eryxias(厄里克夏斯)-第5部分
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taught by hearing and we use the sense of hearing in giving instruction？
CRITIAS： Yes。
SOCRATES： And since medicine frees the sick man from his disease；
that art too may sometimes appear useful in the acquisition of virtue； e。g。
when hearing is procured by the aid of medicine。
CRITIAS： Very likely。
SOCRATES： But if； again； we obtain by wealth the aid of medicine；
shall we not regard wealth as useful for virtue？
CRITIAS： True。
SOCRATES： And also the instruments by which wealth is procured？
CRITIAS： Certainly。
SOCRATES： Then you think that a man may gain wealth by bad and
disgraceful means； and； having obtained the aid of medicine which enables
him to acquire the power of hearing； may use that very faculty for the
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acquisition of virtue？
CRITIAS： Yes； I do。
SOCRATES： But can that which is evil be useful for virtue？
CRITIAS： No。
SOCRATES： It is not therefore necessary that the means by which
we obtain what is useful for a certain object should always be useful for
the same object： for it seems that bad actions may sometimes serve good
purposes？ The matter will be still plainer if we look at it in this way：If
things are useful towards the several ends for which they exist； which ends
would not come into existence without them； how would you regard them？
Can ignorance； for instance； be useful for knowledge； or disease for health；
or vice for virtue？
CRITIAS： Never。
SOCRATES： And yet we have already agreedhave we not？that
there can be no knowledge where there has not previously been ignorance；
nor health where there has not been disease； nor virtue where there has not
been vice？
CRITIAS： I think that we have。
SOCRATES： But then it would seem that the antecedents without
which a thing cannot exist are not necessarily useful to it。 Otherwise
ignorance would appear useful for knowledge； disease for health； and vice
for virtue。
Critias still showed great reluctance to accept any argument which
went to prove that all these things were useless。 I saw that it was as
difficult to persuade him as （according to the proverb） it is to boil a stone；
so I said： Let us bid 'good…bye' to the discussion； since we cannot agree
whether these things are useful and a part of wealth or not。 But what
shall we say to another question： Which is the happier and better man；
he who requires the greatest quantity of necessaries for body and diet； or
he who requires only the fewest and least？ The answer will perhaps
become more obvious if we suppose some one； comparing the man
himself at different times； to consider whether his condition is better when
he is sick or when he is well？
CRITIAS： That is not a question which needs much consideration。
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SOCRATES： Probably； I said； every one can understand that health
is a better condition than disease。 But when have we the greatest and the
most various needs； when we are sick or when we are well？
CRITIAS： When we are sick。
SOCRATES： And when we are in the worst state we have the
greatest and most especial need and desire of bodily pleasures？
CRITIAS： True。
SOCRATES： And seeing that a man is best off when he is least in
need of such things； does not the same reasoning apply to the case of any
two persons； of whom one has many and great wants and desires； and the
other few and moderate？ For instance； some men are gamblers； some
drunkards； and some gluttons： and gambling and the love of drink and
greediness are all desires？
CRITIAS： Certainly。
SOCRATES： But desires are only the lack of something： and those
who have the greatest desires are in a worse condition than those who
have none or very slight ones？
CRITIAS： Certainly I consider that those who have such wants are
bad； and that the greater their wants the worse they are。
SOCRATES： And do we think it possible that a thing should be
useful for a purpose unless we have need of it for that purpose？
CRITIAS： No。
SOCRATES： Then if these things are useful for supplying the needs
of the body； we must want them for that purpose？
CRITIAS： That is my opinion。
SOCRATES： And he to whom the greatest number of things are
useful for his purpose； will also want the greatest number of means of
accomplishing it； supposing that we necessarily feel the want of all useful
things？
CRITIAS： It seems so。
SOCRATES： The argument proves then that he who has great riches
has likewise need of many things for the supply of the wants of the body；
for wealth appears useful towards that end。 And the richest must be in
the worst condition； since they seem to be most in want of such things。
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APPENDIX II。
The two dialogues which are translated in the second appendix are not
mentioned by Aristotle； or by any early authority； and have no claim to be
ascribed to Plato。 They are examples of Platonic dialogues to be
assigned probably to the second or third generation after Plato； when his
writings were well known at Athens and Alexandria。 They exhibit
considerable originality； and are remarkable for containing several
thoughts of the sort which we suppose to be modern rather than ancient；
and which therefore have a peculiar interest for us。 The Second
Alcibiades shows that the difficulties about prayer which have perplexed
Christian theologians were not unknown among the followers of Plato。
The Eryxias was doubted by the ancients themselves： yet it may claim
the distinction of being； among all Greek or Roman writings； the one
which anticipates in the most striking manner the modern science of
political economy and gives an abstract form to some of its principal
doctrines。
For the translation of these two dialogues I am indebted to my friend
and secretary； Mr。 Knight。
That the Dialogue which goes by the name of the Second Alcibiades is
a genuine writing of Plato will not be maintained by any modern critic；
and was hardly believed by the ancients themselves。 The dialectic is
poor and weak。 There is no power over language； or beauty of style； and
there is a certain abruptness and agroikia in the conversation； which is
very un… Platonic。 The best passage is probably that about the poets：the
remark that the poet； who is of a reserved disposition； is uncommonly
difficult to understand； and the ridiculous interpretation of Homer； are
entirely in the spirit of Plato （compare Protag； Ion； Apol。）。 The
characters are ill… drawn。 Socrates assumes the 'superior person' and
preaches too much； while Alcibiades is stupid and heavy…in…hand。 There
are traces of Stoic influence in the general tone and phraseology of the
Dialogue （compare opos melesei tis。。。kaka： oti pas aphron mainetai）：
and the writer seems to have been acquainted with the 'Laws' of Plato
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（compare Laws）。 An incident from the Symposium is rather clumsily
introduced； and two somewhat hackneyed quotations （Symp。； Gorg。） recur。
The reference to the death of Archelaus as having occurred 'quite lately' is
only a fiction； probably suggested by the Gorgias； where the story of
Archelaus is told； and a similar phrase occurs；ta gar echthes kai proen
gegonota tauta； k。t。l。 There are several passages which are either corrupt
or extremely ill… expressed。 But there is a modern interest in the subject
of the dialogue； and it is a good example of a short spurious work； which
may be attributed to the second or third century before Christ。
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