science of logic-第51部分

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within　itself　the　whole　Notion；　the　Notion　is　the　omnipresent　soul　in　it；　which　remains　simple
self…relation　and　remains　a　one　in　the　multiplicity　belonging　to　objective　being。　This　multiplicity；　as
self…external　objectivity；　has　an　indifferent　subsistence；　which　in　space　and　time；　if　these　could
already　be　mentioned　here；　is　a　mutual　externality　of　wholly　diverse　and　self…subsistent　elements。
But　in　life　externality　is　at　the　same　time　present　as　the　simple　determinateness　of　its　Notion；　thus
the　soul　is　an　omnipresent　outpouring　of　itself　into　this　multiplicity　and　at　the　same　remains
absolutely　the　simple　oneness　of　the　concrete　Notion　with　itself。　The　thinking　that　clings　to　the
determinations　of　the　relationships　of　reflection　and　of　the　formal　Notion；　when　it　comes　to
consider　life；　this　unity　of　its　Notion　in　the　externality　of　objectivity；　in　the　absolute　multiplicity　of
atomistic　matter；　finds　all　its　thoughts　without　exception　are　of　no　avail；　the　omnipresence　of　the
simple　in　manifold　externality　is　for　reflection　an　absolute　contradiction；　and　as　reflection　must　at
the　same　time　apprehend　this　omnipresence　from　its　perception　of　life　and　therefore　admit　the
actuality　of　this　Idea；　it　is　an　incomprehensible　mystery　for　it；　because　it　does　not　grasp　the
Notion；　and　the　Notion　as　the　substance　of　life。　This　simple　life；　however；　is　not　only　omnipresent；
it　is　absolutely　the　subsistence　and　immanent　substance　of　its　objectivity；　but　as　subjective
substance　it　is　the　urge；　and　moreover　t　'　he　specific　urge；　of　the　particular　difference；　and　no
less　essentially　the　one　and　universal　urge　of　the　specialised　difference　that　reduces　this　its
particularisation　into　unity　and　maintains　it　therein。　It　is　only　as　this　negative　unity　of　its　objectivity
and　particularisation　that　life　is　a　self…related　life　that　is　for　itself；　a　soul。　As　such　it　is　essentially　an
individual；　which　relates　itself　to　objectivity　as　to　an　other；　to　a　non…living　nature。

Consequently　the　original　judgment　of　life　consists　in　this；　that　it　detaches　itself　as　an　individual
subject　from　objectivity；　and　in　constituting　itself　the　negative　unity　of　the　Notion；　makes　the
presupposition　of　an　immediate　objectivity。

Life　is　therefore　first　to　be　considered　as　a　living　individual　that　is　for　itself　the　subjective　totality
and　is　presupposed　as　indifferent　to　an　objectivity　that　confronts　it　as　indifferent。

Secondly；　it　is　the　life　process；　the　process　of　sublating　its　presupposition；　positing　as　negative　the
objectivity　that　is　indifferent　to　it　and　actualising　itself　as　that　objectivity's　power　and　negative　unity。
By　so　doing　it　makes　itself　into　the　universal　that　is　the　unity　of　itself　and　its　other。

Hence　life　is　thirdly　the　genus　process；　the　process　of　sublating　its　individualisation　and　relating
itself　to　its　objective　existence　as　to　itself。　Accordingly；　this　process　is　on　the　one　hand　the　return
to　its　Notion　and　the　repetition　of　the　first　diremption；　the　becoming　of　a　new　individuality　and　the
death　of　the　first；　immediate　one；　but　on　the　other　hand；　the　Notion　of　life　that　has　withdrawn
into　itself　is　the　becoming　of　the　Notion　that　is　in　relationship　with　itself　and　exists　universally　and
freely　for　itself…the　transition　into　cognition。



A　The　Living　Individual

B　The　Life　Process

C　The　Genus　＇Kind＇



Chapter　2　The　Idea　of　Cognition

Life　is　the　immediate　Idea；　or　the　Idea　as　its　Notion　not　yet　realised　in　its　own　self。　In　its
judgement；　the　Idea　is　cognition　in　general。　

