　existence。
But　the　reflection…into…self　of　its　absolute　process　is　the　sublating　of　this　immediate　individuality；
thereby　the　Notion　which；　as　universality　in　this　individuality；　is　the　inwardness　of　the　latter；
converts　the　externality　into　universality；　or　posits　its　objectivity　as　being　the　same　as　itself。　

In　this　second　stage；　the　Idea　is　the　Idea　of　the　true　and　the　good　as　cognition　and　volition。　In
the　first　instance；　it　is　finite　cognition　and　finite　volition；　in　which　the　true　and　the　good　are　still
distinguished　and　each　appears　as　yet　only　as　a　goal。　The　Notion　has；　in　the　first　instance；
liberated　itself　into　itself　and　as　yet　given　itself　only　an　abstract　objectivity　for　its　reality。　But　the
process　of　this　finite　cognition　and　action　converts　the　initially　abstract　universality　into　a　totality；
whereby　it　becomes　a　complete　objectivity。　Or；　to　consider　it　from　the　other　side；　finite；　that　is；
subjective　spirit；　makes　for　itself　the　presupposition　of　an　objective　world；　just　as　life　has　such　a
presupposition；　but　its　activity　consists　in　sublating　this　presupposition　and　converting　it　into　a
positedness。　In　this　way　its　reality　is　for　it　the　objective　world；　or　conversely；　the　objective　world
is　the　ideality　in　which　it　cognises　itself。　

Thirdly；　spirit　cognises　the　Idea　as　its　absolute　truth；　as　the　truth　that　is　in　and　for　itself；　the　infinite
Idea　in　which　cognition　and　action　are　equalised；　and　which　is　the　absolute　knowledge　of　itself。　

Chapter　1　Life

The　Idea　of　Life　is　concerned　with　a　subject　matter　so　concrete；　and　if　you　will；　so　real；　that　with　it
we　may　seem　to　have　overstepped　the　domain　of　logic　as　it　is　commonly　conceived。　Certainly；　if
logic　were　to　contain　nothing　but　empty；　dead　forms　of　thought；　there　could　be　no　mention　init　at
all　of　such　a　content　as　the　Idea　of　Life。　But　if　absolute　truth　is　the　subject　matter　of　logic；　and
truth　as　such　is　essentially　in　cognition；　then　cognition　at　least　would　have　to　be　discussed。　So
called　pure　logic　is　usually　followed　up　with　an　applied　logic　…　a　logic　dealing　with　concrete
cognition；　not　to　mention　the　mass　of　psychology　and　anthropology　that　it　is　often　deemed
necessary　to　interpolate　into　logic。　But　the　anthropological　and　psychological　side　of　cognition　is
concerned　with　its　manifested　aspect；　in　which　the　Notion　on　its　own　account　has　not　yet　come
to　have　an　objectivity　the　same　as　itself；　that　is；　to　have　itself　for　object。　The　part　of　logic　that
treats　of　this　concrete　side　does　not　belong　to　applied　logic　as　such；　if　it　did；　then　every　science
would　have　to　be　dragged　into　logic；　for　each　is　an　applied　logic　in　so　far　as　it　consists　in
apprehending　its　subject　matter　in　forms　of　thought　and　the　Notion。　The　subjective　Notion　has
presuppositions　which　present　themselves　in　psychological；　anthropological　and　other　forms。　But
to　logic　belong　only　the　presuppositions　of　the　pure　Notion　in　so　far　as　they　have　the　form　of　pure
thoughts；　of　abstract　essentialities；　that　is；　the　determinations　of　being　and　essence。　Similarly；　in
respect　of　cognition；　the　Notion's　apprehension　of　itself；　logic　will　not　deal　with　other　shapes　of　its
presupposition　but　only　with　that　which　is　itself　Idea；　this　latter；　however；　necessarily　falls　to　be
dealt　with　in　logic。　Now　this　presupposition　is　the　immediate　Idea；　for　since　cognition　is　the
Notion　in　so　far　as　this　is　for　itself　but　as　a　subjectivity　is　in　relation　to　an　objectivity；　the　Notion　is
related　to　the　Idea　as　presupposed　or　immediate　Idea。　But　the　immediate　Idea　is　life。　

To　this　extent　the　necessity　of　treating　of　the　Idea　of　life　in　logic　would　be　based　on　the　necessity；
otherwise　recognised；　too；　of　treating　here　of　the　concrete　Notion　of　cognition。　But　this　Idea　has
come　upon　the　scene　through　the　Notion's　own　necessity；　the　Idea；　that　which　is　true　in　and　for
itself；　is　essentially　the　subject　matter　of　logic；　since　it　is　at　first　to　be　considered　in　its　immediacy；　it
must　be　apprehended　and　cognised　in　this　determinateness　in　which　it　is　life；　in　order　that　its
treatment　shall　not　be　an　empty　affair　devoid　of　determinate　content。　All　that　we　need　perhaps　to
remark　is　how　far　the　logical　view　of　life　differs　from　any　other　scientific　view　of　it；　this　is　not　the
place；　however；　to　concern　ourselves　with　how　life　is　treated　in　the　unphilosophical　sciences；　but
only　with　differentiating　logical　life　as　pure　Idea　from　natural　life　which　is　dealt　with　in　the
philosophy　of　nature；　and　from　life　in　so　far　as　it　stands　in　connection　with　spirit。　The　former　of
these；　as　the　life　of　nature；　is　life　as　projected　into　the　externality　of　existence　and　having　its
condition　in　inorganic　nature；　and　where　the　moments　of　the　Idea　are　a　multiplicity　of　actual
formations。　Life　in　the　Idea　is　without　such　presuppositions　which　are　in　the　form　of　shapes　of
actuality；　its　presupposition　is　the　Notion　as　we　have　considered　it；　on　the　one　hand　as　subjective；
on　the　other　hand　as　objective。　In　nature　life　appears　as　the　highest　stage；　a　stage　that　nature's
externality　attains　by　withdrawing　into　itself　and　sublating　itself　in　subjectivity。　In　Logic　it　is　simple
inwardness　＇Insichsein＇；　which　in　the　Idea　of　life　has　attained　an　externality　that　genuinely
corresponds　to　it；　the　Notion　that　earlier　appeared　on　the　scene　as　subjective　Notion　is　the　soul　of
life　itself；　it　is　the　urge　that　mediates　for　itself　its　reality　throughout　objectivity。　Nature；　having
reached　this　Idea　from　the　starting　point　of　its　externality；　transcends　itself；　its　end　does　not　appear
as　its　beginning；　but　as　its　limit；　in　which　it　sublates　itself。　Similarly；　in　the　Idea　of　life　the　moments
of　its　reality　do　not　receive　the　shape　of　external　actuality　but　remain　enclosed　within　the　form　of
the　Notion。

In　spirit；　however；　life　appears　partly　as　opposed　to　it；　partly　as　posited　as　at　one　with　it；　this
unity　being　reborn　as　the　pure　offspring　of　spirit。　For　here　life　is　to　be　taken　generally　in　its　proper
sense　as　natural　life；　for　what　is　called　the　life　of　spirit　as　spirit；　is　its　peculiar　nature　that　stands
opposed　to　mere　life；　just　as　we　speak；　too；　of　the　nature　of　spirit；　although　spirit　is　not　a　natural
being　and　is　rather　the　opposite　of　nature。　Life　as　such；　then；　is　for　spirit　partly　a　means；　and　as
such　spirit　opposes　it　to　itself；　partly　spirit　is　a　living　individual　and　life　is　its　body；　and　again；　this
unity　of　spirit　with　its　living　corporeality　is　born　from　spirit　itself　as　an　ideal。　None　of　these
relations　to　spirit　concerns　logical　life　and　life　is　to　be　considered　here　neither　as　instrument
＇Mittel＇　of　a　spirit；　nor　as　a　moment　of　the　ideal　and　of　beauty。　In　both　cases；　as　natural　life　and
as　life　standing　in　relation　with　spirit；　life　possesses　a　determinateness　of　its　externality；　in　the
first　case　through　its　presuppositions　which　are　other　formations　of　nature；　in　the　second　case
through　the　ends　and　the　activity　of　spirit。　The　Idea　of　life　by　itself　is　free　from　the　former
presupposed　and　conditioning　objectivity　as　well　as　from　relation　to　the　latter　subjectivity。

Life；　considered　now　more　closely　in　its　Idea；　is　in　and　for　itself　absolute　universality；　the
objectivity　that　it　possesses　is　permeated　throughout　by　the　Notion　and　has　the　Notion　alone　for
substance。　What　is　distinguished　as　part；　or　in　accordance　with　some　other　external　reflection；　has
within　itself　the　whole　Notion；　the　Notion　is　the　omnipresent　soul　in　it；　which　remains　simple
self…relation　and　remains　a　o