The　Notion　is；　as　Notion；　for　itself　in　so　far　as　it　freely　exists　as　abstract　universality　or　as　genus。
As　such；　it　is　its　pure　self…identity；　which　inwardly　differentiates　itself　in　such　a　manner　that　the
differentiated　moment　is　not　an　objectivity；　but　is　likewise　liberated　into　subjectivity　or　the　form　of
simple　selflikeness；　and　hence　the　object　of　the　Notion　is　the　Notion　itself。　Its　reality　in　general　is
the　form　of　its　determinate　being　and　the　point　of　interest　is　the　determination　this　form；　on　this
determination　rests　the　difference　between　what　the　Notion　is　in　itself　or　as　subjective　and　what
it　is　when　submerged　in　objectivity；　and　then　in　the　Idea　of　life。　

In　the　latter　it　is　indeed　distinguished　from　its　external　reality　and　posited　for　itself；　yet　this　its
being…for…self　it　possesses　only　as　the　identity　that　is　a　relation　to　itself　as　submerged　in　its
subjugated　objectivity；　or　to　itself　as　indwelling；　substantial　form。　The　elevation　of　the　Notion
above　life　means　that　its　reality　is　the　Notion　form　liberated　into　universality。　Through　this
judgement　the　Idea　is　duplicated　into　the　subjective　Notion　whose　reality　is　the　Notion　itself；　and
into　the　objective　Notion　that　is　in　the　form　of　life。　Thinking；　spirit；　self…consciousness；　are
determinations　of　the　Idea　where　it　has　itself　for　object；　and　its　determinate　being；　that　is；　the
determinateness　of　its　being；　is　its　own　difference　from　itself。　

The　metaphysics　of　the　spirit；　or；　as　it　was　more　commonly　expressed；　of　the　soul　revolved
round　the　determinations　of　substance；　simplicity；　immateriality　…　determinations　in　which　the
general　idea　of　spirit　taken　from　empirical　consciousness；　was　laid　down　as　subject；　and　it　was
then　asked；　What　predicates　agree　with　our　observations？　This　kind　of　procedure　could　get　no
further　than　the　procedure　of　physics；　which　reduces　the　world　of　phenomena　to　general　laws　and
reflective　determinations　since　it　too　was　based　on　spirit　merely　in　its　phenomenal　aspect；　in　fact
this　procedure　was　bound　to　fall　short　even　of　the　scientific　character　of　physics。　

Since　spirit　is　not　only　infinitely　richer　than　nature；　but　also；　its　essence　is　constituted　by　the
absolute　unity　of　opposites　in　the　Notion；　it　exhibits　in　its　phenomenal　aspect　and　relation　to
externality　contradiction　in　its　extreme　form。　Consequently；　it　must　be　possible　to　adduce　an
experience　in　support　of　each　of　the　opposed　reflective　determinations；　or　starting　from　experience
it　must　be　possible　to　arrive　at　opposite　determinations　by　way　of　formal　syllogistic　reasoning。　

Since　the　predicates　immediately　yielded　by　spirit's　phenomenal　aspect　in　the　first　instance　still
belong　to　empirical　Psychology；　there　only　remain；　strictly　speaking；　for　the　metaphysical
consideration；　the　wholly　inadequate　determinations　of　reflection。　Kant；　in　his　criticism　of　rational
psychology　adheres　to　this　metaphysics；　insisting　that；　in　so　far　as　rational　psychology　purports　to
be　a　rational　science；　the　smallest　addition　from　observation　to　the　general　idea　of
selfconsciousness　would　transform　that　science　into　an　empirical　one　and　mar　its　rational　purity
and　its　independence　of　all　experience。　Consequently；　on　this　view；　nothing　is　left　but　the　simple
representation；　'I'；　a　representation　devoid　of　any　content　of　its　own；　of　which　we　cannot　even　say
that　it　is　a　notion　but　a　mere　consciousness　that　accompanies　every　notion。　Now　according　to
the　further　Kantian　conclusions；　by　this　'I'；　or　if　you　like；　it　（the　thing）　that　thinks；　nothing　further　is
represented　than　a　transcendental　subject　of　thoughts　=　x；　which　is　cognised　only　through　the
thoughts　which　are　its　predicates；　and　of　which；　taken　in　its　isolation；　we　can　never　have　the　least
conception。　In　this　context；　the　'I'　has　the　inconvenience；　to　use　Kant's　own　expression　that　we
must　already　make　use　of　it　whenever　we　want　make　any　judgement　about　it；　for　it　is　not　so
much　a　single　representation　by　which　a　particular　object　is　distinguished；　but　rather　a　form　of
representation　in　general　in　so　far　as　this　is　to　be　called　cognition。　Now　the　paralogism　committed
by　rational　psychology；　says　Kant；　consists　in　this；　that　modes　of　self…consciousness　in　thinking　are
converted　into　notions　of　the　understanding　as　applied　to　an　object；　that　the　'I　think'　is　taken　as
a　thinking　being；　a　thing…in…itself；　and　that　in　this　way；　from　the　fact　that　I　always　occur　in
consciousness　as　a　subject；　and　that　too　as　a　singular　subject；　identical　in　all　the　multiplicity　of
representation；　and　distinguishing　myself　from　the　latter　as　from　something　external　to　me；　the
unjustified　inference　is　drawn　that　the　'I'　is　a　substance；　and　further　a　qualitatively　simple　being；
and　a　one；　and　something　that　has　a　real　existence　independently　of　the　things　of　time　and　space。　

I　have　drawn　out　this　exposition　in　some　detail；　because　it　shows　clearly　the　nature　of　the　previous
metaphysics　of　the　soul　and　especially；　too；　the　nature　of　the　criticism　by　which　it　was　made
obsolete。　The　former　aimed　at　determining　the　abstract　essence　of　the　soul；　in　doing　so；　it　started
originally　from　observation　and　converted　the　empirical　universality　of　observation　and　the　wholly
external　reflective　determination　attaching　to　the　individuality　of　the　actual；　into　the　form　of　the
above…mentioned　determinations　of　essence。　Kant　in　his　criticism　had　generally　in　mind　only　the
state　of　the　metaphysics　of　his　time；　which　in　the　main　adhered　to　these　abstract；　one…sided
determinations　wholly　devoid　of　dialectic；　the　genuinely　speculative　ideas　of　older　philosophers　on
the　notion　of　spirit　he　neither　heeded　nor　examined。　In　his　criticism　then　of　those　determinations；　he
followed　quite　simply　Hume's　style　of　scepticism；　that　is　to　say；　he　holds　fast　to　the　'I'　as　it　appears
in　self…consciousness；　from　which；　however；　since　it　is　its　essence　…　the　thing…in…itself　…　that　we　are
to　cognise；　…　everything　empirical　must　be　omitted；　nothing　then　is　left　but　this　phenomenon　of　the
'I　think'　that　accompanies　every　representation　…　of　which　'I　think'　we　have　not　the　slightest
conception。　

Certainly；　it　must　be　conceded　that　we　have　not　the　least　conception　the　'I'；　or　of　anything
whatever；　not　even　of　the　Notion　itself；　so　long　as　we　do　not　really　think；　but　stop　short　at　the
simple；　fixed　general　idea　and　the　name。　It　is　an　odd　thought　…　if　it　can　be　called　a　thought　at　all　…
that　I　must　already　make　use　of　the　'I'　in　order　to　judge　of　the　'l'；　the　'I'　that　makes　use　of
selfconsciousness　as　a　means　in　order　to　judge；　this　is　indeed　an　x　of　which；　as　well　as　of　the
relationship　of　such　'making　use'；　we　cannot　have　the　s